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Abstract 
Background: Diseases such as stroke and heart disease are chiefly caused by 
unhealthy behaviours and are a major societal burden. User financial incentives are 
being explored as a way to encourage healthier lifestyles. This research developed a 
framework to provide information on pricing and cost-effectiveness of incentives and 
guide design of future incentive schemes. 
Methods: The workstreams were: a) structured, configurative literature review to 
identify neo-classical/behavioural economic explanations for behaviour change and 
incentives; b) contingent valuation survey to identify willingness to accept (WTA) and 
incentive pricing; c) systematic review and meta-analysis of incentives for weight loss; 
d) development of decision-analytic model to estimate cost-effectiveness of 
incentives for weight loss. 
Results: The reviews identified a number of factors important for understanding the 
effect of incentives including internal motivation, self-control and time preference. A 
theoretical framework of incentive impact was developed to facilitate WTA survey 
design. The WTA survey was completed by 112 people (n=56 at 3 months). 57% 
strongly disagreed with incentive use. The mean incentive required per month 
depended on behaviour, ranging £103.69 for smoking cessation to £45.43 for 
reducing alcohol intake. The most important predictors of WTA were self-control, 
perceived difficulty of change and attitudes to incentives. There was some evidence 
that WTA incentives increased over time. Review and meta-regression provided 
efficacy parameters for the decision-analytic model which comprised the following 
health states: healthy, type II diabetes, stroke, myocardial infarction and dead. 
Analyses from NHS and employer perspectives indicated incentives for weight loss 
are cost-effective over a lifetime as they dominated usual care. 
Discussion: Incentives may be most powerful if they are personalised to account for 
individual factors and attitudes and are dynamic in response to these. Incentives may 
be cost-effective in a number of scenarios. Further research is required on the long 
term outcomes of incentives and financing models.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
1.1.1. Lifestyles and health 
Preventable diseases have a huge impact on individual and societal well-being and 
they are on the increase. Cardiovascular diseases (CVDs), including stroke and 
ischaemic heart diseases are the number one cause of death globally, accounting for 
1 in 4 deaths.(1) In 2010, ischaemic heart disease was the leading cause of disability-
adjusted life years (DALYs) globally while stroke was the third leading cause.(2) 
These represent 29% and 19% increases in DALYs, respectively, for heart disease 
and stroke on figures from 1990.(2) In England, CVDs affect 4.1 million people, killing 
170,000 annually and account for around 20% of all hospital admissions.(3) The 
combined annual cost to the NHS of CVDs is around £20.8 billion while the annual 
cost to society, including loss of productivity, is in the region of £48 billion.(4)  
The link between certain health behaviours or lifestyles and CVDs is well established. 
Around 80% of the stroke and heart disease risk is accounted for by unhealthy 
behaviours such as poor diet, alcohol abuse, physical inactivity and tobacco use.(5) 
Using data from the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study 
2010, analysis estimated that the leading risk factors for years lived with disease in 
the UK in 2010 were tobacco (accounting for 11·8% [10·5–13·3] of DALYs), followed 
by increased blood pressure (9·0% [7·5–10·5]), and high body-mass index [BMI] 
(8·6% [7·4–9·8]).(2) The study estimated that the combined risks of poor diet and 
physical inactivity accounted for 14·3% (12·8–15·9) of DALYs.  
 
1.1.1.1. Tobacco use 
According to statistics for the year 2010, 20% of adults (20% of men and 19% of 
women) in England reported smoking. An average number of 12.7 cigarettes were 
smoked every day. In 2012 in the UK, £18.2 billion (1.9% of household expenditure) 
was estimated to be spent on tobacco products. There is a downward trend in 
smoking prevalence with rates in 2008/2009 being 22% compared to 39% in 1980.(6) 
However, data indicates that this trend is largely a consequence of an overall increase 
in people who have never or only occasionally smoked. The proportion of this group 
rose from 43% in 1982 to 55% in 2010.(6) The inference we might make is that the 
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decline in smoking rates is less associated with successful quitting and that when 
people start to smoke, they continue to smoke. In addition, possibly because they are 
cheaper per cigarette, there has been an increase in the use of hand-rolled cigarettes. 
As these are often smoked without a filter they may represent a higher health risk 
than filter cigarettes as more nicotine and tar is inhaled.  
Although smoking is on the decline it still represents a major health risk. Smoking is 
the primary cause of preventable illness and premature death in England, accounting 
for 81,400 deaths in 2009.(7) In 2011/12 there were around 1.6 million hospital 
admissions (an average of 4,300 per day) of adults aged 35 and over where the 
primary diagnosis was a smoking-related disease.(6) The most common smoking-
related diseases leading to hospital admission were circulatory, followed by cancers 
and respiratory diseases. Furthermore, in 2012/2013 almost 13% of mothers were 
smokers at the time of delivery in England. This was estimated to cause up to 5,000 
miscarriages, 300 peri-natal deaths and approximately 2,200 premature births.(8) 
 
1.1.1.2. Diet and weight 
In 2011 65% of men and 58% of women in England were classed as overweight (BMI 
= 25-30) or obese (BMI ≥ 30). Obesity is on the rise with rates in England increasing 
from 13.2% to 26.2% for men and from 16.4% to 26.1% for women in the period 1993-
2011.(9, 10) A distinct but possibly related trend also appears in diet with household 
purchases of fruit moving in the opposite direction being 4.1% lower in 2011 than in 
2008. Figure 1 shows the increase in rates of obesity and proportion of people 
overweight in England from 1980 to 2005 and future predictions from 2005 to 2020. 
A clear upward trend is evident; this is the case in most other OECD countries.(11)  
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Figure 1: Past and projected future rates of obesity and overweight in England, age 
15-74 
 
Source: Recreated using OECD analysis of national health survey data 
 
In 2004 it was estimated that 34,100 deaths were attributable to obesity in 
England.(12) Along with the significant morbidity and mortality associated with obesity 
comes the substantial financial burden on the NHS and wider-society costs which 
appear set to increase in coming years. A recent analysis predicted that the annual 
costs of treating obesity-related diseases would increase by £648 (95% CI 352–944) 
million per year by 2020 and £2 (95% CI 1·2–3·0) billion by 2030. These increases 
would represent 0·5%–2% of the total health-care spending in 2009 in the UK (£109·7 
billion).(13)  
A corollary of increasing obesity levels are higher rates of obesity-related diseases 
such as type II diabetes. The number of people diagnosed with diabetes - over 90% 
with type II diabetes, a major cause of which is obesity - rose from 2.2 million in 2006 
to 2.9 million in 2011.(14) The global mortality rate associated with diabetes has 
doubled since 1990 to 1.3 million (1) and it is estimated that 24,000 people die early 
annually in England and Wales because of the condition.(15) The annual direct NHS 
diabetes treatment costs are around £9.8 billion (2010/11) which is close to 10% of 
the total NHS budget; this is predicted to increase to £16.9 billion by 2035/36. The 
indirect costs, for example of treating the complications of diabetes including kidney 
failure, stroke, amputations and blindness, are expected to increase from £7.7 billion 
to £13.5 billion over the same period.(14)  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
R
at
e
s
Year
Overweight+obesity (standardised) Overweight (standardised)
4 
 
 
1.1.1.3. Physical activity 
Around 65% of men and 76% of women aged over 16 are not physically active enough 
to meet the current national recommendations - that is, they spend less than 30 
minutes on 5 or more days a week involved in at least moderately intense 
activities.(16) It was estimated that in 2011/12 only 36% (41% of men and 31% of 
women) of adults in England participated in sport for 30 minutes at least once a 
week.(12) The societal cost of physical inactivity in England, including the direct costs 
of treatment for major lifestyle-related diseases and the indirect costs caused through 
sickness absence, has been estimated to be £8.2 billion a year (2002 prices).(17)  
 
1.1.1.4. Alcohol abuse 
The 2007 Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey (APMS) (18) provides estimates of the 
levels of hazardous drinking, harmful drinking and alcohol dependency in England. In 
2007, 24% of adults were classified as hazardous drinkers while 6% of men and 2% 
of women were classified as harmful drinkers. The prevalence of alcohol dependence 
was 9.3% in men compared to 3.6% in women. These levels represent a slight 
decrease from 2000 figures for men while the levels for women remained about the 
same. However, levels of health service resource use due to alcohol consumption are 
on the rise. In 2011, there were 167,764 prescriptions of alcohol dependency 
medication in the NHS – an increase of 4.7% on the 2010 prescriptions (160,181) and 
of 63% on the 2003 figure (102,741).(19) Hospital admissions related to alcohol 
consumption have also increased significantly in recent years. Admissions almost 
doubled over the last decade; rising from just over half a million in 2002/2003 to over 
a million in 2009/2010. There was an 11% increase in admissions from 2010 to 2011 
alone.(19) According to the Office of National Statistics (ONS) definition, there were 
6,669 deaths in 2010 in England that were directly attributable to alcohol. This figure 
was a 22% increase on 2001 figures (5,476).(19) The Global Burden of Disease study 
reported that, along with obesity, alcohol was the only other leading DALY risk factor 
that did not decrease between 1990 and 2010.(20) The annual estimated (directly 
and partly attributable) cost of alcohol misuse to the NHS in England including 
hospital stays and visits, and A&E and GP visits is £2.7 billion (2006/2007 prices) – a 
figure likely to increase with the trend for increased resource use.(21) 
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1.1.1.5. Lifestyles and health inequalities 
In 2010 the life expectancy in England and Wales was 85 for men and 89 for women; 
these figures represent an increase from 1960 of around 10 years for men and 8 
years for women.(22) Thus life expectancy is improving, albeit at a slower rate in 
recent years. However there are variations in the degree of improvement and recent 
statistics suggest that that although life expectancy continues to improve in most 
areas of the UK, there is a widening gap between areas with the highest and lowest 
life expectancies. ONS data indicate that between the 2004–06 to 2008–10 period, 
the gaps between the areas with highest (Kensington and Chelsea) and lowest 
(Glasgow City) life expectancies increased from 12.5 to 13.5 years for males and from 
10.1 to 11.8 years for females.(23)   
The social class or socio-economic status (SES) of an individual has been shown to 
have a robust association with life expectancy. In a recent study using census data 
for England and Wales, the largest increase in life expectancy in males between 
1982–86 and 2002–06 (5.3 years) was experienced by those in the lower managerial 
and professional classes (such as school teachers and social workers).(24) The 
smallest increases were experienced by those in the lowest SES groups – 3.8 and 
3.9 years for semi-routine and routine occupations, respectively. Consequently the 
gap in life expectancy between highest and lowest SES groups increased from 4.9 in 
1982-1986 to 5.8 years in 2002-2006. A similar trend was apparent in females over 
the same period with the gap in life expectancy between the highest and lowest SES 
groups growing from 3.8 to 4.2 years. 
A number of studies have found a relationship between obesity levels and SES, with 
rates of obesity generally being higher in lower SES groups in high income 
countries.(11) This gradient is most apparent for women and either less pronounced 
or absent in men.(11) However, when years of education are used to categorise 
groups rather than SES, as Figure 2 shows, there is a clear gradient in both sexes. 
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Figure 2: Obesity by years of education in England 
 
Source: Recreated using OECD analysis of national health survey data 
 
While only 15% of people in managerial and professional roles smoke, 30% of those 
in routine and manual occupations smoke.(25) Recent analysis of smoking trends in 
England suggests that although smoking declined between 2001-2008, it increased 
in the lowest SES groups and the number of people quitting declined in the same 
period.(26) Crucially, those in lower SES groups have higher uptake and lower 
success in quitting.  
A more complex link exists between SES status and alcohol consumption in England. 
In general, those in higher SES and income groups drink more often than those in 
lower SES groups according to national surveys, counting the proportion drinking on 
five or more days in the last week or number of people who consumed more than 8/6 
units on at least one day in the last week.(19) However, a recent analysis indicated 
that men in the lowest SES group were 3.5 times more likely to die from alcohol-
related diseases than men in higher managerial and professional jobs. A similar 
pattern was found for women where ‘routine’ workers had 5.7 times the alcohol-
related mortality risk than women in higher professional roles.(27)  
The picture for physical activity is less clear-cut in terms of the SES gradient. 
However, data from a recent British Heart Foundation report (28) based on the Health 
Survey for England for 2008 (Figure 3) suggests that higher income households are 
more successful in achieving recommended levels of physical activity – defined as 30 
minutes or more of moderate or vigorous activity on at least 5 days a week.  
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Figure 3: Self-reported physical activity in English adults, 2008 by income quintile 
 
 
Data source: Recreated from British Heart Foundation: Physical activity statistics, 
2012 
 
Vascular diseases explain over 50% of the mortality gap between rich and poor in 
England.(3) According to the Marmot Review: Fair Society, Healthy Lives, those dying 
early due to health inequalities annually in England lose in total between 1.3 and 2.5 
million years of life. The review posits that health inequalities are unfair if they are 
preventable by reasonable means and are consequently a matter of social justice. 
Marmot calls for a strategy of ‘proportionate universalism’ to tackle health inequalities 
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– universal policies that are of a scale and intensity proportionate to the level of 
inequality that address social inequalities, widely seen as a root cause of health 
inequalities. Two years after the publication of the review, figures indicate that life 
expectancy has increased in most of the 150 health authorities areas in England that 
took over responsibility for public health in 2013.(29) However, the gap in life 
expectancy between the most and least affluent areas also increased, indicating that 
health inequalities are still widening.   
There is considerable evidence that lifestyle and health behaviours are a significant 
driver of preventable illness and mortality in England. These illnesses represent a 
substantial financial burden to the NHS at a time when they are compelled to meet 
the ‘Nicholson Challenge’ and find £billions in efficiency savings. Unhealthy 
behaviours are typically higher in low SES groups and hence are a key factor in the 
still widening health inequalities in England (see (30) for a review).(3) Furthermore, 
evidence is emerging that unhealthy behaviours are ‘clustered’ such that (for 
example) individuals who smoke are more likely to be inactive and overweight.(31)  
There are compelling arguments on the grounds of social justice, health service 
efficiency and economics for targeting unhealthy behaviours with a view to reducing 
preventable diseases. Two of the five aims of the newly formed Public Health England 
relate to behaviour change: helping people to live longer by reducing preventable 
deaths from conditions such as heart disease, stroke, cancer and liver disease; and 
helping employers to facilitate and encourage their staff to make healthy choices. 
Both the recent White Paper on the NHS, and Marmot Review outlined the need to 
encourage the adoption of healthier lifestyles in the UK (especially among lower SES 
groups) in an effort to address health inequalities. The ethical and economic need 
and justification for tackling unhealthy lifestyles is unequivocal; the question is: how 
can this be achieved? 
 
1.1.2. Policy options for health behaviour change 
There are a number of strategies available to governments and public health policy 
makers to try and bring about behaviour change in individuals exhibiting risky 
behaviour. These vary in a number of different ways including the unit at which they 
are targeted (e.g. population vs. specific group vs. family vs. individual), the aspect of 
consumption or behaviour they are targeting (e.g. cost, availability, motivations) and 
the level of government intervention required (intrusive vs. laissez-faire). There are 
many theories to explain behaviour change including the Theory of Planned 
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Behaviour and Health Belief Model.(32) Recently, Michie and colleagues conducted 
a systematic review, meta-analysis and Delphi process with experts to reach a 
consensus framework for describing behaviour change that incorporated aspects of 
such theories.(33, 34) Given the rigorous development process, Michie et al’s 
Behaviour Change Wheel is used here as a framework to categorise policy options 
for behaviour change. The Behaviour Change Wheel, lists seven ‘policy categories’ 
(legislation, regulation, fiscal, service provision, environmental/social planning, 
communication/marketing, guidelines); nine ‘intervention functions’ (training, 
enablement, modelling, environmental restructuring, restrictions, education, 
persuasion, incentivisation and coercion); and six ‘sources of behaviour’ within three 
groups (Motivation – automatic and reflective; Capability – physical and 
psychological; Opportunity – social and physical). Governments will typically employ 
a combination of interventions across the seven policy categories contemporaneously 
in an effort to change public health behaviour. A brief description of the seven policy 
categories with examples are given below. 
 
1.1.2.1. Legislation and regulation 
Governments might choose to use legislative powers to ban or restrict the 
consumption of certain products. Examples of this include the banning of smoking in 
public spaces in England that came into effect on 1st July 2007; this legislation is now 
common-place with similar laws in place across Europe and North America. Also in 
2007, the UK brought in legislation preventing the sale of tobacco to people under the 
age of 18 (previously 16). England are currently considering the banning of smoking 
in cars when children are passengers, a law which is already in place in parts of 
Canada, the US and Australia. Other examples include the attempt by Michael 
Bloomberg, Mayor of New York City, to ban ‘super-sized’ sugary soft drinks in New 
York cinemas, cafes and restaurants (this legislation is currently challenged in the 
courts by the drinks producers) and by legislation to ban (e.g. in Denmark and 
Switzerland) or clearly label (e.g. US and Canada) trans-fats in food. Governments 
and public health bodies also use regulatory powers to protect consumers - examples 
of this include regulations of tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide in cigarettes. These 
types of intervention appear to be highly effective in most cases. For example, 
analysis has suggested that the smoking ban in England has been responsible for an 
additional 300,000 people attempting to quit smoking (35), a 2.4% reduction in heart 
attacks (36) and 1900 fewer A&E visits annually due to asthma attacks,(37) along 
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with other benefits such as reduced premature births and lower second-hand smoke 
exposure to children.(36)  
 
1.1.2.2. Fiscal 
Governments may also use price manipulation to try and reduce demand for 
unhealthy products. General taxation on cigarettes and alcohol has been found to 
significantly reduce consumption.(38, 39) However, policies affecting a one-off price 
rise are increasingly being introduced or discussed as options. Taxes on alcohol and 
fatty or sugary foods (called ‘sin taxes’) are currently receiving media attention as 
countries battle to curb rising obesity levels. If we consider that the (over) 
consumption of unhealthy goods leads to ‘negative externalities’ in the form of 
reduced long term health and increased burden on health services (or insurers) then 
a scenario arises where social costs exceed the private costs of consumption. The 
imposition of a tax to reduce production and consumption in this circumstance such 
that either demand or supply is decreased to a point where private costs more closely 
approximate social costs, the tax imposed can be considered a form of Pigovian 
tax.(40)  In 2011 the Danish government introduced such a Pigovian (‘fat’) tax which 
levied a tax of DKK 16 (around £1.83) per Kilogram of saturated fat (if the product 
was >2.3% fat) on goods such as cakes, butter, meat and processed foods. Recently 
calls have been made to target sugar consumption and introduce a sugar tax to 
combat childhood obesity.(41) This approach was adopted in Finland in 2011 and 
France in 2012 where taxes have been levied on sugary drinks and both fat and soda 
taxes have recently been demanded in England.(42, 43) There is little evidence 
available on the efficacy of such measures (44) although data from the Danish fat tax 
indicated that sales of margarine, butter and cooking oil fell by 10-20% over the 
previous year and the government gained $200 million tax revenue.(45) 
Another fiscal policy that has received a great deal of media attention recently in the 
UK is minimum unit pricing of alcohol. The Scottish parliament passed an act in May 
2012 setting a 50p minimum price per unit of alcohol to try and reduce consumption. 
However, this has not yet been implemented as it is being challenged in the courts 
by the Scotch Whisky Association and other drinks manufacturers on the basis that it 
breaches EU trade laws. England and Wales did introduce a law to ban selling alcohol 
for less than the combined tax and duty paid on it which was effectively a very low 
minimum pricing strategy.(46) Although the English government was considering a 
higher minimum price of 40p per unit, this policy option was dropped in March 2013. 
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A recent model analysing the impact of alcohol consumption and pricing estimated 
that a minimum unit alcohol price of 50p in England would reduce overall alcohol 
consumption by 6.7%, leading to 3,060 fewer deaths and 97,700 fewer hospital 
admissions over ten years. It would also result in 424,400 fewer days absent from 
work, 25,900 fewer people unemployed in the first year and save society £9.7bn over 
10 years.(47) 
Alcohol minimum pricing strategies have not yet been implemented on a country-wide 
basis although 8 out of 10 Canadian provinces have some form of minimum price. 
Given this there is little data on the effectiveness of the strategy although there are 
some positive results coming out of Canada. Analyses indicate minimum pricing led 
to significantly reduced alcohol consumption, with consumption of higher strength 
drinks falling most.(48) To illustrate, the study found that a 10% increase in the 
minimum price of beer led to a 22% decrease in consumption of higher strength 
(> 6.5% alcohol/volume) beer compared with an 8% reduction in lower strength beers.  
The extent to which fiscal policies are successful in reducing inequalities will depend 
to a large degree on the price elasticity of demand of different income groups. 
Evidence suggests however that the elasticity of demand for addictive goods may be 
low as they are viewed as necessity goods. Wagenaar et al’s meta-analysis of alcohol 
fiscal interventions found the mean elasticity for alcohol to be -0.51 across 91 studies 
with the elasticities for heavy drinkers in 10 studies reported as -0.28. A report of 86 
studies on tobacco pricing found a mean price elasticity of –0.48 with another review 
estimating a general range between -0.2 and -0.6 in high income countries.(49) 
Regardless, reviews generally report that lower income and SES groups are more 
responsive to price increases than higher income groups.(50)  
There is evidence that fiscal policies do reduce consumption with higher effect sizes 
achieved than with behavioural interventions.(39) However, as the price elasticity of 
demand for addictive goods is often low, the impact of imposing such taxes will not 
be commensurate. In fact it may mean that they encourage those who are most likely 
to change behaviour (least addicted) to change first, leaving those with the most 
unhealthy consumption habits. Thus the ‘pain’ of the policies (on moderate 
consumers and unhealthy consumers) may not be matched by the successes in 
behaviour change.  
Due to governments’ reluctance to pursue such policies in the past there is limited 
evidence currently available on the impact of sin taxes on different income groups 
(and therefore health inequalities). However one model, as well as showing that such 
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policies are regressive, also predicts that they may not necessarily bring about the 
proportionate reductions in consumption in lower income groups required to redress 
the health-income imbalance.(51) While fiscal policies may be more effective than 
lighter touch interventions and be an additional way of generating government income 
(which may be redirected to subsidise healthy behaviours), such interventionist 
policies are politically unpopular (see (52) for a parliamentary debate on minimum 
alcohol pricing) and come with a number of drawbacks. Fiscal policies may be 
regressive as taxes and minimum prices will be proportionately higher for low income 
groups; this jeopardises the aim to achieve distributive justice. Taxes may be 
proportionately lower on high quality goods only consumed by the wealthy – for 
example, minimum alcohol pricing will probably not change the price of champagne 
or high quality spirits and wines. Fiscal policies are also non-discriminatory and thus 
do not target specific groups or individuals; this being the case they may punish 
‘moderate’ consumers. Interventionist policies also interfere with the freedoms and 
choices of individuals, drawing accusations of a ‘nanny state’. 
In addition to these drawbacks, fiscal policies, as with any other type of policy, have 
a risk of significant (often unexpected) negative consequences. For example, raising 
the price of cigarettes has led to an increase in the consumption of roll-your-own 
cigarettes (as they are cheaper) which tend to have a higher negative health impact 
than manufactured cigarettes. The Danish fat tax was rescinded after just one year 
because people were able to circumvent the tax by purchasing unhealthy goods 
across the border in Sweden and Germany. There was also a deleterious economic 
impact as there were some job losses in related local industries (e.g. pastry 
producers). Other negative consequences include increased smuggling, increased 
black market activity, home production and risky consumption. 
 
1.1.2.3. Service provision 
Through the NHS the government provides a number of individual-level interventions 
available for deployment by healthcare professionals to try and change health 
behaviour. These range from advice and counselling, health coaching, free quit 
smoking kits and nicotine replacement therapies and referral to gyms or weight loss 
programmes. The myriad services that are available have had limited success in 
changing lifestyles and this is especially the case in people with low-income, although 
few interventions have been targeted specifically at this group.(53) There has been 
low participation in the NHS health checks for those most at risk of CVDs.(54) There 
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are reports of high non-adherence rates with statins(55), - and in general with CVD 
medications, especially among lower-income groups(56) - smoking cessation(57), 
and physical activity programmes.(58) A recent review of weight loss interventions 
concluded that - surgical procedures aside – most had limited efficacy.(59, 60) A 
recent trial found offering smoking cessation counselling or free nicotine replacement 
products gave no additional benefit to phone helpline support alone.(61) Furthermore, 
the effects of interventions are often not sustained; for example, smoking cessation 
in a recent trial of nicotine replacement therapy and pharmacy counselling fell from 
22.5% at 4 weeks to 3.6% at 52 weeks.(62) In addition, a review of NHS smoking 
cessation services indicated an average quit rate decline from 53% at 4 weeks to 
15% at one year.(63) There are, however, examples of NHS services having a 
significant positive impact; a recent analysis of the NHS health trainer scheme 
suggested that it was effective at increasing physical activity and improving diet, 
especially among lower income groups.(64)  
 
1.1.2.4. Environmental/social planning  
Michie et al described environmental and social planning interventions as designing 
and/or controlling the physical or social environment. This may involve creating cycle 
lanes, for example or the ban on tobacco displays in shops recently introduced in 
England. In a social context it may include attempting to change the social norm which 
pervades in society or regions relating to health behaviour. There is some support for 
this strategy (65) although little longitudinal population-level data exists to enable an 
evaluation of this approach in England. 
 
1.1.2.5. Guidelines 
Guidelines are provided by public health bodies to enable consumers to make 
informed choices about consumption. Typically this involves making the public aware 
of the risks of unhealthy behaviours, the benefits of healthy behaviour and the levels 
of consumption that are risky. The government provides guidance, for example, on 
safe alcohol consumption, healthy levels of salt, fat and sugar intake and 
recommendations on healthy levels of physical activity. These guidelines are usually 
packaged as interventions along with communication and marketing campaigns such 
as the NHS’s Change4Life. 
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1.1.2.6. Communication/marketing 
Communication strategies aim to provide information and to educate the population 
in order that they make healthier choices. Change4Life is possibly the largest 
communication campaign in the UK with an annual budget of around £1.6 million 
(although this has dropped from £9.2 million) followed by anti-smoking campaigns 
(£1.1 million in 2010/11). However it is unclear how effective these messages are. A 
recent review of the Change4Life mass marketing campaign concluded that it has 
had limited beneficial impact.(66)  
A report on a 2010 Scottish survey, The Knowledge, Attitudes and Motivations to 
Health(67), found that 87% of people were aware of advice to eat five portions of fruit 
or vegetables a day, but only 22% achieved that level of consumption. Similarly, 52% 
of adults felt they were they physically active enough to be healthy, but only 39% met 
the recommended levels of 30 minutes of moderate activity on most days of the week. 
The figures suggest that knowledge of what constitutes healthy behaviour is 
insufficient in itself.  
 
1.1.2.7. The politics of public health policy 
Political orientation often holds sway over public health policy and governments are 
keen to avoid a stance that draws accusations of the nanny state. This being the case, 
political expediency may determine policy selection as much as policy effectiveness. 
For illustrative purposes, the seven policy strategies outlined by Michie et al have 
been plotted in Figure 4 on a continuum indicating the possible level of government 
intervention and associated impact on consumer choice (or degree of intrusiveness). 
At the light touch (laissez-faire) end of the continuum there is little direct intervention 
in an attempt to change behaviour with only guidance and marketing campaigns used 
to educate and persuade people to change. At the other extreme are legislative 
interventions where choices are restricted or completely removed. 
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Figure 4: Continuum of Government Intervention in Health1 
 
 
Currently in England, public health policy that include bans, taxes and minimum 
pricing have so far been eschewed in favour of strategies such as the ‘Responsibility 
Deal’(68) even though the former are likely to provide superior outcomes. The 
Responsibility Deal is a voluntary agreement which food and drinks manufacturers 
and voluntary organisations can enter into with the government to bring about change 
without the use of legislation. The impact of the deal has been limited and highly 
contentious.(69) To date the deal requires manufacturers and sellers of products to 
commit to pledges such as calorie reduction, salt reduction, alcohol awareness and 
labelling such as providing calorie information. As of February 2013 more than 480 
companies had signed up to pledges. Examples of action include ASDA restricting 
alcohol displays in store foyers and PepsiCo and Britvic pledging to actively 
encourage more people to choose low-calorie drinks in cinemas. However, evidence 
of the health impact of the deal is limited and assessing its success will prove 
difficult.(70, 71) 
 
 
 
                                               
 
1 Figure created by the author but using concepts from the Nuffield Intervention Ladder 
(http://nuffieldbioethics.org/report/public-health-2/policy-process-practice/) 
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1.1.2.8. The challenges in changing health behaviour 
The widening health inequalities, largely attributable to unhealthy lifestyles, suggest 
that - thus far - behaviour change policies have been unsuccessful in persuading 
individuals in lower SES groups to adopt healthier lifestyles. Health seeking behaviour 
and adherence to preventative measures being lower in this group.(3) Even when 
individuals have significant incentives to change they find it difficult. For example, 
according to a recent analysis of a national clinical audit of diabetes in England by 
Diabetes UK, only 20% of patients are currently achieving NICE standards for 
controlling their condition (which includes a healthy diet and physical activity).(72) 
This is despite the fact that uncontrolled disease can lead to blindness and 
amputation.  
The explanations for the apparent stubbornness of unhealthy lifestyles are manifold 
and are offered from biological, psychological, social and economic perspectives. 
Economic research has shown that the demand for health investments is price 
inelastic (73) and a recent study reporting a discrete choice experiment found that 
respondents were not willing to pay for help in achieving weight loss.(74) In the latter 
study, while respondents valued weight loss and reduced risk of CVDs, they valued 
their current lifestyles more and so were disinclined to change behaviours. In fact the 
analysis yielded a negative willingness to pay value for change in lifestyle indicating 
that participants would need to be paid in order to attempt behaviour change. This is 
consistent with theories of ‘rational addiction’ which illustrate that some see the costs 
(disutility) of behaviour change as outweighing the (discounted) potential future 
benefits (utility).(75) In this case it may well be rational for individuals to continue with 
their current lifestyle course. Meanwhile neo-classical economic research based on 
human capital theories (76, 77) suggest that, given the likely future returns on health 
capital and health investments, some may quite rationally decide to continue to 
‘disinvest’ in their health. This effect would intuitively be stronger for individuals who 
have low expected future earnings. 
Despite the commitment of government and health services to bring about behaviour 
change, the prioritisation of health inequality reduction, the multifarious services 
offered by the NHS and extensive marketing and education campaigns, sustained 
behaviour change remains elusive. Decades of applying conventional methods of 
identifying barriers and enablers to change and the application of psychological 
models of behaviour have, on the whole, not yielded the desired results. When 
behaviour change strategies achieve some success they may not have the desired 
effect of inequality reduction. Hence, as articulated in a recent commentary, new 
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strategies may be required to tackle inequalities: “giving bigger doses to the poor of 
what benefited the rich is no guarantee of equal benefits, never mind proportionately 
higher benefits for the poor”(78).  
 
1.1.2.9. Growing interest in financial incentives for health 
In recent years both the UK and US governments have become interested in the 
behavioural concepts presented in the book ‘Nudge – Improving Decisions about 
Health, Wealth and Happiness’.(79) In the book ‘paternalistic libertarianism’ is 
presented as an effective way of influencing individuals’ behaviour by the 
manipulation of choices, defaults, biases and use of targeted incentives, negating the 
need for more interventionist policies. It has been the catalyst for the creation of the 
Behavioural Insights Team in the UK who advise the government on how to change 
behaviour on a number of issues including inter alia tax, health, health and safety, 
and pensions.(80) The group recently created a framework to help describe behaviour 
and facilitate behaviour change entitled MINDSPACE (Messenger, Incentives, 
Norms, Defaults, Salience, Priming, Affect, Commitments, Ego). Elsewhere, a 
Department Of Health report, Health Lives, Healthy People, the government set out 
their strategy for public health in England and state: ‘We will trial new ways of 
changing behaviours, using emerging ideas from behavioural science, such as the  
use of social norms, changing defaults and providing incentives’ (page 44).(7) Use of 
financial incentives in health and their suitability as an NHS intervention was 
discussed by the National Institute of Health and Care Excellence’s Citizen’s Council 
- a group of the general public called upon to discuss key issues and to provide a 
barometer of general population opinion.(81) In addition, the UK has seen the creation 
of two academic centres set up to study incentive use; the Contingency Management 
Programme focussing on addiction research and the Centre for the Study of 
Incentives in Health, both at King’s College London. Further to this, two 
comprehensive systematic reviews of incentives have recently been completed.(82, 
83) There are also signs that incentives initiatives are being employed by local 
authority and third sector agencies as a public health improvement tool. 
It is apparent then that, in the UK and elsewhere, there has been a heightened interest 
in user incentives for health, especially as a tool to change behaviour in low SES 
groups. The reasons for this interest are a matter of conjecture but may include: the 
perceived failure of traditional behavioural interventions; nascent evidence of the 
effectiveness of incentives; the unwillingness of governments to use fiscal and 
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legislative policies; and, at the same time, the growth of behavioural economics which 
advocates modification of behaviour without restricting choices.  
 
1.1.3. Financial incentives in health 
1.1.3.1. History of incentive use 
Financial incentives can be defined as monetary or non-monetary rewards (e.g. 
vouchers and prizes) offered to individuals to encourage them to behave in a desired 
manner. They may also include fee remission or reduction in insurance premiums, for 
example. The term ‘incentive’ is also used generally in this thesis (except where 
specified) to cover financial ‘disincentives’ (where an individual pays money as a 
punishment when failing to reach a target or stick to a desired behaviour) and lotteries 
(where rewards are uncertain). In substance abuse studies, financial incentives are 
commonly termed contingency management (CM); and in development economics 
they tend to be termed conditional cash transfers (CCTs). CM is a general approach 
of behaviour reinforcement that may include financial incentives as a reward for 
desired behaviour. 
The use of CCTs has been common in low and middle income countries for some 
time as a means of reducing poverty.(84) Initiatives include: Oportunidades (originally 
called Progresa) (85), a national scheme in Mexico which by 2002 had targeted five 
million poor families with an annual budget of $2.1 billion aiming to increase human 
capital via improvements in health, nutrition and education of their children; and Bolsa 
Familia in Brazil, which offered payments to encourage the enrolment of children in 
school.(86) Since these schemes were introduced in the 1990’s, similar programmes 
have been introduced across South and Central America (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay) and Asia 
(Bangladesh and Pakistan). Evaluations have generally concluded that these have 
been successful (87) and had positive results in terms of preventive health and health 
status.(88, 89) 
The concept of incentives is based on B.F. Skinner’s classic psychological theory of 
operant conditioning.(90) One of the key principles of this is positive reinforcement 
whereby a behaviour or response is followed by a reward or stimulus which in turn 
increases the frequency of the behaviour. Edward Thorndike also conducted studies 
that illustrated what he called the Law of Effect where responses that were followed 
by pleasant stimuli or consequences were repeated, and those with unpleasant 
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consequences were less likely to be repeated.(91) A key principle of economics is 
that people respond to incentives. Incentives in the form of remuneration and bonus 
payments have been an important tool in management and business for centuries, 
ensuring that firms have sufficient motivation to produce and employees have 
sufficient motivation to work, delivering specified levels of quality and quantities within 
a given period.  
Recently some employers – particularly in the US – have also used incentives to 
influence the health behaviour of its employees.(92, 93) For example, following the 
success of a clinical trial evaluating the effectiveness of incentives for smoking 
cessation with its employees, General Electric has now rolled out the incentive 
scheme to all 152,000 staff members.(94) General Electric believes the scheme will 
pay for itself in three to five years with higher employee productivity, lower 
absenteeism through sickness and lower healthcare costs. Other examples include 
IBM offering $150 twice annually to staff completing online health surveys and 
reaching targets such as weight loss, diet change and set physical activity levels. 
Discovery, South Africa’s largest private health insurance firm, offered rewards (such 
as cinema tickets and flights) for participation in health and fitness programmes; a 
strategy that was found to yield positive outcomes in terms of increased participation 
levels and reduced sickness.(95) Disincentives are also being used widely. For 
example Alabama City charges employees a $50 a month insurance premium if they 
smoke while a South Florida city council no longer hires people who smoke. Scotts 
Miracle-Gro offers cheap gym membership and levy a health insurance premium 
increase of $40 per month if individuals do not take a voluntary health risk assessment 
and a higher levy if they do take the assessment, found to be at risk and choose not 
to change their behaviour.(96) According to a recent US survey of workplace wellness 
programs in nearly 800 US companies, 83% offered incentives or disincentives to 
encourage participation and encourage certain behaviours.(97) These types of 
incentives have had limited exposure in the UK although PruHealth (a partnership 
between Prudential and Discovery insurance companies) are offering the Vitality 
health incentive programme - a scheme that offers incentives such as reduced gym 
membership, cinema tickets, reduction of bicycle cost, train tickets and holidays for 
healthy behaviour. 
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1.1.3.2. Current use of financial incentives 
There has been a rapid growth in the number of incentive studies which is indicative 
of their increased general usage. According to a clinical trials database 
(https://clinicaltrials.gov) there are a large number of incentive studies currently or 
soon to be recruiting (mainly in the US). A search of the meta-trial register with the 
term ‘contingency management’ yielded 126 results. The studies included incentives 
for HIV testing (98), healthy eating (99), weight loss (100), management of 
tuberculosis (101), reducing adolescent alcohol abuse (102), and cocaine-
dependence.(103) UK studies are few but on the increase. Two UK trials are 
evaluating the use of incentives for smoking cessation in pregnant women (104, 105). 
Another is evaluating their use to encourage human papillomavirus vaccination in 16-
18 year old females (106) and a further study is evaluating their use to promote 
breastfeeding.(107) The National Institute for Health Research Health Technology 
Assessment (HTA) Programme has also recently funded two large trials of incentive 
interventions: for the reduction of cannabis use and relapse in early psychosis at a 
cost of £2million (HTA Ref: 09/144/50); and adherence to anti-psychotic maintenance 
medication at a cost of £1million (HTA Ref: 07/60/43).  
In addition to these studies there are a number of local authorities running behaviour 
change schemes. These follow local initiatives such as the Help 2 Quit programme 
run by Shropshire NHS and Give It Up For Baby run by NHS Tayside which offer 
incentives to pregnant women who quit smoking.(108) The Significant Other Scheme 
(SOS) scheme funded by the Department of Health and run in the Yorkshire and 
Humber region also offered incentives to pregnant women for smoking cessation. 
SOS offered £20 high street vouchers on entry to the scheme and every four weeks 
on achieving cessation (confirmed with a CO test) up to two months post birth. 
Another £40 was available for a “significant other supporter” if the mother did not 
smoke for the scheme duration. The smoking cessation reward scheme run by 
Tobacco Free Futures also targeted pregnant women in the NorthWest. Both 
schemes concluded that, when combined with support, incentives were an effective 
intervention. Evidently, most of the incentive research in the UK to date has focussed 
on contingency management in addiction and on maternal and post-natal health 
behaviour. 
The private sector has also recently seen growth in this area with a number of 
companies offering incentive schemes to motivate individuals to achieve their health 
(and other) targets. For example the website Stickk (http://www.stickk.com/) asks 
participants to commit an amount of money (a disincentive termed ‘deposit contract’) 
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to achieving a certain goal such as stopping smoking or weight loss. The deposit is 
lost and donated to a charity (or ‘anti-charity’) if they fail but paid back to them if they 
achieve their goal. Other examples using the same (dis)incentive principles are 
Beeminder (https://www.beeminder.com/), 21Habit (http://21habit.com/) and 
GymPact (http://www.gym-pact.com/) although the latter shares lost deposits among 
successful individuals. Weightwins   (http://www.weightwins.com/) is a UK site which 
rewards individuals for weight loss (and maintenance) (http://www.healthywage.com/ 
is a similar site in the US) which charges a fee for registration and financially rewards 
individuals who achieve weight loss targets. It is not clear how popular these sites are 
but as of October 2014 Stickk – a US site – claims that over 250,000 commitments 
had been made with almost $20 million contingent on success. 
 
1.1.3.3.  Effectiveness of incentives 
One of the key expectations of incentives is that they may help to reduce inequalities 
since low SES groups should be more responsive to smaller absolute incentives.(109, 
110) The neo-classical economic rationale is that people with low income will have 
higher marginal utility of money; this being the case incentives may help to achieve 
distributive efficiency.(111)  
To date there is promising but, mixed, evidence for the efficacy of financial incentives 
in achieving behaviour change. They appear most promising in the area of substance 
abuse where, according to NICE, there is a ‘considerable and compelling evidence 
base’.(112) There is also stronger evidence for incentives when the target behaviour 
is a discrete event such as visiting a clinic or vaccination as opposed to sustained 
behaviour change.(113) Incentives have produced some positive results in 
encouraging weight loss (114) and physical activity (115) but further research is 
needed to justify widespread use.(113) A Cochrane review of 19 competition and 
incentive studies for smoking cessation found that despite encouraging more people 
to attempt quitting, only one study found a significant effect on quit rates at 12 months 
or later follow-ups.(116) The exception was a study by Volpp et al (2009) where large 
incentives (possible $750) were contingent on completion of a cessation programme 
($100) and cessation at 6 ($250) and 12 months ($400).(117) Overall, 15.4% of the 
incentive group enrolled in a cessation programme (10.8% completed), compared 
with 5.4% of the controls (2.5% completed). At 15 or 18 months, quit rates for the 
incentivized and control groups were 9.4% vs. 3.6%, respectively (P=0.001). Volpp 
et al (2008) found promising short-term effects in a weight loss study with 50% of 
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obese people in a 16 week commitment contract programme achieving a weekly 
weight loss goal of 0.45 kg (1lb) compared to only 10% of usual care group.(114) As 
with many other behaviour change interventions though, incentives suffer a fading 
effect such that benefits are not typically sustained past 12 months (or past the end 
of the incentive programme).(116, 118-121) More recent reviews in smoking 
cessation (122, 123), weight loss (124) and reducing unhealthy behaviours in people 
with serious mental illness (125) have been less pessimistic. A review conducted by 
Higgins et al. (2012) considered 6 controlled trials of incentives for cessation of 
smoking among socioeconomically disadvantaged pregnant women.(122) The 
largest (n=220) study (by Donatelle et al, 2000 (126)) - where women were offered 
vouchers to the value of $50 then $25 monthly - found abstinence rates at end-of-
pregnancy and 2-months postpartum in the voucher and control conditions to be 32% 
vs. 9% and 21% vs. 6%, respectively. 
 
1.1.3.4. Cost-effectiveness of incentives 
To date, few studies have conducted economic evaluations of incentive schemes for 
behaviour change. A recent paper reported the cost-effectiveness of a 12 week 
incentive reward scheme versus self-monitoring designed to increase employee 
physical activity.(127) Participants in the incentive scheme earned points on a ‘loyalty 
card’ redeemable against rewards for every minute of physical activity they undertook. 
The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) for the incentive versus self-
monitoring was £2,900 (2013 prices) per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) with 
(bootstrapped) sensitivity analysis indicating an 85% probability (assuming a 
willingness to pay threshold of £30,000/QALY) that the incentive scheme was cost-
effective. While the study presents promising results it is limited as the costs and 
benefits of the interventions were not modelled for the lifetime of the participant.  
Elsewhere, a study concluded that incentives for smoking cessation were cost-
effective, finding the average cost per quitter to be relatively low (£191; price year not 
stated) compared to other interventions. However, interpretation of the relative cost-
effectiveness of the intervention is limited by the fact that authors do not present 
outcomes in terms of QALYs or consider the lifetime impact of smoking 
cessation.(128) This was also the case for an analysis of team commitment contracts 
for smoking cessation in Thailand.(129) Another study presents the cost-
effectiveness of a workplace incentive for weight loss.(130) The authors report the 
cost-effectiveness ratios per pound (0.45 kg) of weight loss to be $25.50 (£15.24) and 
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$58.10 (£34.72) (2011 prices) for incentivised and none-incentivised groups, 
respectively. The study did not include healthcare costs but did include costs avoided 
through absenteeism and productivity gains. A further study of incentives for weight 
loss by Relton and colleagues (131) reported that the total cost of their incentive study 
was £75,000. This equated to an average cost of £186.57 per participant and - 
assuming weight loss of 4 kg - a mean cost per kg lost of £46.64 (all 2010 prices). 
The remaining economic evaluations of incentives are found in contingency 
management of substance abuse and mental health. One such evaluation assessed 
the cost-effectiveness of incentives for achieving antipsychotic medication 
adherence.(132) The cluster-randomised controlled trial offered participants in the 
incentive group £15 (2012 prices) for every antipsychotic medication injection they 
received. Over 12 months, adherence rates in the control arm were 71% while the 
incentive arm achieved 85% (p=0.003 for adjusted difference). The results were 
extremely encouraging for the incentive arm but, again, QALY outcomes were not 
incorporated. Other contingency management studies using prize- and voucher-
based incentives in opioid-dependent patients also neglect to present cost-per-QALY 
outcomes.(133, 134)  
Generally speaking, the few published economic evaluations do not meet NICE 
requirements for technology appraisals and efforts within them to explore 
methodological issues are minimal. Given the dearth of research in the area this is 
commonly identified as a key target for future research.(121, 135, 136) The costs of 
programmes relate to the cost of incentive scheme set-up, monitoring and provision 
which is itself dependent on the incentive amount, payment frequency and duration. 
Cost savings may come from a reduction in future behaviour-related diseases and 
associated resource savings. Quality of life and survival benefits may arise from an 
increase in healthy behaviour directly and avoidance of future disease. While this 
appears a relatively straight-forward decision-analytic modelling task, there are a 
number of additional considerations when evaluating the cost-effectiveness of 
financial incentives. One relates to the level of incentive offered. While it is presumed 
that larger incentives lead to better outcomes, it is unclear what the precise 
relationship is and, since increasing the incentive increases costs, it is important to 
consider what the optimal incentive pricing might be. Related to this is the idea that 
the same incentive amount may have a different motivating effect on different 
individuals - for example, if they have differing income levels and marginal utility of 
money. A further issue worthy of consideration is the impact of incentives in the long 
term (or at least after they are removed) and whether crowding-out or crowding-in 
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occurs. Such phenomena might influence cost-effectiveness and, in the absence of 
data to prove or disapprove their existence, assumptions might need to be applied to 
estimate their potential impact.  
One aspect of the current research is to conduct an economic evaluation of financial 
incentives and explore some of the methodological considerations outlined above. 
This is reported in Chapters 8 and 9.  
  
1.1.4. Controversies surrounding incentives 
There are a number of issues surrounding financial incentive use in health that require 
consideration; these and the potential barriers to incentive use are discussed below. 
 
1.1.4.1. Ethical issues 
A major criticism of incentives is that they (and paternalistic libertarianism in general) 
are based on the assumption that policy makers make better choices for individuals 
than the individuals themselves. Further - that incentives represent a form of bribery 
and coercion, used to compel individuals to behave in ways they would not do if they 
had unfettered choice.(137-139) It could be countered that incentives do not 
represent government will over individual will as choices are not restricted, merely 
that some (healthier) choices are made more likely. However if incentives are offered 
to low income groups it is debateable to what extent they have free will over the 
decision to accept it or not.(138) These criticisms are concordant with the thoughts of 
John Stuart Mill who in 1859 argued that: 
 "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant."(140)  
More recently the liberal philosopher Ronald Dworkin argued that the state should be 
neutral as for an activity or behaviour to truly improve an individual’s life then the 
individual must endorse its value themselves rather than be nudged or incentivised 
toward it; this he termed the ‘endorsement constraint’.(141) It could be argued that, 
as unhealthy lifestyles lead to greater burden on health services, the opportunity cost 
in terms of alternative uses of those resources foregone represent a potential ‘harm 
to others’, which is consistent with Mill’s statement. Others have criticised Dworkin’s 
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idea of government neutrality (142) and in a piece defending the nanny state, Alain 
De Botton wrote: 
“We don't currently live in a "free" society in the true sense of the term. Every day, our 
minds are assaulted by commercial messages that reach us from all sides. The whole 
billion-pound-a-year advertising industry runs counter to any assertion that we're 
currently free and un-nudged as it stands..... We face temptations and compulsions 
which we revile, but which we lack the strength and encouragement to resist, much 
to our eventual self-disgust and disappointment.”(143) 
There are robust and defensible arguments for governments intervening in 
individual’s health and choices (144), especially  - as alluded to by De Botton - when 
individuals make choices that are inconsistent with their preferences and inconsistent 
with maximising their (future) quality of life.(113) These choices, unless guided by a 
paternalistic agent, might be more susceptible to inconsistency if the individual is 
highly present-biased, is disadvantaged or has low levels of health education.(145) 
Much of the incentives research in the UK has targeted pregnant women; as this 
includes the well-being of an individual (the unborn child) who has no control over 
their choices. Certainly in this case it is possible that there is a stronger moral 
imperative for incentive use.  
Another claim against incentives is that they will change the Dr-Patient relationship 
from one based on trust to a financial affair.(113, 138) There is little narrative evidence 
of this occurring although the picture may change if incentives are applied on a wider 
scale and are provided by the health service. GPs in England have however been 
independent financial agents for a long time and have explicit incentives (in the form 
of the Quality Outcome Framework) of their own in which case it could be argued that 
the principal-agent relationship is already partly a financial transaction. Another 
criticism aimed at incentives is that they are essentially unfair since they reward 
individuals for being over-indulgent, for doing something they should do themselves 
and for which they already have incentives (improved health).(138) By extension, they 
could be seen as punishing those who do consume responsibly. It is not clear 
however that free will, opportunity and informed choice in health behaviour can be 
assumed. Health behaviour does not occur in a vacuum but, when it is a conscious 
choice (which may be seldom), is a function of upbringing, social norms, education, 
circumstances and a conflation of many other factors only some of which an individual 
has autonomy over. It has been argued that for this reason individuals are not fully 
responsible for their health behaviour.(146) 
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There is certainly scope for incentives to be abused, especially with individuals who 
have limited control over their situation. For example, a recent think tank called for 
the benefits of unemployed people to be docked if they failed to adhere to prescribed 
exercise regimes (147) and incentives were offered in the US if drug-abusing women 
acceded to sterilisation.(148) However, all arguments considered, the use of 
incentives (if only in research) is warranted given the potential benefits of reduced 
inequalities.  
 
1.1.4.2. Acceptability  
Even if evidence weighed in favour of the use of incentives on a wider scale, it is likely 
that there would be opposition to this move. Governments may be wary of funding 
schemes that could be considered unfair or unacceptable by the public. They have 
hesitated in encouraging their use and it is possible that research in the area has 
been stymied for that reason. Despite NICE guidance recommending the use of 
contingency management in alcohol abuse, years after publication this has not been 
attempted in the UK. With the growing notion that incentives may have some part to 
play in health behaviour change, a number of studies have specifically looked at the 
acceptability of them to the general public.  
One of the first explorations of acceptability in the UK was with the NICE Citizen’s 
Council who discussed their use in 2010.(81) In the event, 20 out of the 32 (62.5%) 
Council members thought there were circumstances when incentives were a 
legitimate use of public funds. There were however a number of caveats: 
 
 incentives should never be exchangeable for tobacco or alcohol; 
 should only be offered to people who are committed to changing their health 
behaviours; 
 cash incentives should be only offered as a last resort;  
 progress of participants should be monitored throughout;  
 results of the schemes should be analysed so that more can be learnt about 
their effectiveness 
 
Ipsos MORI conducted a poll in 2012 to evaluate the acceptability of offering 
incentives to low income groups to encourage behaviour change.(149) Key findings 
were that incentives were more acceptable to the public than taxation or legislation 
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and were more acceptable when children were involved. The way the questions were 
framed also made a significant difference with ‘rewards’ considered much more 
acceptable than ‘payments’.  
A recent study exploring the public perception of incentives in the UK and US found 
little support for them in weight loss, addiction and smoking but did so for mental 
health.(150) However, the study authors concluded that incentives could not be 
rejected on the basis of public opinion alone and that further research is required to 
inform policy. Elsewhere, a US general public sample (n=1010) was asked which of 
a number of smoking cessation interventions (including an incentive) they would 
support. The financial incentive received the lowest support (39.3%) but was not 
statistically different from treatment (45.8%, p=0.14) or medication (41.7%, 
p=0.58).(151) While most studies have approached the general public to ascertain 
their opinion (although a fair proportion will engage in some unhealthy behaviour) a 
study in Australia approached socially-disadvantaged smokers. The study found that 
46% believed incentives were an excellent/good idea; 38% viewed them as a 
bad/very bad idea and 47% believed incentives did more good than harm. Those who 
smoked were more likely to agree with incentive use than those who did not. Another 
study sought the opinion of healthcare professionals on the acceptability of incentives 
for promoting breastfeeding finding that the major concern was the risk to the 
relationship with the patient.(152) 
Research is ongoing into what forms public opinion on the issue but it is likely that the 
framing of incentives may be important – for example they may be more acceptable 
if they are shown to be more cost-effective than alternatives or it is shown that 
individuals in receipt are not necessarily responsible for their circumstances and 
behaviour. This was the finding by Promberger et al (2012) who conducted a discrete 
choice experiment on incentive acceptability.(153) Results indicated that the 
acceptability of incentives was dependent on their effectiveness with even small 
increases in efficacy (measured by an attribute describing the percentage of people 
they are proven to help) leading to relatively large changes in acceptability. To 
illustrate, increasing how effective the incentive is when describing it (from 10% to 
11%) increased the number of people supporting their use from 46% to 55%. In 
concordance with the NICE Citizen Council views, healthy grocery vouchers were 
more acceptable than either cash or vouchers for luxury items. In addition, incentives 
had more support when used for weight loss than for smoking cessation (60% vs. 
40%).  
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Incentives will remain a contentious issue, especially when concepts of responsibility 
and public money are introduced. The issue of public opinion is only a major concern 
when public money is at stake; this is not the case when individuals put their own 
money at stake via websites such as Stickk and WeightWins. It is clear that the way 
schemes and studies describe incentives is important, as is their effectiveness. 
Although there is currently little evidence to suggest that incentives are cost-effective 
compared to standard behaviour change interventions, should that be the case it is 
likely that their acceptability will be even higher. 
 
1.1.4.3. Unintended negative consequences 
In addition to questions over the morality and acceptability of incentives, there is 
concern about their potential for unintended negative consequences. A particular 
worry is that incentives may ‘crowd-out’ good behaviour. Humans have an intrinsic 
reward system that delivers a ‘warm glow’ (or utility) following certain actions or 
behaviours. Examples of behaviours that might initiate the intrinsic reward system are 
acts of altruism, pro-social behaviour, achieving goals and honouring commitments. 
In a classic text ‘The Gift Relationship: from Human Blood to Social Policy’ 
(1970)(154) Richard Titmuss describes the different national policies relating to blood 
donation and in particular whether people are paid for it or not. Titmuss considered a 
scenario where blood giving policy changes from donation to payment and describes 
a potential phenomena he termed ‘crowding out’; that the intrinsic motivation and 
reward for carrying out an altruistic act (the gift of blood) may be extinguished if the 
act is no longer altruistic but leads to financial remuneration (‘extrinsic reward’). In this 
scenario, if the expected utility of remuneration is less than that provided by the 
altruistic act, then overall motivation may be reduced and blood donations may 
decline. There is some evidence that this is the case (155) although not when non-
monetary incentives are used.(156) There is substantive corroborating evidence for 
its existence from the fields of education and employment.(157-159) However there 
is little or no evidence in the field of health behaviour change of this phenomenon. As 
noted in the earlier sections, intrinsic motivation alone does not currently appear to 
be sufficient to persuade individuals (especially those in lower income groups) to 
change their behaviour, therefore the impact of any crowding-out may be minimal. In 
fact it is the lack of intrinsic motivation which is a major argument in favour of incentive 
use.  
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Conversely, there is evidence that incentives can ‘crowd-in’ behaviour and lead to 
positive, spill-over effects. A study of rewards for gym attendance showed that, 
physical activity actually increased after the incentive was removed - as a result, the 
authors believe, of habit formation.(115) An English pilot study offering incentives for 
smoking cessation during pregnancy reported that, in 42% of cases, someone close 
to the incentivised participant had also quit smoking. Furthermore, 94% of the 
households that were not smoke-free at study outset were so at study end even 
though the incentive was not contingent on that particular outcome. The success of 
incentives – certainly for complex behaviours - may depend on their ability to 
encourage the formation of habits. In theory, incentives provide the motivation (that 
for whatever reason is absent or insufficient) for individuals to initiate behaviour 
change and by the time the incentive is removed intrinsic motivation (or automated 
behaviours) will have taken over to ensure that behaviour change is maintained. 
However, there is currently little evidence to corroborate or refute this hypothesis.  
An additional worry is that individuals may engage in deception or strategic behaviour 
to acquire financial incentives. For example, pregnant women may either start to 
smoke or consider delaying cessation in order that they can join an incentive scheme. 
This may be unfounded though; a review of smoking cessation incentive studies 
found no evidence of this type of behaviour.(116)  
 
1.1.5. Summary 
Preventable illnesses are a significant burden on health services and societies. 
Unhealthy behaviours explain a large proportion of preventable illness risk and are in 
several cases increasing, or, at any rate, increasing disproportionately in low income 
groups. This latter phenomenon contributes to increasing health inequalities in 
England. As these illnesses are preventable, reducing them – and necessarily the 
unhealthy behaviours that cause them – is viewed as a matter of social justice. 
However, current methods available to bring about behaviour change have either had 
limited impact or are perceived to be politically unpalatable. In this context, the use of 
financial incentives is starting to be explored as a tool to change behaviour. Evidence 
to date for their use is promising but often effects are not sustained. There are a range 
of arguments offered in opposition of incentives; on the grounds of ethics, 
acceptability and their potential for negative consequences. Robust counter 
arguments can be made against each of these and it is clear that, rather than being 
ruled out, the use of incentives should be discussed further in light of study evidence.  
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1.1.6. Need for further research 
A number of incentive trials have recently been initiated and it is also clear that local 
government authorities (now responsible for public health) are creating their own 
incentive schemes. Research in this area is growing and we are beginning to 
understand what works.(123, 158, 160, 161) We know, for example that incentives 
work better for one-off or simple behaviours (e.g. vaccination, screening attendance) 
than sustained behaviour (e.g. maintained weight loss) – although this was 
challenged in a recent review (83); that incentive levels need to be high enough 
(relative to income) to motivate (or, larger incentives are better than smaller 
ones)(162); immediate rewards are better than delayed ones; frequent and increasing 
incentives are required for sustaining behaviour change; and rewards for group 
performance are better than those for individual performance.(121, 163) However it 
is acknowledged that the mechanism by which incentives work is complex and may 
be different depending on the context.(164) 
General guidance aside, there are still many unanswered questions relating to the 
design, implementation, and (cost-)effectiveness of incentives with several reviews 
calling for more research in the area.(110, 124, 165) Methodological trials are 
underway in the US including one evaluating different incentive structures on smoking 
cessation including (individual and cooperative) financial rewards and deposit 
contracts.(166) Other studies are exploring the timing and duration of incentives (167) 
and impact of different win probabilities in an incentive lottery.(168) Key outstanding 
questions include: which health behaviours are incentives most effective for?; what 
type of incentive structure is most effective and does this vary between social groups 
or health behaviours?; are incentives effective in engaging and changing behaviour 
of low income groups?; what is the optimal timing and frequency of incentive 
delivery?; what is the impact of unintended consequences, particularly crowding-out? 
can effect be sustained after incentives are removed?; are they cost-effective?  
Very little research has been done on the pricing of incentives although it is clearly of 
importance.(162, 169) The Paul-Ebhohimhen and Avenell review of incentive studies 
in weight loss found a weak trend in favour of incentives being more effective when 
they exceeded 1.2% of individuals’ disposable incomes.(121) Bonevski and 
colleagues ran a survey of incentives for smoking cessation finding that the most 
common incentive level required for 12 months of cessation was either $500 or 
$1000.(170) You et al constructed a discrete choice experiment to identify incentive 
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levels for weight loss.(171) The study found that the effect of both cash and grocery 
cards were about 10 times larger than that of a gym pass and that payment timing 
was important (monthly payments and one cumulative payment at 12 months being 
preferred to a single payment at 3 months). At this preferred payment structure, an 
incentive of $98 resulted in a predicted participation rate of over 90% among 
overweight or obese men and women. Reviews have found it difficult to identify in 
studies a rationale or justification for the choice of the incentive amount or payment 
schedule.(121, 135) Several authors call for further research to establish optimal 
incentive levels and potential factors influencing efficacy.(83, 116, 160, 172)  
Notwithstanding the promise highlighted by some studies of incentives, any 
incremental behaviour change success they have brought have, in the main, been 
modest. However, it is possible that incentive schemes could be finessed to yield 
improved results.(173) Volpp and colleagues argue behavioural economics suggests 
that “the same decision errors that contribute to poor health-related behaviors can be 
used to “supercharge incentive programs”. It may also be possible to apply a 
‘personalised medicine’ approach, tailoring incentives to individuals. Further, by 
making incentives dynamic – should that be practicable - they could respond to 
fluctuations in levels of motivation and to changes in the feedback of behaviour 
change success (or failure). If low motivation (or lack of intention) is the target health 
‘disease’ and financial incentive the ‘treatment’ it is possible to conceive of a dose-
response model where incentives are commensurate with the deficit in motivation and 
change in line with this. In addition, in behaviours which are not ‘all or nothing’ such 
as physical activity or weight loss, there is also the need to account for goal setting of 
the desired behaviour (e.g. how much weight should an individual be incentivised to 
lose?) Again, the published research is silent on this. 
 
1.1.6.1. An economic framework for incentives 
It is important to identify which factors determine whether individuals achieve and 
sustain behaviour change, to enable an improvement in the targeting and success of 
these interventions in the future and a reduction in health disparities. There is a great 
deal of research in public health and health psychology examining the causes of 
unhealthy behaviour and the factors influencing behaviour change; indeed it is a 
discipline in itself. A number of health behaviour models have been developed such 
as the Health Belief Model, Stage of Change Model, Social Cognitive Theory, Relapse 
Prevention Model, Theory of Reasoned Action and Theory of Planned 
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Behaviour.(174) However, these models are often inconsistently applied and 
evidence does not recommend any one over another.(175)  
Incentives have been studied extensively in the field of business and management, 
primarily with a focus on the relationship between pay and performance. A number of 
studies have considered frameworks to capture aspects of incentives (176-179), 
including the relationship between incentives and motivation and, specifically, the 
potential for crowding-out of intrinsic motivation (180-183), and the impact on the 
principal-agent relationship.(184) A formal and comprehensive economic framework 
for incentives in health would be a valuable tool for researchers and policy makers 
but is, as yet, unavailable. Such a framework, proposed for development here, could 
incorporate the pricing of incentives, impact on health inequalities, potential for 
crowding out and incentive cost-effectiveness taking into account these factors. 
 
1.1.7. Aims and Objectives 
The aim of the PhD research was to generate a framework that would help describe 
and predict the impact of, and inform the design and analysis of, financial incentives 
within the context of cardiovascular disease prevention. To achieve this, a programme 
of research was undertaken with a number of objectives that were split into those 
relating to cardiovascular disease prevention and those that were more generally 
related to the use of financial incentives in health: 
 
Objectives relating to financial incentives for cardiovascular disease prevention: 
 
a) Conduct a configurative, structured review of the literature to identify neo-
classical and behavioural economic theories that have been employed to 
explain behaviour change or that might be useful in describing the impact of 
financial incentives. 
b) Based on the synthesis of theories identified by the review, propose a 
theoretical framework that describes the effect of financial incentives on the 
process of behaviour change for CVD prevention and the factors that might 
determine effectiveness. 
c) Using information from the review and theoretical framework, generate and 
test a contingent valuation survey. Gather data relating to the acceptability 
and pricing of incentives and capture information relating to key concepts and 
theories from the proposed theoretical framework. 
33 
 
d)  Conduct regression modelling on the survey data to identify optimal levels of 
incentives, incentive acceptability and the determinants of these. 
e) Using weight loss as a case study, conduct an aggregative, systematic review 
and meta-analysis of financial incentive studies to provide synthesised 
estimates of effectiveness and other parameter values for use in a decision-
analytic model. 
f) Analyse individual patient-level data of incentives in weight loss to explore the 
relationship between financial incentive levels and effectiveness, taking into 
account heterogeneity. 
g) Generate a decision-analytic model to estimate the cost-effectiveness of 
financial incentives in weight loss using information from objectives d), e) and 
f) to parameterise the model. 
 
Broader objectives relating to financial incentives in health: 
 
h) Based on the literature reviews, propose a generalised theory of how financial 
incentives influence behaviour change. 
i) Examine the relationships between minimum incentive levels required and 
factors such as perceived difficulty of behaviour change, individual 
characteristics and attitudes.  
j) Examine the extent to which required incentive levels may change over time. 
k) Identify methodological issues relating to decision-model-based economic 
evaluations of financial incentives in health. 
l) Make general recommendations for future research, analysis and design of 
user financial incentives in health. 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on neo-classical and behavioural economic 
frameworks that have been used to explain health behaviour and behaviour change 
(objective a). It provides a description of the process of behaviour change (relating 
broadly to behaviours which increase the risk of cardiovascular disease) and the 
potential effects of financial incentives and uses these to evaluate whether the 
frameworks identified would be useful in describing the impact of incentives. They are 
also employed to identify additional behavioural theories that might be useful. Chapter 
3 then considers and synthesises aspects of these models and theories into a 
framework for financial incentives in health (objectives b, h). The framework aims to 
describe the important factors and processes that determine behaviour change; how 
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financial incentives fit within this and their likely mode of effect; and, finally, factors 
that influence the potency of this effect. Chapter 4 uses the factors and relationships 
hypothesised in Chapter 3 to develop a contingent valuation survey to both determine 
acceptable incentive levels and explore what influences these (objective c). The 
survey data analysis is reported in Chapter 5 (objectives d, i, j), providing some test 
of the relationships set out in the framework.  
Chapter 6 moves on to introduce the cost-effectiveness of financial incentive 
schemes, using weight loss as an exemplar. Chapter 7 reports the analysis of data 
from a trial of incentives in weight loss and a systematic review and synthesis of 
incentive schemes in weight loss (objective e, f) which provide estimates of 
effectiveness for the economic evaluation. Chapters 8 and 9 present the decision-
model based economic evaluation of incentives in weight loss (objectives g, k). 
Finally, Chapter 10 considers the work streams and makes recommendations for the 
design and analysis of incentive schemes, discusses the future of incentives and 
highlights the priorities for future research (objective l).  
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2. Literature reviews 
 
There are several definitions of what constitutes a systematic review and these have 
evolved over time. For example, some organisations (e.g. The Campbell 
Collaboration) now require user involvement in the review process. Broadly speaking, 
though, systematic reviews are considered to require a clear research question and 
transparent, explicit, reproducible methods in searching and data extraction. Ideally 
they should be completed by two independent researchers and also include a 
synthesis of results. Gough and co-authors provide a useful typology of systematic 
reviews, distinguishing between ‘aggregative’ and ‘configurative’ reviews.(185) The 
former being research aimed at combining and averaging information to make 
empirical statements (such as reviews of treatment effects and meta-analyses) and 
the latter aimed at understanding theories, arranging information and developing 
concepts. Configurative reviews are more exploratory and accept that methods may 
be adapted in an iterative manner during the research.(185) It was this latter type of 
review method that appeared to suit the study objectives.  
A configurative review was conducted to: identify neo-classical and behavioural 
economic frameworks currently used in economics to model and explain health 
behaviour change; and to evaluate the suitability of the identified theories for 
explaining the effect of incentives and for use in an incentive framework. The review 
reported in this chapter was considered to be ‘configurative’ since it had a broad 
scope and used an iterative approach to identify relevant theories. These theories 
were used to propose an over-arching theory of incentives in behaviour change rather 
than being aggregated in a quantitative sense. Given the nature of the review it was 
impractical for the study selection to be completed by two researchers and it was not 
possible to have a uniform data extraction form or to synthesise data and thus the 
review cannot be considered to be systematic. However, while acknowledging these 
limitations may limit the prospect of reproducing the results, the review was 
considered structured as the aims, searches and inclusion and exclusion criteria are 
described explicitly.  
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2.1.1. Aims and research questions 
The purpose of the literature review was to establish the extent to which traditional 
economic theories and models and behavioural economic theories have been 
employed in attempts to explain health behaviour change. More specifically, to 
identify the contexts in which economic frameworks have been employed to describe 
and explain the decision of individuals to continue with unhealthy lifestyles such as 
smoking, poor diet, sedentary behaviour or excessive alcohol use, or to attempt to 
change their behaviour. The review also sought to identify how and where in these 
frameworks incentives could plausibly fit and whether the frameworks were suitable 
for explaining how financial incentives may bring about change. Finally, the review 
aimed to identify other theories – from traditional and behavioural economics - that 
could potentially be important explanatory factors in incentive pricing, impact and 
effectiveness.  
 
2.1.2. Research questions: 
1. What neo-classical economic frameworks have been employed to explain 
health behaviour and health behaviour change? 
2. How might these frameworks incorporate the impact of financial incentives 
to encourage behaviour change? 
3. What behavioural economic theories may be relevant in explaining the 
impact of incentives? 
4. What theories may help inform the design and pricing of incentives? 
 
37 
 
 
 
2.2. Methods 
2.2.1. Literature search 
2.2.1.1. Search terms and databases 
Before beginning the full searches, scoping searches were completed to identify key 
studies and review papers in order to identify relevant concepts in the field and search 
terms typically used by other reviews. Searches of PubMed, EconLit, Google Scholar 
(which now incorporates IDEASrepec) and health economics textbooks were 
conducted to identify relevant economic frameworks that had been proposed to 
explain and predict health behaviour change and a targeted search using the models 
identified as search terms was conducted subsequently. In addition, search terms 
used in previous incentive reviews were consulted and incorporated here.(116, 121, 
135, 136) 
Three sets of search terms were generated that included both general terms and 
specific framework names and concepts that had been identified a priori as important 
or had been included in previous reviews. Sets of search terms were generated for: 
health frameworks; incentives; and health behaviours. The economic framework 
search terms included: “economic framework”, “economic perspective”, “utility 
maximisation”, “grossman model”, “health capital” and “rational addiction”. The 
incentive search terms included: “financial incentive”, “monetary reward”, “deposit 
contract”, “contingency management” and “contingency payment”. While the health 
behaviours search terms included: “obesity”, “weight loss”, “diet”, “physical activity”, 
“exercise”, “smoking” and “alcohol”. The full initial (wave 1) search terms are included 
in Table 1. Any additional frameworks and concepts identified during the review 
process were used in targeted supplementary (wave 2) searches, shown in Table 2. 
Wave 2 was conducted to ensure that applications of the theories identified early in 
the review were captured, acknowledging that the more general search terms in wave 
1 may not have been sufficiently sensitive to achieve this. For example, the theory of 
‘ego depletion’ was not included in wave 1 as it was unknown to the researcher but 
identified as being potentially relevant during the review of wave 1 search results. The 
targeted searches in wave 2 helped identify publications that used the concept that 
otherwise would have been omitted.  
The search strategy was an iterative process, at first testing several approaches until 
the results yielded appeared sufficiently sensitive but specific enough to be 
manageable. For example, searching for incentive terms alone in titles, abstracts and 
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keywords yielded several thousand results that were sensitive but not sufficiently 
specific thus the requirement was added that one of the framework terms was also 
present in these fields. Similarly, when the framework terms were included only in the 
title, the results were considered too few when combined with the other search term 
sets and so was broadened out to keywords and abstracts. The searches were 
conducted in April 2011 and updated in August 2014. 
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Table 1: Search terms – wave 1 
Incentive terms General economic framework 
terms 
Specific economic 
framework and concept 
terms 
Health behaviour terms 
“financial incentive”   
“financial disincentive” 
“monetary incentive”  
“non-monetary incentive”  
“financial reward”  
“monetary reward”  
“deposit contract”  
“commitment contract” 
“contingency management”  
“contingency payment”  
“cash transfer”  
 
“economic framework” 
“economic model”  
“economic perspective”  
“behavioural economic”  
“behavioural finance”   
“behavioural model”  
 
“utility-maximi*”  
“utility theory”  
“consumer choice”  
“rational choice”  
“rational addiction” 
“health investment”  
“investment in health”  
"health capital"  
“demand for health”  
“grossman model”  
“time preference”  
“intertemporal choice”  
obes*  
overweight  
diet*  
"weight loss" 
smok*  
tobacco  
cigarette  
nicotine  
alcohol 
exercis*  
"physical activity"  
"physical inactivity" 
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“intertemporal decision”  
“future discount*” 
“crowding in” 
“crowding out” 
“intrinsic motivation” 
“internal motivation” 
“extrinsic motivation” 
“external motivation” 
“deferred gratification”  
“delayed gratification” 
“unhealthy lifestyle” 
“sedentary behaviour” 
“sedentary lifestyle”  
“cardiovascular risk” 
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Table 2: Additional searches - wave 2 
Incentives terms General economic framework 
terms 
Specific economic 
framework and concept 
terms 
Health behaviour terms 
“financial incentive”   
“financial disincentive” 
“monetary incentive”  
“non-monetary incentive”  
“financial reward”  
“monetary reward”  
“deposit contract”  
“commitment contract” 
“contingency management”  
“contingency payment”  
“cash transfer”  
 
“economic framework” 
“economic model”  
“economic perspective”  
“behavioural economic”  
“behavioural finance”   
“behavioural model”  
 
“mindspace” 
nudge 
“self control” 
“Self regulat*” 
Willpower 
“ego depletion” 
“bounded rationality” 
“hyperbolic discount*” 
“dynamic inconsisten*” 
“delay discount*” 
“reward discount*” 
“multiple selves” 
“future self” 
obes*  
overweight  
diet*  
"weight loss" 
smok*  
tobacco  
cigarette  
nicotine  
alcohol 
exercis*  
"physical activity"  
"physical inactivity" 
“unhealthy lifestyle” 
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Picoeconomics 
“mental accounting” 
“myopic addiction” 
“primrose path” 
“prospect theory” 
“loss aversion” 
“default bias” 
“status quo bias” 
“cognitive bias” 
heuristic 
“sedentary behaviour” 
“sedentary lifestyle”  
“cardiovascular risk” 
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The review included the databases listed in Table 3; these were chosen as it was 
thought they would yield studies with health, psychology and more economic and 
business orientations. The search covered: 
 
 English language papers only  
 Human studies only 
 Grey literature (e.g. reports and working papers)  
 Conference abstracts 
 All years (no date restrictions) 
 
Table 3: Databases and Sources searched 
Database Provider 
Medline Ovid 
Embase Ovid 
PsychInfo Ovid 
Business Source Premier EBSCO 
Econlit EBSCO 
Google Scholar N/A 
 
The final search strategy (Table 4) was arrived at via an iterative process of testing 
the targeting of terms, results and limits. 
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Table 4: Search strategies 
EBSCO - EconLit and Business Source Premier; OVID Medline, 
Embase and PsycINFO 
[INCENTIVE TERMS, 
TITLE, KEYWORD, 
ABSTRACT] 
AND [GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
TERMS, KEYWORD, 
ABSTRACT] 
OR 
[GENERAL 
FRAMEWORK TERMS, 
TITLE, KEYWORD, 
ABSTRACT] 
AND [HEALTH BEHAVIOUR 
TERMS, TITLE, 
KEYWORD] 
OR 
[SPECIFIC 
FRAMEWORK/THEORY 
TERMS, TITLE, 
KEYWORD] 
AND [HEALTH BEHAVIOUR 
TERMS, TITLE, 
KEYWORD] 
Google Scholar 
[INCENTIVE TERMS, 
TITLE]  
AND [HEALTH BEHAVIOUR 
TERMS, TITLE] 
OR 
[GENERAL 
FRAMEWORK TERMS, 
TITLE] 
 
AND 
[HEALTH BEHAVIOUR 
TERMS, TITLE] 
 
2.2.1.2. Review methods 
The inclusion and exclusion criteria were as follows:- 
 
Inclusion criteria: 
 English language, human study publications that either: 
 Presented an economic or behavioural economic framework or theory 
relevant to health decisions and behaviour or incentives 
or 
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 Reported an application of a framework or theory to behaviour change related 
to tobacco or alcohol use, obesity or physical activity or incentives 
 
Exclusion criteria: 
 Non-English language publications 
 Animal studies 
 Individual studies reporting the application of frameworks or theories 
to the behaviours outlined but not considering behaviour change 
 Studies reporting on health psychological models of behaviour change 
only or on employment-related applications of incentives only 
 
Abstracts yielded by different databases were pooled and duplicates removed. 
Abstracts and titles were reviewed to identify potentially relevant studies. Full papers 
of shortlisted studies were obtained and read for relevance and their bibliographies 
searched for other relevant references. There was no data extraction form for the 
review given the disparate nature of the results and since this was a configurative 
review where the interest lay in general concepts rather than specific study results. 
The identified economic frameworks were briefly described and their applications in 
health behaviour change assessed. The suitability of each framework and theory for 
capturing the impact and effectiveness of financial incentives was appraised. 
Consideration was given to whether the identified frameworks and theories could 
explain the potential for incentives to encourage individuals to initiate and also 
maintain behaviour change (as all the behaviours in question are complex rather than 
‘one-off’ tasks). The discussion covers how characteristics of incentives and their 
interaction with characteristics of the individual might affect incentive efficacy. A 
summary section is devoted to summarising the strengths and weaknesses of the 
available frameworks and the degree to which their predictive validity has been 
evidenced. For the latter, the literature review results were searched specifically for 
studies that explored the predictive ability of the framework. The following terms were 
used for this purpose: “predictive”, “prediction”, “validation”, “out-of-sample”, and 
“model performance”. 
To enable an assessment of whether the frameworks and theories are useful in 
describing behaviour change (specifically, weight loss, healthy eating, physical 
activity, smoking cessation and reducing alcohol consumption – the main causes of 
cardiovascular diseases) and the impact of incentives, it was necessary first to 
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broadly define the process of behaviour change and what the impact of incentives 
might be.  
 
2.2.1.3. Defining the process and impact of behaviour change 
Individuals endeavouring to change their health behaviour will potentially incur a 
number of costs and benefits.  
 
1. The health behaviours under consideration are complex in that (unlike a 
vaccination or a screening test visit) they require sustained effort. There are 
many theories (mostly from health psychology) about how and why behaviour 
change is enacted and about the process of change.(186, 187) However what 
is unarguable is that; a) some people start behaviour change and some do 
not; b) of those who start, some achieve sustained change and some do not. 
Thus it seems sensible to consider the framework and theories in terms of a) 
initiation; and b) maintenance. 
2. There are often financial costs to be borne by the individual in changing 
behaviour such as travel, gym membership fees or sports gear 
purchases(188), nicotine replacement therapies and healthier diets.(189, 190) 
There may not be cost savings to individuals except for smokers who will 
potentially save a non-trivial proportion of their income (depending on the level 
of their usage) by not smoking (See Table 8: Costs of smoking).(191) 
3. There may also be a time cost to individuals of behaviour change although, 
again, this will depend on the behaviour. There may be little time cost 
associated with smoking cessation but more with diet change, especially in 
switching from processed food to meals prepared with fresh ingredients.(192, 
193) Physical activity may bear the highest time cost as travel to a sports 
venue is often needed in addition to exercising time.(194, 195)  
4. Individuals will experience ‘physical’ (dis)utility associated with the change 
process. The cravings experienced after smoking cessation(196, 197), 
withdrawal from alcohol(198), sugary, salty or fatty foods(199) or the physical 
pain and tiredness when exercise regimes are commenced all represent 
potentially significant sources of disutility. The marginal disutility of these may 
diminish over time although this is likely to depend on the type of behaviour – 
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for example, exercise gets easier as the individual becomes fitter.(200) 
Conversely, behaviour change may lead to utility associated with health 
benefits. For example, former smokers may feel generally healthier and be 
more able to exercise; those becoming physically active or eating healthier 
foods may feel generally better, have higher energy levels and improvements 
in sleep and mood.(201, 202) As with the disutility experienced, it is possible 
that the marginal utility gains will diminish over time. Individuals commencing 
diets and physical activity programmes may find that weight loss is greater to 
begin with as are gains in fitness levels but that these tend to plateau after a 
certain time (or amount of progress) and greater efforts are required for the 
same increases in benefit.(200, 203-205) The shape of the marginal utility 
curve may be different for each behaviour over time. 
5. Behaviour change bears a ‘cognitive cost’; the effort or willpower required to 
exert self-control and avoid giving in to temptation. This willpower may be 
depleted over time making it more difficult to maintain healthier 
behaviours.(206, 207) Additional cognitive effort may be required in making 
consumption choices; whereas previously these were in part determined by 
habit and default behaviour now conscious consumption choices must be 
made(208), especially in relation to weight loss and healthy eating.  
6. The psychological impact of behaviour change may be significant. There will 
be utility or disutility associated with success or failure in behaviour change 
which emanates from the human intrinsic reward and punishment 
system.(209) Failure may carry an emotional cost of the embarrassment, 
stress, humiliation, guilt and a deleterious impact on self-esteem.(210-212) 
Success will bring the opposite and boost self esteem and emotional well-
being.(212, 213) These effects – positive and negative – may be greater if 
commitments to change were made publicly or if there is an impact on a group 
(e.g. group incentives).(214) In addition, the utility impact of success or failure 
may depend on the level of resources invested in change. For example, failure 
will be particularly hard felt if the individual ‘gave their all’ in trying to achieve 
change.  
7. There may also be a social impact of behaviour change although this may 
depend to some degree on the particular social norm that the individual is 
subject to. This may be positive if it moves the individual in line with social 
norms (215) or negative if the behaviour is contrary to these norms, for 
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example, leading to the person being judged by peers for ‘self-advancement’ 
efforts.(216) 
8. Even where behaviour change is achieved in the short run, in the long run 
individuals often revert back to their previous unhealthy lifestyle for one or 
more of any number of reasons.(186) Sustained behaviour change may come 
about if the individual continues to experience the benefits of change, for 
example, if they find they enjoy exercising or have redirected their tobacco 
budget to other utility-yielding consumption. Sustained change may also be 
aided if individuals make their healthier lifestyle a ‘habit’ - that is, their 
behaviour no longer requires conscious effort or willpower even if they do not 
find the behaviour ‘pleasant’.(217, 218)  
 
2.2.1.4. Defining the impact of incentives 
1. The most obvious expected effect of incentives is to increase the motivation 
for the initiation and/or maintenance of the incentivised behaviour.(161) The 
level of effect will depend on individual, behaviour and incentive 
characteristics (see Table 6 for these considerations).(158, 160) 
2. Incentives may also (or only) remove financial barriers to behaviour change - 
for example, by enabling the individual to afford gym attendance, healthier 
diets or travel.(188, 219) If the individual had the intention to change behaviour 
and were sufficiently motivated at the outset but were deterred by cost, the 
incentive level may only need to equal the monetary cost of behaviour change 
to be effective. This might be achieved with subsidised healthy foods, nicotine 
replacement therapies or free gym memberships rather than financial 
rewards. However, it is considered unlikely that most of the group of particular 
interest (low income) would have sufficient motivation at the outset. 
3. Incentives would increase the income of individuals, albeit by a small amount 
and in the short run, assuming that most incentive schemes have a maximum 
duration (for example, 12 months). In the case of smoking cessation and 
reduced alcohol consumption, the behaviour change would also free up a - 
probably non-trivial - proportion of income. This income could be diverted from 
unhealthy to healthy consumption or from one type of unhealthy consumption 
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to another depending on the relationship of the goods (i.e. if they’re 
substitutes).(220)  
4. Schemes often require the individual to undergo an assessment to confirm 
that they are adhering to the required behaviour change; this may mean 
monthly clinic visits for nicotine tests or weigh-ins which may bring a time and 
financial cost (e.g. for travel).  
5. Incentives may ‘crowd-out’ behaviour in two ways: a) if the incentive level is 
insufficient it may reduce the motivation of the individual to a level below what 
it would be in the absence of an incentive(162); b) after the incentivised period 
has elapsed, the individual may experience a ‘relapse’ such that their 
motivation reduces to a level below that had no incentive been offered 
initially.(157) 
6. Conversely, incentives may ‘crowd-in’ behaviour.(221) This could manifest in 
a number of ways: a) the individual adopts more healthy behaviours that were 
not incentivised – for example, stopping smoking and then also joining a gym 
or reducing consumption of complementary unhealthy goods(222, 223); b) 
unincentivised peers of the individual may adopt healthy behaviours either to 
help the individual or due to observing any positive effects of behaviour 
change in the individual(224, 225); c) the incentivised behaviour becomes 
self-sustaining (or habitual) after the incentive period has elapsed.(115, 226) 
7. Incentives may encourage ‘strategic’ or ‘gaming’ behaviour; that is, they may 
encourage people to take up an unhealthy behaviour to make them eligible 
for incentives while others may delay behaviour change in order to qualify for 
schemes. This is considered unlikely however and there is little evidence of 
this phenomenon.(116) 
8. It is possible that the mere offering of an incentive provides a signal to the 
individual that the incentivised task or behaviour is desired and valuable; this 
would amount to an increase in information. However, it is likely given modern 
media coverage of unhealthy behaviours and their consequences that 
individuals would already have this information.  
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It is possible to postulate that a number of factors known to influence health behaviour 
may not be affected by incentives: 
 
 Information (except possibly for point 8 in section 2.2.1.4) 
 Skills or education 
 Social norms or peer effects (except possibly for point 7 in section 
2.2.1.3) 
 Attitudes to risk and risk perception 
 Environmental effects 
 
Table 5 includes factors that have been suggested as potential explanatory factors in 
the effectiveness of incentive schemes. They have been included here either because 
they have been reported in reviews as key components of incentives, found to be 
important covariates or design features in predicting incentive effectiveness or found 
to be significant predictors of stated preferences for, or willingness to accept, 
incentives. In addition, other, more general concepts in behaviour change are 
included (e.g. social norms). Pre-specifying these – although they may be 
supplemented post review – facilitates the identification of related theories. Recently 
a formal framework for characterising incentives has been published (227) although 
it describes incentives in narrower terms than is done below.  
 
Table 5: Factors likely to affect incentive efficacy 
Individual 
characteristics 
Behaviour characteristics Incentive characteristics 
Age (e.g.(228)) Stopping (e.g. smoking) vs. 
starting (e.g. 
exercising)(e.g.(161)) 
Level (i.e. price) 
(e.g.(162)) 
Gender (e.g.(170)) One-off (e.g. Dr visit) or 
complex (e.g. weight loss, 
smoking cessation) (e.g.(160)) 
Frequency of receipt 
(e.g.(171)) 
Income level 
(e.g.(170)) 
‘Strength’ (e.g. number 
cigarettes smoked, 
weight)(e.g.(170)) 
Timing of receipt 
(e.g.(171)) 
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Social group 
(norms)(e.g.(65)) 
Knowledge and skills required 
(exercising and diet change) 
or not (smoking cessation) 
(e.g.(229)) 
Immediacy (i.e. how soon 
they are received after 
behaviour) (e.g.(160)) 
Internal motivation 
(e.g.(230)) 
Cost saving (smoking 
cessation) or not (exercise 
and healthy diet)(e.g.(161)) 
Duration of receipt 
(e.g.(231)) 
Education and skills 
(e.g.(188)) 
 Individual vs. group 
(e.g.(232)) 
Risk perception 
(e.g.(233)) 
Disincentive vs. incentive 
(e.g.(114)) 
Perceived control 
and likelihood of 
success (e.g.(234)) 
For disincentives – where 
does lost money go? (e.g. 
(235)) 
Mood(188) Monetary vs. non-
montetary (e.g.(171)) 
Time-preference or 
discount rate 
(e.g.(236)) 
Tasks required for 
verification (e.g. monthly 
testing (237)) 
Self-control or 
willpower 
(e.g.(238)) 
What is incentivised 
(participation vs. 
behaviour vs. outcomes) 
(e.g.(239)) 
Current health and 
future health 
expectations 
(e.g.(240)) 
Incentive framing (e.g. 
‘reward’ vs. 
‘payment’(149)) 
 Certainty of pay-off 
(certain vs. 
lottery)(e.g.(114)) 
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Who pays (e.g. NHS vs. 
private vs. co-
workers)(e.g.(228)) 
 
Figure 5 illustrates in simple form the potential outcomes for an individual who is at 
risk of cardiovascular disease and requires behaviour change. This basic decision 
tree helps clarify the process of change. The distinction between wanting to change 
and not may be important for discussions about rationality and the role of government 
paternalism and intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The dichotomy simplifies reality as 
we might expect individuals to vacillate on a continuum of desire to change. 
 
Figure 5: Behaviour change decision tree 
 
 
 
Behaviour 
change required
Wants to change
Initiates change
Sustains change
Not sustain 
change
Does not initiate 
change
Does not want to 
change
Initiates change
Sustains change
Not sustain 
change
Does not initiate 
change
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2.3. Results 
2.3.1. Literature search 
Initial search results from OVID and EBSCO were 1634 and 1046, respectively. After 
de-duplication 935 results remained for title and abstract scanning. In the Google 
Scholar [title word] searches with “financial incentive” and “health”, “smoking”, “diet”, 
“weight”, “alcohol”, “exercise” or “physical activity” returned the following results: 18, 
3, 1, 8, 0, 0, 3, respectively. In total 355 results were selected for abstract review and 
190 published papers, working papers, reports and book chapters were retrieved for 
review. See Figure 6 for full search results. 
 
Figure 6: Framework literature search results 
 
 
2.3.2. Overview 
The review is split into sections covering theories which could be considered ‘neo-
classical’ in as far as they make strict assumptions about the rationality of man; and 
those which could be considered ‘behavioural economic’ as they relax the rationality 
assumptions. The literature review revealed attempts to explain health behaviour 
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using neo-classical economic frameworks generally fell into one of three types: those 
employing standard consumer choice/utility-maximisation frameworks; those using 
the health production/capital/investment in health frameworks; and models of 
addiction, although the latter two are essentially specific types of utility-maximisation 
frameworks. Addiction studies are dominated by those employing the rational 
addiction model proposed by Becker and Murphy (1988)(75) and the health capital 
studies dominated by the human capital model proposed by Becker (1964)(76) and 
later Grossman (1972)(77) and Wagstaff (1986, 1993).(241, 242) These models, their 
variants and their applications - where relevant - are described below. The suitability 
of these for describing health behaviour change is then briefly discussed. A number 
of behavioural economic theories were also identified which offer alternative 
explanations for choices in health; these are described as they may be of use in 
understanding the mechanisms by which incentives work and factors that may 
influence their efficacy.  
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2.4. Neo-classical theories 
The consumption of certain goods (to excess) and particular behaviours represent a 
risk to health and as such this consumption or behaviour appears inconsistent with 
the fundamental tenet of neo-classical economics: that humans are rational and aim 
to maximise their utility. Despite this, risky health behaviours persist in a high 
proportion of individuals, even in those who desire and attempt behaviour change and 
especially in the lowest income groups. There is a body of work employing rational 
choice and utility-maximisation theories to the issue, hypothesising and occasionally 
providing empirical evidence for the - seemingly counter-intuitive – notion that people 
engaging in these risky behaviours may actually be behaving rationally. 
 
2.4.1. Consumer choice theory and utility-maximisation 
The concept of consumer choice and utility-maximisation is a core theme of both neo-
classical and behavioural economics; people behave in ways and consume 
(quantities of) products such that their ‘utility’ is maximised. Further, that this utility-
maximisation is their main goal in life. In doing this individuals are assumed to employ 
deliberative decision-making processes in weighing up the costs and benefits of 
behaviour and consumption options (over a lifetime) and choose accordingly. It is 
worth providing a detailed exposition of utility-maximisation here as the concepts are 
transferrable and used as the basis of several other relevant theories. The level of 
utility, U, attained is shown as a function of combinations of various goods and 
services, X: 
𝑈 = 𝑈 (𝑋1, 𝑋2, … . 𝑋𝑛) 
The utility that is derived from any good is subjective and personal and relates to 
individual preferences. Utility is defined here as decision utility or preferences as 
opposed to benthamite utility or utilitarianism proposed by John Stuart Mill (which 
might be considered a measure of overall happiness).(243) In seeking to maximise 
their utility, consumers are assumed to be rational agents acting in self-interest. 
Rationality means that consumers’ decisions are consistent with their aim of 
maximising their expected utility in the presence of uncertainty. This concept 
originates from Daniel Bernoulli’s work in 1738 and was developed by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern in 1947(244) while working on game theory. They provided a set of 
expected utility theory (EUT) axioms which describes how people make choices in 
the face of uncertainty: 
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1. Axiom of completeness: individuals have well defined preferences for bundles of 
goods and services which they can express. Thus given two states, A and B. A is 
preferred to B; B is preferred to A or the individual is indifferent between them.  
2. Axiom of transivity: preference order is consistent across >2 products. So if A is 
preferred to B and B is preferred to C, it follows that A is preferred to C. 
3. Axiom of continuity: if state B is between A and C in preference order, there is a 
lottery where an individual will be indifferent between certain B and p probability 
of A + (1-p) probability of C. 
4. Axiom of independence: individuals do not change their preference order between 
two goods if a third good is offered. That is, if A is preferred to B and subsequently 
C is offered, A will still be preferred to B (regardless of the order of preference for 
C). 
 
Additional laws have subsequently been described such as non-satiation: consumers’ 
wants cannot be fully satisfied and greater consumption leads to greater utility; and 
substitution: individuals only care about the end outcome and are indifferent between 
simple and complex lotteries as long as the expected utility is the same. Consumers 
are limited by their budget constraint which is determined by their income and the 
prices of the goods under consideration. This is given by: 
∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑋𝑖  ≤ 𝐼 
Which is the sum of the prices (P) and goods (X) less than or equal to their income 
(I). Many analyses assume that expenditure beyond income (debt) is not possible 
although this clearly is not reasonable given the ease of attaining credit. The 
indifference curve isoquant is concave in shape due to diminishing marginal returns 
and denotes equal levels of utility derived from different bundles of goods. The slope 
of the indifference curve is the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) or, to put it another 
way, the quantity of one good that must be exchanged for another in order that utility 
levels are unchanged. MRS is always negative and expressed: 
𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑥𝑦 =  −
𝛿𝑦
𝛿𝑥
 
In the case of two goods, a combination of goods is chosen where the ratio of prices 
(which represents the slope of the budget constraint) is equal to the ratio of marginal 
utilities (which represents the indifference curve slope): 
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𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑥𝑦 =  −
𝛿𝑦
𝛿𝑥
=  
𝑀𝑈𝑋
𝑀𝑈𝑌
=  
𝑃𝑋
𝑃𝑌
 
In plainer terms, utility maximisation occurs when the indifference curve is tangential 
to the budget constraint. The above equation explains that individuals will maximise 
utility when the price of an additional unit of X is the same as that for an additional 
unit of Y; i.e. the marginal cost and benefit is equal.  
 
2.4.1.1. Income and Price Elasticity 
Elasticity represents the relative sensitivity of changes in one factor to changes in 
another – for example, the change in demand (for goods or health, for example) after 
a price increase. It is a useful concept in understanding how choices may react to 
changing circumstances. The price elasticity of demand (PED) is the percentage 
change in quantity demanded (Q) divided by the percentage change in price (P):  
𝑃𝐸𝐷 =  
∆𝑄%
∆𝑃%
 
Elasticities of <1 mean that PED is relatively inelastic while elasticities of >1 indicate 
a relatively elastic demand. The income elasticity of demand (represented by the 
Engel curve) measures the responsiveness of demand to changes in income. The 
income elasticities can be used to define types of goods; the demand for normal 
goods increases if consumer income increases while the demand for inferior goods 
decreases when income increases. Normal goods can be further defined as either 
necessities, where the increase in demand is proportionately smaller than the 
increase in income; or luxury goods, where the demand increases by a greater 
proportion than income. 
 
2.4.1.2. Applications in behaviour change 
Utility-maximisation and consumer choice theories are the dominant paradigm and 
backbone of modern economic analysis. Where the assumptions behind these 
theories are rejected and alternative theories offered, the concept of an individual 
making consumption decisions with a goal of maximising the value they derive is 
common place. These core theories also represent the building blocks of more 
complex frameworks such as Grossman’s health investment model and Becker and 
Murphy’s rational addiction model. Thus there are relatively few examples of generic 
utility-maximisation applications as analysts have been attracted to the ‘off-the-shelf’ 
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frameworks. There are many potential variants of a utility-maximisation framework 
thus only two are described in any detail here. Binkley uses a lifetime utility-
maximisation model to evaluate smoking starting and quitting decisions in low income 
individuals.(245) The Binkley model is represented as: 
 
UL=U1(x,Z)+ θ(s) P(x) U2(g(M)) 
 
Where U1 and U2 are utilities in periods 1 (today) and 2 (tomorrow); Z is all other 
goods; M is today’s income; Θ(s) is the discount rate at time s within period 1; g(M) is 
the expected income tomorrow which assumed to be positive or 0; and P(x) is the 
probability of survival in the next period (with P(x) < P(0)). The author focuses on the 
question of whether an individual chooses to begin consuming an unhealthy good (x) 
or not and whether to decide to quit, creating two equations. One of these includes 
the utility yielded today from consumption of x and the other for the utility of ‘tomorrow’ 
which includes the health effects (disutility) of the consumption of x. His model is 
similar to Grossman’s (described later) in that total future income is considered a 
source of utility. Using US data on smoking behaviour from the Behavioral Risk Factor 
Survey (1994 to 2007), the study finds evidence for the idea that low income groups 
make unhealthy choices because the potential future costs – namely, loss of future 
earnings and associated utility due to illness – are lower for them (relative to high 
income groups). While the framework has been applied elsewhere (e.g.(246)) its 
predictive ability outside the original development studies has not been established. 
In a theoretical study, Cawley uses a time allocation perspective model of utility-
maximisation to understand diet and physical activity.(247) Cawley’s Sleep, Leisure, 
Occupation, Transportation and Household (SLOTH) model estimates how 
individuals allocate time across activities. Here utility is maximised given three 
constraints of budget, time and biology (for weight gain and loss). The framework 
explains how individuals must make purchasing and consumption decisions within 
these constraints to reach targets of energy and fat content assuming higher costs 
and time inputs are required for healthier consumption. SLOTH improves on the 
Binkley model as it incorporates hedonic aspects of utility (happiness) rather than just 
the utility of income. It goes beyond typical utility-maximisation and Grossman models 
by adding constraints on time and targets for dietary intake that must be met and 
formally acknowledges that healthy eating and exercise have costs and that they 
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improve health. It has since been used as a theoretical framework to consider 
potential interventions.(248)  
The original paper did not empirically test the theory but variants of the model have 
been applied in empirical work. Humphreys & Ruseski (2006)(249) adapted the 
SLOTH model by differentiating between participation and duration decisions in sport 
and between different types of activity. They improved the model by including the 
costs incurred in participating in activity. The dual-level model was achieved using the 
Heckman approach.(250) Predictions of the theoretical model include that those with 
higher income may be more likely to engage in physical activity as they have the 
financial means to secure access. However, given that they earn more, the 
opportunity cost is greater for them and thus the model predicts they will engage for 
less time. They conducted empirical tests of these predictions using data from the US 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey and this appeared to support the theory 
relating to income and its relationship with participation and duration of engagement. 
Having children reduced participation as did getting older although the duration of 
engagement in exercise regimes increased with age. They found that women spent 
less time participating in physical activities than men but this difference could not be 
explained by the model. There was a differential too by education level with higher 
educated people spending less time participating in physical activity. Again, we may 
suppose that the higher educated have more demanding and busier jobs, less time 
and also have greater opportunity costs of exercise. However, unless there was a 
differential in exercise intensity, this concept runs counter to most of the neo-classical 
theories which suggest that the higher educated both have more to lose by unhealthy 
behaviour but also have a greater understanding of the health risks of inactivity. 
In support of the model theory, another study also found that more educated people 
are more likely to participate in sports; however, demand for activity dropped with 
earnings due to the higher opportunity cost.(251) Participation dropped with the 
increase in number of school-age children - presumably due to lack of time available 
to engage. Engagement increases around retirement age which may reflect the 
increased desire to invest in health and/or increased time available to be active. It 
also increases at the weekend, again, probably due to people having more time. Good 
health appears to decrease the demand for sport which may reflect activity conducted 
in a desire to improve health status. The analysis highlights several factors which 
influence participation that are not described in the model, including personal 
characteristics (age and health), marital status and children, time of year, day of week, 
the region and the level of urbanization. Indeed the authors ask for caution in over-
60 
 
 
 
interpreting their results and concede: “the explanatory variables only explain a small 
part of the total variation of individual time allocated to physical activity”. Eisenberg 
and Okeke also employed the model to explore the impact of weather and seasonality 
on physical activity.(252) They found that a five degree decrease in average 
temperature caused a 2.5% drop in those meeting recommended minimum levels of 
physical activity. This effect was 2-3 times larger for some lower education and 
income groups; the authors hypothesised that this effect occurred because these 
groups may not be able to make the switch to indoor activities (presumably because 
of cost) when weather was poor. 
Price elasticity is a vital determinant of the impact of fiscal policies employed to try 
and bring about changes in health behaviour. Establishing the PED for different goods 
in different income groups helps to understand the likely impact of ‘sin taxes’. The 
application of this concept is covered in the fiscal policy options section in the 
Introduction. A common finding is that the PED for unhealthy goods is relatively 
inelastic (as might be expected with goods that might be considered addictive)(39, 
48, 253) but perhaps paradoxically that lower income groups are more 
responsive.(50) This may be because price changes will be represent a higher 
proportion of their overall income. Analysis by Bask and Melkerrson (254) on alcohol 
and cigarette demand found that long-run own-price elasticities are negative but that 
the demand for alcohol was more elastic than cigarette demand, suggesting that 
tobacco is more addictive than alcohol. The cross-price elasticities were also 
negative, suggesting that alcohol and cigarettes are complementary goods.  
 
2.4.1.3. Usefulness for incorporating financial incentives 
The utility-maximisation framework allows us to represent the question of behaviour 
change as an individual weighing up the costs and benefits of continued unhealthy 
behaviour against the costs and benefits of a healthier lifestyle, taking into account 
the disutility of changing behaviour and the attendant future health risk of choosing 
not to do so. In a simplistic sense the decision is then an intertemporal one; between 
having benefits now (cigarettes, cake, sitting and watching TV) and costs in the future 
(ill health) versus incurring costs now (tobacco withdrawal, no cake, physical activity) 
and benefits in the future (improved health). Table 6 provides a simple illustration of 
the types of pros and cons an individual considering smoking cessation might have 
to weigh-up in making a decision to stop smoking or not. This is intuitively a choice 
between the health and monetary benefits of cessation against the difficulty in giving 
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up, the disutility of which has been shown to be significant.(255) Framed as a problem 
of utility-maximisation under constraint, all factors in the table could be considered in 
a utility context - that is, that their value can be expressed in terms of utility, including 
health status, time and money. Where there is uncertainty in terms of outcomes then 
von Neumann’s and Morgernstern’s theory of expected utility under uncertainty may 
be applied. 
 
Table 6: Arguments for and against smoking cessation 
Arguments for not attempting 
smoking cessation 
Arguments for attempting smoking 
cessation 
Smoking is relaxing and relieves stress There may be immediate and future 
health benefits for me and others  
Withdrawal and cravings may be very 
unpleasant 
I would save money 
Nicotine replacements are expensive I may be able to exercise more 
Social situations may be more difficult Get rid of the bad smell 
I may gain weight  
I may fail  
Health risks may be small  
 
Intuitively, utility-maximisation and EUT appear useful for capturing decisions to 
change behaviour although it is unclear whether price elasticity of demand would 
have a function in helping to understand behaviour change or incentive impact. As 
we can convert monetary terms into utility we can consider what impact a financial 
incentive may have on overall utility. Hence, the concept of marginal utility of money 
might shed light on the responsiveness of different income groups to different levels 
of financial incentive. It is assumed, due to the property of diminishing marginal utility 
of money (256), that utility gains will be higher for low income individuals compared 
to high income individuals and thus incentives (of the same value) should provide 
relatively greater motivation for the former.  
The concept of homo economicus – economic man - is based on the key assumptions 
that when individuals make consumption decisions, they are rational and driven by 
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self-interest. The assumption of rationality denies uncertainty in that individuals are 
assumed to have perfect information about the utility they will derive from the good 
(and all possible combinations of other goods) and can predict their future 
preferences. While EUT and rationality are the cornerstone of modern decision 
analysis, there is growing evidence indicating that humans are not rational when it 
comes to weighing up costs and benefits, under uncertainty or otherwise. The choices 
of individuals are influenced by an array of cognitive biases and heuristics such that 
individuals may not have full autonomy over ‘choices’ at all, instead following a series 
of unconscious defaults and norms.(80) 
 
2.4.2. The Demand for Health and Investment in Health 
Grossman’s ‘human capital model of the demand for health’ (1972)(77, 257) uses the 
neo-classical economic framework of utility-maximisation and rational choice to 
explain how individuals make decisions about their health and healthcare. In essence 
it postulates that health is a good that is produced, demanded and consumed by 
individuals. Health is demanded because it enables the production of income and 
wealth and generates utility in itself. Individuals produce or invest in health via health 
behaviours (diet, exercise, consumption choices) and medical care. The model 
considers healthcare a derived demand since it is not demanded for its self but for 
the improvements in health that it provides. Further, that health itself is a derived 
demand since when we are healthy we are able to work and earn money. Individuals 
enter the model with a ‘stock’ of health which, like any other capital good, depreciates 
over time but can be increased with investments. The efficiency of these investments 
is a function of the individual’s age, education and knowledge.(258) 
The Grossman model has seen widespread application in research since its 
publication. In the 1980s Wagstaff presented a geometric representation of the 
Grossman Model (Figure 7 (258)) with a view to illustrating its principles and 
mechanisms (Wagstaff 1986 a, b)(242). Represented in the southwest quadrant (I) of 
the figure is the budget constraint which shows the possible combinations of medical 
care (M) and all other consumption products (O) that can be obtained with available 
resources taking into account income and prices. The northeast quadrant (II) shows 
the indifference curve indicating the combinations of health (H) and all other 
consumption products (O) that yield the same level of utility (U). The northwest 
quadrant (III) enables us to understand the relationship between the consumption of 
healthcare and health and health-related utility. A production function illustrates the 
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level of health output yielded per healthcare unit input. The southeast quadrant exists 
only to connect shifts in budget constraint and indifference curves via 45 degree 
identity line. The figure illustrates how any given level of health investment or input 
leads to a corresponding level of health. The production function is convex due to 
diminishing marginal returns of production; that productivity yields from inputs 
increase with increasing inputs up to a point after each additional unit of input provides 
less output. The figure suggests that utility will be maximised at Umax which is yielded 
through the consumption of H* of health and O* of all other goods. To achieve this, an 
individual would need to spend their income on M* of healthcare. In Grossman’s 
model, individuals opt for a combination of health and non-health goods to consume 
to maximise utility and the derived demand for a given level of healthcare results from 
this. Theoretically this framework can be employed to estimate the impact of changes 
in, for example, consumption good prices, income, health productivity as well as 
health shocks.  
 
Figure 7: Grossman Model  
 
[Wagstaff (1986) revised by Morris et al (2012) – Figure taken from Morris et al](258) 
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At its simplest level the demand for health begins with the utility function: 
U = U (H,O) 
Which indicates that utility (U) is that derived from a combination of the consumption 
of health (H) and all other fundamental commodities (O). Fundamental commodities 
are generated with time and other market goods. In this case H is the number of 
healthy days in a lifetime and is determined by the level of health stock (HS). HS at 
any given time (HSt) is determined by HS in the previous period (HSt-1) plus any 
investment in health the person has undertaken (It) and minus any depreciation in HS 
in the same period (dt). This can be expressed formally as: 
 
HSt = HSt-1 + It - dt 
 
Health capital can depreciate with age or by damaging health behaviour such as 
smoking, overeating, excessive alcohol intake or physical inactivity. Investment can 
be made by adopting healthy behaviours such as exercising or a healthy diet. It and 
Ot are produced at any one time by a combination of factors and are subject to 
production functions.  
The production functions can be represented as: 
 
It = I(Mt, THt, Et) 
Ot = O(Xt, TOt, Et) 
 
Where M = medical care and X = all other goods; T= time spent producing health or 
other goods and E = human capital which is invariably considered to be represented 
by level of education. The constraints to the production function are in time (T); which 
is necessarily limited to 365.25 mean days a year and incorporates time spent 
working, investing (or being ill) and spending (S) which is determined by time spent 
working, wage rate and the prices of the goods – health and otherwise – to be 
consumed.  
To maximise utility given these constraints and the production functions requires 
equilibrium where the marginal benefits of health capital are equal to the marginal 
cost. Marginal benefit (MB) is comprised of two parts; one relating to the utility gained 
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from health investment (MBH) and one relating to the monetary gain from health 
investment (MBM). The output of these investments is measured in the marginal 
product of health (MPH) in units of healthy days provided by a unit of health stock. 
Healthy days provide utility in itself but they also enable us to engage in paid 
employment which in turn yields income and utility. Since at equilibrium these factors 
are equal to marginal costs, they are expressed in monetary terms. The utility-
maximisation problem is over the lifetime of the individual and therefore a discount 
rate - (1 + 𝑟)𝑡 - is used to reduce future values. We arrive at the following where 𝑀𝑈𝐻 
and 𝑀𝑈𝑤 represent marginal utility of healthy days and income, respectively. 
𝑀𝐵𝐻𝑡 =  𝑀𝑃𝐻𝑡 × (1 + 𝑟)
𝑡  ×  
𝑀𝑈𝐻𝑡
𝑀𝑈𝑊𝑡
 
The benefit of health capital investments are given by multiplying the marginal product 
of health by the wage rate: 
𝑀𝐵𝑀𝑡 =  𝑀𝐵𝐻𝑡 × 𝑊𝑡 
The marginal cost of health capital is the marginal cost of investment in health (MCI) 
multiplied by the opportunity cost of investment (which is taken to be the rate of 
interest) and by the level of depreciation (d). The interest rate is the real rate minus 
the change in rate over time in the marginal cost of investment (∆MCI). The equilibrium 
condition is represented thus: 
 
𝑀𝐵𝐻𝑡 +  𝑀𝐵𝑀𝑡 =  𝑀𝐶𝐼𝑡−1 × [(𝑟 −  ∆𝑀𝐶𝐼𝑡−1 ) + 𝑑𝑡)]  
 
This equilibrium derived from the Grossman model describes how individuals invest 
in their health capital to the point where the marginal benefit (comprised of 
consumption and investment benefits) are equal to the marginal cost of investment.  
There have been many revisions of the model since its development. These include 
a demand for health framework with the addition of a physiologically optimal level of 
health (259) and a revision such that the family unit is the producer of health.(260) 
Gjerde et al (2005) revised the model by incorporating adaptation to ill health (261) 
while Benitez-Silva and Ni incorporated a longevity production function.(262) The 
original model assumed that death was reached when health capital fell below a 
certain threshold; this was revised in later versions of the model. Ehrlich and Chuma 
(1990) showed that life expectancy and its demand should be modelled just as the 
demand for health and consumption goods is.(263) Dias (2010)(264) combined the 
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Grossman model with a model of health inequality based on the framework of 
inequality of opportunity proposed by Roemer, where a distinction is drawn between 
circumstance (parental socio-economic status and childhood health) and effort 
(lifestyle) variables in health. The addition of uncertainty was modelled by Clark and 
Etile (2002) evaluating the impact of changes in information on smoking behaviour 
over time (265). This approach was also taken in a theoretical paper by Laporte and 
Ferguson (2007)(266) focusing on the uncertainty of investment in the Grossman 
model and by Asano and Shibata (2011) reformulating the deterministic Grossman 
model into a stochastic one.(267) Galama and Kapteyn produced an alternative form 
of the Grossman model relaxing an assumption that people can change their health 
investments instantly to a new optimal level.(268) Other work by Galama also calls 
into question the results of the Grossman model previously presented in the literature 
as they find evidence to support the notion of decreasing returns to scale in health 
investment in contrast to many previous studies that have based analyses on the 
assumption of constant returns.(269) Other studies have also examined behavioural 
aspects of the demand for health. For example, one study developed a theoretical 
model that explained the demand for health as stemming from the need for status 
and identity but also something to which people adapted over time.(270) Another 
study has introduced the concepts of social pressure, status and trust as important 
determinants of the demand for health.(271)  
 
2.4.2.1. Applications in behaviour change 
The Grossman model has seen significant use in health economic research (257) 
with its most common applications being in exploring the relationship between 
education and health and in understanding healthcare demand. There was mixed 
empirical evidence to support its predictions and debate over its usefulness has 
continued.(272, 273) Summarising the criticisms Laporte highlights significant doubts 
over the predictive ability of the model.(274) She points out that Grossman fails to 
predict that health declines in line with lowered socio-economic status. In addition, 
the model predicts a positive relationship between health status and health 
investment but usually this relationship is negative in empirical tests. Despite the 
popularity of the model there have been few examples of its application to research 
on behaviour change specifically. Studies have tended to use the model to explore 
investments in health and their outcomes (e.g.(275)). Zhao et al used the model to 
explore the impact of information (e.g. new diagnosis of high blood pressure) on 
health choices (276) finding that those with higher income were more responsive in 
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terms of behaviour change. This finding is in line with the model theory and therefore 
provides some evidence of its predictive validity. Lindgren et al evaluated the impact 
of obesity history on future health investments (277) however the methods applied do 
not help elucidate behaviour change decisions. Elsewhere, van Kippersluis and 
Galama empirically tested the suitability of the Grossman model for explaining why 
rich individuals engaged in more moderately unhealthy behaviours (e.g. drinking 
alcohol) compared to low income individuals who engaged more in severely 
unhealthy behaviour (e.g. smoking).(278) Although richer individuals have more 
income with which to consume unhealthy goods, the authors submit that they demand 
less unhealthy consumption as the costs to them (in terms of the financial 
consequences of future ill-health) are relatively greater than those that lower income 
individuals would face. Bolin and Lindgren applied the model to identify the demand 
for physical activity with consideration for a physiologically optimal level.(279) An 
analysis by McCarthy evaluated whether the model could be used to evaluate the 
likelihood of decisions to start and quit health capital investments such as exercise 
regimes.(280) He hypothesised that a significant increase (above one that is rationally 
required) in health capital (profit) is needed from a health investment before such a 
regime is initiated, thus, if only small improvements are expected, the regime may not 
be initiated. McCarthy introduced uncertainty in investment and employed Dixit’s 
‘hysteresis effect’ (281) which explains why regimes may be difficult to initiate 
(perhaps due to inertia, barriers or higher ‘start-up’ costs) but when started are easier 
to maintain. While interesting, McCarthy presents only theoretical work and the 
predictive ability of the model has not yet been evidenced (or tested). 
Clark and Etile (265) examined the impact of health shocks on people who smoke. 
According to the predictions of the Grossman model, an increase in the health costs 
associated with unhealthy consumption should be met by decreased consumption of 
that good. The authors do find evidence that smoking is reduced and quit attempts 
are higher in those who have had a health shock. They believe that the health event 
provides information about the relationship between smoking and health damage 
which was previously uncertain. However, they also found quitting was negatively 
correlated with consumption – those who smoked more were less likely to quit. This 
is counter to the Grossman model which would predict that those with the greatest 
costs would adjust their consumption most. Furthermore, lung check-ups were 
uncorrelated with quitting. According to Grossman, individuals will make a rational 
decision that is consistent with their long term preferences based on revised 
information – in this case relating to the costs of their behaviour. However, we do not 
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know what motivates the behaviour change attempts observed in the data. Following 
a health shock, individuals will have been implored by healthcare professionals to quit 
and given access to smoking cessation interventions (e.g. nicotine replacement 
products); thus the costs of behaviour change are reduced and they are following 
other people’s preferences. Hence we should be cautious in accepting the results of 
empirical research based on large panel datasets as evidence of the predictive ability 
of such theories due to the threat of exogeneity.  
 
2.4.2.2. Usefulness for incorporating financial incentives 
The Grossman model predicts that low income individuals may persist with unhealthy 
behaviour because they have low returns on health investments, either because they 
have low lifetime income earning capability or because they have low education and 
are inefficient at creating capital. In this case individuals do not see extended or 
enhanced life as beneficial or at least worth investing in. In the context of the model, 
unhealthy behaviour would be seen as disinvestment in health or leading to a higher 
rate of health stock depreciation (253) and behaviour change viewed as increased 
investment in health. An individual chooses the level of investment or disinvestment 
such that the marginal costs are equal to the marginal benefits.  
The Grossman model is a theoretical framework and it is valuable as long as it is a 
useful tool to explain individual or population health behaviour and predict the impact 
of policy changes. The model is based on a number of assumptions which have drawn 
criticism. It assumes that individuals have perfect information and foresight about their 
health, health capital depreciation rate and the impact of health investment, 
healthcare and consumption behaviour on their health. A literal interpretation of the 
model assumptions suggests that individuals deliberate and choose a rate of health 
investment (or disinvestment) until their health stock reaches 0 (or a minimum 
threshold level) and they die. Crucially, the original model does not permit uncertainty 
or allow ‘irrationality’ in consumer behaviour. In addition it fails to recognize that 
individuals are unable to adjust their health stocks instantaneously. A number of 
modifications of the model make it more palatable as a representation of health 
behaviour. Studies have allowed individuals to adjust their health capital slowly, a 
more intuitive form as health behaviour change and its positive impact takes time. 
Similarly, health investments are uncertain and individuals do not know, for example, 
what impact a healthy diet will have on their health stock; thus the addition of 
uncertainty into the model is an improvement. Certainly in its strict rational form the 
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Grossman model would not appear to fit with the general behaviour of low-income 
individuals who engage in risky health behaviours. In reality it is unlikely that such 
individuals plan, deliberate, decide, choose and achieve particular amounts of ‘health 
stock’ over a lifetime. In the case of behaviour change initiation (health investment), 
the uncertainty about success and accompanying level of improvement may be 
important factors in determining whether change is initiated at all. Thus the addition 
of uncertainty in investment (by Asano and Shibata) is appropriate; as the authors 
note, when uncertainty is high, investment is less likely to occur.  
The original model assumed that there are constant returns to scale of health capital 
investment, an assumption relaxed in subsequent studies.(269) This modification 
also appears to have face validity and better reflect reality. For example, during weight 
loss and fitness regimes, weight loss and fitness gains become more difficult over 
time (200, 203-205) and health gains from behaviour change, such as blood pressure 
reduction(282) and efficient oxygen uptake(283), eventually reach a plateau after 
which more intensive investment yield limited or no marginal benefit. This is captured 
by the theory of marginal efficiency of capital (MEC) where the phenomenon of 
diminishing marginal returns can be observed. Employing this neo-classical theory 
we expect that as investment in health is increased and health stock rises, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to add to the stock per unit of health investment, hence a convex 
shape of the marginal efficiency of capital curve is observed. The curvature of the 
MEC and idea of diminishing utility benefits from health behaviour may be apposite 
for explaining failing motivation and high failure rates in those attempting to sustain 
behaviour change.  
Focussing on incentives, it can be seen that a financial reward would increase the 
value of investment and make investment (behaviour change) more likely. However 
the strength of this effect in the model may be weak as investments in health are 
determined by lifetime earning potential which of course will be unchanged. Incentives 
would be expressed as increased income although only in the short run and in the 
case of tobacco use, cessation would also free up income to spend on other 
consumption – thus the budget constraint would move out. With this comes the risk 
for consumption to switch to other unhealthy products – e.g. away from tobacco to 
increased intake of sugary or fatty foods. The income increase would be counteracted 
by the cost (time and money) required to invest in behaviour change.  
As with a general utility-maximisation framework, future health consequences of 
current risky behaviour may be undervalued either due to uncertainty, a risk-seeking 
attitude, poor health knowledge or high discount rates (or any combination of these). 
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In this case the incentive works to bring the reward or pay-off of healthy behaviour 
forward in time thus avoiding the discount rates and/or making the payoff more certain 
(depending on the incentive design). Consideration of the MEC and diminishing 
marginal returns may prove useful in capturing both the dynamic nature of behaviour 
change feedback; and, in relation to incentives, the need to tailor the rewards to the 
level of difficulty the individual faces during the change process bearing in mind it is 
likely to fluctuate. In addition, the hystersis effect, although unrelated to the Grossman 
model, may provide a novel perspective on the initiation of behaviour change and 
information about the level of incentive required to persuade individuals to initiate 
change. 
 
2.4.3. Rational Addiction 
The rational addiction model (75) is the dominant paradigm employed to model 
addictive behaviour. The model was first proposed by Becker and Murphy (1988) and 
has been applied, tested and modified many times since. A key principle of rational 
addiction is that a consumer is said to be addicted if an increase in past consumption 
(‘habit stock’) causes present consumption to rise. Reinforcement occurs because an 
increase in past consumption increases the “craving” for the addictive good today 
(consumption of cigarettes at different time periods in time can be considered 
complements). Tolerance also occurs since the satisfaction of present smoking is 
lower when past smoking is greater. This is akin to the opponent process theory in 
psychology where increased consumption of an addictive good disrupts the opiod 
reward homeostasis in the brain requiring greater and greater consumption to achieve 
‘highs’ that were felt previously. The model is described below. 
Where Ht  is a habit stock that measures the degree of addiction at time t, the concept 
of habit stock can be expressed as: 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡−1 
The habit stock in the present period is equal to the amount of smoking in the previous 
period (or cumulatively as all the previous periods combined). Ut is instantaneous 
utility at time t of consuming an addictive good and consuming a bundle of non-
addictive goods, which are represented by Ct  and Yt, respectively: 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝑈(𝐶𝑡 , 𝐻𝑡, 𝑌𝑡) 
It can be inferred that tolerance is a manifestation of diminishing marginal utility and 
hence - using the smoking example - smoking one extra cigarette today increases 
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utility but the rate of increase in utility reduces with the amount of cigarettes smoked. 
As Andersson et al (284) illustrate: the marginal utility of smoking 5 cigarettes instead 
of 4 is larger than that of smoking 11 cigarettes instead of 10. The habit stock is 
assumed to affect instantaneous utility negatively and at an increasing rate. Due to 
the phenomenon of reinforcement, the level of past smoking or habit stock, increases 
the marginal utility of present smoking. As in all consumption choices, the consumer 
faces a budget constraint but since the model assumes that consumers are forward 
thinking, the constraint also includes (constantly discounted) future prices of the 
goods to be consumed. Subject to habit stock and the budget constraint, the 
consumer chooses combinations of C and Y that maximise the sum of instantaneous 
utility: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐶𝑡, 𝑌𝑡  ∑(1 + 𝜎)
−𝑡  𝑈(𝐶𝑡, 𝐻𝑡, 𝑌𝑡) 
∞
𝑡=1
 
Where σ > 0 is the constant rate of time preference. The maximisation problem 
solution allows the derivation of a demand function for the non-addictive and addictive 
goods. Assuming that the discount and interest rates are equal (i.e., σ = r) the demand 
function for an addictive good would be represented(258):  
𝐶𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  (1 + 𝑟)𝛽1𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑡+1 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑡  
Individuals in the model weigh up the costs and benefits of continued consumption or 
quitting and decide accordingly with a view to maximising utility. The main difference 
from general utility-maximisation models is the mechanism of the habit formation and 
the influence of habit stock on current and future consumption. Becker and Murphy 
went on to use the model to predict sudden withdrawals and binges, and illustrated 
how stressful events (for example divorce and unemployment) can be the catalyst for 
addictions. 
 
2.4.3.1. Applications in behaviour change 
Since being developed the rational addiction model has seen a broad application in 
economics and has become the main economic theory used to explain addictive 
behaviour.(285) Variants of the model have included an allowance for uncertainty 
(286), binge consumption (287), chaotic consumption (288), assessed the impact of 
‘health shocks’ on health behaviour (289), and estimated the optimal death age and 
its impact on health investment with relation to healthy and unhealthy 
consumption.(290) Tregeagle adapts the rational addiction model into a health 
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depletion model where the concern is not with habit stock but with remaining health 
stock.(291) 
Rational addiction in public health has generally focussed on smoking as the addiction 
although studies have applied the framework to other unhealthy behaviours such as 
alcohol abuse and obesity (overeating). Andersson (2006) applied the model to two 
addictive goods (smoking and Snus) (284) as did Bask and Melkersson (254) while a 
number have applied the model to smoking (e.g. Baltagi and Grifin, 2001(292); 
Gruber and Koszegi, 2001(293); Escario, 2001(294); Becker, 1994(295)), smoking in 
pregnancy (Bradford, 2003,(296)) and alcohol (Baltagi, 2002 (297); Baltagi, 2006 
(298); Fenn, 2001(299); Skog, 2006(300)). Dragone (2009) and others have applied 
the model to obesity, diet and overeating (301-303) and Liu and Lopez to fizzy soft 
drinks.(304) Notwithstanding the model criticisms there is some empirical support for 
its application, however this varies from study to study. Bask and Melkersson found 
the model suitable for describing alcohol addiction but not smoking as individuals who 
smoke were found unresponsive to changes in tobacco prices. One of the key pieces 
of empirical support for the model stems from studies showing consistently that future 
price increases (of tobacco products) lead to a reduction in current consumption 
(e.g.(292, 295)) although others have found contradictory results.(e.g.(305))  
There is empirical support for another prediction of the model – that going ‘cold turkey’ 
is an effective way to quit.(285) Notwithstanding this, most studies address the 
continuation of risky behaviour, rather than specifically focussing on behaviour 
change. Jones accounts for the additional costs incurred when trying to stop smoking 
and the impact of withdrawal.(306) In earlier work the same author (307) considered 
quitting an addiction (smoking) a ‘double hurdle’ problem; one of initiation and then 
success or failure in the long term. This approach was repeated by Feng (308) who 
considered rational addiction equivalent to the ‘motivation’ to quit smoking and ‘self-
control’ the probability of success in the quit attempt. The author refers to this latter 
factor as ‘ability’ although qualitatively a different concept. The two ‘hurdles’ are 
modelled with separate equations with the second probability conditional on the first. 
Results from the study include the finding that heavy smokers are less likely to try to 
quit even though they have a bigger financial incentive to do so. In addition, there was 
no evidence that smokers explicitly consider their chance of quit success when 
making their decision to quit and heavy smokers are not less likely to succeed once 
they decide to quit.  
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2.4.3.2. Usefulness for incorporating financial incentives 
The rational addiction model has been heavily criticised by some, with one economist 
referring to it as an ‘absurd’ theory.(309)  There is mixed evidence for the explanatory 
power of the model with one study suggesting that even non-addictive goods (such 
as milk and eggs) can be shown to be rationally addictive.(310) It has been found to 
have structural uncertainty (311) and, in a survey of economists who had employed 
the model, doubts were expressed about its validity.(312) A publication reporting the 
use of the model usefully describes the challenges that it faces in trying to model 
addiction:  
“substance use of any type or pattern and abstinence are best considered as being 
nonlinear, complex, dynamic, multidimensional, phase/level structured, and bounded 
(culture, time, place, etc.) phenomena. They are not simplistic, linear, cause and 
effect outcomes.”(284) 
One author believes that the RA framework is inconsistent with the desire for 
increased self-regulation that is often displayed by many addicts.(313) Another study 
highlighted the lack of consideration of peer or social influence in smoking and 
biological dependence (314) although one recent model has introduced this, using 
the case of obesity and considering ‘weight stock’.(315) Tomer provides a criticism of 
the concept of addiction as rational and presents an alternative socio-economic 
model.(316) Work has also been conducted evaluating the impact of low health and 
social capital and low expectations for future capital as an explanation for the initiation 
of unhealthy behaviours.(317) One review of addiction models could not conclude 
that the imperfectly rational have more evidence to support them than rational 
addiction models (318), however a more recent review concluded that imperfectly 
rational models were most appropriate.(285)  
As with most neo-classical models of behaviour, a number of limiting assumptions 
are made in the rational addiction model. It assumes that addicts are forward looking, 
considering past consumption and its consequences and future product prices, future 
preferences and then making deliberative consumption choices with autonomy. In 
doing this it assumes that addicts can predict their future preferences accurately, 
which has been shown not to be the case.(319) Further, that future utility and costs 
are discounted at a constant, exponential rate.  
In the model everyone who decides to change is successful; there is no breakdown 
of willpower or motivation and behaviour change is deterministic not stochastic. In 
reality, many people who want to change do not attempt this in any given year and 
74 
 
 
 
many of those who do initiate an attempt to change, fail. According to UK figures in 
2010: 66.4% of smokers want to quit; 35.9% attempted to quit in the previous 12 
months; and only 4.8% of smokers quit in the last 12 months.(320) As the model omits 
failure it also omits regret, both in consumption and in failed quit attempts. 
Incentives in this model would function as they do in the Grossman model, bringing 
the reward forward temporally and potentially tipping the balance of cost and effects 
in favour of quitting or changing. An additional potentially useful application of the 
addiction framework is a reconstitution of the ‘habit stock’ function. In Becker and 
Murphy’s model it represents unhealthy behaviour but it could be applied to habit 
formation in healthy behaviour. A model structure that encompasses the phenomena 
whereby past behaviour increases the likelihood of future behaviour might be useful 
in capturing the hypothesised long term effects of incentives. This might be 
particularly apposite in physical activity and healthy eating which may become ‘good 
habits’ after a certain period. Of interest too is the modelling by Jones (307) and Feng 
(308) on motivation and ability to quit. Casting behaviour change as a ‘double hurdle’ 
fits with some psychological theories of intention and motivation and the a priori 
specification of the change process made at the beginning of this section. This 
approach may prove useful in considering the effect of incentives which may be 
differential for change initiation and then maintenance.  
 
2.4.4. Time preference and discount rates 
“The State should protect the interests of the future in some degree against the effects 
of our irrational discounting and of our preference for ourselves over our descendants” 
(Pigou (40) I.II.7) 
 
It is a generally accepted rule that humans would prefer to have benefits sooner rather 
than later and would rather defer costs further into the future. The reason for this 
phenomenon is disputed but is likely to include uncertainty around our health and 
survival and wealth in the future. Time preference is integral to most economic 
frameworks involving intertemporal choices – where the costs and benefits of 
decisions are incurred at different times(321) – and especially where we want to make 
choices with future consequences and wish to weigh up those consequences now. 
Time preference refers to the degree to which individuals ‘discount’ future costs and 
benefits. A high positive time preference means that an individual would much prefer 
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satisfaction now than in the future. A high positive time preference necessarily means 
that the individual employs a high ‘discount rate’. The discount rate is calculated as a 
percentage of the required increase in payoff that would bring about deferral of 
satisfaction.(321) 
Paul Samuelson proposed the discounted-utility model in 1937 and this was 
subsequently accepted and became embedded in standard economic analyses.(322) 
He introduced the idea that homo economicus seeks to maximise the sum of future 
utilities with the assumption that: “The individual discounts future utilities in some 
simple regular fashion which is known to us”. The higher the discounting of future 
costs and benefits, the more highly current costs and benefits are valued, relatively 
speaking. Thus a ‘present-biased’ (or ‘oriented’) individual who discounts ‘future’ 
costs and benefits highly puts greater weight on current consumption. This is argued 
to be one of the main reasons for the continuation of unhealthy behaviour: individuals 
employ high discount rates to the future financial and health costs of unhealthy 
behaviour. Intuitively, the direction of causality would appear to be from individual to 
payoff as we assume that people with higher time preference may be more impulsive 
and show greater disregard to future health consequences. However, as Becker and 
Mulligan argue, the reverse could plausibly be the case – that, in view of either poor 
health prognosis or expectations and/or poor anticipated earning potential, a decision 
is made to be more present-biased, or to ‘live for the moment’.(323)  
The discount rate is a metric measured using intertemporal choices, either revealed 
or stated. However, conceptualising and measuring it is very challenging. Attempts to 
capture this have included asking people to trade off between (monetary or health) 
benefits (or losses) now (or sooner) in return for higher benefits in the future. More 
simplistic – and less desirable(324) - attempts to capture time preference use proxy 
questions relating to risky behaviours (e.g. driving without seatbelts, having 
unprotected sex) and level of savings.(325) In the UK the TEMPUS study 
endeavoured to identify a societal discount rate for future health benefits using a 
number of methods. With caveats over the study methods, the authors reported 
median annual discount rates ranging between 3.8% and 6.1% depending on the 
methods used, delay period and whether own health or that of others was being 
discounted.(325) In contrast the UK’s National Institute of Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE) requires future costs and benefits to be discounted at a rate of 3.5%.(326) 
However, large variations in discount rates have been reported.(327) 
There are several types of discounting models (328) but the standard assumption in 
economics, including in technology evaluations considering costs and benefits 
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beyond one year, is that individuals have a constant, exponential discount rate. The 
exponential discount rate is given below, where r = discount rate and t = time: 
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡 
 
2.4.4.1. Applications in behaviour change 
A key role is played by time preference or individual discount rates in both neo-
classical and behavioural economic models. They can have a major impact on 
estimates of lifetime costs and benefits. Time preference has been found to have a 
significant association with various health behaviours such as smoking(329-334), 
choosing an unhealthy diet (335), obesity (336, 337), addiction (338) and alcohol 
consumption.(339) Axon et al, studying time preference and its relationship with 
preventive health behaviour in hypertensive adults, found that a 1% increase in 
discount rate increased the likelihood that respondents did not check their blood 
pressure by 3.5%.(236) Those with the highest quintile of discount rates were the 
least likely to change their diet and exercise behaviour after hypertension diagnosis 
compared to the rest of the sample (6.8% vs. 12.4%). There is some evidence that 
time preference explains the gradient in smoking (a proxy for health 
inequalities).(340) However, some studies do not find that time preference is 
important in health behaviour (341, 342), has only a weak relationship with health 
indicators such as BMI (343), or that it is dependent on gender (344) or age (345). 
One meta-analysis found time preference to be more explanatory in addictive 
behaviours than non-addictive behaviours.(342) The potential link between time 
preference and life expectancy has been highlighted elsewhere.(346) Findings also 
suggest that addictive behaviours can be interdependent and are dependent not just 
on time preference but also on the individual’s level of risk aversion.(347) 
Furthermore, there is the suggestion that health and financial costs and benefits may 
incur differential discounting.(348) An empirical investigation into this issue by Lazaro 
and colleagues gave interesting results.(349) They found that social discount rates 
were lower than private rates and, crucially, that discount rates for health were much 
higher than for financial gains (39.5 and 14.1, respectively for private values with a 2 
year delay). In addition, while there appeared evidence for hyperbolic discounting 
(discussed later) for health (the private discount rate fell from 39.5 at 2 years delay to 
15.2 at 15 years delay), there was little sign of this for financial gains (14.1 at 2 years 
delay to 12.3 at 15 years delay). However, caution is urged over these results as the 
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sample was a set of students who might have atypical preferences (compared to the 
general population) regarding health and wealth. 
A study by Yi and Landes was particularly interesting as it assessed time preference 
during smoking cessation.(350) The authors found that smokers employed higher 
discount rates following smoking abstinence than during periods when they smoked. 
Thus time preference appeared to vacillate along with physiological state, perhaps 
due to craving. This may have added significance as it is associated with higher 
failures in behaviour change attempts, in smoking in pregnant women (351) and 
smoking in heavy drinkers.(352) Goto et al found, after controlling for alternative 
possible predictors of cessation, time preference was still associated significantly with 
relapse to smoking having a hazard ratio of 1.17 (95% CI: 1.10–1.24, P < 0.001).(333) 
Elsewhere, discounting has been shown to be important in weight loss.(353) 
 
2.4.4.2. Usefulness for incorporating financial incentives 
Time preference is clearly important in people’s health behaviour decisions as it 
essentially determines the relative value placed on current and future costs and 
benefits. In the utility-maximisation frameworks, individuals seek to maximize the 
present discounted value of lifetime utility. One of the key arguments in favour of using 
incentives is predicated on the idea that people who persist with unhealthy behaviours 
despite the high risk of significant future health costs, are too present-biased and, 
consequently, the benefits of current consumption outweigh future costs. Offering 
incentives in the short term brings forward the reward for healthy behaviour. In 
addition, a key implication of the role of future discounting is that commitment devices 
may offer an effective way of trying to deal with high present discount rates. In terms 
of incentive design it’s possible that individual discount rates may play a part in their 
effectiveness. If incentive rewards are too distant in the future, present-biased 
individuals (likely to be the target group) may apply a high discount rate and the 
incentive will not be a sufficient motivator. Thus immediate rewards are likely to be 
the most effective. It may be that the act of behaviour change may also change the 
individual’s time preference, a conclusion from a recent study of incentives in 
smoking.(350, 354) 
A recent review and meta-regression corroborates previous findings that discount 
rates for health losses and gains tend to be different (327) with time preference for 
the latter often being found to be higher than the former.(355) More crucially there is 
now substantial evidence that discount rates are not constant but depend on the 
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length of delay to the pay-off. For example in the TEMPUS project based on discrete 
choice elicitation, the implied annual discount rates were 5.0%, 4.6%, 3.8% for own 
health (private rate) and 6.4%, 5.7%, 3.8% for others’ health (societal rate) over 5, 8 
and 13 year delays, respectively.(325) Hence, discount rates are often time-
inconsistent (or ‘dynamically inconsistent’), a theory discussed in the behavioural 
section of the review. Every assumption behind the discounted utility model has since 
been empirically tested and shown to be invalid.(321) Time preference and discount 
rates are clearly important both in terms of understanding health behaviour change 
and incentive impact but it is unlikely that the rational time-consistent formulation often 
employed in neo-classical models best represents reality.  
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2.5. Behavioural economic theories 
Neo-classical economic theory as espoused by Gary Becker and the Chicago school, 
requires that individuals are perfectly informed about all potential consumption 
options and consumption outcomes (even if they occur many years in the future) and 
that they have the time and capacity to consider this perfect information before 
making optimal choices. These conditions, as well as those surrounding expected 
utility theory, are increasingly being viewed as unrealistic and a large body of research 
conducted in experimental psychology and behavioural economics casts doubt on the 
assumptions of rationality upon which such economic theories are predicated.(356, 
357) 
The growth of behavioural economics has seen a leader in the field, Daniel 
Kahneman, receive the Nobel Prize for economics in 2002 and greater popularity as 
indicated by the success of books such as ‘Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, 
Wealth and Happiness’ by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (79), Dan Ariely’s 
‘Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions’(358) and 
Daniel Kahneman’s ‘Thinking, Fast and Slow’. Behavioural economics has been 
embraced as a tool to shape government policy and population behaviour, evidenced 
by the creation of the ‘Behavioural Insights Team’ in England.(359) Scientists and 
policy workers are arguing for increased research in, and a greater role for, 
behavioural economics (360, 361) and it is likely that this relatively new discipline 
could have a specific role in designing incentive schemes.(173) 
The literature searches identified a number of behavioural theories of potential 
relevance to the design of incentive schemes. A small number are general 
frameworks relating to behaviour change built upon a collection of theories or biases 
identifying faults in rationality and others are stand-alone theories. The format is 
slightly different to the previous section as there was more material to cover hence 
the theories have been categorised into related concepts and are briefly described 
with their relevance for incentive design discussed.  
 
2.5.1. General theories and frameworks 
2.5.1.1. Bounded rationality 
Bounded rationality is a general concept offered as an alternative to the assumption 
of the perfectly rational ‘homo economicus’. The term is credited to Herbert Simon 
(362) in the 1950’s and the concept has been adopted widely since.(357) Simply put, 
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bounded rationality posits that humans are unable to maximise their utility due to a 
number of deficits in information, information processing skills and flawed decision 
making ability.(363) Instead, the outcomes or payoffs of individuals’ choices are 
‘bounded’ by their imperfect capacity. Thus, the theory goes, we make decisions with 
imperfect information, through a biased filter using error-prone cognitive short-cuts - 
or heuristics – to arrive at a satisfactory solution rather than an optimal one. In this 
sense we are ‘satisficers’(362) rather than ‘optimisers’ and several studies were found 
that proposed models incorporating this approach.(364, 365) Examples of its formal 
application in health are few and there is little or no empirical evidence to assert its 
validity. One group of researchers have included bounded rationality separately in 
models of smoking (366) and dieting.(367) The former relaxes the assumption in 
addiction models that individuals have fully formed, lifetime consumption paths. The 
attempts to model each cognitive bias and heuristic are not presented here; it is 
perhaps sufficient to consider that individuals will make choices such that:  
𝑈𝑠 ≥ 𝑈𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑈𝑠 ≤ 𝑈𝑚𝑎𝑥 
Where Umin is the lowest acceptable outcome and Umax is the optimal outcome and Us 
is a satisfactory level between the two. 
 
Relevance for incentives 
It seems that a framework for behaviour change would need to account for the 
bounded decision making abilities of individuals. Rather than being a utility-
maximisation problem, it is more likely that the decisions to start, persist, desist and 
abstain from unhealthy behaviours and the impact of incentives in this process will be 
the result of ‘satisficing’. 
 
2.5.1.2. Imperfectly ‘rational’ addiction models  
Becker and Murphy’s rational addiction model is predicated on rational choice theory 
(75) and attendant assumptions that individuals carefully weigh-up the consequences 
of current and future consumption and have exponential time preferences. However, 
there is evidence that addicts and non-addicts alike are not effective at predicting 
future preferences (319, 368), that humans do not conform to standard discounted 
utility assumptions (321) and are influenced by factors excluded from rational 
addiction models such as social norms.(316) A number of other addiction models 
have been proposed which relax these assumptions. Sloan (285) describes these 
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models of addiction as being ‘imperfectly rational’ as they may assume that 
individuals (i) have time-inconsistent preferences (e.g. employ hyperbolic discount 
rates); (ii) underestimate the risks of their current behaviour; (iii) have cognitive 
difficulties in estimating risk levels or in learning from the experiences of others; 
and/or (iv) have imperfect information about their own risk of addiction. 
The Myopic model of addiction (Pollack, 1970)(369), assumes that addicts are not 
forward looking in their consumption planning. There is evidence – for example in 
smoking from Gruber and Köszegi - that they do consider future prices in decision 
making.(293) Elsewhere there are confirmatory studies; a simulation analysis by 
Frank indicates that addicts may indeed by myopic but that this might also be 
rational.(370) The ‘Primrose Path’ model of Herrnstein & Prelec (1992)(371) also 
assumes myopia and that habit formation is a slow and gradual process; as such, 
individuals ‘sleep-walk’ into addiction rather than consciously choose it as the best 
course of action. This may be explained with an adaptive utility model where 
individuals constantly adjust their utility to (for example) greater levels of obesity.(372) 
There have been few economic explorations of this theory and it is possibly only 
informative about the process of habit formation rather than behaviour change.  
Orphanides and Zervos’s (1995) model incorporates time-inconsistent preferences 
and, by incorporating uncertainty in beliefs about addiction, allows for people not to 
choose to become addicts but fall into it unwillingly and with regret.(373) There is 
much evidence to suggest that individuals do regret unhealthy consumption (e.g. in 
smoking (374)). Elsewhere, Suranovic and colleagues present a bounded rational 
addiction model, which also does not require addicts to be ‘happy’ and to choose their 
predicament.(366) Using smoking as an example, they formally include quitting (or 
adjustment) costs which are higher, the more a person smoked. Incorporating these 
quit costs they are able to show why an individual might be unhappy with their 
unhealthy lifestyle yet be unable to change it. Using the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth data, a US study found results that empirically supported the Suranovic et al 
model. They found that smoking cessation relapses increased when the costs of 
withdrawal increased (through weight gain).(375)  
 
Rosin presents less an addiction model but a theoretical framework for understanding 
dieting behaviour and failure which includes social norms, and time-inconsistent 
preferences.(376) Elsewhere Chen and Petrie model the decision to quit smoking 
incorporating risk aversion and uncertainty.(377) However, no empirical analyses 
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have been conducted on these propositions hence their predictive ability is 
undetermined. 
Robust empirical comparisons of the predictive power of rational and imperfectly 
rational (and irrational) models could not be identified in the review. Research 
suggests that different models can lead to different results and implications for policy 
thus the relaxing of assumptions in the rational addiction model have a non-trivial 
impact.(378) 
 
Relevance for incentives 
Several competing theories of addiction have been proposed where rationality is not 
a requirement. These may have a role, not in describing how incentives may influence 
the decision to change behaviour or the probability of success, but rather in describing 
how healthy habits may be formed (which may be initiated by incentives). Of note is 
the fact that most addiction models formulate addiction as a decision about whether 
to persist or desist with a behaviour accounting for the fact that changing behaviour 
has costs. 
 
2.5.1.3. Nudge and MINDSPACE 
Nudge is a general concept outlined in the eponymous 2008 book by Thaler and 
Sunstein (79) who define a nudge as: 
“...any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable 
way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
consequences. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap 
to avoid.” [page 6] 
The definition is important as it sets out the boundaries of the theory application and 
highlights a requirement that interventions should be both cheap to implement and 
not intrude on people’s lives. The philosophy of ‘libertarian paternalism’, upon which 
the nudge ethos is based, is seen as a route to “minimal government” and offers an 
alternative to ‘nannying’. This has clearly resonated with some politicians and is likely 
why the theory has enticed governments in the UK and US (379) and is being 
exported to other nations such as Australia, France and Canada. While uptake of the 
concept has been rapid and at the highest levels of public policy making, the danger 
that policy will advance ahead of evidence has been a cause for concern.(25, 361, 
380-384) A recent report by the English House of Lords Science and Technology 
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Select Committee on Behaviour Change concluded that currently there was limited 
evidence for the effectiveness of nudges and that the:  
“....central finding is that non-regulatory measures used in isolation, including 
“nudges”, are less likely to be effective [in changing behaviour]”(385) 
The government response conceded this was a fair conclusion and the Behavioural 
Insights Team have initiated a number of clinical trials of nudge-based interventions 
with the results pending (359, 386, 387) while studies begin to emerge elsewhere 
showing positive (387-389) and mixed results.(390, 391) 
The MINDSPACE framework developed by the Behavioural Insights Team is inspired 
by Nudge.(80) The definition of each feature is briefly described in  
Table 7. 
 
Table 7: MINDSPACE definition 
Messenger Who delivers the message influences our response 
Incentives We respond to incentives but certain rules can be applied 
– i.e. we respond more to losses than gains 
Norms We are heavily influenced by what others do (and what we 
think they do) 
Defaults We have a default bias and often go with it without making 
a conscious choice 
Salience We pay particular attention to what is novel and relevant to 
us 
Priming Our behaviour is often influenced by sub-conscious cues 
Affect Behaviour can be driven by emotions 
Commitment We are keen to stick to the commitment we make 
(especially if made in public) and reciprocate 
Ego We act in ways that make us feel good 
 
MINDSPACE is a collection of existing theories from psychology and behavioural 
economics. The framework is not generally applied wholesale but represents a 
behavioural toolkit informing on how particular biases may be targeted to bring about 
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desired changes. The Department of Health outlined in their 2011 report ‘Changing 
Behaviour, Improving Outcomes: A New Social Marketing Strategy for Public 
Health’(392) instances where a number of studies incorporating these strategies have 
been initiated. Studies employing the framework currently underway in the health 
arena include a trial of ‘prompted choice’ for organ donation which is hoped to 
increase the number of donor registrations and another study which tackles binge 
drinking in universities by using social norm techniques. Of the nine case studies 
highlighted in the Behavioural Insights Team report, three clearly relate to 
(dis)incentives. One is a collaborative study with Boots pharmacy using financial 
commitments and incentives to encourage weight loss; another a partnership with a 
childrens’ TV show (Lazytown) where children sign monthly ‘energy contracts’ 
committing to a healthy diet and exercise and for which they receive rewards; and in 
physical activity, evaluating schemes such as ‘Step2Get’ initiative in London that 
offers incentives for children to walk to school. 
The Behavioural Insights Team has recently proposed what is essentially a revised 
formulation of this behaviour change framework called EAST - Easy, Attractive, 
Social, Timely.(393) This was developed as they felt MINDSPACE was too complex 
and that a simpler framework – which still includes incentives, defaults and social 
factors - would be more likely to be used in practice. To date, there have been no 
economic considerations or empirical tests of these theories as a collective framework 
although the insights team have been conducting trials of interventions that target 
specific theories in Nudge and MINDSPACE. Examples include encouraging smoking 
cessation in pregnant women by placing stickers on pregnancy tests and by trialling 
different website messages for the Stoptober smoking cessation campaign.(394) 
 
Relevance for incentives 
Nudge and MINDSPACE are loose collections of ideas for bringing about behaviour 
change with minimal interference by targeting key behavioural biases. Although 
nudge does refer to deposit contracts (financial disincentives), there is debate as to 
whether incentives fit with the concept of libertarian paternalism.(383) Certainly it 
does not fit with the definition of nudge provided. Others have made a clearer 
distinction between nudges and incentives: 
“Nudges are ways of influencing choice without limiting the choice set or making 
alternatives appreciably more costly in terms of time, trouble, social sanctions, and 
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so forth. They are called for because of flaws in individual decision-making, and they 
work by making use of those flaws.” (Hausman & Welch 2010, 126)(395) 
Both Nudge and MINDSPACE contain elements of behavioural theory of potential 
use for describing incentives; however, the individual decisional ‘flaws’ are described 
in more detail below.  
 
2.5.1.4. System 1 and System 2 
Thinking, Fast and Slow is a book by Daniel Kahneman (208) that draws together 
some of his work from previous decades under a general theory about decision 
making. It proposes that individuals have two systems for decision making; System 
1, a fast system based on associative memory which is frequently used, subconscious 
and automatic; and System 2, a slow system which is deliberative, conscious and 
logical. It goes on to focus on System 1 describing the biases and heuristics that we 
rely on and the short-comings of these. The effects of anchoring, framing, priming, 
optimism and default biases, ego depletion and endowment effect on decision making 
are discussed. The importance of such heuristics and associative consumption has 
been corroborated in several studies.(396, 397) Kahneman and colleagues offered 
results from a brain imaging study showing differential brain activity following different 
types of decision making in a laboratory test as evidence of the existence of the dual-
system.(398) However, no formal (behavioural) economic model encompassing 
Kahneman’s dual-system approach could be identified. As they are dealt with 
elsewhere, the main components of the theory that are relevant to incentives (such 
as Prospect Theory) are reviewed later on.  
 
Relevance for incentives 
Kahneman’s proposition of a dual-decision making system (System 1, System 2) 
could offer an alternative explanation to the formation of ‘habits’. It is possible that the 
‘decision’ to persist with unhealthy behaviours is processed by System 1 and thus is 
associative or ‘hard-wired’ and consequently difficult to alter. System 2 may deal with 
decisions about health behaviour, weighing up the pros and cons of changing. Since 
new behaviours may be costly (in terms of time and overcoming cognitive and 
psychological barriers), they may not pass the threshold for action. Should these 
barriers be overcome and the individual attempts behaviour change, the marginal 
costs in continuing with the healthy behaviour may be lower as time passes; decisions 
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to engage in it will be shifted to System 1 and hence, after a time, become automatic 
(and more likely). 
This might be an argument for the use of incentives and counter-argument to those 
who question their sustainability. The role of incentive may only to be to secure 
participation (“foot in the door” approach) and the remainder of the change process 
could be a natural shift of desired behaviour to System 1. Should this be the case, it 
would only be necessary to determine the value of the incentive that would be 
required to outweigh the additional costs of behaviour change. 
 
2.5.2. Theories relating to motivation 
2.5.2.1. Crowding theory 
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is key to understanding how 
and whether financial incentives work. Intrinsic motivation is the aspect of behavioural 
drive that emanates from innate processes (which may be intrinsic reward or 
punishment processes). In a general context, people might derive this ‘feel-good-
factor’ utility from pro-social or altruistic acts such as volunteering, recycling, helping 
others, being creative, achieving something at work, completing a task deemed 
worthwhile, or fulfilling a commitment (to yourself or others). In the context of 
behaviour change, individuals may be driven to stop smoking or lose weight because 
they would feel better about themselves, feel a sense of achievement, receive social 
approval, etc. (See Table 6). Extrinsic motivation is generated by external pressure, 
demands or rewards. In the case of incentives for healthy behaviour it takes the form 
of financial remuneration for achieving health targets which are set by an external 
agent assumed to be acting in the individual’s best interests.  
The distinction between the two types of motivation is important because there is 
evidence that they can be mutually exclusive – particularly, that extrinsic motivation 
may ‘crowd-out’ intrinsic motivation. The concept of crowding-out was developed by 
Richard Titmuss in his book entitled ‘The Gift Relationship: from Human Blood to 
Social Policy’(154) in which he predicted that offering extrinsic rewards for a task may 
extinguish the intrinsic motivation for it and have the effect of lowering overall 
motivation. Formerly intrinsically rewarding tasks are altered in the principal’s eye to 
become ‘jobs’ thus extinguishing their intrinsic value. There is some evidence 
corroborating the phenomenon in blood donation (155) although this is less clear 
when non-monetary incentives (e.g. vouchers) are used (156, 399) and there is also 
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evidence to the contrary.(230) There is a substantive body of research indicating 
crowding-out is a real phenomenon from the fields of education and employment 
(157, 158) and generally in pro-social behaviour.(400-402) 
Bruno Frey posited that crowding-out is dependent on the principal’s perception of 
the incentive; if it is seen as controlling or coercive, intrinsic motivation is reduced, if 
it is perceived as supportive, crowding-out does not occur.(159, 402, 403) Ariely and 
colleagues offer an ‘image-motivation’ hypothesis which holds that people derive 
utility from being seen publicly to behave pro-socially.(176) One study showed that 
the level of motivation (or effort) and crowding-out did in fact depend on whether the 
task was private or public. When an incentive was offered for a pro-social task in 
public, it actually reduced effort where the reverse was true in private. The highest 
performance effort was observed for the task when completed in public without an 
incentive.(176) The importance of this interaction of incentive, visability (or public 
judgement) and motivation was also raised in a review in blood donation 
research.(404) Elsewhere, Janssen and Mendys produced an economic model of 
crowding-out in blood donation distinguishing between altruists and egoists (405) 
predicting that incentives may crowd-out donations and that this would be 
exacerbated if incentives were removed after introduction. Perhaps the most 
commonly cited explanation for crowding-out is Cognitive Evaluation Theory (itself 
founded on self-determination theory) provided by Deci and Ryan. They suggest that 
a reduction in intrinsic motivation following extrinsic reward only occurs if the target 
task is considered to be ‘interesting’ (i.e. rewarding in itself).(406) 
Aside from research on blood donation, there is a dearth of studies exploring 
crowding-out in a health context. Crane and colleagues found that financial incentives 
did not reduce – what they referred to as – autonomous motivation for participation in 
a weight loss programme.(407) Moller and colleagues reported that incentives had 
no impact during a weight loss trial but was associated with worse weight loss 
maintenance outcomes when the incentive was removed.(408) In a subsequent 
analysis the authors concluded that incentives also reduced people’s enjoyment of 
the target activities (such as exercising).(409) In contrast, a recent review could not 
find any evidence of crowding-out in a health context. The explanation offered for this 
finding is that crowding only occurs when initial intrinsic motivation is high which is 
seldom the case in populations that would be offered the extrinsic incentive.(410) 
A lesser-reported, but potentially important, phenomenon is crowding-in, a converse 
proposition to crowding-out where extrinsic rewards not only increase motivation for 
the principal for the target behaviour but has positive ‘spill-over’ or ‘double-dividend’ 
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effects. These effects might include the principal engaging in other, non-incentivised 
healthy behaviours (which can be considered complementary goods); continuing the 
target behaviour beyond an incentivised period; or encouraging other, non-
incentivised, individuals to change their behaviour. To some degree, the sustainability 
of incentives for delivering complex behaviour changes may rely on the existence of 
crowding-in; that, when incentives are removed, as they must inevitably be, 
motivation remains. A small number of studies suggest that such a process might 
exist.(115, 223)  
 
Relevance for incentives 
Crowding theory may be an important consideration for incentive schemes. Research 
seems to suggest that whether crowding occurs or not depends on the perception of 
the individuals participating and/or the target behaviour. It is unclear whether the 
research in pro-social behaviours or the Cognitive Evaluation Theory generalises to 
health behaviour where the most obvious benefits are improved future health which 
is a private ‘good’: although it may save the NHS future costs, it’s unlikely that this 
public motivation is particularly strong.  
A detailed discussion on the nature of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for health 
behaviour change is beyond the current research. However, a few points are worth 
making on the distinction between the two. Intrinsic rewards rely on the principal’s 
perception of the task; the more self-directed, pro-social, public, selfless and arduous, 
the higher the rewards will be for completion. Consequently, it is possible to see how 
intrinsic rewards for the same task may vary from principal to principal. Crucially, it 
may depend on whether the principal views behaviour change as ‘worthwhile’ which 
itself may depend on social norms, education, and other factors and go some way to 
explain why different socioeconomic groups may have different levels of intrinsic 
motivation for the same behaviour. A simple representation of this is given in Figure 
8. 
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Figure 8: Likelihood of crowding-out 
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Incentive schemes clearly need to consider how the principal views the task and the 
reward. The suitability of incentives for certain tasks and for certain groups may be 
questioned on this basis. However, the phenomenon may only be a risk if intrinsic 
motivation is present at the outset and, if it is, incentives may not be required.  
 
2.5.2.2. Habit formation  
Although not strictly a behavioural economic concept, habit formation is studied more 
often as a behavioural phenomenon. Studies of habit formation are concerned with 
understanding how behaviours move from being conscious choices which may be 
infrequent or irregular in occurrence to more automated behaviours, conducted 
regularly or as part of a routine, the inception of which requires little or no cognitive 
effort. Examples of bad habits may include buying a doughnut every morning on the 
way to work, driving to work, watching television for several hours every night. 
Examples of good habits are taking the stairs instead of the lift at the office, snacking 
on fruit and nuts at work or cycling to work. 
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While elements of the addiction models may be useful in characterising habit 
formation, dedicated habit formation models were not identified in the review. The 
creation of habits of healthy behaviours is highly desirable.(411) Healthy behaviours 
often require intention, motivation and self-control which demand psychological effort. 
The desired behaviours are more likely to occur and be sustained if they are 
automatic and rely less on the effortful weighing up of pros and cons and consequent 
intention.(412, 413) A recent study found that habits were more likely to be formed in 
physical activity if the individual had intrinsic motivation for the behaviour at 
outset.(411)  
Psychological-based models of behaviour change were not part of the review scope. 
However, most acknowledge habit formation. A commonly used model is Prochaska 
and Di Clemente’s Transtheoretical Model (TTM) of Health Behaviour Change, also 
known as the ‘Stages of Change’ model.(187) The model breaks down behaviour 
change into stages defined by timing: Pre-Contemplation (no intention to change); 
Contemplation (the individual is thinking about change and weighing up the pros and 
cons but not ready to take action); Preparation (the individual is making plans to 
change behaviour); Action (the individual has made specific changes to their 
behaviour); Maintenance (Following a change in behaviour the individual is 
endeavouring not to relapse); Termination (the behaviour change initiated by the 
individual has become normative or associative and there is no longer a prospect of 
relapse). This has been criticised by some who believe the ‘stages’ of change as 
presented are essentially arbitrary and because it relies on the assumption that 
individuals usually make coherent and concrete plans.(32, 414) Studies have shown 
however that a majority of – for example – smoking quit attempts were 
unplanned.(415) In response West proposed the PRIME theory of motivation where 
the motivational system is conceptualised as chaotic and unstable and where change 
can occur at any time without planning but is also at risk from after-shocks or small 
triggers.(32) In contrast to the TTM, the PRIME model also acknowledges that 
addictive behaviour eventually becomes semi-automated. 
 
Relevance for incentives 
Proponents of incentive use argue that a major benefit they may offer is to encourage 
the formation of healthy habits. Incentives may encourage the initiation of behaviour 
(that may not occur in the absence of incentives) and motivate behaviour continuation 
in the short-run. It is hoped that before the incentivised period elapses, the desired 
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behaviour becomes more automatic and habitualised. Thus the impact of the 
incentive may extend beyond the incentivised period. It is conceivable however, that 
behaviours that were perceived as leading to disutility prior to attempts are actually, 
after an initial period, enjoyable and in that sense self-control and motivation are not 
necessarily required. For example, people may dislike the idea of exercise but after 
an initial period may enjoy the experience and endorphin rush they get and, similarly, 
people might stick with a healthy diet, not because of defaults in choice but because 
they feel in a better mood and have more energy. Self-motivation has been found to 
depend on the level of positive feeling one derives from exercise.(416) There is also 
evidence that once weight loss maintenance is achieved at 1 year, then it is easier to 
maintain between 2 and 5 years which may be attributable to the formation of good 
habits.(203) Kahneman’s System 1 and System 2 framework, which encapsulates 
themes of the main psychological models, may offer some explanation of habit 
formation. However, there has been no formal assessment of the framework for this 
purpose.  
 
2.5.3. Theories relating to willpower and self-control 
“You must bind me hard and fast, so that I cannot stir from the spot where you will 
stand me and if I beg you to release me, you must tighten and add to my bonds” 
[Homer, The Odyssey, Book XII, (c 800 BC)] 
 
In considering the issue of self-control, Thaler and Shefrin (417) conceptualised the 
problem as one of intertemporal choice. They refer to earlier work by George Stigler 
in 1966 (418) where the Christmas Club fund (where individuals put money into none-
interest yielding and inaccessible saving funds) quandary is explained by “another 
item of preference: a desire of people to protect themselves against a future lack of 
willpower”. Thaler and Shefrin offer a two-self model of economic man, the farsighted 
planner and the myopic doer. The former is concerned with lifetime utility, while the 
latter’s sole interest is in one period and is totally selfish. They go on to propose that 
the planner has two ways to control the consumption of the doer: “(1) The doer can 
be given discretion in which case either his preferences must be modified or his 
incentives must be altered, or (2) the doer's set of choices may instead be limited by 
imposing rules that change the constraints the doer faces.” 
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The self-control problem is an issue faced by people in many aspects of their life and 
wherever their good intentions (whether to save money, to eat less or exercise more) 
are vulnerable they use a number of self-control tactics. In many cases this involves 
making a commitment or removing options – for example, people will pay gym 
membership fees to make sure they go enough to ‘get their money’s worth’; heavy 
smokers or drinkers will try to limit consumption by purchasing one packet or bottle at 
a time even though it can be more costly and be greater hassle continually having to 
make new purchases; and heavy spenders cut up credit cards.  
Baumeister and Tierney describe willpower, the ability to control our behaviours in the 
face of temptation, as being like a muscle, which can be depleted after over use but 
which can be trained to become stronger.(206, 419) They go on to distinguish 
between four different uses of willpower; to control our performance, our thoughts, 
our emotions and our impulses. In a series of experiments, Baumeister’s group found 
that exerting will or self-control is tiring and that people are less able to exert this 
control in subsequent tasks. This process has been termed ‘ego depletion’ and 
corroborated in many studies.(420) Ego depletion may be overcome by incentives as 
it is related to loss of motivation rather than cognitive overload.(420)  
There has been much work in psychology on health behaviour and self-control (421), 
self-efficacy (234) or self-regulation (422) and a number of attempts by economists 
to integrate these concepts in behavioural models.(423-426) The general concept has 
been found to be important in weight loss (238, 427), smoking (428), alcohol 
consumption (429) and physical activity.(238, 430) It appears to improve with age 
(431) but is at risk when people become depressed or are in a low mood state.(432, 
433) Gul and Pesendorfer’s model (434) aimed to estimate the preference for 
commitment or self-control in dynamically consistent individuals. Their model 
included, not just choices of consumption, but choices between choice sets and 
concluded that opting for restricted choices may lead to better outcomes. Miao 
employed the Gul and Pesendorfer self-control utility model to consider optimal entry 
and exit investment decisions for a consumer with discount rate and self-control 
problems and for considering willingness to exercise.(435) The model, in contrast to 
the hyperbolic discounting model, is time consistent and includes ‘temptations’ that 
the agent must resist. 
In contrast, Fudenberg and Levine present a quasi-hyperbolic discounted, dual-self 
model of self control (423) where the decision problem is conceptualised as a game 
between a “sequence of short-run impulsive selves and a long-run patient self”. 
Similar to Gul and Pesendorfer, one prediction of their model is that individuals have 
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a preference for commitment devices to optimise utility. An alternative approach 
adopted by Brocas and Carillo (436) uses the principal-agent approach to consider 
the problem of self control. They propose that a forward-looking but unaware system 
(the principal) must make consumption decisions to maximise utility for itself and a 
myopic but informed system (the agent). As the principal lacks complete information, 
some choices are made by the agent although these may be from restricted choice 
sets which exclude unhealthy options. Here, again, Kahneman’s two-system concept 
of decision making seems to resonate since part of System 2’s role is to monitor the 
actions and choices suggested by System 1: 
 “there are vital tasks that only System 2 can perform because they require effort and 
act of self-control in which the intuitions and impulses of System 1 are overcome.” 
[Thinking, Slow and Fast; page 31] 
 
Relevance for incentives 
Willpower and self-control are clearly key in determining the success of behaviour 
change. The ego depletion work by Baumeister and colleagues (437) appears to 
suggest that willpower is an exhaustible resource which has important implications 
for incentive design. The main potential implication for behaviour change is that 
willpower may become depleted after a time and it may become more difficult for 
individuals to stick to new behaviours. This would suggest that incentives may need 
to change in line with this to bridge the willpower or motivation deficit. 
There are probably at least four noteworthy components to these general concepts 
of self-control: 1) Whether an individual believes – in part a function of education, faith 
in information on risks of unhealthy behaviours – that they have any say in their health 
(whether it is internally or externally controlled – the “when your time’s up, your time’s 
up!” attitude; 2) assuming that they believe 1) to be true, the general extent to which 
they feel they have the self-control and willpower to change behaviour; 3) how this 
self-control fluctuates over time and to what degree it becomes ‘depleted’; 4) related 
to 3) is which system is engaged in the decisional process – when behaviour becomes 
automatic, self-control (and therefore depletion) may no longer be an issue.  
According to West (32) the valence associated with addictive substances (or 
unhealthy behaviours) is chaotic and unstable. It is likely to be in flux throughout the 
day due to neurological, psychological, physiological cues. For example, a smoker 
may crave a cigarette first thing in the morning or after a meal and those on a diet 
may face greater cravings when out with friends for a meal or if they see nice food in 
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a magazine or on television. This being the case, the incentive level (which for 
practical reasons cannot move in line with these fluctuations) must be high enough to 
ensure that motivation is retained (that the pros outweigh the cons) at the height of 
the cravings and cognitive costs that the individual may face.  
 
2.5.4. Theories relating to time-preference 
2.5.4.1. Hyperbolic discounting  
Traditional models of temporal decisions required that people discounted future utility 
at an exponential rate. However, Strotz (1955) explored what happened if this 
assumption was relaxed and preferences were no longer assumed to be consistent 
over time, that people were ‘dynamically inconsistent’.(438) Many studies indicate 
that individuals do not employ normal (exponential) or consistent discount rates 
assumed in Grossman and rational addiction models but rather employ what is 
termed hyperbolic (126, 321, 345, 424, 439-442) or quasi-hyperbolic discount 
rates.(443) A full description of the different models is available elsewhere.(444) Put 
simply, given two rewards, one smaller and received earlier than the other, larger 
reward, people’s preferences for the smaller vs. the larger reward often changes as 
a function of the timing of the choice even though the delay between the two rewards 
stays the same. This was termed ‘hyperbolic discounting’ by George Ainslie (445) 
and describes the phenomenon where individuals have higher discount rates for 
intertemporal tradeoffs that occur sooner than for those that occur further in the future, 
expressed formally: 
𝑉𝑝 =  
𝑉
1 + 𝑘𝐷
 
Where Vp and V are the discounted and undiscounted rewards, respectively; k is a 
parameter denoting sensitivity to delay and D is the delay.(446) An example might be 
that an individual would prefer to receive £100 now rather than £110 tomorrow but 
would rather have £110 in a year and a day than have £100 in a year. The implied 
discount rate is the same in both options but a preference reversal means people are 
inconsistent in their discounting. 
It has been shown that hyperbolic discount rates can predict health behaviour.(447) 
Time preference or discount rates have been argued to be key in health behaviours 
such as smoking (329, 330, 332, 333, 441) (448), unhealthy diets (335), obesity (336, 
337, 449), exercise (447), addiction (338) and alcohol abuse (339) (although not all 
95 
 
 
 
studies corroborate this finding (341)). Discounting has been found to differ by gender 
(344) and there is some evidence that it is negatively associated with income levels 
or social status(323, 450) and mood.(451-453) Research also suggests that the 
degree of discounting also depends on the size of the reward (the magnitude 
effect)(454, 455) with small rewards being heavily discounted (the peanuts 
effect).(456) While there is a clear and commonly found relationship between 
discounting and health some argue that the direction of causality is from health to 
time preference – that poor health (or health expectations) lead people to become 
more present-focussed and employ greater delay discounts.(323)  
 
Relevance for incentives 
While some believe that hyperbolic discounting is in fact rational (457) what is less 
arguable is that it better reflects temporal decision making than exponential 
discounting. A key interpretation of hyperbolic discounting is that individuals are 
‘present-biased’ and consequently have self-control problems – thus plans to change 
behaviour are undermined by high present discount rates. Given this, time preference 
may have a role in explaining both unhealthy behaviours and the success or failure 
of behaviour change attempts. If, as some studies indicate, those in lower income 
groups have higher discount rates than higher income groups, then this may partly 
explain why they are more likely to engage in unhealthy behaviours. We must then 
ask the question: to what degree is an individual’s discount rate an innate quality or 
a natural and rational response to their life situation – i.e. living in the now because 
future prospects (including health) look (or are perceived to be) bleak. The 
implications for incentive design may be that rewards should not be delayed unduly 
and should be of sufficient value to avoid heavy discounting (the peanuts effect).  
 
2.5.4.2. Picoeconomics and Multiple selves 
“With every day, and from both sides of my intelligence, the moral and the 
intellectual, I thus drew steadily nearer to that truth, by whose partial discovery I have 
been doomed to such a dreadful shipwreck: that man is not truly one, but truly two.”  
(The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, Robert Louis Stevenson) 
 
The conundrum of decision making over time is intertwined with the idea of multiple 
selves which was discussed earlier; of the individual being different entities in time 
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with different wants. This concept is covered by Thaler and Shefrin’s theory of multiple 
selves (the farsighted planner and the myopic doer) used to explain self-control (417) 
and by Schelling (458) describing the internal fight a smoker may experience: 
"Everybody behaves like two people, one who wants clean lungs and long life and 
another who adores tobacco or another who wants a lean body and another a dessert. 
The two are in a continual contest for control; the 'straight' one often in command 
most of the time, but the wayward one needing only to get occasional control to spoil 
the other's best laid plan." 
An influential psychologist in this field was George Ainslie who developed the theory 
of ‘Picoeconomics’.(445, 459) Picoeconomics is the concept that many interpersonal 
economic phenomena also apply at an intra-personal level; that individuals operate 
in a market place and make decisions and choices with other intertemporal versions 
of themselves. Within this, Ainslie thought hyperbolic time preferences dictated that 
current versions of yourself made choices and decisions that are incompatible with 
the preferences of future versions of yourself but that the future self had to accept 
these as they are locked in by earlier choices. Relating back to issues of hyperbolic 
discounting and self-control, Picoeconomics suggests that there are optimal 
strategies for dealing with this by making the current self make commitments.   
Elsewhere, Laux and colleagues consider unhealthy behaviours and addictions as an 
interpersonal, intertemporal externality – i.e. costs incurred by the future self due to 
the consumption of the current self.(460)  
 
Relevance for incentives 
Understanding inter-temporal preferences is key to finding a solution to problems of 
willpower and self-control which are often the beginning and (premature) end of 
behaviour change endeavours. Issues of self-control and willpower are ignored by 
traditional economic theory which states an individual decides on the best course of 
action and then completes the action without fail. While incentive design need not 
explicitly incorporate ideas of multiple selves, they should be created such that heavy 
discounting is avoided. The growth in websites offering platforms for commitment 
(such as SticCK and BeeMinder discussed in the Introduction) indicate that ideas 
relating to self-control devices have gained prominence.  
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2.5.5. Heuristics and biases 
2.5.5.1. Prospect Theory and loss aversion 
Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory (208, 461) was a key development in 
behavioural economics. They challenged Daniel Bernoulli’s theory on the utility of 
money and particularly the differences in utility impact between losses and gains. 
Offered as a challenge to expected utility theory it outlines a number of human flaws 
in decision making under uncertainty. Kahneman outlined three key cognitive 
principles that underpinned the theory: that the reference point for decisions matters; 
that people have diminishing sensitivity to changes in wealth (or other factors); and 
that people are loss averse. Bernouilli had showed that people did not evaluate 
gambles in a way consistent with expected utility theory. For example, most would 
prefer a guaranteed prize of £100 over a gamble with a 10% chance of winning £1050 
even though the gamble has a higher expected value (£105 vs. £100). However, 
prospect theory highlighted the willingness to take a gamble is affected by the 
alternative options as illustrated in the decision problems below: 
Choice 1: would you rather have a guaranteed £900 or have 90% chance of winning 
£1000? 
Choice 2: would you rather lose a guaranteed £900 or have a 90% chance of losing 
£1000? 
While the expected value of both options in Choices 1 and 2 are the same (£900 and 
0.90 x £1000), many people would choose the guaranteed £900 gain in Choice 1 and 
take the risk of losing £1000 rather than losing £900 for certain in Choice 2. Thus, our 
willingness to take risks is not equivalent in gains and losses. This is illustrated in 
Figure 9 which shows the utility impact of (monetary) losses and gains. The figure 
shows the ‘S’ shape of utility representing diminishing marginal returns (the more we 
gain, the less utility we obtain from each incremental gain) but, importantly, the curves 
are not the same shape in the gain and loss parts of the graph. The curve in the loss 
section is much steeper than in the gain section indicating that losses lead to much 
greater changes (reductions) in utility than gains of the same value, or “losses loom 
larger than gains”. This finding underlines the importance of loss aversion in decision 
making and debunks the expected utility theory tenets that reference points are 
irrelevant and that people only care about absolute wealth, not relative wealth. 
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Figure 9: Prospect theory - utility of gains and losses 
 
 
This is given by the following equation:  
𝑈𝑒 = ∑ 𝑤
𝑛
𝑖=1
(𝑝𝑖)𝑣(𝑥𝑖) 
where Ue is expected utility of decisions, prospects or gambles where pi is the 
potential probabilities and xi the outcome. The functions w and v are weights for 
assigning values to the probabilities and outcomes, respectively. We can conclude 
that people are risk averse except when all the prospects on offer are unattractive in 
which case people become optimistic and risk seeking. This behavioural 
phenomenon may explain not just our attitudes to financial gambles but to risky 
behaviour itself. For example, imagine the following choice between:  
Option A: Give up salty and fatty food and start going to the gym 
Option B: Continue to eat what you like and have a 5% risk of a stroke in next 10 
years 
It is possible to see how individuals may follow one of the major findings of prospect 
theory: “In bad choice, where a sure loss (changing health behaviour) is compared to 
a larger loss (stroke) that is merely probable, diminishing sensitivity causes risk 
seeking” (Thinking, Fast and Slow; page 285) and go for option B. The theory has 
been applied in the design of a number of interventions.(462-464) 
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Relevance for incentives 
The implications of prospect theory for incentives are two-fold. Firstly, people would 
prefer certain rewards (providing they are of a sufficient magnitude) over uncertain 
ones even if the expected value is the same; secondly, due to loss aversion, people 
will be highly motivated to avoid losing money as this is felt keenly. Thus, deposit and 
commitment contracts, where individuals pledge money that is returned to them only 
if they succeed in agreed behaviour change may on average be a more powerful 
motivator than positive incentives. However, their suitability for use in low income 
groups is questionable and – assuming such schemes are voluntary – they would 
probably suffer from very low participation in these groups which in turn would 
jeopardise any opportunity to reduce health inequalities.  
One criticism of Prospect Theory is that is does not accommodate regret or 
disappointment.(208) Some psychologists believe that the desire to minimise regret 
rather than the desire to maximise outcomes may sometimes be the driving force in 
decision making. When decisions are repeated, this may be a useful tool in incentive 
design. For example, in one period where the individual failed to achieve their targets, 
informing them what they could have won may well augment motivation for the next 
period.(465) 
Not unrelated to Prospect Theory and intensively researched by the same author is 
people’s ability to judge the probability of events. Kahneman has concluded from his 
work and that of colleagues that people overestimate the probabilities of unlikely 
events. This suggests that, even though people prefer certain rewards, lotteries may 
be a more cost-effective form of incentive than guaranteed incentives. In addition, 
research shows that lotteries will be more attractive than certain rewards if the certain 
reward is small; partly because people over-estimate their chance of winning but also 
people discount small rewards heavily (the peanuts effect again).(456) 
 
2.5.5.2. Endowment effect 
The endowment effect (466-468) describes the phenomenon that people value things 
more if they own them. This is evidenced by studies showing people are willing to pay 
more to keep something than they would to buy the same thing from someone else. 
Like all theories described in this section, it represents a contravention of classical 
100 
 
 
 
economic theory which states that an individual’s willingness to accept should be the 
same as their willingness to pay. The explanations for this phenomenon are varied 
but loss aversion is usually offered as the cause – when we own something, giving it 
up has the effect of a loss and, as outlined previously, losses are keenly felt.  
 
Relevance for incentives 
The application for incentives is that promising a reward with the threat of reducing or 
removing it with failure may elicit a stronger behavioural response than only offering 
the reward if behavioural targets are met. A recent study by Hossain and List found 
that worker motivation was higher when they were working to retain a provisional 
bonus than if they were working to attain a bonus.(469) The authors found that this 
‘framing manipulation’ led to a 1% increase in team productivity and concluded this 
was driven by ‘loss aversion’. No studies of incentives in health have been found to 
adopt this format. 
 
2.5.5.3. Mental Accounting 
Richard Thaler and colleagues developed the theory of mental accounting; the theory 
that individuals parse out their money into different mental accounts.(470) People 
may have different accounts for salary, food and clothes and money is not easily 
switched between them - that is, it is not fungible. A classic study highlighting this 
phenomenon found individuals may be willing to travel to save £5 on a £15 radio but 
not to save £5 on a £240 refrigerator.(471) 
The theory may explain why an individual might be relatively insensitive to a price 
increase in some things (e.g. cigarettes) but not to others (e.g. vegetables) and, 
consequently, why high price increases (e.g. in taxes) have not been met with a 
commensurate reduction in behaviour (especially in tobacco use). Mental accounts 
are self-control mechanisms to ensure we have enough sufficient funds to purchase 
the things we need and not spend too much on one category of need, thus neglecting 
another. A consequence is that funds for addictive goods may be ring-fenced and 
protected as this good is a ‘necessity’.  
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Relevance for incentives 
This phenomenon may have significance in describing the impact of incentives. For 
example, due to mental accounting, it is unlikely that individuals considering the level 
of incentive offered for smoking cessation will also factor in the amount of money they 
will save by not smoking. Thus incentive pricing for smoking cessation and reduction 
of alcohol consumption should ignore cost savings to the individual which might be 
large. In 2013 prices, a pack of 20 cigarettes will cost at least £6.50. If an individual 
smokes 20 cigarettes a day they will spend £197.71 a month or £2,372.50 a year on 
the habit. Table 8 illustrates smoking costs as a proportion of income. Given this, 
smokers may already have a significant financial incentive to quit but still many do 
not.  
Table 8: Costs of smoking 
 
Expenditure on cigarettes as % of 
monthly disposable income by 
income quintile* 
  
Cigarettes 
per day 
  
Monthly 
disposable 
income 
Lowest 
quintile 
(£840.67) 
Fourth 
lowest 
(£1,499.33) 
Third 
lowest 
(£2,179.67) 
Annual 
habit cost 
Monthly 
habit cost    
10 £1,187.55 £98.96 11.8%  6.6%  4.5%  
15 £1,781.33 £148.44 17.7%  9.9%  6.8%  
20 £2,375.10 £197.93 23.5%  13.2%  9.1%  
25 £2,968.88 £247.41 29.4%  16.5%  11.4%  
*From Department of Work and Pensions (2013) 
 
2.5.5.4. Status Quo Bias 
Status quo bias is the inclination for people to stick with their current situation even 
though a change in their behaviour would lead to better outcomes.(467, 472) 
Samuelson thought this bias resulted from: a) rational decision making due to 
transition costs and uncertainly; b) cognitive biases including loss aversion and the 
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endowment effect; c) psychological commitment relating to the sunk cost fallacy, 
regret avoidance and a desire for consistency.(472)  
 
Relevance for incentives 
This might be particularly important in health behaviour change and explain why it is 
so difficult to achieve. Status quo biases may highlight that there is a significant ‘cost’ 
threshold to overcome initially before change is initiated. Consequently, it may be 
beneficial for incentive pricing to include a signing-up bonus or large enough pay-off 
at inception to persuade individuals to overcome the initial cost of change threshold. 
 
2.5.6. Social factors 
Social factors are key in behaviour change (188) and likely to be important in 
understanding incentive effect.(80) It is probable that much of what we do is in part 
driven by what others do and what they expect.(473) Social norms (474) and social 
networks (475) may drive health expectations and behaviour. We may compare our 
health behaviour and status with others around us and be less inclined to quit smoking 
or go on a diet if people around us smoke and are overweight. Similarly, if several of 
your family or people in your neighbourhood die at 70 of cardiovascular disease you 
might perceive this as ‘normal’ and lower expectations for your own health in line with 
this. This would make behaviour change and the short-term costs associated with it, 
not worth the investment. 
Making commitments publicly will also augment motivation because if we fail we may 
feel we have let people down and that they will judge us negatively (e.g. as lazy or a 
failure) and, conversely, if we succeed the opposite will occur.(80) This social process 
which acts to magnify feelings is clearly dependent on the social group we are part of 
and interact with. If we are trying to stop smoking and most of our friends and family 
smoke not only will there be more environmental cues for smoking making quitting 
difficult, there will be no social pressure to quit and attempts to quit may not be judged 
favourably by others in the social group.  
 
Relevance for incentives 
Incentive schemes may capitalise on the issues above. For example, it may pay for 
behaviour change schemes to involve a public commitment (as is the case with 
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www.StickK.com which asks participants to name witnesses to their commitments), 
for rewards to be based on group performance and may benefit from inviting other 
members of the target individual’s social group (e.g. partner) to be involved in the 
scheme. A number of local authorities in the UK have run schemes for smoking 
cessation where the pregnant woman and her partner are both rewarded for 
cessation.(476)  
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2.6. Summary and discussion 
The introduction to the chapter set out a hypothesis on the process of behaviour 
change and impact of financial incentives on that process. The subsequent 
configurative review has outlined the published models and theories that might 
formally explain some of these aspects. The review identified a number of economic 
and behavioural-economic theories that seek to explain both unhealthy behaviour and 
behaviour change and described these sets of theories separately and discussed 
their strengths and weaknesses. Traditional psychological concepts of behaviour 
change were excluded from the review since they present a myriad of competing 
explanations with no consensus as to which is optimal. Evidence for the predictive 
power of the identified frameworks was, in the main, limited. The framework search 
results were searched for studies that presented empirical tests of the models but in 
most cases this produced few or no results. Consequently, for the main frameworks 
under consideration, brief searches were conducted of articles that had cited the 
framework to identify examples of empirical tests. The theories and frameworks and 
their strengths and weaknesses are briefly summarised again below along with the 
discussion on their suitability for inclusion in an incentive framework. 
 
2.6.1. Neo-classical economic theories 
The review categorised neo-classical theories into either; generalised utility-
maximisation models; human capital and health investment models; or rational 
addiction models. However, this is a false distinction to a degree as all could be 
thought of as utility-maximising frameworks. Utility-maximisation and rational 
consumer choice frameworks are the common building blocks of economic theory. 
Simply put, individuals make decisions and consumption choices that maximise their 
utility over a lifetime. Binkley et al and Cawley present frameworks based on utility-
maximisation relating to health. Binkley’s model relates to smoking starting and 
cessation decisions with the aim to maximise long term utility from income taking into 
account earnings and potential lost earnings through smoking-related illness. 
Empirical tests of the theory could not be identified. Cawley’s SLOTH (Sleep, Leisure, 
Occupation, Transportation and Household) model in contrast has been used, 
adapted and tested on a number of occasions. The SLOTH model estimates how 
individuals allocate time across activities to reach dietary targets. It improves on the 
Binkley model as it includes utility relating to well-being and not just income. 
Acknowledging that people have time and biological constraints as well as an income 
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constraint is a strength of the theory and it is a novel and useful addition to the 
literature. Predictions from the model include: a reduced demand for physical activity 
with increased earnings due to the increased opportunity cost; and reduced activity 
participation in those with children, presumably due to time constraints or since caring 
for children increases normal activity levels. The usefulness of the model is limited by 
the fact that it is only suitable for diet and physical activity and would not be relevant 
for other behaviours such as smoking or alcohol consumption where time and 
biological constraints are less relevant. Furthermore, empirical tests showed the 
model had only modest explanatory power.  
The Grossman health investment model has been applied many times and remains 
popular. It has been adapted and many of the shortcomings of the original model 
addressed; for example, with the incorporation of uncertainty into the model. While 
some of its predictions are intuitive (e.g. that improved education improves health 
production efficiency), the predictive power of the model has been criticised. There 
were supportive studies – for example, findings that people with higher income were 
more likely to modify their lifestyle following a diagnosis of high blood pressure; and 
that those who receive a health shock are more likely to change behaviour. However, 
Grossman fails to predict that health declines with lower socio-economic status and 
incorrectly predicts a positive relationship between health status and health 
investment.  
The Rational Addiction framework has also been extensively used across several 
behaviours and the developers claim it predicts unhealthy habit formation and 
explains phenomena such as binge consumption and cold turkey quitting. Evidence 
for the predictive ability of the model is mixed with some finding future prices are 
predictive of behaviour change and others finding that the model erroneously predicts 
addiction to harmless goods such as milk. Useful augmentations of the model include 
a Heckman double-hurdle approach where individuals face separate problems of quit 
attempts and then quit maintenance. However, as with other neo-classical 
frameworks, empirical tests of the model in behaviour change are scarce. The original 
model implausibly assumes that addicts choose their path and are content – i.e. there 
is no regret; this is counter-intuitive since many addicts are unhappy with their 
predicament and would prefer to quit unhealthy habits. According to rational addiction, 
addicts would simply choose to quit if they were unhappy with their current lifestyle 
and be successful in this endeavour. Clearly this does not reflect the situation for most 
people trapped in a cycle of unhealthy behaviour and these assumptions are a 
significant weakness of the model.  
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Since neo-classical models incorporate decisions about future consumption, they 
employ discount rates of future prices and utility. Traditionally this is incorporated as 
a constant rate. Despite the methodological difficulty in measuring this factor, it has 
been found to independently predict both unhealthy behaviour and behaviour change. 
However, many studies have shown the assumption of a constant discount rate to be 
inadequate and that time-inconsistent or hyperbolic discount rates better reflect inter-
temporal choices.  
The neo-classical approaches are limited by restrictive assumptions regarding 
rationality, perfect information, future consumption planning and constant 
discounting. Many of these have been relaxed in more recent adaptations but the 
predictive ability of the models remains mixed at best. Where findings are in line with 
predictions the underlying mechanism of action and causality is often undetermined 
as tests have been based on data from national databases of health and consumption 
which have limited variables available. For example, a change in behaviour following 
a health shock may relate to new information about health, a reduction in uncertainty 
in this information, social pressure or interventions from the health service (supply 
rather than demand). Thus the threat of exogeneity remains a significant weakness 
of these theories. 
The neo-classical models help to frame health decisions as any other consumption 
or investment decision: a rational human (Homo Economicus) simply weighing up the 
pros and cons of alternative courses of action and making choices that maximise their 
utility. Viewing health-related decisions in this way allows us to deconstruct the 
important factors and to try and identify a) causes of behaviour; b) routes to 
intervening; c) potentially optimal intervention design. Utility-maximisation is not the 
only theory in welfare economics although it does predominate. Capability theory – 
where welfare is judged on an individual’s ability to produce value - is a competing 
theory which may have some relevance for incentives. However, reviews of all 
economic paradigms was not feasible here. 
 
2.6.2. Behavioural economic theories 
Many of the adaptations of the neo-classical models have sought to improve on 
forerunning models by relaxing the assumptions of rationality and incorporating more 
behavioural aspects. For example, bounded rationality offers the alternative plausible 
paradigm to utility-maximisation where agents seek only to achieve a satisfactory 
level of utility. Of the behavioural theories identified, most were individual theories 
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and not cohesive frameworks. For example MINDSPACE is a collection of strategies 
for targeting biases and heuristics to deliver behaviour change. The exception to this 
was the imperfectly rational and ‘irrational’ addiction models. These introduce time-
inconsistent discount rates, uncertainty and regret associated with addiction and 
failure in quit attempts. Robust attempts to compare the predictive ability of rational 
and irrational addiction models could not be identified; however, the latter appear to 
offer greater face validity than the former. A particularly useful addition from irrational 
models is the assumption of greater costs of starting quit attempts due to withdrawal, 
something that has been empirically validated and is predictive of relapses (in 
smoking cessation attempts at least). 
The behavioural frameworks such as MINDSPACE and Nudge have not been 
accompanied by formal econometric representations. These are qualitative theories 
and loose collections of biases and heuristics and the relationships between them 
have not been described formally or tested empirically which is a significant limitation. 
In addition to these are individual theories and concepts such as Kahneman’s System 
1 and 2, hyperbolic discounting and willpower depletion. Again, taken separately, 
these do not described a process of behaviour change. However, some of these are 
potentially useful components of a framework for understanding the effect of 
incentives. The evidence for these theories tend to come in a different form to that of 
the investment in health and addiction models which have been applied to large panel 
datasets. Evidence for concepts such as System 1 and System 2 and willpower 
depletion come largely from laboratory experiments. These represent a more direct 
and robust evaluation of theory validity but the absence of larger-scale, empirical tests 
of these in real-world settings represents a limitation. 
Time preference was identified as important in understanding why people do not 
change behaviour and how incentives could influence this. Since the benefits of 
healthy behaviour are often in the future, those with high discount rates will devalue 
these benefits significantly and hence current unhealthy consumption will continue. 
Incentives are assumed to bring the reward forward in time making change more 
likely. However, hyperbolic discounting has consistently been found to improve on 
constant discounting in terms of predictive power.  
Kahneman’s dual consciousness system provides a neat theory to describe the way 
in which unhealthy behaviours may persist. Given that decisions carry a cognitive 
burden, choices regarding behaviour often follow a default, a quick and unconscious 
process. This might explain habits; how they persist and the additional (cognitive) 
costs in changing them. Since it is assumed that indefinite incentives are 
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unsustainable, the System 1 and 2 theory might provide both information on pricing 
levels needed to kick-start change and a route for incentives to have a lasting effect 
by influencing habits. There is growing evidence for the existence of a dual decision 
making system which comes from brain imaging during decision making tasks in a 
laboratory setting.  
The case for a role of willpower or some aspect of self-control in behaviour change 
also appears strong. A number of studies have shown a positive relationship between 
self-control and behaviour change. Furthermore, Baumeister and others have 
consistently found in experiments that willpower becomes depleted. After, periods of 
exerting self-control, this resource depletes and individuals are less able to resist 
temptation in the future. While they are intuitive and attractive, establishing the 
predictive power of theories such as System 1 and 2 and willpower depletion outside 
laboratory experiments is challenging since the variables required are quite specific, 
difficult to measure and thus unlikely to be available (and certainly not in large panel 
datasets). Furthermore, verifying them in a real-world test of incentives would be 
difficult. 
The review identified a number of other biases that may be important in explaining 
behaviour change and incentives including the default bias and prospect theory. 
Evidence supports the existence of these phenomena and they form the core of some 
of the behavioural economic approaches including Nudge and MINDSPACE. Finally, 
the concept of crowding was identified as important in understanding the impact of 
incentives. There is evidence from blood donation that this phenomenon may mediate 
the effectiveness of incentive schemes. It describes how the utility derived from 
behaviour change and incentives may be influenced by external factors such as how 
society perceives the behaviour and whether the behaviour is visible but also internal 
factors relating to the innate human reward system.  
There are several other heuristics and biases excluded from the review that 
undoubtedly influence people’s choices in everyday life such as framing and 
anchoring effects and confirmation bias. Confirmation bias occurs when we seek out 
information in our array that confirms our beliefs or what we want to believe. Ignoring 
all the people in their neighbourhood who died prematurely due to unhealthy 
behaviours, an individual who smoked or was overweight wishing to avoid cognitive 
conflict might believe: “Derek smoked all his life, never had a day off work and lived 
til he was 90 and John never smoked, never drank, cycled everywhere and died of a 
heart attack at 60”. These nuanced biases have not been covered in the review but 
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can conceivably contribute to the same issue in behaviour change – initial costs of 
change. 
 
2.6.3. Overall summary 
There are currently no frameworks which aim to describe and predict the impact of 
financial incentives for health behaviour change. The review did identify frameworks 
that have been used to describe behaviour change and other theories which may 
have a role in an incentive framework. The neo-classical theories are restricted by 
their assumptions and scope. However, the core principles are worth retaining with 
some adaptation. Despite widespread use, the empirical tests of these, especially 
with reference to behaviour change, are few and in those conducted results appear 
mixed. While neo-classical frameworks can be made more realistic by incorporating 
uncertainty in both information and investments and by making individuals myopic or 
present-biased and adding regret, they will still omit important concepts. They are 
aimed more at a macro level in describing behaviour investments and are not 
designed to describe the impact of particular interventions in detail. They omit key 
behavioural principles relating to control and crowding out. Furthermore, a micro-level 
framework is required to describe the design issues relating to incentives.  
It is acknowledged here and elsewhere that it is the combination of economics and 
psychology that provides the most promise for explaining behaviour.(465, 477) The 
emergence of behavioural-economic theories allows a more realistic explanation of 
decisional processes. The consideration of the individual behavioural factors covered 
in this review have sustained economists and psychologists over decades and 
produced hundreds of studies and extended econometrics proofs of theorem. It was 
not possible here to cover each in significant detail but sufficiently to determine 
whether these factors could explain the effectiveness of incentives and help with the 
design of the survey and inform the later research themes. The following brief chapter 
proposes a theoretical form describing the effect of financial incentives taking into 
account the process of behaviour change outlined previously and the theories 
reviewed here which underpin this. The theoretical model will be the basis for 
designing the incentive pricing survey. 
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3. Theoretical framework of financial 
incentives in health 
 
3.1. The need for a new framework 
A framework is quite a vague concept and can mean different things in different 
contexts and disciplines. In economics, frameworks are often formal econometric 
theoretical representations of the relationships between principals, agents and 
qualities of goods and services in the area of interest - for example, between 
consumers and the supply and price of goods. These frameworks are useful for 
introducing behavioural phenomena such as diminishing marginal utility and events 
such as changes in price or supply or improved information. Frameworks are useful 
for describing these relationships and for evaluating and predicting how changes and 
events can impact on demand and consumption; this in turn allows us to plan, create 
appropriate policy and design interventions. In the absence of a framework for 
incentives in health, the design of incentive schemes and understanding of their 
impact is likely to be less certain and more risky. Schemes may be less efficient and 
research questions in the field not targeted to the areas of greatest uncertainty.  
The previous chapter summarised the theories and frameworks that have been used 
to describe and predict behaviour change and also those that might be useful in 
explaining behaviour change and the role and impact of incentives. The frameworks 
identified were not adequate, either conceptually, from a face validity perspective or 
based on tests of their explanatory power. Several behavioural theories were thought 
relevant to incentives but did not constitute frameworks and were not presented 
together in a way so that they could be considered to capture the breadth of factors 
that are known to be important in behaviour change.   
For this reason a new framework is required to help better understand incentives. The 
framework should build on the idea of an individual trying to make decisions which 
provide satisfactory utility but capture the behavioural elements and acknowledge that 
choices are influenced by a number of biases and cognitive systems and that these 
interact with aspects of the incentive and individual. This chapter aims to achieve this 
by proposing a framework for capturing the impact of financial incentives. Based on 
the literature reviews of behaviour change frameworks and behavioural theories 
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relating to health, a theoretical framework is proposed in this chapter that seeks to 
explain: 
 
a) key factors in behaviour change 
b) the role of incentives within this process 
c) how features of incentive schemes and individuals receiving them can influence 
incentive effectiveness 
 
This framework formally conceptualises the hypothesised impact of incentives and 
helps to inform the development of the pricing survey and parameters within the 
model developed for the economic evaluation.  
The proposed framework is based on a bounded utility-maximisation problem and 
thus individuals attempt to achieve a satisfactory level of utility without being 
constrained by the neo-classical assumptions of perfect information and foresight. 
The framework does assume that consumers are forward looking to a degree but they 
are present biased and employ hyperbolic discounting. Many studies show that 
individuals discount in this way and not at a constant rate as presented in neo-
classical models. I incorporate the idea that there is a dual-system (in line with 
Kahneman’s System 1 and 2) for decision making. This idea has not previously been 
incorporated in health economic frameworks but provides an intuitive explanation for 
why unhealthy behaviour persists. Addiction models have considered habit stock to 
be a driving force of habits and others have considered the additional costs that are 
incurred in behaviour change. These still rely on the conscious weighing-up of 
options, however, and do not consider that behaviours persist because of decisional 
defaults or unconscious actions.  
The neo-classical models unrealistically predict that when the balance shifts and the 
costs begin to outweigh the benefits of unhealthy behaviour then individuals will 
choose to change and succeed. Adaptations have added uncertainty to this process 
without describing a clear mechanism of action. The proposition improves on this by 
specifying control or willpower as the key to this process with success depending on 
the degree to which willpower is depleted. Laboratory and questionnaire research 
would allow this value to be estimated empirically but inclusion here allows us to 
consider interventions that might target this element of the framework.  
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The generic frameworks in the review did not consider individual interventions and 
thus there were several factors relating to financial incentives that are not covered. 
Thus the proposal below describes not only the process of behaviour change but, 
separately, attributes of incentive schemes that could be relevant and theories for 
incorporating these in to scheme design. Thus the proposal goes beyond previous 
attempts by characterising in detail the components of incentives. To illustrate, the 
framework can acknowledge that crowding theory may hinder effectiveness and also 
how decisional flaws may be manipulated to improve design. For example, prospect 
theory predicts that people over estimate the expected value from lotteries and thus 
lotteries may be more cost-effective than guaranteed incentives in changing 
behaviour.  
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3.2. Proposition 
The following presents a descriptive theoretical model of decision making in health. 
The model is behavioural-economic in the sense that it does not assume ‘rationality’ 
and is not deterministic. Within this model a principal is presented as forward looking 
to a degree but employs high discount rates over future consumption and thus is 
present-biased. The concept of ‘dual selves’ proposed by Thaler et al (417) is not 
formally incorporated but factors consistent with this are. 
The framework incorporates the idea that the decision to change or continue a 
behaviour is to some extent a process of weighing-up the pros and cons of 
alternatives and choosing that which yields the greatest expected utility. In this sense, 
it is in the spirit of the utility-maximising theories outlined in Chapter 2. However, 
applying the behavioural theory of Simon (363), instead of utility maximising, the 
rationality of the principal is bounded and they seek to ‘satisfice’ and reach an 
‘acceptable’ level of utility only. 
‘Decisions’ are made by System 1 (S1) and System 2 (S2) based on proposition of 
Kahneman and colleagues.(208) S1 decisions are not processed but semi-automatic 
and thus rely less on the weighing-up of the pros and cons of alternative courses of 
action. S2 decisions are effortful and calculated. Only after behaviour has been 
engaged in for some (undefined length of) time does it move from S2 to S1. While 
determined by S2, behaviours are prone to failure due to a fluctuation in any of the 
contributing factors such as costs. Even in S2 processes, decisions are bounded and 
utility is not ‘maximised’. While strength of motivation is determined by expected 
utility, behaviour is dependent on decisional process and skills along with motivation. 
A principle engaging in unhealthy behaviour has a probability (p∆) of changing 
behaviour in the current period (t) or maintaining changed behaviour in the next 
period (t+1). This can be viewed as: 
 
𝒑∆ 𝒕 = 𝒇(𝑺𝟏𝜹,𝟐, 𝑴𝒐, 𝑾𝒑, 𝑬, 𝑶)   [1] 
 
Where 𝑆1,2 represents which of the dual-systems makes the ‘decision’ about 
behaviour. If it is S1 then it is likely that behaviour in t+1 will be equal to that in t since 
conscious decision making is limited and the principal ‘goes with the flow’. This is 
represented by the weighting factor 𝛿 in S1. If it is S2 in control then the weighing-up 
of other contributing factors becomes more important. The decision system employed 
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depends on the load factor (𝜎) equivalent to the number of times the behaviour (B) 
has occurred in the past and whether this is equal to or above a critical (undefined) 
threshold (𝑥): 
 
𝑆1,2 = {
1 𝑖𝑓  𝐵𝜎 ≥ 𝑥
2 𝑖𝑓  𝐵𝜎 < 𝑥
    [2] 
 
𝑀𝑜 is motivation, Wp is a measure of willpower or self-control, E is education and skills 
and O is a vector of other factors that might have influence such as social norms. E is 
important as it required for the principal to convert motivation into well-directed 
behaviour (e.g. knowledge is needed about diets and exercise). Thus an individual 
can be highly motivated to change but fail because they lack knowledge in how to 
change.  
The term motivation is used broadly here, it refers more generally to volition or 
demand for change. Overall motivation for behaviour change is Mo. Which, at time t0 
(baseline before change is initiated), can also be used as a measure of intention to 
change. 
 
𝑀𝑜 =
𝑈∆ 
𝑈¬∆ 
     [3] 
 
Where 𝑈∆ is the expected lifetime utility of changed health behaviour and 𝑈¬∆  is the 
expected lifetime utility of continuing with unhealthy behaviour. If Mo > 1 then 
behaviour change is more likely to be initiated or maintained; if Mo < 1 then the inverse 
is true. The greater Mo, the stronger the desire for change. 
The utility of not changing health behaviour (𝑈¬∆ ) is given by: 
 
𝑈¬∆ =  ∑ ?̂?((𝐵¬∆,
n
𝑡=1 𝐶, 𝐻)/(1 + 𝑘𝐷))  [4] 
 
Which is the lifetime (n is life expectancy) net present value of the sum of expected 
utility (?̂?) from the unhealthy behaviour (𝐵¬∆), from 𝐶 which is consumption of other 
goods and from 𝐻 which represents health. To obtain the net present values, a 
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discount rate is used to discount future utility. As proposed by Mazur and Ainslie, a 
hyperbolic discount rate is employed where k is the parameter denoting sensitivity to 
delay and D is the delay.(445, 446) This is contrary to rational economic theory but, 
as outlined in the review chapter, a better approximation of how people actually 
behave with regard to future costs and benefits. Thus the discount rate reduces as a 
function of the time to consumption and the principal is heavily present-biased.  
The utility of health (H) is a function of health status (direct ‘consumption utility’ of 
health – i.e. ‘feeling good’) and income (‘investment utility’ which is indirect utility 
resulting from the ability to earn income, itself subject to diminishing returns). Income 
is dictated both by ability to work and wage rate (W). These aspects are similar to the 
consumption and investment benefits used in the Grossman model covered in the 
neo-classical economic section of the previous chapter.(77) Health status is driven 
by physical and mental health components. While both are important determinants of 
health utility; mental health (and mood in particular) has additional importance as it 
dictates the expectations and perceptions of the future. Thus those with low mood 
may devalue future prospects leading to even greater discounting. Health status (Hs) 
is subject to decrements (HD) from ill-health relating to unhealthy behaviour which is 
probabilistic and determined by (1 – pe).  
 
𝐻 =  𝑓(𝐻𝑠 − (𝐻𝐷(1 − 𝑝𝑒)), 𝑊)   [5] 
 
Unlike the Grossman model, individuals cannot predict if and when they will be ill; as 
outlined by Arrow (1963), health is essentially uncertain.(478) In this behavioural 
model the decisions about behaviour change incorporate people’s expectations about 
future health and their belief about the consequences of their unhealthy lifestyle. Thus 
their perceived risk pe is assumed to be a function of their education: 
 
𝑝𝑒 = 𝑓(𝐸)      [6] 
 
Those with poorer (health) education will not fully understand the risks of their health 
behaviour and have a lower perceived pe. The utility associated with behaviour 
change (𝑈∆) with financial incentivisation is given by: 
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𝑈∆ =  ∑ ?̂?
∞
𝑡=1 ((𝐵c∆, 𝐶, 𝐻, 𝐼)/(1 + 𝑘𝐷))  [7] 
 
Which is the sum of lifetime expected utility of C and H (as above) and of Bc∆  
representing the cost (and benefits) of behaviour change. Bc∆  is given by: 
 
𝐵𝑐∆ = 𝑓(𝐹∆, 𝑇∆, 𝑊∆, 𝑃∆, 𝑌)    [8] 
 
Where F∆ represents the financial costs (for example the cost of a healthier diet or 
gym membership) and benefits (for example, money saved on cigarettes) of change; 
T∆ is the time costs (for example, the additional time required to prepare healthier 
meals and to exercise); W∆ is a stock of willpower which is necessary to overcome 
cognitive cost of having to learn new skills and maintain self-control; and P∆ 
represents the physical costs (such as withdrawal symptoms and strain of exercising) 
and benefits (feeling healthier). These costs and benefits will depend on Y which 
represents the type of behaviour being considered. For example, stopping smoking 
may save money but exercising will not; there will not likely be any cognitive benefits 
to any of the behaviour changes. While F∆ and P∆ have the capacity to be positive, 
overall Bc∆ will be negative. Excepting financial costs, these factors are a positive 
function of the strength of behaviour; hence, for example: the more an individual 
smokes, the more ‘costly’ it will be to stop.  
As outlined by Baumeister and colleagues and discussed in the review of behavioural 
theories, willpower is considered an exhaustible resource.(437) The principal is 
considered to have a stock of willpower (W∆) that is depleted over the course of 
engagement in behaviour change. Willpower in period t is equal to that in the previous 
period (t-1) minus additional cognitive costs (Cct) in exerting control of temptation in 
the current period.  
 
𝑊∆𝑡 =  𝑊∆𝑡−1 −  𝐶𝑐𝑡    [9] 
The literature review highlighted that status quo bias could result from very high initial 
costs in changing (467, 472) thus Cct is high initially but may fall over time. 
Acknowledging that willpower is a limited resource: 
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𝜃𝑤 = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑊∆  > 0
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑊∆  ≤ 0
    [10] 
 
Where 0 is a critical threshold value and 𝜃𝑤 is an indicator of whether willpower or 
self-control is fully depleted (=1) or not (=0). If 𝜃𝑤 = 1 the overall costs 𝐵𝑐∆ will be 
unsustainable.  
The final component of equation [7], I, is the utility derived from the financial incentive. 
As I occurs in time t, unlike future benefits of H, it avoids heavy future discounting. I 
is a function of the incentive level or price (Ip), a vector of factors denoting the 
incentive format including payment schedule and whether it is a lottery or guaranteed 
(If) and the individual’s marginal utility of income (M).  
 
𝐼 = 𝑓(𝐼𝑝, 𝐼𝑓 , 𝑀, 𝐶𝑜)    [11] 
 
The review of behavioural theories highlighted the importance of loss aversion (467) 
and prospect theory (461) is people’s response to losses and gains. Because of this 
we can assume that for the same expected value of 𝐼𝑝  I  for lottery < I for a certain 
reward which is <I deposit contract. However, this is sensitive to the magnitude effect 
(e.g. peanuts effect) which may reverse these preferences.(454)  
Co is the degree to which crowding-out occurs, itself a nested function of the task, the 
individual’s perception of the task and whether it is publicly visible or not. If crowding-
out does occur the overall effect will be to make 𝐶𝑜  negative. 
Assuming that education and wages are low and that the discount rate is high, and 
the principal is consequently heavily present-biased, the net present values of C and 
H in equations 4 and 7 will approach equivalence and the differential between 𝑈¬∆ and 
𝑈∆   will be determined by (I - 𝐵𝑐∆)− 𝐵¬∆.  
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3.3. Discussion 
The behavioural-economic theoretical framework proposed here offers a starting 
point for understanding the potentially important inter-relationships that explain the 
impact of financial incentives. The framework is useful for isolating the potential 
importance of different factors and possible factors to target in an intervention. For 
example, in the model, improvement in education (E) will help individuals appreciate 
the risk and consequences of unhealthy behaviour (pe) and be better able convert 
motivation into useful behaviour changes (equation 1) both of which would have the 
effect of increasing 𝑝∆ 𝑡. Those who are unemployed or on low wages will have lower 
future income and thus the value of avoiding future ill health will be low.  
Empirical testing of economic frameworks relies on the analysis of large, (often) panel 
datasets. To the authors knowledge, no datasets are available that include data on 
incentives and the other factors hypothesised to be important. Incentive datasets tend 
to include low numbers of participants, from small trials or local government schemes. 
Datasets from the conditional cash transfer schemes run in developing countries, 
large insurance companies and large US corporations may have sufficient sample 
sizes but they will not include data on factors such as time preference and motivation. 
Hence some aspects of the framework presented here is descriptive in nature. 
However, other aspects are empirically tested in the following chapters that report 
results of the incentive pricing survey. 
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4. Developing a contingent valuation 
survey 
 
4.1. Background 
Despite the sustained and increasing interest in incentive schemes as a tool for 
behaviour change, a number of key questions regarding their design and efficacy, 
their affordability, cost-effectiveness and acceptability still remain. These questions 
include: which health behaviours are incentives most effective for?; what type of 
incentive structure is most effective and does this vary between social groups or 
health behaviours?; what is the optimal pricing of incentive schemes? The latter 
question is the focus of this chapter; despite its obvious importance, little research 
has been done in this area.(162, 169)  
A review of incentives in weight loss trials could not identify in any of the published 
studies a rationale or justification for the choice of the incentive amount, frequency or 
method of administration of the financial incentives.(121) There is, however, evidence 
of some research addressing incentive amount; Cahill and Perera’s review of 
incentive studies in smoking found a weak trend in favour of incentives being more 
effective when they exceeded 1.2% of individuals’ disposable incomes.(116) More 
recently, a small number of primary research studies have sought to identify optimal 
incentive pricing. In Australia, Bonevski and colleagues conducted a survey of 
incentive pricing for smoking cessation finding that the most common incentive level 
required for 12 months of cessation was either $500 or $1000.(170) Elsewhere, You 
et al conducted a DCE in the US to identify incentive levels for weight loss (171) 
finding that an incentive of $98 results in a predicted participation rate of over 90% 
among overweight or obese men and women. Thus, while research is beginning to 
address incentive pricing, there are no published UK studies in this area and, hence, 
is an important knowledge gap worthy of investigation.(115, 116, 160, 172)  
In the relatively few trials of financial incentives conducted to date, there has been a 
wide variation in the level of incentives offered to participants. A US study by Volpp 
and colleagues offered incentives of up to $750 if smokers joined a cessation 
programme and quit for 12 months (117) and an ongoing study offers a maximum of 
£752 (up to 6 months post-partum) for smoking cessation in pregnant women (105). 
In the UK, a recent pilot rewarded individuals up to £425 per year for weight loss 
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(131). At the other end of the spectrum a scheme in the US offered just $2.50 for 
achieving a negative drug test.(479) A recent review of 17 studies found incentives 
paid ranged from $5.16 to $786.(83) Several websites now in existence (such as 
Stickk and WeightWins) allow individuals to personally set the (dis)incentive amount 
they believe will be sufficient to motivate them to change. However, it is unclear 
whether these personally-set incentive levels are more effective than externally-set 
incentive amounts in generating the desired motivation and change. 
It is a generally consistent finding that the efficacy of incentives is positively correlated 
with the incentive amount.(83, 123, 124, 480) However the strength of this 
relationship, whether it is linear, and how it is mediated by factors such as income, is 
unknown. There is evidence that in the UK several local authorities are introducing 
incentive schemes but they are doing so in the absence of guidance on incentive 
design and pricing. Poorly designed schemes are more likely to fail and have the 
potential to yield worse outcomes than could have been achieved in the absence of 
incentives. Given this, evidence-based information relating to the design (and, 
specifically, pricing) of schemes is critical, of real value and a priority for research.  
 
4.1.1. Aims and objectives 
The overall aim of the research described in this and the subsequent chapter was to 
estimate the incentive levels required for health behaviour change and to determine 
what influences those incentive levels. The research focussed on the key causes of 
preventable illness: smoking, diet and weight, physical inactivity and alcohol 
consumption. As well as addressing gaps in current knowledge, the results may also 
provide information for the decision-analytic model which is described in Chapter 9.  
The method selected to estimate incentive levels was a contingent valuation survey. 
The current survey is a novel and innovative addition to research in the area for a 
number of reasons: it represents the only attempt in England to value incentive levels; 
it is the only survey where individuals value more than one behaviour concurrently; it 
is the only incentive valuation survey to date that directly targets individuals who are 
compelled to change their behaviour due to a health scare (as opposed to a general 
need for behaviour change); it is the only incentive survey that includes (for a sub-
group of respondents) a follow-up survey, thus allowing the examination of required 
incentive levels over time.  
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Data collection via a prospective survey allowed the generation of data that 
incorporated theories and factors identified a priori (in this instance, during the 
literature review and framework development) as potentially being important 
determinants and mediators of incentive levels. The sample was opportunistic as the 
survey was completed as part of an on-going feasibility trial (described in more detail 
later) of health advice for those who had experienced a suspected cardiac event. 
There were certain advantages and disadvantages to using a sample that had 
experienced such a health scare. The sample was apposite in the sense that they 
engaged in the target risky behaviours (over-eating, physical inactivity, smoking, 
consuming risky levels of alcohol). In addition, due to their health scare, they were 
faced with the real prospect of having to change their behaviours rather than having 
to imagine the need to do this. This latter fact may mean the survey values have 
greater validity but also, conversely, that their responses may be less generalisable 
to the general population who may engage in these risky behaviours but who have 
yet to experience any health consequences. For example, perhaps following a health 
scare, individuals will be more willing to change their behaviour and thus require lower 
incentives. That said, incentives arguably have a clearer role as a targeted 
intervention in those for whom behaviour change is critical, rather than as a wider 
public health intervention, and hence, even if the generalisibility of the survey results 
on a wider basis were questioned, they would still be valuable in the current context.  
Specific objectives for the research described in this chapter were to: i) create a 
contingent valuation survey – including factors identified in the reviews and theoretical 
framework as being important determinants of behaviour change/incentives - to 
provide information on minimum incentives required to change behaviour; ii) to pilot 
test the survey to test it for comprehensibility and practicality. 
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4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Survey design 
A contingent valuation survey was developed to capture information relating to the 
minimum willingness to accept (WTA) incentive level and important covariates in a 
group of patients with unhealthy lifestyles. The survey - the Valuing Health Change 
Questionnaire (VHCQ) – was generated with reference to best practice and content 
informed by the framework proposed in Chapter 3 which had identified key constructs 
and theories. The hypothesised relationship between incentive and behaviour change 
and the factors mediating this are illustrated in Figure 10. To elaborate, the incentive 
effect is determined by the design and the amount offered. Incentives represent 
external motivation and whether this translates into behaviour change is determined 
by a number of barriers and facilitators such as social norms and skills. The extent to 
which the incentive generates sufficient external motivation is thought to be mediated 
by factors such as attitudes (e.g. acceptance of incentives), income and behaviour 
type. The survey had a number of sections which are described below in the order 
they appear in the VHCQ. The pilot version of the VHCQ also contained questions on 
health-related quality of life and health state preference questions which were 
dropped as the focus of the research changed direction. These are not described but 
presented in the pilot version include in the appendix (Appendix 12.1). Questions 
relating to demographics and health behaviours were not included in the VHCQ as 
these were planned to be captured in the larger survey of which VHCQ was to be a 
part. 
Direct questions relating to the economic evaluation research package were not 
included in the survey. This was partly due to the timing of the survey (occurring 
before it was certain the economic evaluation would take place) and partly due to 
space constraint in the survey. In hindsight a number of questions may have informed 
the later analysis, for example relating to time off work, willingness and distance to 
travel to the nearest pharmacy (for weigh-ins) and direct questions about the cost of 
their habits. It may also have been useful to have acquired information about the 
incentive required to achieve the outcome used in the economic evaluation (i.e. 5% 
weight loss). However, it’s debatable whether this line of questioning would have 
yielded valid data.   
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4.2.1.1. Difficulty of change 
A number of items were generated to assess how difficult individuals perceived 
behaviour change to be. Each asked how difficult the respondent thought it would be 
to achieve specific health behaviour changes and asked for responses on a seven-
point scale ranging from ‘Very easy’ (0) to ‘Very difficult’ (6) (see Table 9). A ‘not 
applicable’ opt out was also provided. 
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Figure 10: Hypothesised relationships between incentive and behaviour change 
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Table 9: VHCQ Health change difficult items 
For questions 1 to 5 below we would like you to think about how difficult it would be for you to make certain health changes.  
Please tick only one box for every row. 
 
 
How difficult would it be for you to……… 
Does not 
apply to 
me 
Very 
easy 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Very 
difficult 
6 
Stop smoking 
 
        
Lose weight so that you are at a healthy weight 
 
        
Eat recommended levels (or less) of fat, salt and sugary 
foods and at least five pieces of fruit or vegetables per day?          
Exercise or take part in moderate physical activity (such as 
gardening, walking or jogging) for 30 minutes, 5 times a 
week.  
        
Drink alcohol within recommended levels (21 units for men 
and 14 for women per week)*         
*Half a pint of beer or small measure of spirits is roughly equal to one unit and a glass of wine is equal to one and a half units. 
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4.2.1.2. Contingent valuation 
A contingent valuation (CV) stated preference survey (481) was developed to help 
determine the minimum level of financial incentives required to achieve behaviour 
change. Best practice methods for CV surveys have been described previously with 
the recommendations in the report of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) panel on contingent valuation (482) often being the applied 
standard. The general guidance stated that: a) probability sampling is required in the 
planning of the survey especially if analyses are to be stratified; b) that non-response 
should be minimised taking into account the trade-off between survey length, level of 
information requested and respondent burden; c) that face-to-face interviews be 
conducted where possible although telephone interviews may be acceptable given 
the cost-quality trade-off required; d) pilot test experiments be conducted to gauge 
the extent of any interviewer effects; e) all surveys should report methods and findings 
in detail including sample size and final versions of surveys; f) CV surveys should be 
carefully pre-tested prior to deployment in full surveys to check that respondents find 
the questions acceptable and can understand them. Value elicitation survey guidance 
are also stated which are more specific to the environmental audience at which the 
report is aimed and these include: g) the survey should have a conservative design; 
h) the survey should be in the form of a dichotomous vote for or against a particular 
WTP value; i) the program of interest must be adequately described; j) include a ‘no 
answer’ option; k) follow-up all answers to identify why individuals voted in the way 
they did; l) include additional items that enable you to interpret responses to the main 
valuation task, for example on income and attitudes; m) check whether respondents 
accept and understand the survey and descriptions. The report authors add that these 
requirements should be met without making the survey too burdensome so as to deter 
respondents from completing it (in a valid manner).   
The degree to which the best practices outlined in the report are applicable in the 
current context is debatable. It is reasonable to assume that individuals who engage 
in risky health behaviour can provide relatively accurate approximations of their WTA. 
In most cases, they engage in the behaviours every day, experiencing the utility from 
consumption and disutility when they are not consuming (e.g. hunger pangs or 
nicotine cravings). They also experience the costs everyday, purchasing food, alcohol 
and cigarettes. Furthermore, most will also have directly considered how much they 
value changing behaviour as they will have weighed up the pros and cons (in utility 
terms) and paid for change attempts (e.g. through diets, gym memberships and 
smoking cessation products). This is unlike many of the scenarios in environmental 
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contexts that the NOAA report addressed - for example, individuals considering what 
they would be willing to pay to save a species of animal or environmental asset (such 
as a pleasant beach) that they may never experience or find it difficult to comprehend. 
In addition, environmental surveys are further distinguished from the one conducted 
here as the benefits are usually not experienced by the individual and, if they are, not 
solely so, which further pollutes the values. The CV survey conducted here was 
directed at individuals who had daily, first-hand experience of the alternatives 
(continue or change behaviour) and, furthermore, had to change behaviour (to avoid 
further health issues). Individuals should have a better idea of preferences regarding 
their own health than of abstract goods which they may never consume or experience.  
The NOAA guidelines, and particularly the requirement for dichotomous survey 
response design, have also been criticised on a number of counts. For example, it 
has been found to over-estimate WTP due to ‘yea-saying’(483) and be statistically 
inefficient.(484) There does not appear to be a robust equivalent set of best practices 
for health scenarios reached by a consensus of experts. However, in the absence of 
these the current CV survey design relied on a guide book in health and a 
comprehensive review in the area.(485, 486) In the event, a number of the methods 
employed were in line with the NOAA guidelines. The survey design was pilot tested 
and designed to minimise missing data (NOAA points f and d). It was interviewer 
administered (at baseline and via telephone at three months) (NOAA point c); the 
results and survey versions are fully reported (NOAA point e). The voting style 
response options were not feasible due to the constraints of the IMPROVE research 
project. However, the response option style chosen is widely accepted and preferred 
to open-ended questions.(487) Similarly, detailed descriptions of the program (NOAA 
point i) were not considered as crucial as for abstract environmental schemes. Again, 
due to time and resource constraints, follow-up questions were not asked after each 
response (NOAA point k). However, additional items were included in the survey to 
allow cross-tabulation as recommended (point l) and the interviewer made a note as 
to whether the respondent understood the CV questions (point m). Given the survey 
was embedded within another project, the risks and costs of different designs had to 
be weighed up in order to make the survey practicable but to ensure the data were 
as valid as possible. 
 
The CV survey was necessarily an ex ante enquiry yielding information on 
compensating variation, or the amount of financial gain required to maintain current 
utility levels (before behaviour change is initiated). In other words the CV survey 
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sought to identify how much financial compensation a person would require to incur 
the disutility of behaviour change (e.g. food and tobacco cravings, exercise effort, 
cognitive costs). The CV method was chosen in preference to conducting a discrete 
choice experiment (DCE) for a number of reasons. The VHCQ was completed as part 
of an on-going feasibility trial along with a number of outcome measures and it was 
felt that the number of choice tasks a DCE would require would have represented too 
great a burden for respondents. Furthermore, in the context of studies where the aim 
is to value one factor (as in this study) rather than individual attributes, CV is 
preferred.(488) A recent comparison of CVs using the payment scale method and 
DCE found both gave theoretically valid results.(489)  
Few studies in a health setting have examined the extent to which the willingness to 
pay (WTP) values stated by respondents in CV surveys reflect their true values or 
correspond with their ‘revealed’ WTP.(490) The ‘external validity’ of CV surveys has 
been evidenced (491) but in the main results in this regard are mixed.(492) Relevant 
meta-analyses (e.g.(493)) have found that revealed WTP values are higher than 
those stated; however this is not universally the case and depends on the survey 
design and setting.(492) 
Although it may be minimised through good design and careful testing, there remains 
a threat of response bias in CV surveys.(486, 494). A common criticism of CV surveys 
is that they are open to strategic bias such that respondents report higher WTA (or 
lower WTP) values than they would accept in reality in the belief that (in the current 
context) incentives may be implemented. Although there is limited evidence of this 
bias (495) its threat was minimised by clearly stating the exercise was imaginary and 
also that the NHS would pay the incentive and thus sought to appeal to an individual’s 
sense of fairness. The converse may also be true; that individuals report lower WTA 
than their true preferences because they experience the opposite of the ‘warm glow’ 
effect.(496, 497) That is, respondents may feel guilty about accepting money (from 
the NHS) for behaviours for which they are responsible and report lower WTA as a 
consequence. This effect increases as more questions are completed (if respondents 
engage in more than one behaviour) due to ‘cumulative guilt’; this would be the 
opposite of the ‘fading glow’ effect.(498) To combat this phenomena, clear 
instructions were added such that individuals were asked to consider each valuation 
separately (if they engaged in more than one unhealthy behaviour) and independently 
(rather than cumulatively). The biases that threaten the validity of the results are 
clearly influenced by the design of the valuation survey.(492) For example, responses 
may depend on whether open-ended or binary questions are posed or whether a 
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payment card is used.(482, 499) Carson and Groves recommend binary response 
options to minimise the threat of strategic bias.(500) However, this format was not 
possible in the current survey due to space and time constraints. Other innovations 
in CV methods have been offered as a solution to reducing different types of bias 
such as the use of cheap talk scripts(501) or certainty questions.(502) However, the 
constraints of the survey within the IMPROVE study meant that adding additional 
material would have risked over-burdening respondents and increasing non-
responses and, again, therefore these could not be included. 
Another criticism of CV is that responses may not reflect true preferences but 
generate random WTA values as individuals do not have well-formed preferences, 
illustrated by the ‘embedding effect’.(503) As previously stated, this criticism is 
perhaps more justified in the valuation of abstract public goods, for example, 
environmental damage prevention or species protection. Most individuals are familiar 
with the amount of (dis)utility associated with behaviour change as they may have 
experienced it (many times) – for example, the cravings for cigarettes after smoking 
cessation and the hunger pangs during a diet. Thus we might expect that individuals 
have well-formed preferences and be better able to estimate to what degree they 
would require ‘compensating’. 
The piloted version of the CV survey employed open-ended willingness to accept 
(WTA) questions. As such it asked what would be the minimum amount of incentive 
required per month for the respondent to change their health behaviour (e.g. stop 
smoking, lose weight) and requested participants to write figures on a dotted line. The 
subsequent version of the survey incorporated a ‘payment scale’ (see (485)) with tick 
boxes for incentive amounts between plausible ranges that were reported in the pilot 
testing. The use of fixed responses is preferred in CV surveys as it is believed to 
generate estimates that more accurately reflect respondent preferences.(485) Three 
separate questions asked what is the minimum monthly: guaranteed incentive; 
incentive if you were entered into a lottery with a 1 in 50 chance of winning; deposit 
contract you would have to contribute to motivate you.  
 
4.2.1.3. Attitudinal questions 
The attitudinal questions covered factors that had been identified by the literature 
review and theoretical framework as potentially being key determinants of health 
behaviour and required incentive levels. Each item was in the form of a statement 
with a seven-point response option ranging from ‘Strongly agree’ (0) through ‘Neither 
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agree or disagree’ (3) to ‘Strongly disagree’ (6). The items are included in the table 
below with a description of the construct/factor they are attempting to capture. 
 
Table 10: Attitudinal items in the VHCQ 
 
4.2.1.4. Time preference 
Time preference questions (attitudinal questions - see Table 10 - and questions 
providing numerical discount rates) were included as it had been identified in the 
review as an important determinant of health behaviour. For the latter, two versions 
were included at the pilot stage; one relating to the receipt of an amount of money 
now or a greater amount in one year’s time (236) and another relating to a period of 
illness beginning in 2 years, or a longer period of illness but beginning in 6 years’ 
time.(325) The financial question asked: 
Attitudinal statement Factor assessed 
I am in control of my health behaviour and am able to 
change my lifestyle if I want to  
Level of willpower/self-
control over health  
I believe that my health and chances of getting heart 
disease or a stroke are determined by the type of 
lifestyle and health behaviours I have 
Health education/beliefs 
I am motivated to change my health behaviour 
 
Level of (intrinsic) 
motivation 
I think it would be a major achievement if I managed 
to change my health behaviour 
Difficulty of change/intrinsic 
reward 
I am at high risk of having other problems with my 
heart in the next few years 
Risk perception/Health 
education 
I live for today and try not to worry about what might 
happen in the future 
Time preference/Impulsivity 
I am usually the type of person that can wait for the 
things I want 
Time preference/Impulsivity 
I believe that the NHS should offer financial incentives 
to help motivate people to change their lifestyles 
Acceptability of incentives 
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‘Would you prefer £500 now or £550 in 12 months time? If you said £500 now, how 
much would you have to receive in Option B (in 12 months) for you to choose that 
instead? Please write the amount (which would be higher than £550) below:............’ 
In the choice between £500 now or £550 in 12 months an annual discount rate of at 
least 10% is implied for those choosing £500. At three months the same question was 
asked except that the choice was between £500 in five years or £550 in six years. 
This was to determine whether hyperbolic discounting was evident.(445) 
 
4.2.2. Pilot testing the survey 
The VHCQ pilot testing was conducted with a small group of individuals via interview 
and postal survey. The sample was a convenience sample recruited via word of 
mouth by researchers involved in the Improving Prevention of Vascular Events 
(IMPROVE) study (504) of which the VHCQ was a part. IMPROVE was a randomised 
feasibility trial of health advice delivered by a trained advisor compared to usual 
practice in an acute cardiology service. 
The pilot sample had a representative mix of educational levels and unhealthy 
behaviours thus were considered suitable to test the comprehensibility and content 
of the VHCQ. All of the individuals consented to take part but, as they were not 
patients, were not recruited via the NHS and were not interviewed on NHS premises, 
NHS ethics was not required. In the interviews, respondents completed the survey in 
the presence of the author who was available to clarify any questions and note any 
difficulties that were experienced. Respondents were then asked if any of the 
instructions were unclear or if any questions were difficult to understand. They were 
also asked to justify the minimum acceptable level of incentive they had stated to 
ensure that they understood what was being asked of them. The author recorded the 
time to complete the survey to ensure that it was practical to complete. Where the 
survey was completed by post, respondents were able to record any problems they 
had encountered on a separate feedback sheet.  
In some cases alternative questions (for example on time preference) were presented 
and the respondents asked to state which they thought clearest. Revisions were 
made to the survey in light of comments received. The revised survey was completed 
and reviewed again by a public involvement group (PPI) that was participating in the 
IMPROVE study set-up and oversight. The PPI group was comprised mainly of elderly 
people, some of whom had experienced a cardiovascular event. They were asked to 
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review the instructions and questions and feedback any comments at a PPI event. 
Once again, a number of improvements were made to the VHCQ based on feedback 
received.  
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4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Survey pilot test  
The pilot test was conducted with 13 individuals who engaged in one or more 
unhealthy behaviours (sample details in Table 11). The perceived difficulty, attitudinal 
questions and contingent valuations were comprehensible and suffered from little 
missing data. In general, the VHCQ was well accepted and was not considered too 
burdensome to complete. However, it was clear from the interviews that some people 
felt strongly that incentives should not be offered to change behaviour. 
Summary data for the incentives required are included in Table 11. Aside from one 
outlier in the responses to smoking, the range of incentive amounts stated was 
relatively narrow given that the question was open ended. This allowed a reasonable 
degree of confidence in creating a payment scale format for the contingent valuation 
based on this data. The deposit contract question was not well understood but was 
retained for the main survey with revised instructions. A number of clarifications and 
improvements to the VHCQ were made on the basis of comments received. For 
example, items asking people to estimate their own life expectancy and the likelihood 
they will experience cardiovascular disease were removed as were items asking how 
willing the individual was to change. ‘Not applicable’ options were also added to the 
behaviour change difficulty and incentive questions. In addition, following feedback 
that there was too much text in the survey, the instructions were condensed wherever 
possible. The original survey expressed the payment vehicle in monetary terms but 
this was revised to include ‘vouchers’ as these are generally found to be much more 
acceptable to individuals and thought less likely to ‘crowd-out’ intrinsic motivation. 
Furthermore, the use of vouchers is more likely in trials and local public health 
schemes than cash. 
The monetary time preference question was overwhelmingly preferred to the health 
time preference question and was included in the final VHCQ. The data were 
sufficient to observe a clear positive relationship between the perceived difficulty item 
and the incentive amounts required providing preliminary evidence that the survey 
was valid. The final version of the VHCQ is included below. The following chapter 
describes the administration of the VHCQ is a survey of individuals and analysis and 
interpretation of the data. 
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Table 11: Survey pilot test sample characteristics 
 N=13 
Survey administration  
N Interview (%) 10 (77%) 
N Postal (%) 3 (23%) 
Age   
Mean (SD) 52 (12.1) 
Range 35-73 
Gender  
N male (%) 8 (61.5%) 
N female (%) 5 (38.5%) 
Highest level of education   
University or college or equivalent 4 (30.8%) 
Intermediate between secondary level and university  
(e.g. technical training) 
3 (23.1%) 
Secondary school 4 (30.8%) 
Primary school (or less) 2 (15.4%) 
Health behaviours  
N who smoke (%) 6 (46%) 
N who considered themselves to be overweight (%) 8 (62%) 
N who do not meet the recommended physical activity 
levels (%) 
9 (69%) 
Gross monthly household income   
Less than £500 1 (7.7%) 
£501 - £1500 2 (15.3%) 
£1501 - £2500 1 (7.7%) 
£2501 - £3500 7 (53.8%) 
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£3501 -  £4500 1 (7.7%) 
More than £4500 1 (7.7%) 
Health-related Quality of Life (EQ-5D utility score)  
Mean (SD) 0.80 (0.27) 
Range 1-0.09 
Incentive minimum required per month to:   
Stop smoking – mean (range) (n=7) 
£351 (£10-£2000) 
Lose weight – mean (range) (n=11) 
£27.50 (0-£100) 
Exercise 3xper week – mean (range) (n=10) 
£33 (£10-£100) 
Reduce alcohol intake to safe level – mean (range) (n=9) 
£33.90 (0-£100) 
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4.4. Final VHCQ 
 
Valuing Health Change 
Questionnaire 
 
 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect information about how you think 
about your health and changing your health behaviour 
 
The information you provide will help us understand people’s attitudes to 
health and what helps people to take up healthier lifestyles. 
Please answer all of the questions you feel able to. There are no right or wrong 
answers. All of your responses are anonymous and confidential and will not 
affect any treatment you might receive in the future. 
 
 
Please enter 
today’s date: 
 
For office use  
Q1  
Q2  
          
d d  m m  y y y y 
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Changing your health behaviour 
 
 
Firstly we would like you to think about your current lifestyle and health (your weight, your diet, your level of physical activity, whether 
you smoke or not or drink alcohol).  
For questions 1 to 5 below we would like you to think about how difficult it would be for you to make certain health changes.  
Please tick only one box for every row. 
 
How difficult would it be for you to……… 
Does not 
apply to 
me 
Very 
easy  
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Very 
difficult 
6 
1. Stop smoking 
        
2. Lose weight so that you are at a healthy weight 
        
3. Eat recommended levels (or less) of fat, salt and sugary foods and at least 
five pieces of fruit or vegetables per day?          
4. Exercise or take part in moderate physical activity (such as gardening, 
walking or jogging) for 30 minutes, 5 times a week.          
5. Drink alcohol within recommended levels (21 units for men and 14 for 
women per week)*         
*Half a pint of beer or small measure of spirits is roughly equal to one unit and a glass of wine is equal to one and a half units.
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Financial Incentives 
 
For this section there are three imaginary scenarios about people receiving financial incentives from the NHS. Although the questions may 
seem unusual please consider your response carefully as the information you give will be useful. (Please keep in mind this is an imaginary 
exercise) 
 
 
Please IMAGINE that the NHS would be willing to pay people money or reward them with shopping vouchers (for example for Argos or 
Boots) to persuade them to change their lifestyles. Imagine the NHS would pay you an amount (in money or vouchers) every month for 
one year and you would be assessed every month to make sure you maintained a healthier lifestyle.  
 
What is the minimum amount of money or value of vouchers per month that would persuade you to 
change your behaviour?  
If the behaviour does not apply to you (for example if you don’t smoke), please state what you think would be the minimum amount of 
incentive that would motivate someone who did smoke to stop smoking. Please consider each separately as though you could only receive 
one incentive at a time.  
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Please tick one box only per row 
 
 
 
To motivate me to do the things below 
the minimum financial incentive per 
month would have to be…….. 
£0a 
month 
£5-10 a 
month 
£11-£20 
a month 
£21-
£30a 
month 
£31-£50 
a month 
£51-£75 
a month 
£76-
£100 a 
month 
£101-
£200 a 
month 
£201-
£400 a 
month 
More than 
£400 a 
month 
a. stop smoking  
         How much? 
£…………. 
b. go on a calorie controlled diet and 
lose weight           
How much? 
£…………. 
c. to exercise or do moderate physical 
activity for 30 minutes at least 5 
times a  week  
         How much? 
£…………. 
d. to reduce the amount of alcohol I 
drink to below recommended levels            
How much? 
£…………. 
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Imaginary Prize Draw 
 Imagine now that instead of a guaranteed payment each month you would be entered into a free prize draw if you changed your behaviour. 
Every month you achieved your health target (e.g. not smoking or losing weight) you would be entered into a prize draw and have a 1 in 
50 chance of winning an amount of money or shopping vouchers. 
 
What is the minimum prize that would motivate you to take part and change your behaviour? Please tick 
one box only per row 
To motivate me to do the things below 
the monthly lottery amount (in cash or 
vouchers)  I could win would have to 
be...... 
£10-£50         £51-
£100       
£101-
£200     
£201-
£300    
£301-
£500    
£501-
£1000 
£1001-
£2500 
£2501-
£3500 
More than 
£3500 
a. stop smoking  
        How much? 
£…………. 
b. go on a calorie controlled diet and 
lose weight          How much? 
£…………. 
c. to exercise or do moderate 
physical activity for 30 minutes at 
least 5 times a week  
        How much? 
£…………. 
d. to reduce the amount of alcohol I 
drink to below recommended 
levels   
        How much? 
£…………. 
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Imaginary Financial Commitment 
 
 
 
Imagine you would have to pay an amount of money for every month that you did not achieve your health target (for example not 
smoking or losing a certain amount of weight) and if you lost your money it would be donated to a charity of your choice.  
Please tick one box 
To motivate me to do the things below I 
would have to face losing the following 
amount of money in a month: 
£0-£5 £6-£10 £11-£30 £31-£50     £51-£75 £76-
£100 
£101-
£150 
£151-
£200 
£201-
£350 
More than 
£350 
a. stop smoking  
          
How much? 
£…………. 
b. go on a calorie controlled diet and 
lose weight  
 
         How much? 
£…………. 
c. to exercise or do moderate 
physical activity for 30 minutes at 
least 5 times a week   
         How much? 
£…………. 
d. to reduce the amount of alcohol I 
drink to below recommended 
levels    
         How much? 
£…………. 
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Please state how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements by ticking one option per question 
 
 Strongly 
agree 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree  
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
Strongly 
disagree 
6 
1. I am in control of my health behaviour and am able to change my 
lifestyle if I want to         
2. I believe that my health and chances of getting heart disease or a 
stroke are determined by the type of lifestyle and health behaviours I 
have 
       
3. I am motivated to change my health behaviour 
 
       
4. I think it would be a major achievement if I managed to change my 
health behaviour        
5. I am at high risk of having other problems with my heart in the next 
few years        
6. I live for today and try not to worry about what might happen in the 
future        
7. I am usually the type of person that can wait for the things I want 
       
8. I believe that the NHS should offer financial incentives to help 
motivate people to change their lifestyles        
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Thank you for completing the questionnaire. Please take a moment to check 
that you have responded to all of the questions  
 
1. Imagine you won a lottery and the prize was either £500 now OR instead 
you would receive £550 but in 12 months’ time. Which would you choose? 
(Please tick only one option)  
Option A £500 now  
OR 
Option B £550 in 12 
months 
 
 
If you ticked Option B please skip Question 2 and go to Question 3 below 
 
2. How much would you have to receive in Option B (in 12 months) for you 
to choose that instead? Please write the amount (which would be higher 
than £550) below: 
 
I would have to receive a minimum of £............... at 12 months instead of £500 
now to choose Option B. 
 
One last question...... 
 
3. Please estimate the monthly income of your household (before deducting tax 
and national insurance). If you receive any benefits or pensions please include 
them as income.  
 
The answers you provide are completely anonymous and confidential. We are asking 
for this information because it will help us analyse your responses on financial 
incentives in health. (please tick only one) 
 
 Less than £500  £2501 - £3500 
 £501 - £1500  £3501 -  £4500 
 £1501 - £2500  More than £4500 
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5. Contingent valuation survey 
analysis 
 
This chapter reports the administration of the VHCQ in a sample of individuals 
compelled to change their health behaviour and analysis of the survey data. 
 
5.1. Objectives 
Specific objectives for the research described in this chapter were to: i) conduct a 
follow-up survey with people who engaged in unhealthy behaviours; ii) identify optimal 
pricing strategies for incentive schemes taking into account individual characteristics; 
iii) generate information (e.g. parameter values) that may be useful for the decision-
analytic model described in Chapter 9. 
 
5.1.1. Research questions and hypotheses 
The key research questions for this part of the study are provided below. These 
particular research questions were selected as they targeted important evidence gaps 
in the literature and theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 3. The questions were 
prioritised following the review of the literature and after discussions with supervisors 
and experts in the area. Although not a formal prioritisation exercise, the discussions 
with the experts – who were an academic working in incentives and a Director of a 
commercial organisation that ran an incentive programme – confirmed that the 
questions were worthy of pursuit. The answers to these questions would also 
potentially offer valuable information for subsequent research endeavours in the PhD. 
 
1. What is the minimum incentive level required to secure behaviour change? 
2. How is this mediated by demographic and socioeconomic factors, type and 
‘strength’ of behaviour, perceived difficulty of change, existing motivation and 
other attitudes, type of incentive and time preference?  
3. Is there evidence that minimum required incentive levels change over time? 
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Questions 1-3 address key components of equation 11 in the proposed framework in 
Chapter 3 relating to how incentive levels and incentive design features impact on 
incentive scheme effectiveness (in terms of producing utility). Question 2 would 
provide information about how incentive level is influenced by motivation and control 
(or willpower) as described in equation 1 in the framework. Time preference 
(appearing in equations 4 and 7) would also be captured by the survey. Finally, 
Question 3 may provide information about the relationship between the incentive 
required and self-control over time; this may permit an empirical test of the willpower 
depletion theory. In addition to addressing these key questions the data would allow 
an exploration of other aspects; for example, whether incentives are considered 
acceptable or not and whether the survey methodology is valid and reliable for 
estimating incentive levels.  
Due to the dearth of studies in the area, it is difficult to provide a hypothesis on the 
WTA values that we might expect to derive using the survey. However, based on the 
behavioural literature (Chapter 2) and proposed Framework (Chapter 3) it was 
thought that: 
A) there would be a positive relationship between the level, or ‘degree’ of unhealthy 
behaviour (e.g. smoking levels, how overweight a respondent is and how much 
alcohol they drink) and the minimum amount of incentive required to change 
behaviour; 
B) there would be a positive relationship between perceived difficulty of change and 
minimum incentive required;  
C) in terms of attitudes, it was hypothesised that those who were less motivated or 
less in control of their health would state requiring larger incentives to change 
behaviour.  
Very few studies – in any context - have explored the use of contingent valuations by 
the same individual over time. Given this, hypotheses regarding whether and how 
these responses might change over time are speculative to a degree. However, it was 
further hypothesised that D) the required incentive would on average increase over 
time in those who completed the survey twice. There are a number of reasons for 
this: i) at first completion the individuals have recently experienced a health shock 
and may be motivated by this and may be over-optimistic in estimating the likelihood 
that they will succeed in behaviour change. At follow-up it is possible individuals will 
revert back to unhealthy habits and re-evaluate the ease of, and necessity for, change 
especially if their willpower has become depleted; ii) at first completion the 
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respondents are in hospital and may respond in a socially desirable way stating lower 
incentive amounts - especially as the incentives are described as being provided by 
the NHS. Follow-up completion took place in the home. As respondents were out of 
the NHS setting, they were able to respond more freely and thus may state that higher 
incentives are required; related to this but not necessarily the same issue is argument: 
iii) that between time-points the individual’s environment changed. At baseline 
respondents were in an environment where their health behaviour was controlled (i.e. 
in hospital smoking and drinking alcohol is not permitted and diet is controlled) and 
thus they may have felt more in control of their behaviour. At follow-up however, 
patients are returned to their usual environ and may, despite good intentions, slip 
back to unhealthy habits. Again, if this occurs, we might expect the minimum required 
incentive to increase.  
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5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Survey administration – IMPROVE Study 
The VHCQ was completed as part of the IMPROVE (Improving Prevention of 
Vascular Events) study.(504) IMPROVE was a randomised feasibility trial of health 
advice delivered by a trained advisor compared to usual practice in an acute 
cardiology service. Participants (n=132) were individuals who had experienced a 
suspected cardiovascular event and therefore needed to modify their health 
behaviour (i.e. they were smokers, alcohol abusers, were overweight or had a 
sedentary lifestyle). IMPROVE aimed to interview patients engaging in risky health 
behaviours to identify barriers and facilitators to behaviour change and use this 
information to identify an optimal referral pathway for them. The control group did not 
receive an active intervention but were given information (a leaflet) about behaviour 
change and referred to a health website. The study assessments (including 
evaluations of health behaviours and the VHCQ) were administered by researchers 
face-to-face at baseline (in hospital) to consenting patients. Those who completed 
baseline were invited to complete the survey again at three months. At three months 
the VHCQ was posted out to participants for completion. If their survey was not 
received within a matter of weeks, they were sent a reminder and then subsequently 
asked to complete the survey over the telephone. The study was approved by the 
committee of the National Research Ethics Service for Yorkshire and the Humber 
(Leeds East) on 12 March 2012. REC Reference number: 12/YH/0086. 
 
5.2.2. Sample 
The eligibility criteria for the IMPROVE study and completion of the VHCQ were the 
same. Patients were eligible if they were aged between 40 and 74 years; were willing 
and able to give written informed consent; and had been admitted to hospital with a 
diagnosis of acute coronary event, myocardial infarction or symptoms of a cardiac 
nature. Those patients who were receiving specialist behaviour change treatment 
relating to alcohol in-take, smoking, diet or exercise were excluded as were those 
who did not engage in risky health behaviours. Those unavailable for follow-up 
assessment or who were unable either to speak English to the degree that they could 
not receive the intervention or complete the outcome measures were also excluded. 
More detail is included in the IMPROVE study protocol.(504) 
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5.2.3. Analysis 
Descriptive statistics were produced for the overall sample and sub-groups based on 
gender (males vs. females), age (59 years or less vs. over 59 years), income (less 
than £2000 per month vs. £2000 and over per month), smoking status (Smoke vs. 
Not), body mass index (less than 25 vs. 25-30 vs. over 30), Audit score (less than 4 
vs. 4 and above), perceived difficulty (Easy vs. Difficult) and attitudinal items (Agree 
vs. Disagree) for the minimum guaranteed (WTACertain) and lottery incentives 
(WTAUncertain) required. The expected value of the lottery (WTAUncertain) was 
calculated: 
 WTAUncertain = lottery response × 0.02  
 
For both WTACertain and WTAUncertain, values were converted to percentage of monthly 
disposable income (which is assumed to be the mid-point of an income category 
stated) and analysed again. Due the small sample size the responses to several of 
the items were collapsed into two or three categories. For example, responses on the 
seven-point scales were dichotomised into 0-3 versus 4-6. The data from the CV 
survey were considered both in its presented categorical form and in continuous form 
by taking the mid-point value of the category response. Thus, if an individual had 
stated a minimum required incentive of ‘£21-£30’, their response was recoded to £25; 
there is a precedent for such manipulations in CV analysis (e.g.(505)). Treating the 
data as continuous was thought acceptable as the response categories were placed 
in increasing rank order and there were nine points on the payment scale. Health and 
psychological questionnaires with nine or fewer items are often considered to provide 
continuous data. Furthermore, there was also an open-ended value which generated 
greater variability to the data. This approach to payment scale analysis is commonly 
adopted.(e.g.(506, 507)).  
The time preference data was analysed in the following manner to give the annual 
discount rate (𝑟): 
𝑟 =
(𝑃𝑂𝑓 −  𝑃𝑂𝑝)
𝑃𝑂𝑝
  
Where 𝑃𝑂𝑝 is present pay-off and 𝑃𝑂𝑓 is the future pay-off. Those who stated that 
they would be willing to wait 12 months for the £550 reward were assumed to have a 
discount rate of 10% although it may have been lower (they may have been willing to 
wait 12 months for less than £550). 
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Since some individuals completed items relating to more than one behaviour (e.g. 
they may have been overweight and physically inactive) and completed the survey 
on two occasions, there was an opportunity to analyse the data in a number of 
different ways – as is or by creating multiple observations across behaviours and 
time-points. Thus, data were analysed with baseline health behaviours considered 
individually; individually but with multiple (two) observations over time; with baseline 
health behaviours pooled (thus an individual could contribute four responses if they 
engaged in all unhealthy behaviours); and with both behaviour and time-point data 
pooled where an individual could contribute up to eight responses (four behaviours 
over two time-points). This meant that there were a much greater number of 
observations available for analysis, increasing the power of the study. 
For the categorical data analysis, results are presented as proportions of respondents 
who chose each incentive category. Logistic regression was used to predict a 
response of ‘£0’ WTA and multinomial logistic regression was used to predict the 
categorical WTA response. For the continuous data analysis, correlations were 
conducted to determine the relationships between WTA values and factors such as 
perceived difficulty and motivation. Mean and median WTA between groups (i.e. 
demographic, behaviour change difficulty, behaviour ‘strength’, attitudes, time 
preference) was explored using parametric and non-parametric tests, respectively. 
Paired and unpaired t–tests compared WTACertain and WTAUncertain at baseline vs. three 
months. In addition, the changes in WTA over three months were compared according 
to key outcomes of the IMPROVE trial – namely, whether or not the individual had 
attempted and/or succeeded in changing their behaviour. 
Univariate analyses were employed to identify key predictor variables for inclusion in 
the main analyses. In the event, the data were heavily positively skewed with large 
numbers of zero WTA reported. Linear regression with log-transformation was 
applied but the distribution plots suggested that this did not provide a remedy. Zero 
WTACertain and WTAUncertain values are likely to be from a mix of individuals who: do not 
feel that they require an incentive to change behaviour (either because they feel it will 
be easy or that they have sufficient internal motivation) - ‘true’ zeros; and individuals 
who do not believe that incentives should be provided for behaviour change 
(regardless of how easy or difficulty they perceive change or how motivated they are) 
– ‘protest’ zeros. True zeros are those who have a zero marginal utility for financial 
incentives for behaviour change. It is important to try and distinguish between these 
two and estimate the impact of including ‘protest’ zeros in the analysis. Individuals 
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providing protest responses may weaken any relationships in the data – for example 
the one hypothesised between perceived difficulty and WTA values.  
Analysts often simply remove protest responses from their analysis (508), assuming 
they can identify them. Identification may be made, for example, by asking if 
individuals would accept any value at all or would not due to a general disagreement 
with the concept being valued. The approach taken here was to analyse the data with 
and without the protest zeros to see if they made a substantive impact on the results. 
Unfortunately, a direct question was not included in the survey that would perfectly 
identify (if that is possible) protest zeros however an indicator was created with 
available data. An individual was considered to have provided a protest response if 
they had reported zero for both WTAcertain and WTAUncertain, and stated that they 
strongly disagreed that incentives should be provided. Since people may disagree 
with incentives because they are motivated (and, hence, be ‘true zeros’), a further 
requirement was made: that individuals were also either a) not motivated to change 
behaviour; or b) stated that behaviour change would be difficult.  
Notwithstanding the protest zeros, the data were still skewed positively and specific 
analytical approaches were used to address this. There are a number of alternative 
modelling approaches that might be used in this scenario. Tobit regression is often 
employed to handle skewed contingent valuation data. It is valid when the target 
variable can theoretically be considered censored (509) but is inappropriate where 
negative values are not possible.(510) While negative WTA values were not possible 
on the survey, considering WTA as a latent variable on a continuum, it is possible to 
conceive that those who provide zeros may be willing to pay for behaviour change. 
Given this, the Tobit model was explored. Recently, the generalized linear model has 
gained favour in skewed data analysis.(511) This was applied to the data using a 
Gamma family distribution and log link function as this distribution reflects the positive 
right skew and long tail of the observed data. Alternative distributions were also 
trialled within the GLM analysis before deciding on the aforementioned combination; 
these included Identity and Log links paired with Binomial, Poisson and Negative 
Binomial families. 
Several methods have been proposed to analyse data that include excess zeros (and 
protest responses) (512); these include the ‘spike’ model (513), the double-hurdle 
approach (514), symmetrically-trimmed least squares estimation (515) and least 
absolute deviations estimation (516). In addition to the Tobit and GLM analyses, this 
analysis adopted several other approaches: a two-part model, standard negative 
binomial and zero-inflated negative binomial regression. Zero-inflated negative 
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binomial regression is used to model count variables with excessive zeros where data 
is over-dispersed (where the variance exceeds the mean value – as in this case). 
Furthermore, the model theory is predicated on the idea that the excess zeros are 
generated by a separate process from the count values and that these excess zeros 
can be modelled independently. This model was compared to a two-part model where 
zeros are predicted using logistic or probit models and positive scores predicted 
separately. For the two-part, the negative binomial and zero-inflated models, marginal 
effects were used to interpret the coefficients. 
A number of model diagnostic tests were conducted specific to the model being 
employed. For the GLM, Stata’s Linktest and Modified Park test were utilised to 
respectively determine whether: the model specification was acceptable or not; and 
whether the correct family had been used. Stata’s ovtest was used to test whether 
variables have been omitted from the models and the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
checked to determine whether multicollinearity was present. As a rule of thumb, a 
variable whose VIF values are greater than 10 may merit further investigation. The 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) (517) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 
(518) were also used to judge the models. Both are measures of model ﬁt (smaller 
values generally denote better fit) that allow inter-model comparison. In addition to 
these, homoscedasticity was assessed in each case by plotting residual against 
predicted (fitted) values in a scatter plot and R2 values compared across models. 
Since the analyses employs robust standard errors [vce(cluster)] heteroscedasticity 
did not require formal assessment.  
For the analysis of pooled time data and pooled health behaviour data, time-point and 
health behaviour were respectively entered as dependent variables. In both cases, a 
random effects model or allowance for clustering of errors at the individual level was 
used to account for multiple observations from the same individual. No imputation of 
missing data was made but as missing data was minimal (excepting the discount rate 
question) it is not thought that it would impact significantly on results. For example, 
there were 153 attempts at completing the perceived difficulty section out of a 
possible 168 over the two time periods. Of the total 560 responses where the 
behaviour was applicable, only 4 were missing. In the financial incentive section, there 
were 149 completions out of a possible 168 over the study period and only 19 were 
missing out of 596 applicable questions (<0.5%). In the attitudes section (with eight 
questions) there were only 7 missing responses out of 1224 over the two time-points. 
Logistic regression was used to ascertain whether there were any significant 
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differences between those recruited to the study vs. those who completed the 
baseline VHCQ; and between those who completed baseline vs. 3 month VHCQ.  
The internal validity of the values yielded by the CV survey was assessed by 
comparing WTA cross-sectionally by perceived difficulty and by strength of unhealthy 
behaviour.  
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5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Sample characteristics 
The IMPROVE study screened 887 patients for inclusion in the study and 132 patients 
met the criteria for inclusion. From these, 112 completed the VHCQ at baseline and 
56 at three months (see Table 12 for sample details). There were significantly fewer 
completions at three months due to deaths, study withdrawals and failure to achieve 
contact with the participant. 
Univariate and multivariate logistic regression was used to compare the sample 
characteristics of those who were recruited into the study and those who completed 
the VHCQ at baseline; and between these individuals and those who completed the 
VHCQ at three months. The regression explored whether personal characteristics 
and baseline responses significantly predicted missingness (see Appendix 12.2.1 for 
the univariate results). Comparing the recruited and baseline VHCQ completers, 
univariate analyses using gender, age, education level, baseline health status (EQ-
5D), health behaviours (whether the individual was a smoker, overweight or obese, 
exercised or drank alcohol) and IMPROVE trial arm, did not find any statistically 
significant predictors of baseline VHCQ completion. The multivariate regression did 
not find any significant predictors of VHCQ completion at baseline (results not 
presented). The results suggest that there were no significant differences between 
the samples of those recruited and those who completed the baseline VHCQ. Data 
on attitudes to incentives and income was not available for those who didn’t complete 
the survey; it is possible that these may be explanatory factors in survey non-
completion. 
Comparing baseline and 3 month VHCQ completers, univariate analyses were 
conducted using the same variables as above but also including income group and 
mean responses for all baseline behaviour change difficulty items and WTACertain. In 
this case, there were a few significant differences in the sample characteristics. Those 
who completed the 3 month follow-up were significantly more likely to have higher 
education (intermediate, college or higher; p=0.034) and had reported lower WTA 
incentives at baseline (p=0.049). In the multivariate analyses (not reported) only 
education was still a significant predictor of 3 month completion. In the main then, the 
samples can be considered equivalent and any differences in WTA estimates over 
time may not solely be explained by a change in sample make-up. It is unclear why 
education might predict successful follow-up it may reflect a lower relative burden of 
completion of surveys for this group. Regardless, this finding is in line with previous 
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survey studies which have found a significant relationship between deprivation and 
loss to follow-up (e.g.(519)). 
Table 12: Sample characteristics of VHCQ respondents 
 Baseline 3 months 
 
 N=112 N=56 
Age    
Mean (SD) 58.8 (8.98) 59.71 (9.34) 
Range 40-74 40-74 
Gender   
N male (%) 67 (59.82) 34 (60.71) 
N female (%) 45 (40.18) 22 (30.29) 
Highest level of education    
University or college or equivalent 16 (14.29) 3 (5.36) 
Intermediate between secondary level and 
university  
(e.g. technical training) 
27 (24.11) 26 (46.43) 
Secondary school 60 (53.57) 17 (30.36) 
Primary school (or less) 9 (8.04) 10 (17.86) 
Ethnicity   
Asian or Asian British 4 (3.57) 2 (3.57) 
Black or Black British 1 (0.89) 1 (1.79) 
Mixed ethnicity 1 (0.89) 0 
White 104 (92.86) 52 (92.86) 
Other ethnic group 2 (1.79) 1 (1.79) 
Employment status   
Employed 36 (32.14) 16 (28.57) 
Full-time homemaker 2 (1.79) 1 (1.79) 
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Pensioner 39 (34.82) 22 (39.29) 
Unable to work 25 (22.32) 8 (14.29) 
Unemployed 7 (6.25) 6 (10.71) 
Other 3 (2.68) 1 (1.79) 
Gross monthly household income    
Missing 7 (7.22) 1 (1.79) 
Less than £500 14 (14.43) 6 (10.91) 
£501 - £1500 25 (25.77) 25 (45.45) 
£1501 - £2500 19 (19.59) 8 (14.55) 
£2501 - £3500 11 (11.34) 10 (18.18) 
£3501 -  £4500 9 (9.28) 2 (3.64) 
More than £4500 12 (12.37) 4 (7.27) 
Health-related Quality of Life (EQ-5D utility score)   
Mean (SD) 0.61 (0.32) 0.67 (0.27) 
Range -0.29-1 -0.24-1 
Do you smoke?   
Yes 34 (30.36) 11 (21.15) 
No 78 (69.64) 41 (78.85) 
Do you exercise?    
Yes 39 (34.82) N/A 
No 72 (64.29) N/A 
Body Mass Index   
Mean (SD) 29.50 (5.67) 30.06 (6.46) 
Range 16.5-48.2 16.53-44.65 
AUDIT Score   
Mean (SD) 4.37 (3.97) 4.45 (4.14) 
Range 0-12 0-12 
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5.3.2. VHCQ descriptive statistics 
5.3.2.1. Perceived difficulty of behaviour change 
Table 13 includes the descriptives for perceived difficulty at baseline. A majority of 
smokers reported that stopping smoking would be ‘Very difficult’. The opposite was 
true of responses to reduce alcohol intake where a majority reported this behaviour 
change as ‘Very easy’. Responses to the other questions were more evenly spread 
across the response range.  
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Table 13: Perceived difficulty of behaviour change 
  Very easy 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Very difficult 
6 
Stop smoking N 1 2 2 2 3 4 17 
% 3.2% 6.5% 6.5% 6.5% 9.7% 12.9% 54.8% 
Lose weight  N 11 7 10 13 11 7 19 
% 14.1% 9.0% 12.8% 16.7% 14.1% 9.0% 24.4% 
Maintain healthy diet  N 26 13 14 13 12 4 8 
% 28.9% 14.4% 15.6% 14.4% 13.3% 4.4% 8.9% 
Be physically active  N 22 11 8 8 9 7 29 
% 23.4% 11.7% 8.5% 8.5% 9.6% 7.5% 30.9% 
Drink alcohol within 
recommended levels 
N 35 4 8 7 3 3 3 
% 55.6% 6.4% 12.7% 11.1% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 
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5.3.2.2. Contingent valuation 
Responses to the CV questions are included in Table 14. Responses are highly skewed with a high proportion stating that ‘£0’ incentive 
would be required.  
Table 14: Baseline contingent valuation responses* 
Amount 
required: £0 
£5-
£10   
£11-
£20   
£21-
£30   
£31-
£50   
£51-
£75   
£76-
£100   
£101-
£200   
£201-
£400   > £400   
Smoking 
n 13 0 2 2 1 2 5 3 2 1 
% 41.94 0.00 6.45 6.45 3.23 6.45 16.13 9.68 6.45 3.23 
Diet 
n 32 5 8 6 10 5 4 1 5 2 
% 41.03 6.41 10.26 7.69 12.82 6.41 5.13 1.28 6.41 2.56 
Exercise 
n 39 6 5 7 11 2 7 2 6 4 
% 43.82 6.74 5.62 7.87 12.36 2.25 7.87 2.25 6.74 4.49 
Drinking 
n 35 3 6 2 4 0 7 4 1 0 
% 56.45 4.84 9.68 3.23 6.45 0.00 11.29 6.45 1.61 0.00 
*These data do not correspond exactly with data provided in Table 12 as some individuals completed demographic and health behaviour 
questions but missed VHCQ items. 
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5.3.2.3. Attitudinal questions 
For each attitudinal question, a high proportion of respondents chose the maximal option (Table 15). In each case, ‘Strongly agree’ was 
the most common response except for the item asking whether the NHS should offer incentives in which case ‘Strongly disagree’ was 
the most common response.  
 
Table 15: Responses to attitudinal questions at baseline 
Attitudinal item 
 
Strongly 
agree 
1 2 
Neither  
4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
0 3 6 
Control 
n 48 11 7 12 8 2 9 
% 49.48 11.34 7.22 12.37 8.25 2.06 9.28 
Health belief 
n 56 13 5 12 3 4 4 
% 57.73 13.4 5.15 12.37 3.09 4.12 4.12 
Motivation n 48 16 9 16 2 3 2 
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% 50 16.67 9.38 16.67 2.08 3.13 2.08 
Major achievement 
n 55 17 6 10 3 2 3 
% 57.29 17.71 6.25 10.42 3.13 2.08 3.13 
Risk perception 
n 41 15 10 22 1 4 4 
% 42.27 15.46 10.31 22.68 1.03 4.12 4.12 
Live for today 
n 33 9 7 21 4 6 16 
% 34.38 9.38 7.29 21.88 4.17 6.25 16.67 
Can wait for things 
n 39 11 7 16 6 8 10 
% 40.21 11.34 7.22 16.49 6.19 8.25 10.31 
Accept incentives 
n 15 2 2 15 4 3 55 
% 15.63 2.08 2.08 15.63 4.17 3.13 57.29 
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5.3.2.4. Time preference 
The responses to the time preference questions and mean discount rates that these 
imply are included in Table 16. A majority of respondents would rather take the £500 
now than wait 12 months. Although there were very high responses for the amount 
they would have to be offered in order to wait for the reward, these were not 
considered outliers and were retained in the analyses. The range in implied discount 
rates is noteworthy and, assuming the question was correctly understood, suggests 
some individuals would only be willing to forgo the £500 now if the future reward was 
significantly higher. This is picked up later in the discussion. 
 
Table 16: Time preference and discount rates at baseline and three months 
 Baseline 3 months 
Would you prefer: n % n % 
A) 500 69 71.88 37 69.81 
B) £550 in a year 27 28.13 16 30.19 
If A) how much to 
choose B 
Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range 
£1764 
(£2168) 
£600-
£10,000 
£1387.50 
(£2038) 
£600-
£10,000 
  Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range 
Implied annual 
discount rate 
163% 
(363%) 10%-1900% 
110.5% 
(324%) 10%-1900% 
 
 
5.3.3. Contingent valuation analysis – categorical data 
5.3.3.1. Regression – individual health behaviours 
A random effects logistic model was run to predict whether respondents would choose 
an incentive amount of £0 or whether they would choose a positive value. These 
results are only briefly described below with the main focus of the chapter being the 
analysis of the data as continuous. The logistic analysis was run for each health 
behaviour and independent variables were selected based on the strength of 
relationships identified in the descriptives by sub-group, correlations and univariate 
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analyses. All models were significant except for weight loss. There were few 
significant independent variables but this may have been related to the small sample 
size. The attitudinal item relating to perceived control over health was consistently 
found to be a significant predictor (except in the alcohol model) with the coefficient 
sign indicating those reporting less control as requiring a positive (>£0) incentive. 
Income and gender were not found to be significant predictors of a ‘£0’ response. Age 
group and education were significant in the alcohol model with those aged under 59 
and those with at least a college education being more likely to state a required 
incentive over £0. In three of the models the item asking whether the NHS should 
offer incentives was found to be significant (borderline in the weight loss model). In 
each case those who disagreed with incentives being offered were more likely to 
respond with a ‘£0’ response. Finally, ‘Visitcycle’ (baseline vs three months) appeared 
to be an important predictor in smoking and alcohol. The coefficient sign suggests a 
non £0 response is more likely at three months. Time preference and ‘strength’ of 
health behaviours (i.e. BMI and AUDIT score) were not found to be significant. 
A multinomial logistic (MNL) regression was run on the categorical financial incentive 
response data with £0 used as the base and clustering of standard errors used for 
multiple observations. The confidence intervals for the coefficients on the other 
models were wide and in most cases ranged from negative to positive. To combat 
this, responses were collapsed such that £0=0 (base); £1-£30=1; £30-£100=2; 
>£100=3. These data did not generate results that added significant insight to that 
provided by the logistic regression and thus are not reported in detail. However, 
results tables for this and the logistic regression are included in Appendix 12.2.2.  
 
5.3.4. Contingent valuation analysis – continuous data 
5.3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 17 and Table 18 include the descriptive statistics for the WTACertain and 
WTAUncertain respectively at baseline and three months when responses were 
analysed as ‘continuous’ data. A significant proportion of individuals reported that the 
level of incentive they would accept would be ‘£0’. Although the samples are small 
and variances large, a number of interesting patterns are apparent in the results. At 
both time-points and for both sets of incentive questions, smoking has the highest 
minimum required incentive value. This was in the order of at least twice the 
magnitude of the other required incentive means. The reported values for diet were 
similar to those for exercise. As samples at three months are small the results are 
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suggestive only but there are noticeable increases in required incentive from baseline 
to 3 months for smokers and drinkers. This was further explored by calculating the 
baseline to 3 month change in WTA for WTACertain, WTAUncertain and WTACommitment which 
is included in Table 56 in Appendix 12.2.4. In all behaviours for all WTA questions, 
except for the lottery question for diet and exercise, the average WTA increased over 
3 months. 
Table 19 includes the descriptive statistics for the financial commitment questions. 
The feedback from the interviewer was that this question was very poorly understood 
and that the values returned should be treated with caution. For this reason, and to 
avoid presenting too many results, reduced sets of results are presented in the main 
thesis with additional findings reported in the appendix (Appendix 12.2). The issues 
with this item and potential ways of improving data collection are picked up later in 
the discussion. 
Table 20 and Table 21 show change in WTA according to participation in a behaviour 
change programme and by observed behaviour change, respectively. The results in 
Table 20 suggest that after people have begun the process of change they may 
require additional incentives. However, this finding was not consistent and statistical 
tests for differences in WTA changes over time were not significant. To some extent 
the same was true of the between-group changes in WTA presented in Table 21 
where it appears that those who have started exercising and reduced alcohol intake 
require lower incentives (than those who haven’t) but those who have lost some 
weight require increased incentives (compared to those who haven’t). The small 
sample sizes must be noted here as these do not permit any confidence in statements 
about the patterns in the data.  Figure 11 is the demand curve for incentives and the 
steeper slope indicates that smokers require higher incentives to change. 
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Table 17: Financial incentive descriptive statistics – baseline and 3 months 
  n Mean SD Min Max 
Baseline           
  Stop smoking 31 £88.15 £187.62 £0 £1,000 
  Diet 77 £45.71 £91.30 £0 £500 
  Exercise 88 £56.51 £109.80 £0 £500 
  Reduce alcohol intake 62 £29.60 £55.58 £0 £300 
3 months           
  Stop smoking 13 £140.77 £146.92 £0 £500 
  Diet 43 £49.59 £75.32 £0 £300 
  Exercise 51 £47.89 £70.96 £0 £300 
  Reduce alcohol intake 37 £71.96* £133.27 £0 £600 
*p<0.05 for unpaired t-test vs. Baseline;  
 
Table 18: Lottery incentive descriptive statistics – baseline and 3 months 
  n Mean SD Min Max 
Baseline           
  Stop smoking 27 £14.60† £24.09 £0 £70 
  Diet 73 £8.02†† £16.00 £0 £70 
  Exercise 82 £6.98†† £14.75 £0 £70 
  Reduce alcohol intake 56 £6.25†† £16.17 £0 £70 
3 months           
  Stop smoking 12 £14.63†† £21.81 £0 £60 
  Diet 40 £7.06†† £14.66 £0 £60 
  Exercise 45 £7.61†† £14.47 £0 £60 
  Reduce alcohol intake 33 £15.22*† £23.60 £0 £60 
*p<0.05 for unpaired t-test vs. Baseline; †p<0.05 for unpaired t-test vs. guaranteed 
incentive; ††p<0.01 for unpaired t-test vs. guaranteed incentive 
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Table 19: Financial Commitment descriptive statistics – baseline and 3 months 
  n Mean SD Min Max 
Baseline           
  Stop smoking 29 £25.05 £37.12 £2.50 £175.00 
  Diet 74 £31.32 £56.21 £0.00 £275.00 
  Exercise 85 £37.69 £66.44 £0.00 £275.00 
  Reduce alcohol intake 58 £30.91 £49.72 £2.50 £275.00 
3 months      
  Stop smoking 11 £81.36 £107.46 £2.50 £275.00 
  Diet 38 £46.91 £73.03 £2.50 £275.00 
  Exercise 45 £43.67 £76.09 £2.50 £275.00 
  Reduce alcohol intake 33 £67.02* £115.19 £2.50 £500.00 
*p<0.05 for unpaired t-test vs. Baseline 
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Table 20: Baseline to 3 months change in WTA by IMPROVE trial outcome* 
Participation in  behaviour 
change programme 
Financial incentive Lottery incentive Financial commitment 
N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) 
Smoking cessation       
No change 4 £18.75 (£134.44) 3 £14.87 (£32.37) 3 £71.33 (£102.34) 
Initiated 3 £110.83 (£115.66) 3 £2.27 (£3.74) 3 -£12.50 (£21.65) 
Diet       
No change 9 £1.94 (£28.44) 9 -£0.07 (£4.66) 8 -£5.21 (£20.38) 
Initiated 15 £16.50 (£114.68) 14 £1.06 (£23.84) 14 £55.81 (£119.82) 
Exercise       
No change 18 -£11.11 (£79.74) 18 -£3.51 (£14.62) 17 £14.13 (£85.36) 
Initiated 13 £40.96 (£93.81) 12 £2.16 (£20.29) 12 £7.71 (£59.10) 
Alcohol reduction       
No change 5 £46.88 (£158.50) 5 £11.40 (£26.33) 6 -£39.40 (£45.46) 
Initiated 8 £143.50 (£264.57) 5 £26.28 (£32.52) 5 £54.58 (£178.61) 
*Positive values are increases in WTA/WTP over time; **There are no significant differences between groups according to t-tests 
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Table 21: Baseline to 3 months change in WTA by reported health behaviour change at 3 months* 
Change in health behaviour Financial incentive Lottery incentive Financial commitment 
N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) 
Smoking cessation*       
No change 9 £59.17 (£113.66) 8 £0.55 (£29.64) 8 £55.44 (£109.75) 
Stopped smoking 0 -- 0 -- 0 -- 
Weight change       
No change or weight gain 16 £5.63 (£79.80) 16 -£0.79 (£11.47) 6 £6.25 (£18.17) 
Lost weight 7 £39.64 (£114.19) 6 £10.82 (£21.94) 16 -£4.75 (£38.71) 
Exercise       
No change or stopped 
exercising 
22 £11.14 (£101.49) 21 £1.40 (£13.55) 8 £22.19 (£103.67) 
Started exercising 9 -£11.67 (£29.61) 8 £0.61 (£8.44) 21 £3.40 (£56.83) 
Alcohol       
No change or increased units 3 £226.67 (£319.83) 3 £20.3 (£33.87) 2 £0.00 (£0.00) 
Reduction in units consumed 2 £0.00 (£0.00) 2 -£29.25 (£39.24) 3 £85.00 (£162.62) 
*Positive values are increases in WTA over time; **There are no significant differences between groups according to t-tests 
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Figure 11: Incentive demand curves by health behaviour 
 
There were significant differences between the minimum required WTACertain and the 
minimum WTAUncertain with the former being between 4.7-9.6 times the magnitude of 
the latter. This has important implications of the costs of incentive schemes. The 
correlations between guaranteed and lottery incentive ranged between 0.27 and 0.53 
indicating that there were moderate levels of agreement (correlation coefficients of 
0.25-0.50) between the survey questions. This adds to the confidence we can place 
in the stated values. In the comparison of baseline and 3 month WTA values, only 
significant differences were found in the alcohol question and only when unpaired 
tests were conducted. No significant baseline-3 months differences were found for 
either WTACertain or WTAUncertain when paired t-tests were used although the sample 
sizes were noticeably reduced (e.g. to n=9 for smoking and n=25 for alcohol 
consumption). 
Table 22 and Table 23 include the respective descriptive statistics for WTACertain, 
WTAUncertain and WTACommitment based on data pooled across time in absolute terms 
and as a percentage of monthly income, respectively. As some respondents provide 
multiple observations, adjusted standard errors are presented (clustered on 
respondent). T-tests indicated the guaranteed incentives required for smoking 
cessation were statistically significantly higher than those required for dieting (99% 
level), exercising (95% level) and reducing alcohol intake (95% level). There were no 
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other significant differences between behaviours. This was also the case for the 
lottery incentive with the exception that no difference was found between smoking 
cessation and alcohol reduction. The only significant difference when % income data 
were analysed (for both WTACertain and WTAUncertain) was between smoking cessation 
and dieting. There were no significant differences in WTACommitment across behaviours 
in either absolute or percentage income terms. 
  
Table 22: CV descriptives – pooled time-point data 
 n Mean SE Min Max 
Financial incentive           
  Stop smoking 44 £103.69 £28.32 £0 £1,000 
  Diet 120 £47.10** £7.95 £0 £500 
  Exercise 139 £53.35* £8.36 £0 £500 
  Reduce alcohol intake 99 £45.43* £9.66 £0 £600 
Lottery           
  Stop smoking 39 £14.61 £4.03 £0 £70 
  Diet 113 £7.68** £1.54 £0 £70 
  Exercise 127 £7.20* £1.30 £0 £70 
  Reduce alcohol intake 89 £9.58 £2.00 £0 £70 
Financial commitment      
 Stop smoking 40 £40.54 £12.20 £2.50 £275.00 
 Diet 112 £36.61 £6.51 £0.00 £275.00 
 Exercise 130 £39.76 £6.58 £0.00 £275.00 
 Reduce alcohol intake 91 £44.01 £9.02 £2.50 £500.00 
*p<0.05 for unpaired t-test vs. Smoking; †p<0.05 for unpaired t-test vs. Diet; incentive; 
∆p<0.05 for unpaired t-test vs. Exercise; ᶿp<0.05 for unpaired t-test vs. Alcohol; 
**p<0.01 for unpaired t-test vs. Smoking; ††p<0.01 for unpaired t-test vs. Diet; 
incentive; ∆∆p<0.01 for unpaired t-test vs. Exercise; ᶿᶿp<0.01 for unpaired t-test vs. 
Alcohol 
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Table 23: CV descriptives as % of income – pooled time-point data 
 n Mean SE Min Max 
Financial incentive           
  Stop smoking 41 17.88 6.32 0 200 
  Diet 113 5.55* 1.58 0 120 
  Exercise 133 8.23 2.23 0 200 
  Reduce alcohol intake 96 8.42 3.46 0 240 
Lottery           
  Stop smoking 36 2.43 0.99 0 24 
  Diet 108 0.69 0.17 0 14 
  Exercise 122 1.03 0.31 0 24 
  Reduce alcohol intake 87 1.17 0.40 0 24 
Financial commitment      
 Stop smoking 37 6.73 3.76 0.06 110.00 
 Diet 106 3.47 1.11 0.00 110.00 
 Exercise 124 4.90 1.44 0.00 110.00 
 Reduce alcohol intake 89 5.94 2.86 0.06 200.00 
*p<0.05 for unpaired t-test vs. Smoking; †p<0.05 for unpaired t-test vs. Diet; incentive; 
∆p<0.05 for unpaired t-test vs. Exercise; ᶿp<0.05 for unpaired t-test vs. Alcohol; 
**p<0.01 for unpaired t-test vs. Smoking; ††p<0.01 for unpaired t-test vs. Diet; 
incentive; ∆∆p<0.01 for unpaired t-test vs. Exercise; ᶿᶿp<0.01 for unpaired t-test vs. 
Alcohol 
 
5.3.4.2. Descriptive statistics by sub-group 
Non-parametric Mann Whitney tests for two groups and Kruskall Wallis tests for three 
groups were conducted to test for differences between WTACertain responses by 
perceived difficulty, attitude and other factors (Table 24; see Appendix 12.2.5 for 
equivalent tables for lottery and financial commitment). Exercise and alcohol WTA 
values were significantly different (95%) by difficulty group when data were analysed 
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as a percentage of income. However these are unadjusted both for repeated 
observations and multiple testing. There were large differences according to grouped 
responses on the sense of control and NHS offering incentives questions. No 
statistically significant differences were found between the difficulty groups when 
lottery incentive data was used. Many of the differences approached significance but 
p values exceeded 0.05. It is possible that the lack of significant findings relates to 
the small numbers in some of the analysed groups and the wide confidence intervals 
around the means. There are no significant differences in WTA by strength of health 
behaviour (BMI, AUDIT score) or between people grouped by discount rates (time 
preference) ( 
Table 25). However, there is a trend that those with higher discount rates require 
higher incentives, except for smoking - again, which may relate to the small samples 
in each group.  
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Table 24: Incentive descriptive by sub-group – Demographics and attitudes 
 Smoking Diet Exercise Alcohol 
Socio-demographics         
Age group         
<=59 £117.11 £51.73 £50.41 £62.32* 
>59 £67.92 £42.16 £56.69 £24.32 
P value 0.369 0.083 0.128 0.016 
Sex         
Female £53.67 £61.90 £69.12 £30.00 
Male £129.57 £36.54 £42.38 £53.14 
P value 0.329 0.758 0.407 0.861 
Income group         
<£2000 pm £95.90 £46.11 £69.81* £68.35 
>=£2000 pm £125.94 £44.92 £35.85 £30.82 
P value 0.487 0.179 0.012 0.108 
Attitude questions         
I am in control         
Agree £43.08 £33.21 £41.53 £24.78 
Disagree £191.25** £74.33* £80.70* £93.75** 
P value .001 .000 .001 0.006 
My lifestyle determines 
health         
Agree £111.32 £39.25 £45.77 £47.47 
Disagree £77.75 £74.17 £83.39 £36.84 
P value .989 .041 .058 .630 
I am motivated         
Agree £80.67 £41.31 £45.58 £33.02 
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Disagree £153.04 £62.36 £74.42 £78.52* 
P value .021 .280 .353 .320 
Major achievement         
Agree £110.35 £53.54 £56.95 £43.88 
Disagree £73.75 £28.71 £44.02 £50.58 
P value .161 .688 .851 .874 
I am at high risk         
Agree £120.40 £43.20 £58.87 £59.64 
Disagree £63.85 £54.49 £45.74 £22.22 
P value .292 .914 .236 .063 
I live for today         
Agree £88.27 £42.63 £56.55 £56.55 
Disagree £125.97 £51.83 £51.15 £37.24 
P value .541 .425 .935 .518 
I can wait for things         
Agree £93.90 £45.03 £46.85 £39.22 
Disagree £116.58 £50.43 £64.90 £55.39 
P value .350 .645 .334 .972 
NHS should offer 
incentives         
Agree £104.22 £64.20 £81.56* £58.79 
Disagree £103.39 £36.87 £38.61 £39.20 
P value .070 .006 .000 .041 
P values relate to non-parametric tests; *Significant at 95% level (t-test); **Significant 
at 99% level (t-test)  
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Table 25: Incentive descriptive by sub-group – Health behaviours and perceived 
difficulty 
 Smoking Diet Exercise Alcohol 
Health behaviours         
BMI         
<25 - £28.96 £59.09 - 
25-30 - £53.49 £71.70 - 
>30 - £41.06 £34.57 - 
P value  0.439 0.575  
AUDIT Score         
<4 - - - £30.10 
>=4 - - - £50.61 
P value    0.917 
Difficulty of change         
Easy £64.58 £29.43 £35.51 £18.96 
Difficult £109.87 £57.27 £66.50 **£116.02 
P value 0.241 0.045 0.065 0.000 
Discount rate         
<20% £255.00 £37.28 £28.78 £29.91 
20%-100% £65.56 £49.73 £60.85 £28.31 
>100% £92.63 £53.23 £65.91 £79.92 
P value .265 .780 .061 .342 
P values are non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon for two groups, Kruskal Wallis for three 
groups); *Significant at 95% level (t-test for two groups, ANOVA for three groups); 
**Significant at 99% level (t-test for two groups, ANOVA for three groups) 
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5.3.4.3. Regression - individual health behaviours 
Since the sample for individual behaviour analyses was small it was decided to run 
only the GLM model as analyses applied separately to the zero responses reduces 
the sample available for predicting the positive values. Results from the GLM 
regression of individual behaviours pooled by time are included in Table 26. The GLM 
passed the linktest in all but the alcohol question. However, GLM was still applied to 
this question for comparability of results. The results of the Modified Park test are 
included in Appendix 12.2.7. A number of combinations of family (including Gaussian, 
Gamma, Poisson and Inverse Gaussian) and links (Identity and Log) were tested and 
either a Gamma or Poisson family appeared appropriate. The Gamma family was 
chosen as this is more commonly used with the Log link in health economics 
(especially for analysing skewed cost data). For parsimony, only WTACertain analyses 
are presented in detail here with the results for WTAUncertain and WTACommitment provided 
in Appendix 12.2.8. 
In each health behaviour the sense of control attitude question was a statistically 
significant predictor of WTA values. In each case those who stated having less control 
over their health required a higher minimum incentive to change their behaviour. 
Perceived difficulty of behaviour change was a significant predictor in weight loss and 
alcohol consumption reduction with those perceiving greater difficulty in changing 
requiring higher incentives. The attitudinal variable indicating acceptance of 
incentives from the NHS was only borderline significant for weight loss but the 
direction of the coefficient indicates those who disagree with incentives stated lower 
WTA values. Sex was a significant WTA predictor in exercise and alcohol (borderline). 
The coefficient direction was the same in both and of a similar magnitude and 
indicated that females required higher incentives. In alcohol and smoking, age has an 
inverse relationship with WTA with older people reporting lower required incentives. 
Finally, the visit variable (baseline vs 3 months) approached significance in smoking 
and alcohol and in both cases higher incentives were required at the later time-point. 
Time preference, other attitudinal questions and behaviour strength variables (e.g. 
AUDIT scores) were not found to be significant predictors of WTA response. 
However, data on number of cigarettes smoked was unavailable. The fact that BMI 
was not significant in weight loss but is in exercise is notable; it is possible that BMI 
may be perceived by some to prevent exercise.  
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Table 26: GLM regression of individual health behaviour WTACertain 
Smoking AIC = 10.398 n = 43   
Log Pseudo likelihood = -217.57 BIC =  -93.314  
 Coef. SE z P > z L 95% CI U 95% CI 
Difficulty stop 
smoking 1.377 1.096 1.260 0.209 -0.770 3.524 
Control 1.284 0.527 2.440 0.015 0.252 2.317 
EQ-5D VAS -0.018 0.016 -1.180 0.240 -0.049 0.012 
Age -0.116 0.062 -1.880 0.061 -0.237 0.005 
VisitCycle 2.002 1.150 1.740 0.082 -0.251 4.256 
Constant 7.208 2.540 2.840 0.005 2.229 12.186 
       
Weight loss AIC = 9.367 n = 117   
Log Pseudo likelihood = -541.98 BIC =  -413.70  
Control 0.966 0.329 2.930 0.003 0.320 1.612 
NHS should 
offer incentives -0.506 0.355 -1.430 0.154 -1.201 0.189 
Sex -0.642 0.425 -1.510 0.130 -1.474 0.190 
EQ-5D VAS 0.009 0.007 1.290 0.198 -0.005 0.023 
Difficulty weight 
loss 0.746 0.327 2.280 0.023 0.104 1.388 
Constant 3.029 0.548 5.530 0.000 1.955 4.103 
  
 
 
     
177 
 
 
 
 
 
Exercise AIC = 9.509 n = 126   
Log Pseudo likelihood = -593.09 BIC= -469.73  
Control 0.937 0.326 2.880 0.004 0.299 1.575 
NHS should 
offer incentives 
-0.518 0.296 -1.750 0.081 -1.099 0.063 
Sex -0.974 0.403 -2.420 0.016 -1.763 -0.185 
BMI group -0.410 0.188 -2.180 0.029 -0.778 -0.042 
Difficulty 
exercise 
0.503 0.354 1.420 0.156 -0.192 1.197 
Constant 4.629 0.581 7.960 0.000 3.490 5.768 
       
Alcohol AIC = 8.446 n = 97   
Log Pseudo likelihood = 402.63 BIC =  -322.19  
Control 1.132 0.421 2.690 0.007 0.306 1.958 
Sex -0.930 0.476 -1.950 0.051 -1.863 0.003 
EQ-5D Index 1.235 0.771 1.600 0.109 -0.276 2.747 
Age -0.079 0.023 -3.440 0.001 -0.124 -0.034 
Difficulty alcohol 
reduction 
1.747 0.378 4.630 0.000 1.007 2.487 
VisitCycle 0.761 0.395 1.930 0.054 -0.014 1.535 
Constant 5.670 1.205 4.710 0.000 3.309 8.032 
 
In Table 62 and Table 63 in Appendix 12.2.8, GLM models are presented predicting 
WTAUncertain and WTACommitment, respectively. In the analysis of WTAUncertain, there were 
no significant predictors in the weight loss model but elsewhere findings were 
consistent with those in the WTACertain analysis. For example, lower control and 
greater perceived difficulty (exercise model only) of change required greater expected 
lottery incentives. Those with poorer quality of life (assessed on the EQ-5D VAS) also 
required greater lottery incentives in the smoking and alcohol models. In the latter 
and in line with expectations, those who drank more (higher AUDIT score) also 
required greater value lotteries to entice behaviour change. There were some 
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inconsistencies between the health behaviour models. For example, in exercise, 
those who had higher education needed greater value lotteries to incentivise them 
while the reverse was true in the alcohol model. This may be a cost of time issue with 
higher educated (and, we can assume, higher income) respondents needing more 
money to compensate them for time lost exercising while behaviour change in alcohol 
requires relatively little time commitment. The income variable corroborated this 
theory as the beta sign was reversed in these two behaviours. 
In the analysis of WTACommitment, similar trends were apparent with higher financial 
commitments required to motivate behaviour change at 3 months (statistically 
significant in smoking and alcohol) or if the respondent had lower control or higher 
perceived difficulty of change. Trends were also apparent indicating that those with 
higher income and higher education were willing to commit more money to such an 
incentive scheme. In terms of health behaviours, those who drank more (according 
to AUDIT) and were more obese (BMI) were willing to commit more money to change 
behaviour which allows confidence in the survey validity. There was a suggestion that 
those with lower motivation were willing to commit less (significant in smoking and 
alcohol consumption) which may reflect lower desire to participate in such a scheme 
or belief that they would not be able to achieve change and regain the committed 
money. A consistent finding not present in the analysis of WTACertain and WTAUncertain 
data was that those who believed they were at lower risk were willing to commit less 
money than those who thought they were at higher risk. Finally, in all behaviours, 
those with higher discount rates were willing to commit less money. It is unclear why 
this might be the case but may reflect an underlying increased uncertainty in the 
return of the money captured in the question or reflect the lower value placed on 
returned money in the future due to high discounting. 
 
5.3.4.4. Pooled health behaviours 
Table 27 and Table 28 include summary statistics and means for WTA by subgroups.  
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Table 27: Pooled health behaviour - WTA descriptives 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Guaranteed incentive 402 £55.04 £106.01 £0.00 £1,000 
Lottery incentive 371 £16.72 £90.55 £0.00 £1,000 
Commitment incentive 373 £39.93 £70.25 £0.00 £500 
Guaranteed incentive 
% income 381 8.56 27.33 0.00 240 
Lottery incentive % 
income 354 1.37 4.63 0.00 50 
Commitment incentive 
% income 350 5.00 17.63 0.00 200 
 
Table 28: Mean WTA by sub-group 
 
Guaranteed Lottery Commitment 
Socio-demographics   
    
Age group       
<=59 £63.28 £13.77 £43.63 
>59 £44.78 £20.38 £35.27 
P value 0.0004 0.0167 0.006 
Sex       
Female £56.97 £7.96 £30.65 
Male £53.84 £22.04 £45.77* 
P value 0.7533 0.8398 0.0017 
Income group       
<£2000 pm £66.82 £9.72 £38.04 
>=£2000 pm £44.43* £22.88 £43.39 
P value 0.000 0.008 0.155 
Attitude questions       
I am in control       
Agree £34.98 £6.90 £29.24 
Disagree £96.76** £34.05** £59.60** 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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My lifestyle 
determines health   
    
Agree £51.30 £18.67 £39.04 
Disagree £69.23 £9.05 £43.41** 
P value 0.045 0.066 0.105 
I am motivated       
Agree £44.84 £10.23 £35.81 
Disagree £81.28** £32.33* £50.69 
P value 0.014 0.001 0.932 
Major achievement       
Agree £59.46 £18.00 £44.58 
Disagree £43.93 £13.53 £28.31 
P value 0.342 0.034 0.206 
I am at high risk       
Agree £61.96 £21.65 £44.58 
Disagree £44.20 £7.55 £28.31 
P value 0.038 0.047 0.148 
I live for today       
Agree £56.79 £22.46 £43.71 
Disagree £53.99 £11.54 £36.46 
P value 0.495 0.182 0.198 
I can wait for things       
Agree £49.17 £11.28 £39.41 
Disagree £64.61 £25.41 £40.79 
P value 0.242 0.059 0.547 
NHS should offer 
incentives   
    
Agree £73.81 £23.98 £46.25 
Disagree £45.19* £12.77 £36.73 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.028 
Annual discount rate        
<20% £44.60 £17.81 £42.37 
20-99% £53.87 £7.73 £55.63 
>=100% £70.67 £10.60 £35.32* 
P value 0.043 0.242 0.000 
P values are non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon for two groups, Kruskal Wallis for three 
groups); *Significant at 95% level (t-test for two groups, ANOVA for three groups); 
**Significant at 99% level (t-test for two groups, ANOVA for three groups) 
 
The data were reanalysed but with responses pooled across health behaviour and 
time-point thus increasing the sample and power of the analyses. The GLM model 
returned control, perceived difficulty, the EQ-5D VAS and highest education level 
(versus primary school only) as being significant predictors of incentives required with 
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acceptance of incentive, the item on ability to wait for things and VisitCycle exhibiting 
borderline significance. These results were largely the same when protests 
responses were removed. However, both analyses failed the linktest and could not 
be improved by using other families or link options. Thus other modelling approaches 
were explored. 
The Tobit model (censored at £0) was significant with the variables on control, 
acceptance of incentive and perceived difficulty returned as significant and VisitCycle 
borderline significant. However, the model predicted WTA values ranging -£154.29 to 
£192.93 with over 50% being negative. The model remains significant (although with 
a reduced pseudo R2) when protests (n=87) are removed and, with the exception of 
the attitudes to incentive question, the same variables remain significant predictors. 
Subsequently, the proportion of negative WTA predicted values were reduced to 25%. 
However, the prediction of such a high number of negative values seems a poor 
theoretical fit for the data thus the Tobit was not considered the most appropriate 
model. 
There was very little difference between the two-part model and zero-inflated model.  
The log-likelihoods were similar and similar variables were returned as significant - 
although the zero-inflated model appeared to have greater power. The Vuong test 
indicated the zero-inflated model was preferred to the standard negative binomial 
model. For these reasons results from only the zero-inflated model are reported. The 
marginal effects for the final WTACertain model are included in Table 29 - the model for 
WTAUncertain did not converge and is not reported. As there were very few zero 
responses to WTACommitment, a GLM analysis is presented (gamma with log link 
function) in the appendix (Appendix 12.2.8).  
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Table 29: Zero-inflated negative binomial model predicting WTACertain 
  Number of obs =  392    
  Non zero obs = 224    
  Zero obs = 168    
Inflation model = 
logit LR chi2(15) = 66.37    
Log likelihood = -
1412.093 Prob > chi2 = 0.000    
 dy/dx SE. z P>z 
L 95% 
CI 
U 95% 
CI 
Sense of Control 49.85 10.16 4.91 0.000 29.95 69.76 
Female Vs Male -15.24 9.47 -1.61 0.107 -33.80 3.31 
Age -0.70 0.46 -1.53 0.127 -1.60 0.20 
Perceived difficulty 
(Easy)        
Vs Moderate 27.67 8.09 3.42 0.001 11.82 43.52 
Vs Difficult 41.33 11.68 3.54 0.000 18.44 64.22 
NHS should offer 
incentives -9.56 8.34 -1.15 0.252 -25.91 6.79 
Education 
(Primary)        
Vs Secondary  -79.57 43.13 -1.84 0.065 -164.11 4.98 
Vs Intermediate -92.81 42.95 -2.16 0.031 -176.99 -8.63 
Vs University -72.80 43.41 -1.68 0.094 -157.88 12.29 
Baseline vs 3 
months 
(VisitCycle) 16.59 8.80 1.89 0.059 -0.66 33.84 
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Health Behaviour 
(Smoking)        
Vs Diet -25.28 16.95 -1.49 0.136 -58.50 7.94 
Vs Exercise -17.67 17.19 -1.03 0.304 -51.36 16.03 
Vs Alcohol 
reduction -14.94 18.44 -0.81 0.418 -51.09 21.21 
EQ-5D VAS -0.30 0.20 -1.47 0.142 -0.69 0.10 
I can wait for 
things -16.00 9.94 -1.61 0.107 -35.48 3.48 
 
As with the analyses by health behaviour, control and perceived difficulty of behaviour 
change were the most important predictors of incentive response. The analyses 
suggest those with low self-control require £49.85 more than those in control of health 
to change behaviour. There appears to be a linear-type relationship between required 
incentive and perceived difficulty of change; those who perceive change as neither 
easy nor difficult require £27.67 more per month than those who perceive change as 
easy and those who state that change will be difficult require £41.33 more than those 
reporting change as easy. The upper and lower confidence intervals for this 
comparison and for the control coefficients, although relatively wide, are all in the 
same direction giving confidence in the importance of these factors. The other 
attitudinal items did not prove to be significant predictors of incentive and were 
excluded from the model. However the surrogate attitude item on time preference (I 
can usually wait for things I want) and the attitudes towards incentives variable were 
retained in the model as they were either approaching significance or theoretically 
key. 
The coefficients for the demographics and visit variables were in the main non-
significant but there is a suggestion that people who attained a higher level of 
education than primary school required less incentive than those whose highest level 
of education was primary school. This might be a reflection of social class, income or 
education. Although not significant, the coefficient for the visit variable suggests that 
the required incentive is £16.59 higher at three months compared to baseline. Males 
appear to require on average £15.24 less in incentive than females and the minimum 
monthly incentive required per month declines by £0.70 with every year of age. There 
is no clear association between age and acceptance of incentives but exploration of 
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an interaction between the two suggests older people who do not agree with 
incentives report significantly lower WTA values. The discount rate variable is 
borderline significant in univariate and multivariate analyses but its introduction and 
consequent reduction in sample size (due to missing data on this item) has a 
disproportionate impact on the other model coefficients and hence was excluded from 
the main model.  
The results from the GLM analysis of WTACommitment show some consistencies with the 
above results. Values significantly increased at 3 months and there were trends for 
increased WTA with increased difficulty and less control. Values also increased with 
income and education but fell with age and higher perceived risk. 
 
 
5.3.4.5. Validity of CV survey values 
 
Figure 12 plots the average financial incentive required by the perceived difficulty of 
change for all behaviours combined. There appears to be a near linear relationship 
between WTACertain and difficulty. Figure 13 and Figure 14 show WTACertain and 
WTAUncertain by response to the motivation question (dichotomised) and by strength of 
unhealthy behaviour, respectively. Equivalent figures for WTAUncertain and 
WTACommitment are presented in Appendix 12.2.6. The results provide some evidence 
of the internal validity of the CV values. Lower motivation requires greater incentives 
across the behaviours as does greater levels of unhealthy behaviour (for smoking 
and drinking). Data on physical inactivity was not available and the relationship 
between BMI and WTA appeared to be non-linear. 
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Figure 12: Mean WTACertain by perceived difficulty 
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Figure 13: WTA by Motivation 
 
Figure 14: WTA by Unhealthy behaviour strength 
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5.4. Discussion 
This chapter reports on the analysis of a contingent valuation survey which aimed to 
establish the pricing of incentives and to identify which factors determine acceptable 
incentive levels. The analysis of required incentive by subgroups and the correlations 
between guaranteed and lottery incentive, suggest that a certain degree of confidence 
can be placed in the validity of the survey results. Due to the small sample sizes, the 
pooled data (by time and by time and health behaviour) was most useful in identifying 
the minimum incentive pricing and mediators. In the event, there were a high number 
of zero WTA values and a number of modelling strategies were explored in trying to 
deal with this. On theoretical and diagnostic performance grounds, the zero-inflated 
negative binomial model was chosen. However, it is notable that the variables 
returned as significant were very similar across models. Excluding ‘protest’ responses 
from the analysis did not substantively change the results although determining who 
has protested is to some extent a value judgement. The explanatory power of most 
of the models was modest despite being generally highly significant. It was also a 
general finding that the fit of the model was poorer for the higher positive WTA values. 
The survey data indicated low support for the NHS providing incentives for behaviour 
change, even in those who had low motivation and control over health. The average 
minimum acceptable incentive appeared to depend on the type of behaviour being 
considered and values varied widely. Smoking cessation was perceived to be the 
most difficult form of behaviour change and also required the largest incentive to bring 
about change. Dieting and exercising required about half the incentive amount per 
month required for smoking cessation. Analysis of the data as continuous suggested 
that the minimum incentive required fell with age, was lower in males, lower in people 
with smaller discount rates and higher in low income and less educated individuals. 
A note of caution must be attached to the discount rates implied by the survey 
responses which reached as high as 1,900% per annum. It is possible that individuals 
did not understand the question, were responding strategically rather than responding 
with the minimum required for them to defer the reward, or were not offering 
considered responses at all. Regardless, the time preference task used here is one 
commonly used in economic studies and doubts must be raised about its validity. 
The introduction posited the hypothesis that A) there would be a positive relationship 
between required incentive and the level of unhealthy behaviour (i.e. BMI and alcohol 
consumption levels) and perceived difficulty of behaviour change. The latter 
relationship was clearly evident and the item on perceived difficulty of change was 
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one of the strongest predictors of incentive level. The pooled data model suggested 
that an additional £41.33 would be required to encourage change in an individual who 
perceived change as difficult (compared to an individual who saw change as easy). 
This would amount to £495 over the course of 12 months and is therefore a non-trivial 
figure. The relationship between behaviour strength and incentive was less clear. 
Given the sample of smokers was small (and data on cigarettes smoked patchy) the 
analysis concentrated on diet and alcohol consumption. The BMI variable was not 
found to be a significant predictor of incentives in univariate or multivariate models for 
WTACertain but was in some WTAUncertain and WTACommitment analyses. The descriptive 
data reveal a possible non-linear relationship between BMI and incentive required, 
being positive initially until a certain level of obesity where the required incentives 
appear to fall. It is unclear why this might be; acknowledgment of a biological process 
that weight loss would be easier for those very over-weight; over optimism in the 
heavily overweight; or reflecting an additional premium that people of a certain weight 
place on weight loss such that they require less external financial incentive. This 
concept is explored further in the following chapter addressing the cost-effectiveness 
of incentives for weight loss. BMI was important in the incentives required for exercise 
however. The AUDIT alcohol score was used to denote the strength of behaviour in 
alcohol consumption. While not significant in multivariate models WTACertain, AUDIT 
score was found to be a significant predictor of incentive level in the univariate model 
and suggested that an additional £6.77 incentive was required for every point 
increase on the AUDIT tool. It was also a significant predictor in WTAUncertain and 
WTACommitment models. 
It was also hypothesised that B) the stated minimum required incentive level would 
be partly explained by responses to a number of attitudinal items. While this was 
found to be the case it was the item relating to sense of control and perceived ability 
to change that had greatest explanatory power; the item relating to motivation had a 
comparatively weak influence (in WTACertain at least). The results largely support the 
inclusion of both of these factors in the proposed framework in Chapter 3. The 
analyses suggest those who did not agree with the statement that they are in control 
of their health and are able to change require £49.85 more of an incentive per month 
than those who did agree with the statement. The item relating to motivation was not 
a significant predictor in the multivariate analyses for WTAUncertain but was in the other 
models. The univariate WTACertain analysis indicated that an increase in incentive by 
£36.44 would be needed for an individual who did not feel motivated to change 
behaviour (compared to an individual who was motivated). The differential 
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explanatory power of these attitudinal items suggests distinct constructs that 
influence behaviour change; individuals may be motivated to change but may not feel 
they have sufficient control over their behaviour or requisite skill to do so. It appears 
that the latter is more important, if not in behaviour change itself, at least in 
determining the level of financial reward or compensation an individual would need to 
receive to consider and achieve change.    
In support of hypothesis C), there was a trend for the incentives required to be higher 
at three months. The analyses suggested an increase in WTACertain on average of 
£16.59 from baseline to three months although the time-point variable in the selected 
model achieved only borderline significance. This effect was most marked for those 
considering smoking cessation or a reduction of alcohol consumption. When the 
univariate analysis was run considering only these two behaviours the p value 
decreased and the increase in incentive required over time rose to £40.73. A crude 
investigation of the change in perceived difficulty over time indicated that the average 
rated difficulty of dieting and exercising fell slightly by three months whereas the 
perceived difficulty of smoking cessation and alcohol reduction both rose slightly over 
the same period. This may offer some reason for the differential change in incentive 
over time by behaviour although we cannot be certain whether these reflect the 
behaviours themselves or the differential success or failure that patients may have 
had in changing those respective behaviours. A clear test of hypothesis C) is an 
exploration of the change in CV response by the same individuals over time which to 
some extent mediates the issue of having a different sample at the two time-points. 
For this, paired t-tests were conducted comparing the baseline and 3 month WTA 
means by health behaviour. In the event, no significant differences were found. It is 
unclear whether this is due to some of the small sample sizes available or if there was 
truly no effect. Despite this finding, means of the individual WTA change over time 
largely suggested an increase in incentives required; for example, mean increases of 
£59.12 and £57.10, respectively, were needed for smoking cessation and a reduction 
in alcohol consumption.   
The sample comparison tests suggested there were mainly insignificant differences 
between those recruited and baseline completers and between baseline and 3 month 
completers. Education was significant in the latter comparison with those with higher 
education more likely to complete follow-up; this is a common finding in survey 
research. In the WTACertain analysis here, education was associated with lower WTA. 
Hence the finding that WTA actually appears to increase over time does so in spite 
of the trend for more educated people to complete the follow-up. In summary though, 
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the sample comparison allows us to be relatively confident that changes in VHCQ 
responses over time are not the result of changing samples. 
Analyses of the lottery and financial commitment survey responses provided results 
that were largely consistent with those from the guaranteed incentive survey section. 
For example, that perception of control and difficulty of behaviour change were 
important determinants of the incentive level chosen. In addition, the suggestion that 
WTA/WTP values rose from baseline to 3 months was enduring as was the positive 
relationship between level of unhealthy behaviour (specifically, BMI and AUDIT) and 
incentive level required. There were some interesting additional findings in the 
analysis of the commitment responses; for example that those with higher income 
and education were willing to commit more money to behaviour change disincentive 
schemes and that willingness to commit was inversely related to discount rate and 
level of risk perception. However, caution is needed to avoid over-interpreting these 
findings – partially due to the small sample size but also due to the number of 
statistical tests performed. There was also qualitative feedback from the interviewer 
conducting the interviews that the financial commitment section was poorly 
understood and that respondents may not have provided informed answers. Many of 
the results from this section of the survey however suggest participants did 
understand and engage with the questions. For example, as with the guaranteed 
incentive and lottery questions and as previously mentioned, the WTA for the financial 
commitment increased in line with factors such as lower motivation and control. 
The results presented here may have a number of implications for the design of 
incentive schemes. Lottery incentives may offer a cheaper alternative to guaranteed 
incentive as individuals are willing to accept a much lower uncertain incentive value. 
However, the analyses to determine the mediators of incentive amount were far less 
informative when a lottery was considered. Results suggest that different incentive 
amounts may be required for different health behaviours. That said, the health 
behaviour variable was not found to significantly predict incentive amount in 
multivariate analysis when perceived difficulty was included. A possible explanation 
for this is that the pricing of incentives may not necessarily be dependent on the 
behaviour per se but on the underlying difficulty that the individual perceives in 
achieving that change. Alternatively, the base category in the model (smoking) had a 
small n which may have reduced power. Optimal incentive levels may vary between 
individuals for the same behaviour and for the same individual over time. The 
implication is that incentive pricing may need to be personalised for the individual, 
accounting for characteristics such as perceived difficulty of change, and be dynamic 
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over time. Information garnered from the study on incentive values and knowledge of 
what determines them, will be useful for incentive scheme design. It may also be 
useful in the consideration of cost-effectiveness presented in Chapter 9. There was 
some support from the survey analysis for the framework proposed in Chapter 3 and 
the hypothesised relationships therein. For example, self-control was found to be 
important. However, the survey data should be explored further to help understand 
inter alia the determinants of reported motivation and time preference. 
Analysis of the lottery and financial commitment data provided additional insights. For 
example, discounting appeared to be significant predictor of WTA but the direction of 
the relationship varied depending on the incentive scheme. The financial commitment 
data analysis suggests that level of income or education may affect participation. 
Those with higher income or education were willing to commit more money to 
behaviour change and this may reflect an unwillingness to participate in low income 
individuals. This suggests that financial commitments may not be a suitable design of 
incentive schemes where the aim is to reduce health inequalities. Risk perception 
was also important in willingness to commit money to behaviour change with those 
who perceive themselves as being at low risk willing to commit less. Given the group 
had all experienced a suspected cardiovascular event and engaged in some form of 
risky behaviour it is an important finding that some felt they were at relatively low risk 
and, further, that this may influence their willingness to engage in interventions to 
reduce this risk. It is possible that increased education is required to counter-act this. 
Doubts were raised during the interviews about the comprehensibility of the financial 
commitment question. Future research in the area whose primary aim is 
understanding commitment responses should invest time in ensuring the format is 
clear. It should also minimise respondent burden and consider only enquiring about 
this form of disincentives since it is possible here that participants were over-
burdened and confused by the inclusion of both positive incentives and disincentives 
in the same survey. Asking the respondents to reframe their thinking from considering 
what they would need to be paid, to what they would need to commit financially may 
be too cognitively challenging.  
There is reason to treat some of the survey results of the study with caution. A number 
of explanations have already been offered for the apparent increase in incentive 
amount over time. An alternative plausible explanation is that those who were more 
in favour of incentives (and who sought greater incentive levels) were more likely to 
complete the VHCQ at follow-up, which would have the effect of raising the mean 
value. This argument is however attenuated by the fact that the trend of an increase 
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only occurs in smoking cessation and alcohol reduction. The sample comparison 
analyses also indicated that were no significant differences in baseline WTA between 
those who did and didn’t complete the follow-up. The increase may also have resulted 
from the change in survey administration mode (from face to face to - predominantly 
- telephone at follow-up)(520) or the change in setting (hospital to home at follow-up).  
Some of the results provide evidence of the internal validity of the CV survey. For 
example, WTA values increased with increased perceived difficulty, lower motivation 
and with greater strength unhealthy behaviours. A change in WTA values in those 
who succeeded or failed at behaviour change at 3 months might be additional 
evidence for the survey validity. There was a trend that those who had begun the 
behaviour change process required greater incentives at 3 months. We might 
speculate that this is because people have either a) realised the true disutility of 
behaviour change; or b) reached a plateau in change and find further efforts more 
challenging. However, this trend was not consistent across behaviours and the 
samples were too small to have confidence in the findings. 
The values obtained here for smoking, diet and exercise (no incentive studies for 
alcohol could be identified) are within the range of those offered in trials and studies 
in these behaviours where some engagement and success with the scheme has been 
observed. For example the baseline WTA for smoking cessation was £88 per month 
here while a recent study (105) which found incentives to be effective offered 
pregnant women up to £752 for smoking cessation up to 6 months post-partum (which 
equates to ≈£50 per month assuming a 15 month scheme). Furthermore there was 
evidence that the values elicited here are largely comparable with those elicited in 
other value elicitation studies. To illustrate, in the You et al (171) discrete choice 
study, overweight women needed to be paid $53.00 (£35.39) per monthly weigh-in 
over 3 months to participate in a weight loss programme. This compares to the 
average value obtained in this study of £47.10 per month.  
It was beyond the scope of the current research to attempt to test the external validity 
of the elicited values. It is known that WTA and WTP values often under and over-
estimate values that people would accept and pay in the real world.(521) Many 
studies apply a calibration rule where the elicited values are divided by a factor to 
generate a value closer to the actual willingness to pay or accept. While the NOAA 
panel suggested the “divide by 2” rule (482) a meta-analysis of calibration studies has 
shown that the ratio of stated and actual preferences is not always above 1 and that 
the disparity depends on: whether the values elicited are to accept or pay (being 
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larger in the former); the elicitation method; and whether the good considered is a 
private or public good (with the former being lower).(521) 
As stated earlier in the thesis, it is debatable whether the calibration requirements 
identified in environmental economics (a majority of studies are in this field) are 
applicable to health and it would be unwise to apply a rule of thumb from that field to 
this. Additional research is needed on clinical trial data and observational data (for 
example, from commercial website schemes) where the response to different 
incentive levels can be observed. Notwithstanding the potential need to adjust for 
hypothetical bias, the relative values obtained within the survey could still be argued 
to have inherent value. For example, the knowledge that smokers, those with high 
levels of unhealthy behaviour, lacking control and perceiving behaviour change as 
difficult might require higher levels of incentives or that higher incentives might be 
needed as time progresses is new, important and potentially useful information 
regardless of the absolute values. 
A major criticism of CV in general is that individuals may not have well-formed 
preferences for the target good or service. For those who do not it may have helped 
to include a ‘Don’t know’ option, however a review suggests that their omission does 
not affect the validity of results but does substantially reduce the data available. (522) 
Regardless, further adjustment of the WTA values may be necessary before applying 
them in the real world.(523) It is also not clear what proportion of the stated required 
incentive relates to an extrinsic motivator and to opportunity cost (or financial 
barriers). For example, respondents may have been factoring into their valuation the 
costs for gym attendance or nicotine patches or accounted for savings they would 
may make (e.g. from not smoking). However, this distinction should not be of great 
significance when designing incentive schemes as the rationale for the incentive level 
accepted is not required. 
Notwithstanding these notes of caution, these analyses represent a valuable addition 
to existing research. This is the first English study on incentive pricing and the first 
ever study (and one of very few contingent valuation studies) that reports responses 
on two occasions over time. A number of issues warrant further research. Analyses 
could explore whether individuals with multiple (clustered) unhealthy behaviours 
systematically respond in a different manner to those with only one unhealthy 
behaviour. Finally, for incentive scheme planning, it would be useful to determine 
what factors influence people’s attitudes towards or acceptance of incentives.  
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5.4.1. Main findings 
The major findings from the analysis are included in Figure 15 with their implications 
for incentives research and schemes outlined.  
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 Figure 15: Important findings and implications 
Finding Implications for incentive research and schemes 
 A high proportion of the sample felt strongly that incentives should 
not be offered by the NHS 
 Incentive schemes may not be accepted by many which may 
limit participation and therefore effectiveness 
 Careful targeting and framing of incentives may be needed  
 There were notable differences in incentive required by health 
behaviour. Smoking cessation was rated most difficult and required 
the largest incentive 
 Schemes and incentive amounts should be tailored to specific 
behaviours 
 The expected cost of uncertain incentives (lottery) was much lower 
than guaranteed incentives 
 Lotteries may provide the most cost-effective incentive format 
 There was a clear relationship between perceived difficulty of 
change and minimum required incentive 
 Incentive pricing should be personalised and take into 
account the perceived difficulty of behaviour change 
 The relationship between self-reported motivation and strength of 
behaviour and required incentive was sometimes weak or non-
linear 
 Incentive pricing based on these factors alone may not be 
optimal 
 Of the attitudes, sense of control over behaviour had the greatest 
explanatory power for WTA values 
 These factors should be accounted for in incentive design, 
targeting and pricing  
 Socioeconomic and demographic factors (education, gender, age 
and income) were moderately important in explaining WTA values 
 Special efforts may be required to convince higher income or 
older individuals of the value of incentive schemes 
 There was a suggestion that required incentives changed 
(increased) over time 
 Incentive schemes may need to be dynamic over time in 
response to underlying motivation, change in difficulty and 
environment 
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 Willingness to commit money to a disincentive scheme was 
positively related to income and education 
 Financial commitment design schemes may not 
attract/engage lower income groups and fail to address health 
inequalities 
 Willingness to commit money to a disincentive scheme was 
inversely related to perceived health risk 
 Interventions may be required to educate individuals 
regarding health risks (even in those who have had a health 
scare)  
 There was qualitative evidence that respondents struggled with the 
concept of a disincentive scheme 
 Future research in this area should devote additional 
resources to ensure WTP tasks are understood 
 
197 
 
 
 
6. The cost-effectiveness of 
incentives 
 
6.1. Background 
The arena for public health in England has changed significantly recently with a new 
body – Public Health England – taking charge of national public health and with 
responsibilities and attendant budgets being devolved to local authorities and Health 
and Well-Being Boards therein.(524) As local government attempts to manage the 
health and social care integration and achieve efficiency savings demanded by 
central government, now, more than ever, it is imperative that they identify which 
public health interventions represent value for money and best return on investment.  
The introduction to this thesis outlined the impact of preventable diseases in terms of 
financial costs and quality of life and highlighted the link between diseases and health 
behaviours. It noted the significant contribution that unhealthy behaviours make to 
increased mortality risks and early, preventable deaths – especially in lower income 
groups. For example, cardiovascular diseases such as stroke and ischaemic heart 
disease are the number one cause of death globally and account for 25% of all 
deaths.(1) Consequently, the mortality associated with preventable diseases explains 
a large proportion of the life expectancy differential between socioeconomic groups. 
While there has been an acknowledgement that changing lifestyles is a priority, 
unhealthy behaviours have proven intractable and a multitude of behavioural 
schemes and interventions have often delivered only modest and often transient 
results. Financial incentives are perceived as a more radical and controversial 
approach to behaviour change than interventions that are based on traditional 
behavioural models. This may partly explain why, despite some promising results in 
favour of incentives, their adoption as a public health tool has been limited. Another 
significant barrier to the wider adoption of financial incentive schemes is the 
uncertainty as to whether or not they represent value for money and whether they are 
financially sustainable. If incentives were to deliver higher rates of behaviour change 
than traditional interventions and therefore prevent a greater number of secondary 
diseases, they may represent value for money. However, the degree to which such 
schemes are affordable in the medium and long term and especially on a population 
basis is questionable. Research establishing the cost-effectiveness of financial 
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incentives is therefore required and frequently cited as a priority for future 
research.(114, 131, 160) Should such schemes be found cost-effective they may 
overcome the barrier of negative opinion as studies indicate that the public are more 
accepting of incentives if they are described as being cost-saving or more cost-
effective than alternatives.(153) 
To date, there have been very few economic evaluations of financial incentive 
schemes. Those existing studies were discussed in section 1.1.3.4 of the thesis. 
Although more robust economic evaluations are planned (e.g.(104)), at the time of 
writing, no published studies present a full economic evaluation of financial incentives 
for achieving lifestyle behaviour change that would meet the technology appraisal 
reference case criteria set out by the National Institute of Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE).(326)  
 
6.2. Aims and objectives 
The following chapters describe research conducted to address this gap in knowledge 
and reduce the uncertainty surrounding the value for money of financial incentive 
interventions. The aim was to develop a decision-analytic model and conduct a full 
economic evaluation of a financial incentive scheme employing the NICE reference 
case methods and presenting the costs and (dis)benefits of the target scheme over 
the full period in which they are likely to be experienced (i.e. the participant’s lifetime).  
For the purpose of the evaluation it was necessary to choose an exemplar health risk 
to be the focus of the analysis and after careful consideration the application of 
financial incentives for weight loss was selected. This area was chosen as obesity 
represents one of the greatest challenges to public health in England (and 
internationally) and is a growing problem whereas smoking (for example) – although 
arguably more hazardous – is generally on the decline in England (and high income 
economies generally). In addition, it was thought that, since much of the work in 
financial incentives applied to lifestyle changes had occurred in weight loss, the 
economic evaluation was more likely to be practicable relying as it does on existing 
evidence. Finally, it was intention that the research, although targeting a specific 
lifestyle consequence, would provide insights relevant to other behaviour change 
challenges such as physical inactivity, smoking and excessive alcohol consumption. 
Thus the evaluation was used to provide information specifically about the cost-
effectiveness of incentives for weight loss but also to generate a tool which would 
allow common methodological issues pertaining to the design and evaluation of 
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incentive schemes to be explored. The following chapters report separately on the i) 
estimation of the effectiveness of financial incentives for weight loss; ii) the 
development of the decision-analytic model; and iii) the running of the model and 
estimation of cost-effectiveness. Specific objectives and research questions are 
outlined below. 
 
6.2.1. Objectives 
i. Determine the effectiveness of incentives for weight loss 
ii. Design and develop a decision-analytic model to enable estimation of the 
cost-effectiveness of weight loss interventions 
iii. Adapt the model to account for issues novel to the use and analysis of 
incentives 
iv. Incorporate information relating to pricing derived in Chapter 5 in the model 
v. Estimate the cost-effectiveness of incentives for weight loss 
vi. Using sensitivity analyses, establish the main drivers of cost-effectiveness 
 
 
6.2.2. Research questions: 
1. What is the effectiveness of financial incentives for weight loss? 
2. Is there heterogeneity in this effect by age, gender and starting weight?  
3. Is it feasible to conduct a full economic evaluation of a financial incentive 
scheme that complies with the NICE technology appraisal reference case? 
4. What are the challenges in modelling the lifetime costs and (dis)benefits of 
financial incentives for weight loss? 
5. Are financial incentives for weight loss cost-effective? 
 
200 
 
 
 
7. Effectiveness of incentives for 
weight loss 
 
7.1. Introduction 
There are several different types of incentive scheme that could be offered to 
encourage weight loss. Schemes may differ by inter alia: the incentive target (e.g. diet 
change, physical activity, participation in or completion of a weight loss programme 
or amount of weight loss); the type of incentive (e.g. vouchers versus cash reward; 
guaranteed versus uncertain rewards; positive versus negative); the level of the 
incentive provided (i.e. the value of the incentive); the timing of the incentive (e.g. 
reward received at the end of the scheme or at various points throughout upon 
reaching milestones); the duration of the incentive (e.g. 6 versus 12 months); who 
provides it (e.g. employer versus healthcare provider versus private company); and 
the unit of the intervention (e.g. individual versus group). In addition, it is possible 
(and arguably preferable) that the incentive - if not offered merely for programme 
attendance - would be part of an intervention including other active components such 
as dietary and physical activity advice, lifestyle coaching and other behavioural 
programmes.  
It was decided that the focus of the economic evaluation would be directly on weight 
loss (outcome) itself rather than indirectly on specific interventions designed to bring 
about weight loss such as exercising, diet change and calorie control (behaviours). 
There are arguments for both approaches; incentivising behaviours is appealing as 
the targets are more controllable and tangible (i.e. individuals will probably have a 
good idea as to whether they can attend a gym twice a week or eat five pieces of 
vegetables and fruit every day and receive immediate feedback as to whether they 
have been successful) but if the ultimate aim is to achieve weight loss it is reasonable 
to make that the contingent outcome. By specifying weight loss as the outcome of 
interest the individuals participating have flexibility to choose the ways in which they 
attempt this (e.g. a mix of diet change and exercise regime).  
A systematic review of the literature was conducted to identify studies of incentives 
for weight loss that could contribute effectiveness values to help parameterise the 
model. For reasons of practicality, the full review process including data extraction 
was not conducted by two independent researchers and no review protocol was 
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generated. However, the methods are considered rigorous and transparent enough 
to argue that the review is systematic; the review clearly specifies search terms, 
databases, inclusion and exclusion criteria; was based on two independent 
researchers selecting studies; and had a formal data extraction process and 
synthesis. Study effects were synthesised in a meta-regression to provide an 
aggregate measure of incentive effectiveness and this was the main model 
effectiveness parameter. It is acceptable for decision-analytic models to be populated 
using aggregate parameter values taken solely from literature reviews.(525) 
However, analysis of individual-level data can help provide a more in-depth 
understanding of effectiveness and heterogeneity in effect. For this reason, in addition 
to the review and meta-analysis, data were sought from a UK study – the Pounds for 
Pounds (P4P) study - of incentives for weight loss.(131) This study was chosen as it 
is recent and had a relatively large sample size.  
 
7.2. Methods 
7.2.1. Review and meta-analysis 
7.2.1.1. Search strategy 
Accepted guidance was referred to in undertaking the review.(526) In order to identify 
studies that could contribute effectiveness values a search of published literature was 
conducted. The search terms were informed by those used in previous reviews. 
Broadly, these covered terms relating to incentives and rewards and to diet and 
weight loss. The full list of search terms are included in Appendix 12.3. MEDLINE, 
Embase, PsychINFO and EconLit databases and the internet were searched in 
August 2014. Initially a search was conducted for reviews and subsequent searches 
sought only to update the most recent systematic review that was identified. In the 
event, the update searches were limited to studies published in the period from 
January 2012 to the date of the search since the review by (527) adequately covered 
studies prior to this.  
 
7.2.1.2. Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Only studies published in English and of human participants were included. Studies 
where incentives were solely contingent on behaviours such as exercise or diet (e.g. 
(222, 407)) were excluded from the review as were studies where the incentive was 
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part of a multi-component intervention. Studies that only incorporated negative 
incentives (e.g. deposit contracts(231)) were also excluded from the review. The 
rationale for this criterion is was that making a financial commitment may not be an 
appealing scheme for many and especially those with lower incomes. While a full 
assessment of the risk of bias was not conducted for each study, the Cochrane 
Guidelines were referenced to identify any major bias risks that would give reason to 
exclude studies from the review.(528) The initial study selection was conducted 
independently by two researchers who met to discuss their selections and reach 
agreement on which studies to include. If either researcher shortlisted a study then it 
would be retained in the review process. 
 
7.2.1.3. Review 
Titles and abstracts of potentially relevant studies were read and full versions of the 
publications (whether they were journal articles, books, book chapters, reports, 
conference abstracts or PhD theses) were obtained if the study could not be 
excluded. Those included in the review were read and information extracted. Although 
it is preferable for two people to extract data independently (526) this was not possible 
in the current study. Extraction data included country, sample size, incentive format 
and value, study length and format and outcomes including attrition, weight loss 
(absolute), proportion achieving 5% weight loss and incentives awarded.  
 
7.2.1.4. Meta-analysis 
In order to synthesise study data and derive an aggregate measure of effectiveness 
from the studies a meta-regression was conducted.(529, 530) Meta-regression 
(sometime referred to as meta-analysis regression), is an extension of meta-analysis 
allowing the exploration of statistical heterogeneity between study results.(529) Meta-
regression was conducted on study-level summary data extracted from the 
systematic review. In this case, study characteristics were used to predict the effect 
of interest (weight loss in kgs). To retain a conservative stance, baseline observation 
carried forward (BOCF) data was input into the model. Hence, studies that did not 
report this or where it was not calculable, were excluded from the analysis. The 
variables included as predictors were sample size, mean sample age, proportion of 
sample being female, mean sample starting weight, duration of study and total 
possible reward. These were included along with a measure of the effect variance 
(standard error). Due to either an absence or inconsistency in reporting across 
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studies, it was not possible to create a usable variable to denote socioeconomic 
status.  
As targeting of weight loss was considered to be an important determinant of actual 
weight loss, another variable was generated from study information. A variable 
denoting the amount of incentive/reward paid for 5% loss of baseline bodyweight; this 
provides an equalised incentive benchmark across studies. All rewards were 
translated into current (2014) UK pound sterling to allow comparison using a 
purchasing power parity converter.(531) Despite this, it is likely that the studies 
differed in some aspects, for example in the payment schedule or advice given to 
participants at study inception. For this reason, a random effects meta-regression was 
imposed as this allows for residual heterogeneity in the true effect. 
The significance of meta-regression models and covariates were reported. The 
relationship between weight loss and significant covariates were presented 
individually on bubble plots. The bubble plot is a graph showing the fitted regression 
line between dependent and (one) covariate variable. Studies are represented as 
‘bubbles’, the size of which indicates the precision of effect – the larger bubbles 
indicate greater precision or smaller within-study variance. 
 
7.2.2. Data analysis 
7.2.2.1. Data 
For the economic evaluation, data were available from the Pounds for Pounds (P4P) 
before and after study which involved a financial incentive scheme from a commercial 
provider (WeightWins).(532) The P4P study took place in England and was a 
collaboration between the local Primary Care Trusts in the area of NHS Eastern and 
Coastal Kent and the scheme provider. WeightWins is an online company that offers 
incentive schemes to individuals who wish to lose weight. A number of schemes are 
available to choose from where the incentive amount is linked to the targeted weight 
loss over different time periods.  
The P4P scheme was offered from January 2009 to March 2010 on a local NHS 
website to staff and the general public who applied online if they were interested in 
participating. The P4P scheme plans ranged from 15 lb (6.8 kg) weight loss over 3 
months to 50 lb (22.7 kg) weight loss over 7 months and included an optional 
maintenance period extending the plan length to a maximum of 13 months. A P4P 
algorithm was used to calculate the reward based on weight loss and plan length and 
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ranged from £70 to £425 per year. Participants were credited monthly for cumulative 
weight loss (with a ceiling of 3.2 kg monthly weight loss rewarded) and for 
maintenance. The accrued rewards were paid to the participants along with a 50% 
bonus if they had reached their final target weight at the end of the plan. There were 
no other intervention components other than the provision of written information on 
weight loss. To confirm outcomes, participants were weighed at baseline and monthly 
across the local area at a number of GP practices, pharmacies, gyms and weight loss 
clubs.  
While not a randomised or controlled trial, the study was protocol driven and run by 
an established academic unit. Full details of the study are described in the evaluation 
paper.(131) Data available from the study were limited with final variables comprising 
age, gender, initial weight and height, month of last weigh-in, last weigh-in weight and 
reward received. Unfortunately, data were not available on the socio-economic class 
of the participant, their income, the payment schedule or target weight loss selected. 
Data were also not available on the length of scheme chosen although this can be 
assumed by the last weigh-in month. Despite these limitations the data was still 
valuable in estimating the association between incentive and effect and between 
duration, starting weight and weight loss. 
 
7.2.2.2. Analysis 
Descriptive analyses were performed followed by correlation analysis. Mean 
estimates of weight loss and incentive reward achieved were calculated for the whole 
group and by the following sub-groups: age groups (<65, >65), gender, initial BMI 
group (<25, ≥25 and <30, ≥30 and <35, ≥35 and <40, ≥40) and follow-up month. 
Proportions of people losing 5% and 10% of their starting weight were calculated, the 
former being a threshold of minimum clinically significant change in weight.(533) 
Linear regression analyses were employed to predict weight loss and reward with 
predictor variables including age, gender, start BMI and length of scheme. In addition, 
squared predictors were explored in the models. 
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7.3. Results 
7.3.1. Literature review 
7.3.1.1. Search results 
The results of the literature searches are included in the PRISMA diagram (534) in 
Figure 16. The search for reviews identified 10 relevant studies. Recent reviews – 
only one as yet published - of incentives for behaviour change excluded weight loss 
studies on the basis that weight loss is a process measure and chose to include only 
behaviour change (e.g. diet and physical activity).(82, 83) General reviews of 
incentives for behaviour change have been conducted by Kane (135), Jochelson 
(118) and Sutherland (119) while Paul-Ebhohihem and Avenell (121), Goodman and 
Anise (535), Jeffery et al (124), Wall et al (136), Cawley and Price (536), Burns et al 
(537) and Paloyo et al (527) conducted independent reviews of diet and weight loss. 
The Wall et al review included four studies but only two of these (one of which 
included an additional follow-up analysis) included an incentive while the others 
included food price reductions or food coupons. The paper by Jeffrey et al is a 
narrative review covering several of the author’s earlier studies on incentives for 
weight loss, some dating back 30 years. Using an inclusion criteria of randomised 
controlled trials of incentives for obesity treatments with at least a one year follow-up, 
Paul-Ebhohihem and Avenell reviewed nine studies. Again, many of these studies 
may be considered dated with all but one of the studies being 20 years old (the most 
recent being 1998). A discussion paper by Cawley and Price (536) provides a useful 
summary table of previous incentive studies in weight loss. They present a summary 
table of 14 incentive studies dating from 1972 to 2008.  
The Paloyo et al study was the most recent systematic review of incentives in weight 
loss. As their searches were conducted in 2012 (month not reported) the update 
searches were conducted including studies published from January 2012 onwards. 
The full list of 32 studies appearing in the review papers are included in Table 30. The 
updated searches identified 114 de-duplicated abstracts for independent screening 
review. A majority of shortlisted studies were identified by both reviewers but a small 
number were only identified by one. If either reviewer shortlisted a study the full paper 
was retrieved for closer scrutiny. In total, the papers of 15 studies from the review 
update and 32 studies identified by the meta-review were obtained and 9 of these 
were deemed to meet the inclusion criteria. Those shortlisted from the updated 
searches are included in Table 31. 
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Figure 16: Flow diagram showing literature search results 
 
 
Table 30: Studies identified from the reviews 
Study Country Include/Exclude Reason for exclusion 
Abrahms and 
Allen (1974)(538) 
US Exclude Deposit contract 
Anderson et al 
(2001)(539) 
US Exclude Incentive contingent on 
healthier diet 
Black and Friesen 
(1983)(540) 
US Exclude Deposit contract 
Burger and 
Lynham 
(2008)(541) 
UK Exclude Secondary data analysis 
Butsch et al 
(2007)(542) 
US Exclude Combined intervention 
(EatRight programme) 
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Cameron et al 
(1990)(543) 
Canada Exclude Deposit contract 
Coates et al 
(1982)(544) 
US Exclude Adolescents and deposit 
contract 
Englberger 
(1999)(545) 
Tonga Exclude Incentive for programme 
participation 
Finkelstein et al 
(2007)(546) 
US Include N/A 
Follick et al 
(1984)(547) 
US Exclude Incentive for programme 
adherence 
Harris and Bruner 
(1971)(548) 
US Exclude Deposit contract 
Hennrikus and 
Jeffery 
(1996)(549)  
US Exclude Incentive for programme 
participation 
Hubbert et al 
(2003)(550) 
US Exclude Combined intervention 
(EatRight programme) 
Jeffery et al 
(1978)(551) 
US Exclude Deposit contract 
Jeffery et al 
(1983)(552) 
US Exclude Deposit contract 
Jeffery et al 
(1984)(553) 
US Exclude Deposit contract 
Jeffrey et al 
(1990)(554) 
US Exclude Deposit contract 
Jeffrey et al 
(1993)(555) 
US Exclude Deposit contract (payroll 
deduction) 
Jeffrey et al 
(1993)(556) 
US Exclude Combined intervention 
(standard behavioural 
therapy) 
Jeffrey and 
French 
(1999)(557) 
US Exclude Incentive contingent on 
programme participation 
208 
 
 
 
John et al (2011) 
(231) 
US Exclude Deposit contract 
Kramer et al 
(1986)(558) 
US Exclude Deposit contract  
Lowe et al 
(2004)(559) 
US Exclude Target population are 
children 
Luley et al 
2010(560) 
Germany Include N/A 
Mahoney 
(1974)(561) 
US Exclude Deposit contract  
Mann (1972)(562) US Exclude Deposit contract  
Mavis and 
Stoffelmayr  
(1994)(563) 
US Exclude Deposit contract  
Relton et al 
(2011) (131) 
UK Include N/A  
Saccone and 
Israel (1978)(564) 
US Exclude Combined intervention 
(programme on behaviour 
and diet) 
Volpp et al 
(2008)(114) 
US Include N/A 
Wing et al 
(1981)(565) 
US Exclude Deposit contract  
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Table 31: Studies shortlised from the review update 
Study Country Include/Exclude Reason for exclusion 
Augurzky et al 
(2012)(566) 
Germany Include N/A  
Bramwell and 
Cresswell 
(2013)(567) 
UK Exclude Vouchers were for weight 
loss class (not financial 
incentive) 
Burns et al 
(2012)(537) 
US Exclude Review only 
Cawley and Price 
(2013)(568) 
US Include N/A 
Crane et al 
(2012)(407) 
US Exclude Combined interventions 
Driver et al 
(2013)(569) 
[Abstract only] 
US Include N/A 
Faghri and Li 
(2014)(570) 
US Include N/A  
John et al 
(2012)(571) 
US Exclude Deposit contract  
Kullgren et al 
(2013)(163) 
US Include N/A 
Kullgren et al 
(2012)(232) 
US Exclude Abstract reporting (572) 
Kullgren et al 
(2013)(163) 
US Exclude Abstract reporting (572) 
Mayor (2013)(573) N/A Exclude Editorial referring to 
Kullgren et al (2013) (163) 
Moller et al 
(2012)(408) 
US Exclude Combined interventions 
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Leahey et al 
(2012)(574) 
US Exclude Does not include a financial 
incentive 
Spring et al 
(2012)(222) 
US Exclude Combined interventions 
 
7.3.1.2. Study review 
Nine studies (five identified from previous reviews and four identified in the updated 
searches) were reviewed (see Table 32). All but three of these were based in the US 
and five ((114, 163, 566, 569, 570)) could be considered to be randomised controlled 
trials. Several trials had only modest sample sizes with five having fewer than 150 
participants, often split between several trial arms. Follow-up ranged from four to 12 
months with a few having explicit weight loss maintenance periods.(131) Most studies 
insisted on frequent weigh-ins to confirm weight rather than relying on self-reported 
weight thus reducing the risk of bias.(575) A number of incentive scheme formats 
were used including threshold weight loss (566), group rewards (163), lotteries (114) 
and sharing of un-won rewards (569). However, a majority incorporated an incentive 
reward per unit (or %) of weight loss (up to a maximum level) and money rather than 
voucher-based rewards. 
Although there was a wide range in study attrition rates, in most cases incentive 
groups were more likely to complete the study. Levels of programme completion were 
on average 59% in the study control groups and 75% in the incentive groups. Several 
studies offered incentives for weigh-ins which minimised drop-out. Most studies report 
intention to treat analysis (as well as complete case) analysis although some define 
this as ‘last observation’ (LO) rather than ‘baseline observation’ (BO) carried forward 
(CF) (which may be the same thing depending on the frequency of follow-up). It is the 
LOCF and BOCF that are of most interest here as they represent a conservative 
estimate of effect. 
Most studies appeared to report a weight loss effect in favour of incentives over 
control although the Finkelstein et al study is an exception (and Cawley et al for 
control vs. Continuous payment).  Despite the heterogeneity in study designs there 
broadly appears to be some consistency in effect. At 4 months Augurzky et al report 
weight loss (greater than control) of -1.88kgs and -2.36kgs for 150 and 300 Euro 
incentives while Faghri and Li report this figure at the same time-point to be -2.11kgs. 
At 3 months Finkelstein reports weight loss of -1.36kg and -2.22kgs for different 
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incentive levels. At 12 months, a number of studies suggest weight loss is around 
4kgs.(131, 163, 569).  
In a few studies, where present, deposit contracts appear to out-perform standard 
positive incentives (568, 570) although this was not universally the case.(114) In 
studies with a maintenance or follow-up period, weight appears to be partially 
regained over time (114, 163, 546) although, again, there were exceptions.(570) Only 
three of the studies reported analyses by subgroup and two of these found no 
differences in weight loss according to these. However, Augurzky et al found that 
those with lower education lost more weight than those with higher education.  
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Table 32: Studies including financial incentives for weight loss 
Study 
 
Country N Study design Duration Assessment Incentive payment and 
schedule  
Results  
Augurzky et al 
(2012)(566) 
Germany 700 RCT 
A. Control vs.  
B. €150 
incentive vs. 
C. €300 
incentive 
 
4 months Weigh-in at 
pharmacy 
(€25 received) 
Incentive for achieving 
individual weight loss targets 
(set by Dr at 6-8% body 
weight). 
When 50% target reached 
rewarded proportionally to the 
maximum reward and full 
reward paid if target met.  
 
Participation 
Probability of completion by males/females were: 0.679/0.632, 
0.722/0.743, 0.822/0.880 from groups  A, B, C, respectively. 
Weight loss 
Mean absolute unadjusted change in BMI for A, B, C: -0.879, -
1.802, -1.957 (All P<001). Significantly more weight loss in B 
and C vs. A. 
There was only a small effect between groups B and C 
(although significant for females).  
Using ITT (BOCF):- Difference vs. A in % change in body 
weight (SE) for B and C for all: -1.712 (0.385), -2.096 (0.459); 
for males: -1.724 (0.445), -1.670 (0.547); for females: -1.744 
(0.845), -3.078 (0.872). 
Difference vs. A in BMI (SE) for B and C for all: -0.628 (0.142), 
-0.788 (0.170); for males: -0.640 (0.171), -0.655 (0.210); for 
females: -0.560 (0.290), -1.078 (0.310). 
Difference vs. A in realising target weight (SE) for B and C for 
all:  
0.117 (0.034), 0.193 (0.038); for males: 0.151 (0.044), 0.186 
(0.048); for females: 0.027 (0.061), 0.232 (0.064). 
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Compared to high education (university degree) difference in 
% body weight change was -1.180 (0.674) for very low, -1.388 
(0.621) for low,        -1.295 (0.640) for medium (all significantly 
different). Age was not significant and income was not 
collected. 
Rewards 
Mean rewards were €62 and €150 for groups B and C hence a 
1% reduction of weight costs €26 and €60 for these groups, 
respectively.  
Cawley and 
Price 
(2013)(568) 
US 2,63
5 
Evaluation of 
worksite 
wellness 
programme 
with self-
selection that 
included 
diet/activity 
information 
and:  
A. Control vs.  
B. Continuous 
payment vs. 
C. Deposit 
Contract + 
Lump Sum vs.  
12 months Weigh-ins at 
work at least 
quarterly 
Group A received no incentive 
except $20 for 12 month 
participation. 
For group B quarterly rewards 
paid according to % weight 
loss. The reward is $1 per 
month per % lost but 
increases after 7% loss. 
Group C must pay $9.95 per 
month (except the first) which 
($109.45) is refunded if they 
lose ≥5% of baseline weight at 
12 months and $100 bonus if 
≥10%. There is also a lottery 
where weight losers can win 
gift certificates, and the 
Participation 
Attrition at 12 months was significantly higher in Group B than 
the other groups: 54.9% dropped out by the end of the first 
quarter and 75.8% compared to approximately 25% by first 
quarter and 48-58% by the end of the year in the other groups. 
The working paper reports 12 month attrition to be 76.4% and 
48.1% in group B and A. 
Weight loss 
Both BOCF and LOCF analysis conducted. No significant 
difference in weight between Control and group B at one year 
(beta = -0.141). The deposit contract groups did have 
significantly greater weight loss than control at one year (for 
BOCF analysis). Weight loss (lbs) coefficients were 2.082 and 
1.944 for groups C and D. The working paper reports (BOCF) 
weight loss in lbs (% body weight loss) to be -1.4 (0.64%) and 
-1.7 (0.87%) for groups B and A. 
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D. Deposit 
Contract + 
Continuous 
Repayment  
‘biggest loser’ receives a $250 
gift voucher at 12 months. 
Group D must pay $9.95 per 
month (except the first). 
Rewards paid quarterly from 
1% of baseline weight lost and 
increase to 20% of baseline 
weight lost. They could join a 
team competition in which 
each member of the highest 
‘losing’ team received $50.  
Team competition led to greater weight loss. Age and gender 
were not significant predictors of weight loss but starting 
weight was. No information on income/education group 
provided. 
Rewards 
the average reward paid per pound-year of weight loss 
amounted to $2.10 in group B and $1.66 in group D.  
Driver and 
Hensrud 
(2013)(569) 
[Abstract only] 
US 100 RCT  
A. Education 
vs. 
B. Education + 
incentive vs.  
C. Education + 
Behavioural 
plan  
D. Education + 
Behaviour 
plan + 
incentive  
12 months Monthly 
weigh-in 
Weight loss goal of 4 lbs per 
month (adjusted based on 
their previous month's weight). 
Successful received $20 per 
month and unsuccessful paid 
$20 into bonus pool which was 
awarded via lottery among 
participants who completed  
the study. 
Participation 
Difference in completion rates for combined the incentive vs. 
non-incentive groups was significant (62% vs. 26%, p<0.001) 
Weight loss 
Assuming BOCF, 12 month weight loss was 9.08 lbs (4.12 
kgs) and 2.34 lbs (1.06 kgs) for the combined incentive groups 
and non-incentive group, respectively. Estimated effect of 
incentives was 6.5 lbs (2.95 kgs) (ANOVA;SE 1.92, p<0.001). 
Rewards 
Not reported 
Faghri and Li 
(2014)(570) 
US 99 Worksite RCT 
A. Control 
4 month + 
3 month 
follow-up 
Weigh-in Participants were encouraged 
to lose 1 or 1.5 pounds per 
week. Group B were paid $10 
Participation 
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B. Incentive 
C. Incentive + 
Deposit 
contract 
per 1.0 pound of weight loss 
for the overweight and $10 per 
1.5 pounds for the obese. A 
possible total of $160 + 
additional $100 if maintained 
for further 3 months. 
Group C could deposit $1 to 
$5 per pound matched by 
study. Depositing $5 and 
losing 16 pounds would return 
$160 incentive + $80 deposit + 
matched deposit ($320). 
Rewards were paid at the end 
of the program. 
Study was completed by 79.2%, 76.2% and 63.3% in groups 
A, B and C. No differences according to participant 
characteristics. 
Weight loss 
LOCF regression difference in weight loss (lbs) at 4 months 
was –4.65 (-2.11kgs) 
(-8.35, -0.96) (p=0.028) for B, –7.01 (-10.16, 3.88)(p=0.006) for 
C and –5.63 (-9.44, -1.81)(p=0.018) for combined incentives.  
LOCF regression difference in weight loss (lbs) at 7 months 
was –4.78 (-2.17 kgs) (-9.19, -0.36) (p=0.041) for B, –6.74 
(3.06 kgs) (-10.69, -2.79) (p=0.012) for C and –5.58 (2.53 
kgs)(-10.48, 1.34) (p=0.032) for combined incentives.  
Patient characteristics (age, sex, education, race, initial 
weight) not included in analyses. 
Rewards 
Not reported 
Finkelstein et 
al (2007)(546) 
US 207 Pilot worksite 
randomised 
trial.  
Three reward 
amounts per 
% weight loss: 
A. $7 steady 
vs. 
3 and 6 
months 
Weigh-ins at 3 
and 6 months. 
Each paying 
$5 
Payment per % weight loss 
(up to 10%) and a maximum 
reward of $140 over 6 months. 
Group A received payment at 
3 and 6 months, Group B only 
at 3 months (front-loaded), 
Group C only at 6 months 
(back-loaded) 
Participation 
Attrition at 3 months was 24% in A, 13% in B and 36% in C 
At 6 months these figures were: 31%, 45% and 54%. Group A 
were 3 and 2 times more likely to attend 6 month weigh in than 
C and B, respectively. Odds of attending weigh-in for groups A 
and B were 2.00, 4.30 (p<0.05) more than C. 
Weight Loss 
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B. $14 at 3 
months vs. 
C. $14 at 6 
months  
 
BOCF assumed for non-attenders. Weight loss at 3 months for 
A and B was -0.87 lbs (-0.395 kgs) and -2.73 lbs (-1.23 kgs) 
(p<0.05) more than for C who lost 2 lbs (-0.907 kgs) while 
those in B lost (0.86 kg) more than group A (P=0.05) who lost 
3 lbs (1.36 kg).  
Weight loss at 6 months for A and B was -0.28 lbs (-0.127 kgs) 
and 0.29 lbs (0.131 kgs). Odds of losing ≥5% of weight for A 
and B were 2.23, 5.39 (p<0.05) more than C. 
Age and gender were not significant predictors of weight loss 
at 3 months and only one age category was significant at 6 
months. No information was provided by education or income. 
There were significant differences by employer (university of 
community college with the latter losing more weight) but it’s 
not clear this reflects an income or education affect. Non-
whites were 3.33 and 4.29 more likely to attend 3 and 6 month 
weigh-in than whites although this did not translate to 
significantly greater weight loss. 
Rewards 
Mean payout of $35 per participant in group B. 
Kullgren et al 
(2013)(163) 
US 105 RCT  
A. Control vs.  
B. Individual 
$100 per 
month vs. 
9 months Monthly 
weigh-in with 
$20 paid per 
month + $50 
each for 6 and 
9 month. 
All participants given goal of 
losing 0.4kg per week and 
notified of their earnings (or 
potential earnings) after 
weigh-ins. Payment was sent 
every month if monthly target 
was met. 
Participation 
Weigh-ins were 91% and 88% at 6 and 9 months. Drop-out 
was minimal due to weigh-in incentives. 
Weight loss 
Analyses used multiple imputation rather than LOCF or BOCF. 
Mean weight loss (kgs) at 24 weeks: 0.5, 1.7, 4.8 and at 36 
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C. Group $500 
incentive per 
month  
 
Future weight loss goals 
adjusted if participants failed 
to achieve them in order that 
overall target of 10.8 kg loss 
was achieved. For group C the 
$500 was split among 
successful group members. 
Primary outcome was weight 
loss at 6 months and 
secondary outcome weight 
loss at 9 months (3 month 
after incentives). 
weeks: 0.4, 0.8, 3.4. The group incentive led to weight loss 
around 3.2 kg more than individual incentives for the same 
cost. Group C lost significantly more weight than A or B at 
week 24 and 36. No difference between A and B. 
Respective % of participants achieving weight loss goals were: 
34%, 54%, 76% at week 4; 6%, 20%, 47% at week 12 and 0%, 
3%, 9% at week 24. 
Sub-group analyses not reported. 
Rewards 
Mean total earnings were $514.70 (SD, $522.60) [£308.27  
£313.01] and $128.60 (SD, $165.50) [£77.01  £99.13] for 
Group vs. Individual incentive groups. 
Luley et al 
2010(560) 
Germany 142 Randomised 
study of family 
intervention + 
diet (-500 
calories/day) + 
A. Enhanced 
diet 
B. Incentive 
C. 
Telemonitoring 
of weight 
6 months Self-weighing 
and control 
weigh-in at 6 
months 
Reward for parents was 5 
Euros for every kg of weight 
loss. Children were also paid 
an incentive.  
Participation 
66% completed without the incentive, 91% completed with the 
incentive. 
Weight loss 
At 6 months mean weight loss for completing parents was −6.9 
kgs (± 6.2) and LOCF −6.3kgs ± 6.2 (p<0.01 for both) vs. -3.4 
and -2.8 without the incentive. Sub-group analyses not 
reported. 
Rewards 
Not reported. 
Relton et al 
(2011)(131) 
UK 405 Self-selected 
sample. 
13 months Monthly 
weigh-in 
Incentive plans ranged from 
15 lb (6.8 kg) weight loss over 
Participation 
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Before and 
after 
evaluation 
A. Incentive + 
booklet of 
weight loss 
tips 
3 months to 50 lb (22.7 kg) 
weight loss over 7 months and 
a max. 13 months.  
Optional weight ‘maintenance’ 
periods were also available. 
Rewards were accrued on a 
monthly basis and ranged 
from £70 to £425 per year. 
Accumulated rewards received 
at plan end, plus a bonus of 
50% of the total maximum 
reward if final target reached.  
Plan lengths ranged from 3 to 13 months (mean: 11.6). At 12 
months 101 participants were active on the programme, 53 
completed a plan, 248 failed to complete a plan. Mean number 
of months actively weighing in = 6.4. 
Weight loss 
Mean (CIs) weight loss (kgs) was: 6.4 (5.7, 7.2). 180/402, 
44.8% (40.0%, 49.7%) lost ≥5% of weight; 95/402, 23.6% 
(20.0%, 28.0%) lost ≥10%. No significant association found 
between weight loss and age, sex, deprivation, baseline BMI 
or target weight loss.  
Mean weight loss at 12 months for active, inactive (plan 
completed) and inactive (no plan completion) were: 11.5 (9.7, 
13.3), 8.7 (5.6, 11.8), 1.6 (21.0, 4.1) and losing ≥5% of weight 
78.2%, 75.0%, 31.6%, respectively. Assuming BOCF mean 
weight loss at 12 months was 4.0 kg (95% CI: 2.4–5.6 kg). 
38% completed a plan. 
Rewards 
Not reported. 
Volpp (2008) 
(114) 
US 57 RCT  
A. Control vs.  
B. Lottery 
incentive vs.  
C. Deposit 
contract. 
4 months 
and 7 
month 
follow-up  
Monthly 
weigh-ins 
paying $20 
Weight loss goal of 1 lb (0.45 
kg) a week  
Group B eligible for a daily 
lottery prize with an expected 
value of $3/d. Lottery included 
infrequent large (a 1-100 
chance of $100) and frequent 
Participation  
All but 1 in 2 incentive groups completed the study 
Weight loss 
Primary analysis ITT (BOCF). Mean (SD) weight loss at 16 
weeks: 3.9 lbs (9.1)[1.77 kgs ±4.13], 14.0 lbs (10.2) [6.35 kgs 
± 4.63], 13.1 lbs (12.6) [5.94 kgs ±5.72]. Groups B and C lost 
significantly more than A and significantly higher proportions of 
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small (a 1-5 chance of $10) 
payoffs. 
 
Group C contributed $0.01-
$3.00/d refunded at month end 
if target met. Deposit was 
matched and supplemented by 
$3/d. Max reward was $252 
per month. 
 
All participants in B and C who 
lost more than 20 lb (9.07 kgs) 
received $50 bonus. 
 
B and C met 16 lb (10.5%, 47.4%, 52.6%) and 20 lb (5.3%, 
36.8%, 26.3%) weight loss targets. 
All groups gained weight between 4 and 7 months. Between 
group weight loss not significant at 7 months (9.2 lb [4.17 kgs] 
for B; 6.2 lb [2.81 kgs] for C vs. 4.4 lb [2.0 kgs] for A), but 
within groups losses were for incentive groups: (lbs)(t= −2.87, 
P = .01; 95% CI, −15.89 to −2.47 for B; t=−2.41; P=.03; 95% 
CI, −11.67 to −0.81 for C) but not for Control: (t=−1.97; P=.06, 
95% CI, −9.19 to 0.29). 
No differences were observed by age, income or starting BMI 
although white participants lost significantly more than black 
participants. 
Rewards 
Mean rewards earned were $378.49 (£226.70) and $272.80 
(£163.39) for Deposit and Lottery groups, respectively. 
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7.3.1.3. Meta-analysis 
The meta-regression allowed the analysis of 15 estimates of effect with some studies 
offering more than one estimate, for example, from different trial arms or time-points. 
Few of the covariates were significant predictors of effect. The exceptions were 
starting weight and incentive per 5% body weight loss. The results for the univariate 
analyses and combined model are included in Figure 17 A-C. Results suggest for 
every kg heavier an individual is at baseline, they will lose 0.071kgs during the 
incentive scheme. In line with what might have been expected, there was a 
statistically significant relationship between incentive offered and weight lost. Results 
suggest that for every £1 higher the incentive is for losing 5% of bodyweight, 0.015kgs 
of additional weight is lost during the incentive scheme. So incentive amounts of £100, 
£200 and £300 per 5% body weight lost would lead to an average weight loss of 
1.5kgs, 3kgs and 4.5kgs, respectively. 
Squared terms were used alongside the incentive variable as we might expect the 
influence to decrease in relation to incentive size. However, this was not shown to be 
significant. 
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Figure 17: Meta-regression results 
A       
  Number of obs = 15    
REML estimate of between-study variance tau2 = 0.557    
% residual variation due to heterogeneity I-squared_res = 64.83%    
Proportion of between-study variance explained Adj R-squared = 52.22%    
With Knapp-Hartung modification        
Weight_loss_kg Coefficient SE t P>t L 95% CI U 95% CI 
Start_weight_kg -0.0710805 0.026494 -2.68 0.019 -0.12832 -0.01384 
Constant 5.872195 2.629464 2.23 0.044 0.191585 11.55281 
B       
  Number of obs = 15    
REML estimate of between-study variance tau2 = 0.3941    
% residual variation due to heterogeneity I-squared_res = 83.16%    
Proportion of between-study variance explained Adj R-squared = 66.20%    
With Knapp-Hartung modification        
Weight_loss_kg Coefficient SE t P>t L 95% CI U 95% CI 
Incentive_5_loss -0.0145492 0.004087 -3.56 0.003 -0.02338 -0.00572 
Constant 0.1290338 0.40628 0.32 0.756 -0.74868 1.006749 
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C       
  Number of obs = 15    
REML estimate of between-study variance tau2 = 0.3812    
% residual variation due to heterogeneity I-squared_res = 67.31%    
Proportion of between-study variance explained Adj R-squared = 67.30%    
Joint test for all covariates Model F(2,12) = 6.51    
With Knapp-Hartung modification Prob > F = 0.0122    
Weight_loss_kg Coefficient SE t P>t L 95% CI U 95% CI 
Start_weight_kg -0.0268692 0.033595 -0.8 0.439 -0.10007 0.046328 
Incentive_5_loss -0.0111557 0.005947 -1.88 0.085 -0.02411 0.001802 
Constant 2.49852 2.983556 0.84 0.419 -4.00209 8.99913 
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Figure 18 shows the plotted meta-regression line between starting weight and weight 
loss indicating a reasonably strong negative relationship; the more overweight an 
individual is at baseline, the more weight they will lose in the study. Figure 19 shows 
the relationship between the level of financial incentive offered for the loss of 5% of 
baseline weight and actual weight loss. There is a suggestion of a linear trend with 
higher incentives leading to greater weight loss. The size of the bubbles indicates low 
precision in the effect estimates however, except for a number of studies where 
minimal weight loss was witnessed. 
 
Figure 18: Bubble plot for weight loss and starting weight 
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Figure 19: Bubble plot for weight loss and incentive (£) for 5% weight loss 
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7.3.2. Data analysis 
The sample characteristics and outcomes are included in Table 33 while descriptives 
for weight loss by subgroup are included in Table 34. A majority of the sample were 
female and the sample age ranged from 17 to 82 years. The descriptives appear to 
suggest that males lose more weight but less body mass than females (BMI data not 
shown). Weight loss and reduction in BMI appear to be positively related with starting 
weight, starting BMI and length of programme. There was a correlation of r=0.70 
between both change in weight and change in BMI and reward earned. 72.04% of the 
sample lost 5% of their weight and 47.63% lost 10% of their weight. 
 
Table 33: Data sample characteristics 
Gender Male 
(%) 
Female 
(%) 
 
360 
(27.3%) 
960 
(72.7%) 
 Mean SD Min Max Median IQR 
Age (years) 42.98 11.48 17.00 82.00 43.00 16.00 
Weight at start 
(kgs) 99.45 20.31 63.78 216.82 96.08 27.60 
BMI at start  34.80 5.91 23.99 66.98 33.72 8.08 
Month last 
weigh-in 6.11 5.71 0.00 24.00 4.00 10.00 
Weight loss by 
last weigh-in 
(kgs) 5.68 7.85 -35.74 48.08 3.63 8.62 
Change in BMI 
by last weigh-in 1.98 2.73 -14.50 17.66 1.30 3.07 
Reward earned £64.02 £178.34 £0.00 £2,139.52 £0.00 £32.60 
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Table 34: Weight loss (kgs) by subgroup 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Gender      
Female 960 5.08 7.39 -35.74 48.08 
Male 360 7.28 8.77 -15.20 47.63 
Age groups      
<37 404 6.30 8.81 -35.74 48.08 
≥37 and <46 373 5.01 7.47 -15.20 47.63 
≥46 and <54 283 5.00 7.30 -13.64 45.81 
≥54 260 6.42 7.23 -7.91 37.19 
BMI group at start       
<25 4 6.24 2.17 3.18 8.16 
≥25 and <30 292 4.53 4.85 -4.80 22.41 
≥30 and <35 484 4.72 6.31 -35.74 29.03 
≥35 and <40 297 6.62 8.45 -10.43 41.00 
≥40 243 7.83 11.47 -15.20 48.08 
Month last weigh-in      
1-3 months 598 2.91 4.36 -7.91 38.10 
4-6 months 224 5.31 6.07 -5.90 34.97 
7-11 months 201 6.60 7.51 -13.64 31.30 
12 months 119 9.92 9.24 -35.74 38.56 
13-24 months 178 11.57 12.40 -15.20 48.08 
 
Table 35 includes univariate regression results predicting weight loss (kgs). Age was 
not a significant predictor of weight loss however some significant differences were 
observed when age groups were compared. The higher the start weight and the 
longer the programme, the higher was weight loss and reward earned. The 
subsequent table indicates that the relationship between incentive and weight loss 
may not be linear as the squared-incentive term is significant: higher incentives lead 
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to greater weight loss but at a lower rate with every £ increase. Table 37 shows the 
results of the multivariate regression predicting weight loss with most predictors being 
significant although gender is now not. The T values for this analysis are unusually 
large and this can only partially be explained by the large sample size. When a 
random sample of 400 is chosen for the analysis the T values corresponding to Table 
37, drop to 17.20 for reward, 3.96 for starting weight and 1.02 for last weigh-in. 
However, the chief reason for the high values is likely to be a degree of collinearity 
between some of the dependent and independent variables and, particularly, that 
reward was to some extent dependent on weight loss.  
 
Table 35: Univariate analyses 
  Gender Age 
Start 
weight 
Last 
weigh-in 
Reward 
Earned 
Weight loss kg      
 N 1320 1304 1320 1318 1320 
  Coefficient 2.202 -0.004 0.074 0.577 0.026 
  t value 4.57 -0.21 7.11 16.76 28.21 
  Probability 0.000 0.836 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Table 36: Weight loss with squared reward 
      N 1320 
      Prob > F 0.000 
      Adj R-squared 0.4052 
      Root MSE 6.0531 
Weight loss kg 
Coef. P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
Reward Earned 0.0389 0.00 0.035 0.042 
Reward Earned2 -0.000012 0.00 0.000 0.000 
Constant 3.5200 0.00 3.159 3.881 
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Table 37: Multivariate analyses predicting weight loss 
     N 
1318 
     F 
141.49 
     Prob>F 
0.000 
     
Adj R-
squared 
0.4305 
Change in Weight 
(kgs) Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Lower CI Upper CI 
Male  0.191 0.401 0.480 0.635 -0.597 0.978 
Age group (vs. <37)        
≥37 and <46 -1.232 0.428 -2.880 0.004 -2.072 -0.392 
≥46 and <54 -1.228 0.463 -2.650 0.008 -2.136 -0.319 
≥54 -0.414 0.477 -0.870 0.386 -1.349 0.522 
Start weight 0.053 0.009 6.020 0.000 0.036 0.071 
Last weigh-in 0.251 0.032 7.810 0.000 0.188 0.314 
Reward earned 0.023 0.001 22.460 0.000 0.021 0.024 
Constant -2.003 0.905 -2.210 0.027 -3.778 -0.229 
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7.4. Discussion 
The aim of this research was to identify incentive weight loss effectiveness 
parameters for the decision-model. This was achieved with a review of the literature 
to identify relevant studies. Additional information was gleaned from analysis of a 
weight loss study dataset. The trial data analysis was somewhat limited by the small 
number of variables that were available. Data on incentives (as opposed to rewards 
– what is offered as opposed to what is received based on weight loss success), 
plans, plan length, attrition and socio-economic status were unavailable. In addition, 
there was likely a degree of collinearity between dependent and independent variable 
from the WeightWins data. However, these data were still useful, particularly as it 
permitted a closer look at whether this relationship was linear. Due to the nature of 
the trial data, the meta-analysis is considered the key measure of incentive efficacy. 
The review aim was to identify studies that could provide the main effectiveness 
information for the economic model. The review included only studies incorporating 
positive incentives targeted at weight loss (rather than behaviours that might bring 
about weight loss such as diet change and exercise). There is an absence of research 
to suggest either is better than the other. A majority of studies identified by the review 
were what might be termed negative incentives (i.e. deposit or commitment 
contracts). It is unclear why this is the case but may relate to a perception that this 
approach might be more financially sustainable and fairer. While there is some 
evidence that – due to loss aversion – deposit contracts may be more effective, there 
is the counter argument that carrots are preferred to sticks.(172) Studies targeting 
negative incentives solely were excluded from detailed review and synthesis. While 
these schemes may be cheaper they may be unacceptable to lower income groups 
which is the target population and primary rationale for employing incentives. In any 
case, the decision model will briefly explore their cost-effectiveness in a sensitivity 
analysis. 
Only a handful of studies were found to meet the inclusion criteria. These generally 
had small sample sizes and heterogeneous incentive schemes. Most studies included 
a control arm however several incentivised the weigh-in required which may have 
changed the participant’s behaviour and leads the author to question whether these 
are actually ‘control’ arms. Since the effects of interest were usually reported as 
weight loss compared to control, reported effects may be an underestimate. 
Confidence in the results of the review and meta-analysis is slightly attenuated by the 
fact that non-randomised studies were included. The self-selection of participants for 
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a particular trial arm may mean the effectiveness estimates for the arms are biased. 
For example, those who are particularly likely to be motivated by a certain incentive 
scheme and self-select into that arm may produce higher levels of effect than may 
have been witnessed had randomisation occurred. While non-randomised studies 
can provide useful, pragmatic effectiveness data – especially if schemes are to be 
offered to participants in a similar manner in the real world – they may have introduced 
additional bias here when pooled with data from randomised studies. That said, only 
two of the nine studies did not conduct randomisation so the overall effect is likely to 
be minimal. Most studies also presented a last-observation or baseline-observation 
carried forward approach to deal with drop-outs. This is a conservative stance but it 
is unclear whether the assumption that drop-out = return to baseline weight is valid. 
Perhaps the most impressive study was from Augurzky and colleagues. It was a 
randomised trial with control arm and two levels of incentives, had a large sample and 
monitored weigh-ins. It is also the only study in the review that had more than one 
trial arm using the same incentive format (but different incentive levels). The other 
studies used the study arms to test the effect of different incentive and payment 
methods. Thus the Augurzky et al study provided information on the effect of incentive 
pricing (which was positive but not linear). The study authors were approached for 
their data but were unable to share this due to a data embargo. In the reviewed 
studies there appeared to be an element of consistency of effect with 3 month weight 
loss being around 2kgs and 12 month weight loss around 4kgs.  
One of the justifications for incentive use is that they may help tackle health 
inequalities by convincing hard to reach populations with low incomes to participate 
and attempt lifestyle change. The assumption is that the marginal utility of incentives 
will be higher for low income groups and thus be more motivating. However, the 
review found few studies had explicitly evaluated effectiveness by income or socio-
economic group and education. Only the study from Augursky and colleagues found 
an effect that corroborates this hypothesis. The remaining studies either did not 
consider such sub-group analyses or found no effect.  
The meta-regression indicated that there was a positive relationship between 
incentive offered and weight lost. The squared term was not significant suggesting 
the relationship may be linear (although the opposite was found in the trial analysis). 
Results suggested that a £200 incentive for the loss of 5% of bodyweight is required 
to bring about an average weight loss of 3kgs. The analysis also suggests that, while 
other covariates were not important, it is necessary to control for starting weight in 
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incentive schemes. This information will be valuable in modelling the cost-
effectiveness of incentives. 
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8. Developing a decision-analytic 
model to evaluate incentives 
 
Chapter 6 outlined the rationale for conducting an economic evaluation of financial 
incentives in weight loss, presented the aims, objectives and research questions. 
Chapter 7 examined the effectiveness of incentives for weight loss with a focus on 
positive incentives for weight reduction. This chapter reports the viewpoint adopted 
and methods employed in the economic evaluation. It reports the development of the 
decision-analytic model - which is to be the evaluation tool - including the rationale 
for the model structure, the identification of parameter values and the proposed 
sensitivity analyses. A form of model was developed by the author in previous 
research and is adapted for use here.(576) 
Decision analysis is an explicit, quantitative, and systematic approach to decision 
making under conditions of uncertainty (577) and is used to aid decision making in a 
number of fields including health, business, law and engineering.(578) It is a 
framework that allows the identification, representation and disaggregation of 
important components of a decision. Decision analysis models in health are an 
analytical approach allowing an economic evaluation of (at least two) alternative 
courses of action (i.e. treatments or services) in the face of uncertainty. The decision 
model is created to reflect the healthcare process, capturing the events that occur to 
the patient or health system during care and estimating the expected costs and 
(dis)benefits of the treatment options. They are powerful tools as they can combine 
information from many sources (e.g. several clinical trials) and quantify uncertainty 
which may emanate from the variance in observed estimates of effect or from 
simulated or extrapolated aspects of the modelling process. The decision model 
presented here sought to be structured and explained in such a way to achieve 
transparency and, should it be required, reproducibility. Published best practice was 
followed in the development of the decision model (579, 580) and more generally in 
terms of the economic evaluation conduct (581, 582)  and reporting.(583)  
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8.1. Methods 
8.1.1. Target interventions 
The target interventions for the economic evaluation are described below.  
8.1.1.1. Financial incentives 
As stated in the Introduction to the economic evaluation chapters, the focus was 
placed on establishing the cost-effectiveness of positive financial incentives for 
achieving weight loss. Positive incentives include guaranteed or lottery incentives 
whereas negative incentives, such as commitment or deposit contracts, involve the 
threat of financial ‘punishment’ or loss of money should failure occur. While the former 
is the focus for the main analyses, subsequent analyses compare these results with 
those obtained from negative incentives in sensitivity analyses using effectiveness 
values from selected studies. Although the meta-analysis, and therefore, the 
synthesised measure of effectiveness, includes one study reporting lottery incentives, 
a sensitivity analyses will separately consider the cost-effectiveness of schemes with 
uncertain rewards. 
The payment schedule for the incentives was that every month participants would 
receive the incentive amount (£10, £20 and £30 were tested) for every 1% of their 
baseline weight they lost in that month. This is typical of the studies in the meta-
analysis. There were no rewards offered for a proportion of baseline weight 
percentage lost and this was assumed not to affect performance in subsequent 
months. The incentive scheme considered here is assumed to have a duration of six 
months since the average duration of studies included in the meta-regression was 
5.4 months. It is also assumed to reward weight loss (rather than maintenance). 
Subsequent analyses explored the cost-effectiveness of a reward per kg lost 
approach. 
 
8.1.1.2. Usual care 
For the purpose of the analysis it is necessary to specify an intervention representing 
the service that overweight or obese patients presenting at primary care might 
reasonably (or typically) expect to receive; defined as ‘usual’ or ‘standard’ care. There 
is great variation in weight management service provision in England and many 
different services are currently available. In the NHS, obese and overweight patients 
are initially managed in primary care with NICE guidance encouraging a focus on long 
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term lifestyle changes in physical activity and diet.(584) The clinical recommendations 
available to GPs for managing this group is set out in the NICE pathway illustrated 
below. 
 
Figure 20: NICE Pathway for managing obese adults 
 
(http://pathways.nice.org.uk/pathways/obesity/obesity-overview) 
 
Currently, drug treatments and surgery are only considered after lifestyle and 
behavioural interventions have been tried, evaluated and proved unsuccessful. In 
attempting to manage weight through lifestyle changes the clinician may at first 
provide information but also may refer the patient on to self-help, commercial or 
community weight loss programmes if the programmes meet certain criteria. 
However, in a majority of cases, the service offered by GPs amounts to printed 
information about dietary and activity lifestyle changes. This being the case, usual 
care was defined here as information provision (i.e. verbally or using printed material 
such as a leaflet) and an absence of an ‘active’ component. This definition of usual 
care is commonly used in weight loss intervention trials (585, 586) and economic 
evaluations.(587, 588) 
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8.1.2. Population, perspective and time horizon 
The population of interest were people in England who were either overweight or 
obese - hence individuals with a body mass index (BMI) of 25 or greater. The 
individuals may have comorbidities (e.g. type II diabetes mellitus) and have received 
weight loss services in the past. The P4P study data was used to generate the 
proportions of male, females, age-groups and starting BMI groups of the cohort at the 
start of the model. Although it may have been possible to base these proportions on 
a national database or large observational study, it was assumed that, as participants 
in the P4P study had signed up to be involved, then they might more closely reflect 
the typical group of people who might agree to be involved in future incentive 
schemes. The P4P sample size was relatively large so the sample characteristics 
should be a reasonably robust representation of the population of interest. However, 
it is acknowledged that, since starting weight (and BMI) will influence the 
effectiveness of incentives, the particular measure of cost-effectiveness derived in 
this study may be specific to this population. While beyond the scope of the research 
conducted here, future efforts should run the analyses using alternative base 
samples. The age of the cohort at model start is 47 (as this was the average in meta-
analysed studies). The analysis assumes that all individuals are healthy at model 
entry. 
The primary analysis adopted the perspective of the NHS and Personal Social 
Services (PSS) as recommended by the NICE technology appraisal guidance.(326) 
As such only costs incurred by the health and social care sector are considered. A 
secondary analysis was conducted from an employer’s perspective since they may 
be the other likely provider of such schemes and new Public Health England 
emphasises the role of employers in encouraging healthier lifestyles in staff. As 
successful weight loss may impact on the ability of the participant to undertake paid 
employment there may be productivity benefits of incentive schemes for employers. 
This analysis was effectively a cost-benefit analysis where employers weigh up the 
costs of the scheme vs. cost(productivity) savings. A third analysis adopted the wider, 
combined perspective which included the costs to the health and social care provider 
and employers. 
The primary analysis considered costs and effects of the interventions over a lifetime 
horizon but cost-effectiveness at 12 months is also reported.  
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8.1.3. Analysis 
A decision model was developed to facilitate the economic evaluation. A cohort 
Markov modelling approach was chosen since the health process being modelled 
must incorporate recursive events (ruling out a decision tree) and because the costs 
and benefits of weight loss occur over a long period of time.(589) A recent review of 
decision models employed in evaluations of weight loss interventions revealed that 
the Markov model is the most commonly applied type of model.(590) While patient or 
micro simulation approaches offer certain benefits over Markov models, they are often 
more computationally intensive and less easily interpreted.  
The Markov process (named after Andrey Markov) is a mathematical system where 
entities exist in mutually exclusive ‘states’ and move between these states according 
to prescribed ‘transition probabilities’.(591) The Markov process is ‘memoryless’ and 
therefore the transitions are independent of the previous location of the modelled 
entities in the ‘state space’. In the current application the modelled process is that of 
weight loss (or gain) and the associated impact on obesity-related illnesses while the 
health ‘states’ (described below) are degrees of obesity and the related diseases (e.g. 
stroke). Entities (in this case, members of a cohort of overweight or obese individuals) 
transit between the health states at the end of fixed temporal ‘cycles’. In the current 
model, costs and effects were estimated for participants in annual cycles from 12 
months over a lifetime horizon. The analysis adopted NICE reference case methods 
presenting a cost-utility analysis with the main outcome being incremental cost per 
quality-adjusted life year (QALY).(326) In addition to the main cost-utility analyses, 
cost-effectiveness analyses are also presented where the effect of interest is cost-per 
kg of weight lost and cost per 5% of body weight lost. The latter is generally 
considered to be the minimum weight loss at an individual level to be clinically 
meaningful.(533) Scenario analyses also explored the optimal pricing of incentives in 
terms of cost-effectiveness.   
Where one intervention is more effective and more costly or less effective and 
cheaper incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) are calculated and presented 
(581): 
𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑅 =  
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑖 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑐
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑄𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑓𝑖 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑄𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑢𝑐
   
 
Where fi is financial incentive and uc is usual care. Interventions with an ICER 
<£20,000 per QALY gain will generally be considered cost-effective while 
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interventions with ICERs in the range £20,000-£30,000 may be considered cost-
effective depending on, among other things, the level of uncertainty surrounding the 
plausible ICER.(326) Where the ICER is above £30,000 the intervention in question 
will not normally be considered cost-effective and be deemed an inefficient use of 
resources unless it fulfils one of a number of other special criteria such as 
representing an innovative approach, being an ‘end-of-life’ treatment or improves 
distributive justice (reduces health inequalities).(326)   
In line with best practice, extensive one-way, scenario and threshold deterministic 
sensitivity analyses (DSA) were conducted using alternative parameter values and 
plausible ranges.(592) Ten thousand (10,000) Monte Carlo simulations 
parameterising the model from pre-specified parameter distributions enabled a 
probabilistic sensitivity analysis (PSA). There is a close relationship between 
incentive amount, effectiveness and costs in incentive studies; however, Cholesky 
decomposition for joint distributions was not required as the incentive costs were tied 
to actual weight loss and was perfectly dependent upon it. The simulated ICERs are 
presented in a cost-effectiveness plane and simulated net monetary benefit (NMB) in 
a cost effectiveness acceptability curve (CEAC) showing probability of cost-
effectiveness.(593, 594) 
Incremental NMB was calculated: 
𝐼𝑁𝑀𝐵 = (𝜆 ∗ ∆𝑄𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆) − ∆𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 
In line with the NICE reference case, future (beyond 12 months) costs and effects 
were discounted at 3.5% per annum with alternative rates (1% and 6% for costs and 
effects) being tested in sensitivity analyses. A half-cycle correction was applied to 
reflect the fact that, on average, health state transitions will occur at the mid-point of 
the cycle.(591) All analyses were conducted in Microsoft Excel© (Microsoft 
Corporation, Redmond, WA, USA). 
 
8.1.3.1. Employer and societal perspectives 
There is a precedent for using an employer perspective in analyses of 
incentives.(127) It is now possible to predict productivity losses based on health-
related quality of life but as this requires patient-level EQ-5D responses an alternative 
method was used here.(595) For each year up to the age of 65 (assumed the average 
age of retirement), the number of short and long absences from work were predicted 
based on a published relationship between BMI and absences.(596) As BMI 
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increases, the number of absences increases per year. Short absences were defined 
as an absence between 1-7 days and long absences defined as 10 or more days off 
sick. Here these were assumed to be 4 and 10, respectively but were allowed to vary 
in the PSA. This was assumed to capture the loss of productivity relating to obesity 
only, thus a further analysis estimated the number of days lost to myocardial infarction 
(MI) and stroke for those who did and did not return to work. Loss of productivity due 
to death was assumed to be captured in the rates of those experiencing and MI or 
stroke but not returning to work. The overall total productivity loss was the sum of 
these two products. The human capital approach was taken to cost sickness absence 
where the number of days absent is multiplied by the average daily wage (in this case 
£121.77).(581) The total days available for work took into account annual leave 
(assumed 25 days) and bank holidays (assumed 8 days); however compassionate 
leave was not accounted for and all sick days were assumed not to occur on annual 
leave days.  
The human capital approach has been criticised for generating unrealistically high 
valuations of productivity loss.(597) For this reason, a sensitivity analysis was 
conducted that applied the ‘friction’ costing method as an alternative.(598) This 
approach to costing productivity loss assumes that loss only occurs during a ‘friction 
period’ which is the time needed for a company to replace the employee who is absent 
from work due to sickness. Beyond this time period, the employee is presumed to 
have been replaced and productivity returned to normal. Given this, the friction 
method tends to yield smaller estimates of productivity loss than the human capital 
approach.(599, 600) The method also requires information on when the friction period 
occurs and assumes a production ‘elasticity’. The latter denotes the hypothesised 
phenomenon that the loss of productivity is not proportionate to the reduction in 
human capital input. For example, when an employee is absent, productivity is not 
reduced fully as colleagues cover the work or the employee catches up with work on 
return. Although there appears little technical justification for this, an elasticity figure 
of 0.8 is often employed.(598) In addition to this, the cost of hiring and training the 
replacement employee should be incorporated. The productivity losses calculated 
using the friction method use the same data as that used in the human capital 
approach except absence is limited to the friction period (68.6 days) after which the 
staff member is replaced and a recruitment and training cost incurred (£6,125) and 
losses limited by the elasticity factor (0.8).  Macroeconomic effects are not considered 
here given this is not a population-level analysis.  
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These costs were added to those of the health and social care system costs to 
generate the total costs from a wider perspective in a supplementary analysis. 
Participant costs were assumed to be none or minimal since these would amount to 
the 10 minutes required for weigh-in. Since this could be done at local pharmacies or 
place of work it was assumed there was no travel required. The parameter values for 
these analyses are listed separately in Table 39. 
 
8.1.4. Model structure 
In developing a decision model it is important to strike a balance between having 
sufficient complexity such that real-world processes and behaviours are accurately 
reflected and achieving simplicity such that errors and computational and data 
requirements are minimised and the model is transparent and readily interpretable. 
These considerations were borne in mind in deciding which and how many health 
states to include. 
The health risks of obesity are well established with studies showing associated 
heightened risks of type II diabetes (601), myocardial infarction (602), stroke (603), 
and a number of cancers (604). Accompanying the significant human cost in terms of 
obesity-related morbidity and mortality is the financial burden borne by the NHS. The 
direct NHS costs for type II diabetes alone for 2010/11 was estimated to be 
£8.8bn.(14) A recent analysis predicted that the annual costs of treating obesity-
related diseases would increase by £648 million per year by 2020 and £2 billion by 
2030.(13) Thus a decision model capturing the full costs and benefits of financial 
incentives for weight loss necessarily incorporated not only the costs of the 
intervention but also the potential cost savings and quality of life benefits associated 
with averting obesity-related diseases. 
The model design and structure was informed by consulting experts in the field of 
weight loss, by published studies and a published systematic review of economic 
evaluations of weight loss interventions.(590) The health states chosen for the model 
were accepted categories of BMI and the three most commonly employed obesity-
related diseases employed in previous modelling studies.(590) Model health states 
and the possible transitions are shown in Figure 21. A cohort of modelled overweight 
and obese individuals move between BMI groups (‘normal’ - <25; ‘Overweight’ - 25-
29.9; ‘Moderately obese’ - 30-34.9; ‘Severely obese’ - 35-39.9; ‘Very severely obese’ 
- ≥40) based on intervention efficacy (and as a result of kgs lost). Up to 6 months, 
weight loss is based on the synthesised results of trials and beyond this time-point, 
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assumptions are made about maintenance and weight loss/gain trajectories for the 
rest of the cohort’s life. Members of the cohort transit to diseased states of type II 
diabetes, stroke, MI and death (the latter either directly or via a diseased health state). 
The probability of transiting increases with higher category BMI group membership 
reflecting the higher risks associated with increased levels of obesity. Transition 
probabilities were introduced to reflect the fact that those with type II diabetes have 
an increased likelihood of experiencing a stroke and MI and that those who have 
experienced a stroke or MI are more likely to experience a secondary event. The 
Markovian assumption of memory-free transitions was relaxed to accommodate the 
fact that the QoL and cost impact of stroke and MI differ over time. A year 1 ‘tunnel’ 
state (not included in the figure) was added for these diseases which cohort members 
occupy for the first year subsequent to the negative health event, after which they 
transit automatically to ‘year 2+’ health states. The diseased health states are 
absorbing in the sense that cohort members cannot move from these back to the 
healthy states and only exit if they die. 
 
Figure 21: Model structure 
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8.1.5. Model parameter values 
The model parameter values were identified using targeted searches of the relevant 
published literature. The search strategies employed are included in Appendix 12.4. 
Priority was given to the most recent data and data from UK studies. Large 
epidemiological studies were targeted to provide relevant risk values. The final 
parameter values are included in Table 38. 
Acknowledging the fact that the financial and health impact of a stroke and MI are 
more severe immediately after the event, costs and utility decrements associated with 
these are higher in year one (the tunnel health state) post event than subsequent 
years. The risk of secondary events is also higher in year one than subsequent years. 
 
8.1.5.1. Weight change and intervention effectiveness 
The main efficacy parameter value (and variance) for the study is weight loss in 
kilograms. This value for the incentive arm was derived from the meta-regression 
coefficients for starting weight and incentive amount as follows (although here the 
beta for weight loss has been multiplied by 5 to give the incentive offered per 1% loss 
– rather than 5%): 
𝑊?̂?  = 2.5 − 0.056𝐼 − 0.027𝑊 
Where 𝑊?̂? is weight loss, 2.5 is the constant, I is monthly incentive level per % loss 
and W is the starting weight. Thus, ceteris paribus, 0.056kgs of weight is lost for every 
£1 of incentive offered. This being the case we assume here that the usual care cohort 
do not experience weight loss over the study period. This assumption of zero weight 
loss is considered conservative as it is likely that those not receiving an active 
intervention will gain weight over time. An alternative model predicting usual care 
weight loss was also tested. 
In the period beyond 6 months a number of assumptions were made as very little long 
term outcome data is available for incentive schemes. The primary assumption is that 
after 6 months, both incentive and usual care cohorts gain weight at the same rate. 
Alternative assumptions are tested in the sensitivity analyses such as the incentive 
group regaining all weight lost by 24 months.  
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8.1.5.2. Transition probabilities 
Annual risks of health events were based on recent epidemiological studies. The 
stroke risk for example was taken from a study reporting on the Norfolk cohort of 
European Prospective Investigation of Cancer (EPIC Norfolk) which included 20,040 
men and women and a follow-up of 11 years. Risks ranged from 0.0022 to 0.0283 for 
type II diabetes for those with a BMI of 25-29.9 and >40, respectively. The equivalent 
risk ranges for stroke and MI were: 0.0027 to 0.0029 and 0.010 to 0.016, respectively. 
The transition probabilities for obesity-related diseases were fixed over time and did 
not increase with age. However, this was mediated by the fact that a natural weight 
gain was assumed and this would have indirectly increased the risk of obesity-related 
diseases. They were also assumed to be the same for males and females. The annual 
mortality transition rates were taken from the English Office for National Statistics 
data on annual death rates. The mortality rates relating to type II diabetes were also 
based on these data but with a published multiplier applied to reflect the greater risk 
of death for those with type II diabetes.   
Additional probabilities were specified for the employer analyses where one of the 
effects of interest was absences from work. 
 
8.1.5.3. Costs 
Costs for the financial incentive intervention were taken from the literature and with 
additional estimates made by the author.(605) These included a fixed set up cost per 
participant and then incentive cost which was solely dependent on weight loss. For 
the latter, a range of incentive amounts that had been employed in previous studies 
were explored in the model. The magnitude of the costs depended on the proportion 
of individuals achieving the weight loss goals and receiving the financial payment. 
There are no studies that report set-up, administration and running costs for a weight 
loss incentive scheme. However a cost (£22 per participant in 2011) has been 
reported for administrating a commercial weight loss programme (605) and this was 
included in the model with a supplement assumed to be £10 per participant. The £10 
supplement, which equates to approximately 20 minutes of a grade 5 (without 
qualification) general practice nurse time, was estimated by the author to cover the 
additional time required to arrange the financial aspects of the incentive scheme 
including the transfer of rewards to a bank account or purchasing and distribution of 
vouchers. In addition it was assumed that a cost would be incurred in the assessment 
of effect (weigh-ins) which is proposed to be done in community pharmacies. This 
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approach avoids the potential of bias if participants self-report. The cost is assumed 
to be 10 minutes of a qualified community pharmacist’s time to weigh the participant 
and record the weight. No equipment costs were included (it was assumed, for 
example, that weighing scales were already present).   
The diseased-state costs were garnered from the literature and updated to current 
prices (year 2013) where necessary using a healthcare specific online inflation 
index.(531) It was assumed that both incentive and usual care interventions were 
associated with an initial visit to the GP where referral (or information provision) would 
occur. However, as this was present in both arms and not considered part of the 
intervention per se, it was not costed in the analyses. It was assumed that usual care 
incurred no cost as only leaflet printing was required and excluding this (albeit minimal 
cost) maintains a conservative analysis stance. It was also assumed that there was 
no cost associated with individuals who were overweight or obese but who had not 
experienced a secondary illness.  
 
8.1.5.4. Utility values  
Utility is the metric employed to quality-adjust survival in economic evaluations. 
Typically, utility values range from 1 which denotes ‘full health’ through zero which 
denotes dead to negative infinity where negative values represent health states 
considered worse than death.(606, 607) Utility values were based on UK studies 
presenting recent, relevant data based on the EQ-5D (three-level) measure (608) and 
scored using the UK time-trade-off tariff.(609) Separate analyses of Health Survey for 
England data provided utility values both for the BMI groups (610) and for the 
diseased states.(611) 
It was assumed that as individuals transit to a diseased state the utility decrements 
associated with their BMI category are lost and the disutility of their health state was 
assumed to be captured by the disease utility decrement. In addition, it was assumed 
that utility decrements were additive (612) (i.e. they were incurred independently); 
thus the health state representing those who experienced type II diabetes and a 
stroke would have the full utility decrements for diabetes and stroke.  
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Table 38: Model parameter values  
Parameter 
Mean point 
estimate 
PSA 
Distribution 
Source  
Efficacy for 5% weight loss 
target 
   
 -0.056kg per £1 Normal Meta-regression 
Annual change >6 months +0.429 (Kgs) Normal (587) 
Usual Care                                
6 Months 0 Normal 
Conservative 
assumption 
Annual change >6 months +0.429 (Kgs) Normal (587) 
Annual transition 
probabilities 
   
Age-related mortality N/A Normal  ONS Life Table 
Type II Diabetes    
<25               0.0006  Beta (613) 
25-29.9               0.0022  Beta (613) 
30-34.9               0.0041  Beta (613) 
35-39.9               0.0158  Beta (613) 
≥40               0.0283  Beta (613) 
Mortality 
Age-specific 
mortality *1.36 
Normal (15) 
Stroke    
<25 0.0024 Beta (614) 
25-29.9 0.0027 Beta (614) 
30-34.9 0.0029 Beta (614) 
35-39.9 0.0029 Beta (614) 
≥40 0.0029 Beta (614) 
Secondary stroke Year 1 0.1110 Beta (615) 
Secondary stroke ≥Year 2 0.0360 Beta (615) 
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Mortality Year 1 0.28 Beta (614) 
Mortality ≥Year 2 0.14  Beta (614)/2 
Myocardial Infarction    
<25 0.007 Beta (616) 
25-29.9 0.010 Beta (616) 
30-34.9 0.011 Beta (616) 
35-39.9 0.016 Beta (616) 
≥40 0.016 Beta (616) 
Secondary MI Year 1 0.0406 Beta (617) 
Secondary MI ≥Year 2 0.0203 Beta (617)/2 
Mortality Year 1 0.392 Beta (618) 
Mortality ≥Year 2 0.196 Beta (618)/2 
Type II Diabetes + stroke 0.009 Beta (15) 
Type II Diabetes + MI 0.0155 Beta (619) 
Costs    
Incentive scheme set-up and 
running 
£33.28 N/A (605)+£10 
Cost of weighing-in £71.64 N/A 
Assume 10 minutes 
x 6 of qualified 
community 
pharmacy time 
Total cost £107.03 Fixed   
Cost of incentives 
Dependent on 
weight loss 
N/A  
Usual Care £0 Gamma 
Conservative 
assumption 
Type II Diabetes £2,765.17 Gamma (14) 
Stroke Year 1  £11,968.89 Gamma (620) 
Stroke ≥Year 2 £1,643 Gamma (620) 
MI Year 1 £5,895.42 Gamma (621) 
MI ≥Year 2 £260.82 Gamma (621) 
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Utility    
Age-related norms Not presented Beta  (610) 
BMI-related decrements    
<25 0 Beta (610) 
25-29.9 -0.006 Beta (610) 
30-34.9 -0.033 Beta (610) 
35-39.9 -0.033 Beta (610) 
≥40 -0.117 Beta (610) 
Type II Diabetes -0.096 Beta (611) 
Stroke Year 1  -0.16 Beta (611) 
Stroke ≥Year 2 -.080 Beta (611)/2 
MI Year 1 -0.139 Beta (611) 
MI ≥Year 2 -.070 Beta (611)/2 
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Table 39: Additional parameters for the employer perspective analysis 
Parameter 
Mean point 
estimate 
PSA 
Distribution 
Source 
Short absences per year by BMI    
<25 0 Fixed (596) 
25-29.9 1 Gamma (596) 
30-34.9 1.18 Gamma (596) 
35-39.9 1.30 Gamma (596) 
≥40 1.30 Gamma (596) 
Long absences per year by BMI    
<25 0 Fixed (596) 
25-29.9 1 Gamma (596) 
30-34.9 1.34 Gamma (596) 
35-39.9 1.71 Gamma (596) 
≥40 1.71 Gamma (596) 
Absence length (days)    
Short 4 Gamma (596) 
Long 10 Gamma (596) 
Daily wage £121.77 Fixed (622) 
Probability return to work post MI 0.83 Beta (623) 
Time to return to work post MI 
(days) 
103.6 Gamma (623) 
Probability return to work post 
Stroke 
0.44 Beta (624) 
Time to return to work post Stroke 
(days) 
75.5 Gamma (625) 
Friction cost of employee 
replacement 
£6,125 Fixed (626) 
Friction period (days) 68.6 Fixed (626) 
Production elasticity 0.80 Fixed (598) 
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8.1.6. Uncertainty 
Variability in the model was accounted for by conducting the PSA and taking the 
central estimate of the Monte Carlo simulations as the main estimate of cost-
effectiveness.(580) As recommended in best practice guides, parameter uncertainty 
was assessed using the PSA where all parameters are varied simultaneously.(592) 
Structural uncertainty is that which relates to the structure of the model and the 
assumptions upon which it is built. One method to combat this it to derive alternative 
models based on different structural assumptions and average the outputs of 
these.(627) However, this was not practicable in the current research. These 
assumptions were tested in deterministic one-way and multi-way (scenario) sensitivity 
analyses (Table 40). 
 
Table 40: Values for deterministic sensitivity analyses 
Parameter Alternative values Source 
Efficacy 
£10 incentive = -
3.91kgs 
£20 incentive = -
4.29kgs 
P4P analyses with 
squared incentive term 
FI 
All weight lost 
regained by year 2 
 
 
All weight lost 
regained by year 3 
 
UC    
3 Months -2 (kgs) Conservative assumption 
6 Months -2 (kgs) Conservative assumption 
Weight change >12 months 
(both groups) 
 
 
Age 45-54 0.245 
Health Survey for England 
data 
Age 55-64 -0.135  
Age 65-74 -0.160  
Age 75+ -0.459  
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Probability of Type II 
Diabetes 
 
 
All(628) 
<25 0.004   
25-29.9 0.008  
30-34.9 0.016  
35-39.9 0.024  
≥40 0.024  
Probability of Stroke   
<25 0.0010 (629) 
25-29.9 0.0011 (603) 
30-34.9 0.0013 (603) 
35-39.9 0.0013 (603) 
≥40 0.0013 (603)  
   
Stroke mortality   
Year 1 0.2090 (630) 
Year 2+ 0.10 (630)/2 
Probability of MI   
<25 0.007 (616) 
25-29.9 0.0084 (602) 
30-34.9 0.0098 (602) 
35-39.9 0.0098 (602) 
≥40 0.0098 (602) 
MI Mortality   
Year 1 0.16  Base case analysis/2 
Year 2+ 0.08   
2nd Stroke   
Year 1 0.0555 Base case analysis/2 
Year 2+ 0.0180  
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2nd MI   
Year 1 0.0656  Base case analysis/2 
Year 2+ 
0.0102 
 
 
Type II Diabetes + stroke 0.00  (631) 
Type II Diabetes + MI 0.01  (632) 
25% reduction in cost of 
diseases 
 
 
Type II Diabetes £2,073.88 Conservative assumption 
Stroke Year 1 £8,976.67  
Stroke Year 2+ £1,232.08  
MI Year 1 £4,421.57  
MI Year 2+ £195.62  
25% Reduction in disease-
related utility decrements 
 
Conservative assumption 
Type II Diabetes 0.072  
Stroke Year 1 0.120  
MI 0.104  
 
8.1.7. Model evaluation 
The face and content validity of the model was checked by holding a number of 
discussions with experts in the field of weight loss and found to be acceptable. The 
internal validity of the model was tested by varying model inputs, by inputting extreme 
values and observing whether or not these produced intuitive and sensible changes 
in the model outputs.(633) We might expect, for example, that increasing the weight 
loss (effectiveness) of an intervention to result in lower aggregate expected levels of 
secondary illnesses (such as type II diabetes) or that increasing the probability of 
secondary illnesses would reduce the ICER for whichever intervention yielded the 
greatest weight loss. Internal validation also involved checking that increases in 
weight produced increases in lifetime risks of type II diabetes, stroke and MI that were 
in line with published risk estimates. 
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8.2. Conclusion 
A decision model was developed to enable an economic evaluation of financial 
incentives for weight loss. The model was developed and validated according to best 
practice and allows estimates of cost-effectiveness, disease-impact and financial 
burden on the NHS and employers. It will allow the testing of several different 
incentive formats and pricing levels and capture the levels of uncertainty associated 
with each analysis. The following chapter reports the results of the model application 
and cost-effectiveness of incentives for weight loss. 
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9. Cost-effectiveness of incentives for 
weight loss 
 
This chapter reports the results from the modelled economic evaluation of financial 
incentives for weight loss. The model development, parameter values and sensitivity 
analysis strategy are described in the preceding chapter. 
 
 
9.1. Weight and secondary disease outcomes 
 
The level of weight loss achieved at six months for different levels of incentive is 
shown in Table 41. These figures were predicted using the meta-regression model 
which adjusts for starting weight. Since each month’s weight loss was predicted 
separately with the starting weight updated, the effect is lower proportional predicted 
weight loss as time passes; this reflects clinical reality where weight loss success 
tends to taper off over time. The weight loss figures appear sensible and mirror those 
found in some studies (for example, both Relton et al and Volpp et al reported weight 
loss of in the order of 4kgs). The base case cost-effectiveness analysis adopted the 
£10 per month incentive level. At this level, over a quarter of participants lose at least 
5% of their initial body weight. According to the model, even offering a small incentive 
of £5 per percentage point lost leads to nearly two thirds of individuals achieving that 
milestone (1% loss) at six months. A scenario analysis indicates that only offering 
above £14.07 per month will ensure that at least 50% of the participants achieve, 
what is commonly considered to be, a clinically significant cumulative weight loss of 
5% of starting weight at six months. 
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Table 41: Weight loss outcomes at 6 months 
Financial Incentive 
per % weight loss 
Mean weight (kg) 
loss (SD) 
Achieving 1% 
loss at 6 months 
Achieving 5% 
loss at 6 months 
£5 -2.49 (3.06) 65.7% 11.9% 
£10  -4.06 (3.06) 88.4% 28.7% 
£15  -5.62 (3.06) 99.2% 56.3% 
£20  -7.19 (3.06) 100% 89.5% 
£25  -8.75 (3.06) 100% 100% 
£30  -10.32 (3.06) 100% 100% 
 
Figure 22 shows the predicted transitions in body mass index (BMI) over a lifetime 
(without mortality or transition to diseased health states) following the 6 month 
intervention offering £10 for every percent of body weight lost. The effect of the 
financial incentive is evident at the start of the BMI trajectories with a sharp decline in 
the BMI>40 group numbers and increases in the 25-30 and 30-35 BMI group 
numbers. After a few years all group proportions start to fall as the assumed natural 
weight gain pushes people into the BMI>40 group.  
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Figure 22: BMI Proportions over lifetime 
 
 
 
The impact of these BMI shifts in terms of predicted secondary diseases is shown in 
Table 42 which shows incidence of type II diabetes, stroke and myocardial infarction 
(MI) over a lifetime for two levels of incentive (£10 and £20 per percent weight lost) 
and usual care. Both incentive groups lead to lower predicted incidence of disease, 
longer life expectancy and disease-free life years. The higher incentive level does 
confer incremental benefits over the lower level however differences between all three 
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groups are small. The £10 and £20 incentives lead to a 1.9% and 4.2% lower risk of 
type II diabetes respectively than usual care. Reductions in stroke and MI from 
incentives compared to usual care appear negligible. The model predicted that the 
£10 and £20 incentives led to around 51 and 128 days of increased life expectancy 
over usual care.  
 
Table 42: Secondary diseases and life year outcomes 
 
£10 per % 
Financial 
Incentive 
£20 per % 
Financial 
Incentive Usual Care 
Lifetime probability of 
secondary diseases   
 
Type 2 diabetes 0.345 0.322 0.364 
Stroke 0.103 0.101 0.104 
MI 0.367 0.361 0.369 
Life expectancy 72.90 73.11 72.76 
Life years 25.90 26.11 25.76 
Disease-free years 20.00 20.63 19.51 
 
 
9.2. Cost-effectiveness 
The estimated cost of obesity-related diseases is included in Table 43. The largest 
cost savings predicted from incentive use appear to be in type II diabetes which 
reflects the higher differential in incidence rates highlighted earlier. Table 44 includes 
the cost-per weight loss outcome. As usual care is assumed to be no cost and lead 
to no weight change these figures can be considered incremental cost-effectiveness 
outcomes. If the usual care group were to gain weight these figures would be an 
underestimation of incentive effect. While the reward earned increases in line with 
incentive level increase, the cost-effectiveness does not. There appears to be a 
curvilinear relationship between incentive level and outcome. This is illustrated in 
Figure 23 which shows cost-per effect falling rapidly with an increase in incentive up 
to about £10-£20 after which it begins to increase. The almost U-shaped form 
suggests the optimal incentive level in the current intervention format might be 
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between £10 and £20 per month per percent point of weight reduction. Given this, 
cost-utility results are presented for both below. 
The nature and cause of the U-shaped curve was investigated in further detail. This 
pattern appeared to be present in both the cost per Kg loss and cost per 5% weight 
loss analyses. Model diagnostics were conducted to determine what was driving this 
apparent relationship which involved systematically adjusting effectiveness and risk 
parameter values of the model and observing the outcome.  However, none of these 
adjustments explained the relationship, which is likely due to the fact that these 
analyses have a time horizon of 6 months (the end of the incentivised weight loss 
programme period) and the impact of obesity-related diseases at that juncture would 
be minimal. The original weight loss model employed was applied every month in the 
incentive programme for 6 months to estimate monthly weight loss. The start weight 
in this model was updated every month reflecting the individual’s new (lower weight). 
The effect of this is that the model predicted slightly lower weight loss at each 
successive month. To investigate whether this had an impact on results, the analyses 
were run again but with only baseline weight applied to the model. However, the 
results shown in Figure 23 persist regardless of which start weight is used in the 
model.  
Examination of the Markov trace was more informative in establishing the cause of 
the cost-effectiveness results and this is clearly shown in Figure 24. This figure plots 
cost per 5% weight loss along with total costs and proportion of the cohort achieving 
this milestone. As the incentive per month increases, weight loss increases and a 
greater proportion of the cohort achieve 5% weight loss at 6 months. At an incentive 
level of £25 per month 100% the cohort achieve the weight loss milestone and a 
ceiling in effectiveness is reached. Thus increases in incentive level beyond £25 only 
increase costs and do not influence the measure of effectiveness and it is this which 
drives the U-shape curve. Hence beyond £25 incentive, cost-effectiveness drops 
(cost per 5% loss increases). Thus the phenomenon relates to the ceiling in the 
measure of effectiveness chosen. A similar analysis is conducted in the cost-utility 
section to explore whether this relationship exists when the QALY (and net monetary 
benefit) metrics are employed.  
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Table 43: Lifetime cost of obesity-related diseases 
 
£10 per % 
Financial 
Incentive 
£20 per % 
Financial 
Incentive Usual Care 
Type 2 diabetes £1,627 £1,497 £1,740 
Stroke £294 £287 £300 
MI £349 £340 £355 
 
 
 Table 44: Cost per weight loss outcome 
 
£10 per % 
Financial 
Incentive 
£20 per % 
Financial 
Incentive 
£30 per % 
Financial 
Incentive 
Average reward earned £10.03 £89.30 £198.12 
Cost per kg weight loss £28.40 £27.07 £29.41 
Cost per 5% weight loss £401.47 £217.34 £303.37 
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Figure 23: Cost-effectiveness by incentive level 
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Figure 24: Ceiling in effect 
 
 
 
9.3. Cost-utility 
The results for the base case cost-utility analyses for a 12 month and lifetime horizon 
are presented in Table 45. At 12 months, six month incentive interventions offering 
£10 or £20 per percent weight loss have incremental cost-effectiveness thresholds 
(ICER) just exceeding the NICE threshold of £20,000 thus would not be considered 
cost-effective compared to usual care. However, both incentive levels confer 
incremental QALY benefits over usual care. Over a lifetime horizon, the incentive 
arms dominate usual care yielding additional health gain and lower costs. Over this 
period, net present cost savings versus usual care are £467 and £1,057 for the £10 
and £20 incentives, respectively. The results for the probabilistic sensitivity analyses 
(PSA) are included in Table 46. Only results from the PSA of the £10 incentive level 
are presented. The mean simulated costs and QALYs suggest a 12 month ICER of 
£23,956, dominance of the (£10) incentive and a net monetary benefit of £3,038 over 
a lifetime horizon. 
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Table 45: Cost-utility results – base case scenarios 
 Costs QALYs ICER 
Base case deterministic analysis – 
12 months 
   
Financial incentive – £10 per % £188.11 0.795 £23,635 
Financial incentive – £20 per % £264.90 0.800 £20,420 
Usual Care £75.15 0.790  
Base case deterministic analysis –
Lifetime 
   
Financial incentive – £10 per % £10,378 12.30 FI Dominates 
Financial incentive – £20 per % £9,788 12.45 FI Dominates 
Usual Care £10,845 12.17  
FI = Financial Incentive 
 
The deterministic sensitivity and scenario analyses for the £10 incentive over a 
lifetime horizon are included in Table 47. In all but one of the analyses conducted the 
incentive still conferred incremental QALYs and cost savings over usual care. The 
costs appeared most sensitive to the type II diabetes risks used. Alternative cost, 
utility and risk model inputs did not change the results materially. However, results 
were sensitive to assumptions regarding weight regain. When the incentive group are 
assumed to regain any weight lost from the incentive intervention by the end of the 
first year the intervention is no longer cost saving and QALY benefits are negligible 
although the lifetime ICER remains below £20,000. 
The results from an additional comparative analysis are included in Table 48. Here 
the results (average rewards and weight loss values) from two deposit contract 
studies (114, 231) and one lottery incentive study (114) were input into the model 
assuming the same set-up cost as the current incentive scheme. Like the exemplar 
incentive scheme evaluated here, at 12 months the ICERs were above the £20,000 
threshold but over a lifetime the incentive schemes dominated usual care. However, 
the ICERs at 12 months were noticeably higher than the ones derived for the incentive 
scheme under consideration. The lottery incentive from the Volpp et al study 
261 
 
 
 
appeared to offer the greatest value for money over a lifetime with an average cost 
saving of £927.41 and incremental QALY gain of 0.28.  
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Table 46: Probabilistic sensitivity analysis results 
 Costs QALYs Mean ICER Incremental NMB* 
Mean  95% CIs Mean  95% CIs Mean 95% CIs 
12 Months        
Financial incentive – 
£10  £191.67 
£191.17- 
£192.18 0.7953 
0.7951-
0.7955 
   
Usual Care 
£75.06 £74.59-£75.54 0.7904 
0.7903-
0.7906 
£23,956   
Lifetime        
Financial incentive – 
£10  £10,353 
£10,276-
£10,431 12.318 
12.311-
12.325 
   
Usual Care 
£10,811 
£10,728-
£10,894 12.189 
12.181-
12.196 
FI Dominates £3,038 £2,997-£3,079 
NMB = Net Monetary Benefit (Calculated assuming lambda = £20,000) 
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Table 47: Deterministic sensitivity and scenario analysis  
Analysis – assuming £10 per % 
incentive 
Incremental 
cost 
Incremental 
QALY 
Lifetime 
ICER 
Efficacy    
P4P analyses with squared incentive 
term 
-£609.27 0.16 FI Dominates 
Weight loss and gain    
UC assuming weight loss -£108.06 0.05 FI Dominates 
Alternative weight change >6 
months -£568.69 0.15 FI Dominates 
All weight loss regained by year 3 -£173.00 0.06 FI Dominates 
All weight loss regained by year 2 -£71.35 0.04 FI Dominates 
All weight loss regained by year 1 £48.92 0.01 £3,521 
Assume habit formation and 
weight loss continues -£702.98 0.19 FI Dominates 
Assume crowding-out after 
removal of incentive – higher 
weight gain -£449.32 0.12 FI Dominates 
Risks    
Alternative type 2 diabetes risk -£30.73 0.11 FI Dominates 
Alternative stroke risk -£482.53 0.13 FI Dominates 
Alternative stroke mortality risk -£471.89 0.13 FI Dominates 
Alternative MI risk -£495.39 0.12 FI Dominates 
Halved MI mortality -£493.13 0.12 FI Dominates 
Halved risk of second stroke and 
MI -£468.92 0.13 FI Dominates 
Alternative type 2 diabetes+ stroke 
and MI risk  -£44.61 0.09 FI Dominates 
Costs    
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FI set-up cost x 2 -£361.92 0.13 FI Dominates 
Cost of secondary diseases 
(combined) - 25% -£321.53 0.13 FI Dominates 
Utility    
Utility decrement of diseases 
(combined) - 25% -£467.11 0.12 FI Dominates 
Discounting costs and utility    
1% Discount rate -£771.52 0.19 FI Dominates 
6% Discount rate -£290.01 0.09 FI Dominates 
 
 
Table 48: Deterministic sensitivity analyses - alternative incentive studies 
Analysis Incremental 
cost 
Incremental 
QALY 
ICER 
Commitment contract - 12 
months 
   
Volpp et al* £323 0.009 £35,066 
John et al** £165 0.004 £37,789 
Commitment contract - Lifetime    
Volpp et al -£787 0.26 FI Dominates 
John et al -£558 0.17 FI Dominates 
Lottery incentive – 12 months    
Volpp et al* £260.51 0.010 £27,383 
Lottery incentive – Lifetime    
Volpp et al* -£927.41 0.28 FI Dominates 
*Effect assumed to last to 6 months; ** Effect assumed to last to 12 months 
 
The simulated ICERs and expected net benefits from the PSA are illustrated in Figure 
25 (cost-effectiveness plane) and Figure 26 (CEAC). The cost-effectiveness plane 
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shows a majority of the simulated ICERs are in the south-east quadrant of the plane 
indicating dominance of the incentive over usual care. The CEAC shows that, at all 
willingness to pay values for health gain, the incentive scheme has over a 90% 
chance of being the cost-effective option compared to usual care. Where 𝜆 = £20,000 
the incentive has a 94.4% chance of being cost-effective. 
 
Figure 25: Cost-effectiveness plane 
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Figure 26: Cost effectiveness acceptability curve 
 
 
 
Analyses were conducted to determine whether the U-shaped relationship between 
incentive level and cost-effectiveness observed in the previous section existed in the 
cost-per-QALY analysis. Figure 27 shows the incremental net monetary benefit 
(INMB) by different incentive levels at the 12 month and lifetime horizons. Over 12 
months there does appear to be a curvilinear relationship between incentive and cost-
effectiveness. Only when the incentive level is in the range £14 to £18 does INMB 
become positive, indicating incentives are cost-effective compared to usual care. 
After this point the value falls rapidly. However, when the lifetime horizon is adopted 
and downstream impact of weight loss factored in, the relationship between incentive 
level and INMB appears positive and linear. 
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Figure 27: Incremental NMB by incentive level 
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9.4. Alternative perspectives 
 
9.4.1. The employer perspective – productivity loss 
Results of the cost-benefit analysis from the perspective of the employer are included 
in Table 49. As with the cost-utility analyses, the between-arm differential in the effect 
of interest was very small. Use of an incentive scheme would, for example, lead to an 
average 0.13 (£10 incentive) or 0.61 (£20 incentive) fewer short sickness absences 
(from the age of 47 to 65) than if no intervention was initiated (usual care). Along with 
a - similarly small - reduction in longer absences, this resulted in 1.2 (£10 incentive) 
or 4.87 (£20 incentive) fewer sick days in a working lifetime. The differences in 
productivity loss according to costing method are marked with those calculated using 
the friction method being roughly half (over a lifetime) those calculated using the 
human capital method. Assuming a set-up cost of £107 (as in the cost-utility analysis) 
and previously stated rewards, total per employee scheme costs would be £117.03 
and £196.30 for the £10 and £20 incentive schemes, respectively. The net benefit of 
the schemes are included in Table 50. At 12 months, both £10 and £20 incentive 
schemes lead to a net loss (vs. usual care), regardless of the approach used to cost 
productivity. Results are more favourable for incentives over a lifetime when greater 
productivity loss savings are created. When the reward is £20 per % lost, incentives 
are cost-effective regardless of the productivity loss calculation method used. 
However, the probabilistic simulations indicate that there is a high level of uncertainty 
around these estimates. 
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Table 49: Sickness absence and productivity loss 
 
Financial Incentive Usual care 
£10 per % 
lost 
£20 per % 
lost 
Absences predicted by BMI    
Mean no. short absences (1-7 days) 33.99 33.51 34.12 
Mean no. longer absences (≥10 
days) 
6.13 5.95 6.19 
Mean no. days off in lifetime 197.22 193.55 198.42 
Total productivity loss (costs £)    
12 months    
Human capital approach £2,229 £2,177 £2,253 
Friction cost approach £1,221 £1,189 £1,233 
Lifetime    
Human capital approach £31,836 £31,298 £32,009 
Friction cost approach £16,083 £15,767 £16,189 
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Table 50: Cost-effectiveness from employer perspective  
 Deterministic 
total Cost* 
Deterministic Net 
Benefit vs Usual 
Care** 
Probabilistic Net 
Benefit vs Usual 
Care** 
Probability 
cost-effective 
12 months     
Human Capital approach     
Usual Care £2,253    
£10 per % lost £2,346 -£93.49 -£92.95 0.092 
£20 per % lost £2,373 -£120.06 -£122.29 0.12 
Friction costing 
approach 
    
Usual Care £1,233    
£10 per % lost £1,338 -£104.87 -£105.14 0.063 
£20 per % lost £1,385 -£151.91 -£154.23 0.07 
Lifetime     
Human Capital approach     
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Usual Care £32,009    
£10 per % lost £31,953 £56.23 £106.85 0.47 
£20 per % lost £31,495 £514.76 £549.81 0.57 
Friction costing 
approach 
    
Usual Care £16,189    
£10 per % lost £16,200 -£11.01 £22.79 0.42 
£20 per % lost £15,963 £225.97 £239.21 0.46 
*Total cost is equal to the set-up cost, plus the cost of running the incentive scheme plus productivity loss; **This is the difference between the 
total cost and productivity loss in the usual care arm   
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9.4.2. Combined healthcare provider and employer 
perspective 
The results below (Table 51) include the cost-effectiveness and cost-utility analyses 
when both the health provider and employer costs are taken into account for usual 
care vs. £10 incentive per % weight loss. Two sets of results are provided – one where 
productivity loss is calculated using the human capital approach and one where it is 
calculated using the friction method. Over a lifetime, the incentive intervention still 
dominates usual care. The effect of combining the healthcare provider and employer 
costs at 12 months is to reduce costs on average and the ICER to acceptable levels.  
 
Table 51: Cost-effectiveness – societal perspective 
Analysis Incremental 
cost 
Incremental 
benefit 
ICER 
Cost-effectiveness (per 5% 
loss)* 
   
Human capital approach £91.66 0.287 £319.36 
Friction cost approach £103.03 0.287 £359.00 
Cost-utility    
12 months    
Human capital approach £89.39 0.005 £17,879 
Friction cost approach £100.77 0.005 £20,154 
Lifetime    
Human capital approach -£640.40 0.13 
Incentive 
dominates 
Friction cost approach 
-£573.16 0.13 
Incentive 
dominates 
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9.5. Discussion 
This is the first study to explore the cost-effectiveness of financial incentives for weight 
loss. The model predictions and outputs are logical, consistent with prior expectations 
and produce disease incidence estimations in line with those generated from a well-
known risk calculator.(634) The analysis presents cost-effectiveness (cost per unit of 
weight loss), cost-benefit (for the employer perspective) and cost-utility metrics for 
two levels of incentive pricing across two time horizons (12 months and lifetime). In 
all analyses, the cost and effect differential between incentive and usual care (defined 
as no active intervention) was small. The cost-utility analyses from the healthcare 
provider perspective suggested incentives may not be cost-effective at 12 months but 
might confer health gains and cost savings over a lifetime. This finding was generally 
robust to a suite of sensitivity analyses (both deterministic and probabilistic). 
However, these analyses imply that assumptions relating to what happens after the 
incentivised period in terms of weight change are important.  
One of the most likely adopters of incentives as a tool to bring about health change 
are employers. The analysis of incentives from the employer perspective indicated 
that although they provided only modest benefits over a ‘do nothing’ approach they 
may save the employer money in the long term. This was the case when both human 
capital and friction methods were applied to estimate productivity loss. The 
programme costs were assumed to be the same for the NHS and employer 
perspective but the latter may be somewhat cheaper (and thus the results an 
underestimate of cost-effectiveness) since weighing-in may be completed at work 
with supervision rather than in a pharmacy (for example). In fact these costs may be 
removed from both sets of analyses if self-reported weight could be relied upon. 
Furthermore, productivity loss is based on absenteeism only and presenteeism is not 
included.   
The analysis of cost-per weight loss outcome suggested that there was a curvilinear 
relationship between incentive level and cost-effectiveness, that cost-per weight loss 
milestone fell as incentives increased up to a point after which it began to rise again. 
A number of diagnostic tests were conducted and revealed that this phenomenon was 
due to a ceiling in effectiveness being reached, beyond which increasing the incentive 
level resulted only in higher costs. The incentive level offered should be sufficient to 
motivate individuals to lose enough weight but not be above that required. In the 
current analysis, an incentive of between £10 and £20 per month per percent of 
weight lost appeared to be optimal. However, cost-effectiveness is not necessarily a 
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good indicator of value for money in the cost-utility framework. To illustrate, while 
John et al (231) concluded that their intervention was more cost-effective than Volpp 
et al’s (114) (cost per kg weigh loss of £16.02 vs. £38.16), when applied to the 
decision model and the cost-utility framework, both the ICER at 12 months and the 
cost savings and QALYs gained over a lifetime were in favour of the Volpp et al study. 
Thus the relationship between incentive level, cost-effectiveness and health 
outcomes is complex, delicate and no doubt sensitive to changes in any of the 
contributing factors. Additional analyses indicated that the curvilinear relationship 
between incentive and effect was not present when INMB was the metric employed. 
In this case, there was a linear relationship between incentive level and NMB; the 
higher the incentive, the greater the NMB. This was due to the relationships between 
weight and risk of secondary illnesses specified in the model. However at 12 months, 
in line with the cost-effectiveness analysis, there was a non-linear relationship 
between incentive level and NMB and INMB was only positive between £14-£18 
monthly incentive levels. As different decision makers may make decisions over 
different time horizons, it is possible that the results of different analyses may be of 
value depending on the perspective. Employers for example, may be less interested 
in the long term secondary illnesses avoided than the NHS and therefore the 6 and 
12 month analyses may be more relevant to them. 
There is a debate as to whether making behaviours such as diet and physical activity 
(process) the incentive target would be more effective than targeting the outcome 
(weight loss).(635-637) The cost-effectiveness analysis presented here considered 
the incentivisation of weight loss however this was in part due to the fact that there 
are more studies reporting data of this nature. Financial incentives are clearly a highly 
complex intervention and it is likely the effect is sensitive to nuances in the format, 
delivery and assessment. Many of the studies in weight loss included study arms with 
multi-component aspects. For example, Faghri and Li (2014)(570) included an arm 
with deposit contracts and matched funding, Driver and Hensrud (2013)(569) 
incorporated a deposit contract and bonus pool and elsewhere group interventions 
were employed. There was heterogeneity also in the targets set and payment scheme 
with some study rewards increasing after a certain level of weight loss, some paying 
rewards monthly and some at study end (with and without a bonus). Clearly, 
synthesising outcomes from these studies was a challenge and consequently the 
uncertainty surrounding the predicted weight loss is increased.     
Crowding-out of intrinsic motivation is a general concern with extrinsic reward 
schemes. However, those with the lowest incomes are the most appropriate target 
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group for incentives and will be most responsive. Given discussions in the framework 
section (Chapter 3), this group will have the least intrinsic drive for behaviour change 
and thus have little motivation to be crowded out. It is plausible though that while 
baseline motivation is low, the introduction and subsequent removal of incentives may 
reduce motivation even further. A sensitivity analysis was conducted to model the 
potential impact of crowding-out by using a higher weight regain value in the incentive 
arm after the removal of the incentive. Although a simple modification, it was thought 
that this approach would capture the effect of a motivation level that was lower post-
incentive than pre-incentive. In the event, however, it did not change the decision 
regarding incentive cost-effectiveness.  
The results of the meta-regression suggested that the effects of incentives were not 
heterogeneous according to gender, age and socio-economic class. Given this, sub-
group analyses were not deemed necessary. A major argument for incentives is that 
those earning less will respond more and hence they represent a way to reduce health 
inequalities. Unfortunately, this was not empirically testable due to the dearth of 
effectiveness data by income group. There was no information either in the trial data 
or from the meta-analysis relating weight loss to difficulty of behaviour change or 
motivation. Thus it was not possible to further test some of the theories developed in 
the survey chapter. The results from the CV survey analysis suggested that people 
consider smaller expected values of lotteries as equivalent to much larger certain 
rewards (for the pooled time data for changing diet and losing weight these were 
£47.10 vs. £7.67 for certain and uncertain rewards, respectively). This suggests that 
reward schemes may be more cost-effective if they take advantage of this. 
Future research should explore the cost-effectiveness of alternative incentive scheme 
formats such as ‘foot in the door’ approaches, where participation in a programme is 
incentivised rather than process or outcomes. Work should also establish the extent 
to which those in lower income groups would be attracted to such schemes and 
whether offering incentives in this manner would encourage a ‘different’ type of 
individual to participate. Future incentive schemes should seek to measure 
participant’s motivation during studies and explore the value and practicability of 
modifying incentive levels in line with required self-control or motivation deficits. 
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10. Discussion 
 
The research conducted as part of this PhD programme focussed on user financial 
incentives - a relatively new field of enquiry in health. The work has made a number 
of potentially valuable and novel additions to the research and evidence base. It is 
the first to propose a framework to explain the impact of incentives in a health setting 
related to behaviour change. It is the first incentive pricing study conducted in England 
and represents the first longitudinal contingent valuation survey (and one of the few 
follow-up valuation surveys in any field of enquiry). Since the contingent valuation 
survey was conducted a number of other stated preference studies have explored 
pricing from a more limited perspective; there was limited additional information 
collected in these studies that would help interpret the elicited values (for example, 
perceived difficulty of change and sense of control). The design of the survey, 
including the contingent valuation and additional items, was facilitated by the literature 
reviews and subsequent development of the theoretical framework. This research 
also presents the first meta-analysis of incentives for weight-loss (as opposed to 
behaviour change). Finally the research represents one of the most comprehensive 
assessments of the cost-effectiveness of incentives and the only one conducted in 
weight loss. In doing this the research has addressed a number of research gaps and 
provides a basis for extending knowledge in the field. However, there were a number 
of limitations to the research; these are discussed below along with the extent to 
which they could have been avoided and how future research can address these 
limitations. 
While the theory review, framework and contingent valuation survey had a broad 
perspective, for reasons of practicality, it was necessary for the effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness sections to narrow the focus to one area. Weight loss was chosen 
as the focus as obesity is a growing public health concern. However, it is hoped that 
the research has provided some learning that could be generalisable to other 
behaviours such as smoking and alcohol consumption. 
 
10.1. Framework for incentives 
The literature reviews carried out here concluded that little work had been conducted 
in this area and that there had been no substantive attempts to formally characterise 
the impact of user financial incentives within behaviour change. In contrast much 
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effort has been expended in testing and refining generalised economic frameworks 
of health behaviour such as the Grossman and rational addiction models. However, 
the review concluded that these general frameworks would not be useful in the area 
of financial incentives for behaviour change. The formal process of framework 
development requires the generation of a hypothesis about the impact of incentives, 
formal econometric representation of the hypothesised relationships and testing of 
this (often) in large, panel datasets.(638) It is possible that research in the area has 
been stymied by a lack such datasets that included relevant variables. 
A framework was suggested based on the hypothesised process of behaviour 
change, key aspects of incentives and theories garnered form the literature reviews. 
The framework incorporated the idea that decision making processes are based on a 
dual-system as espoused by Kahneman (208, 357) and embedded in the Behaviour 
Change Wheel developed by Michie and colleagues following their meta-theory of 
behaviour change.(33) In the framework proposed here, intention and motivation (and 
therefore incentives) only come into play when System 2 holds sway over a decision. 
Empirical testing of this dual-system would be a worthy pursuit as it may help define 
inter alia, the conditions necessary (e.g. timing, behaviour ‘load’ or repetition) for the 
shift from System 2 to System 1 and the ‘resistance’ of these systems (e.g. how robust 
is it to shocks such as environmental cues and stresses?). Knowing this may help 
determine how long people with a motivation deficit should be incentivised for. 
Time preference is consistently found to have a significant association with unhealthy 
behaviours. It was included in the contingent valuation survey as it was thought a 
priori to be an important component of continuation of unhealthy behaviours. The 
results of the survey called this into question as it was seldom shown to be a 
significant predictor of required incentive. However the survey highlighted the 
difficulty in measuring this concept and the author questions the direction of the 
relationship. It is plausible that an individual’s circumstances and mood determine the 
extent to which they discount future benefits and costs and thus their risky health 
behaviour and not – as commonly assumed – that time preferences are endogenous. 
If discounting were shown to reduce with improved circumstances or health this would 
have significant implications for addiction models. It might also bring discounting itself 
into the picture as a target for interventions. Regrettably, it was not possible to 
explicitly test such theories within this research programme due to time constraints 
and lack of available data. 
One of the key aspects of the framework is that it assumes, while System 2 is in play, 
the costs and benefits of behaviour change will fluctuate and as such motivation will 
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not be constant over time. The natural corollary is that incentives should not be 
constant either. Incentives may have to be of a certain magnitude to raise motivation 
above a minimum required (remembering initial costs will be high) for behaviour 
change. They may also need to be increased commensurate with the difficulty of 
change and depleted self-control over time or individuals may relapse. Although the 
sample was small, this was to some extent indicated by the contingent valuation 
survey results as there was a suggestion that the minimum incentive required rose 
over time.   
Unless the relationships specified in the framework can be empirically tested 
however, it remains speculative. Unfortunately this is an unavoidable limitation of the 
research. Further research using large databases is required to empirically test the 
framework. It may have been possible to acquire large datasets reporting incentive 
data such as conditional cash transfer programme evaluations from low and middle 
income countries. However, it is unlikely that these would have the data necessary to 
test the theories presented here (for example on time preference or feelings of 
control). The nature of such data may mean it is not applicable here as they do not 
often relate to behaviours such as weight loss or smoking but more on combinations 
of behaviours covering diverse factors such as vaccination, nutrition and school 
attendance. However, it is hoped that large databases will soon become available as 
workplace wellness programmes take off (especially in the US) and these may permit 
the required endeavours. Additional econometric work is also required to develop 
testable theories regarding issues such as the optimal pricing of lottery incentives and 
commitment contracts taking into account factors such as prospect theory, loss 
aversion and regret theory. 
 
10.2. Pricing and acceptability of incentives 
The contingent survey conducted here may provide valuable information about the 
acceptability and pricing of incentives. Possibly because of the framing of the 
question, the environment, or situation of the respondents (or combination of these 
factors), incentives provided by the NHS were not found to be acceptable by many 
(over 57% of people strongly disagreed with them). It is not uncommon for high 
proportions of people surveyed to disagree with incentives.(639) However, it is also 
a common finding that they are acceptable in certain circumstances, for example if 
privately funded, if they are in the form of vouchers (for healthy products and services) 
and described as ‘effective’.(153, 639, 640) Unfortunately such follow-up questions 
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or testing of the question framing that may have shed light on why incentives were 
generally considered unacceptable were not possible here. As the survey was quite 
long it was not possible to add in additional questions and since the sample was 
relatively small it was not possible to split it and give differently framed attitude or 
valuation survey questions to each. It is quite possible that the valuations are a 
product of the particular formulation of the survey and that – for instance – one where 
the NHS was not mentioned (and say, the employer was the payer) may have 
produced quite different values. In that sense, the values may be context dependent 
and not applicable to incentive settings where the healthcare provider is not the 
incentive payer.  
Some manipulation of the data and application of non-standard regression models 
were necessary to make the most of the contingent valuation survey given its 
categorical nature and skewed responses. One of the notable findings was that there 
were clear differences in the perceived difficulty of changing behaviour depending on 
the behaviour with smoking appearing to be the most challenging. There was a clear 
trend between perceived difficulty of changing and self control and the incentive 
required. As a result, smokers required the greatest incentive to change. The 
hypothesis that the incentive would be correlated with the strength of the behaviour 
(e.g. number of cigarettes smoked and weight) was not consistently observed across 
behaviours. In weight loss there appeared to be a curvilinear relationship, with those 
over-weight requiring a larger incentive than the obese. However, this was also 
reflected in the weight loss incentive trial analysis which showed starting weight a 
significant positive predictor of weight loss; that is – the heavier people are the easier 
they find weight loss initially.   
As discussed above and contrary to the hypothesis, time preference was not found 
to be a strong predictor of required incentive, although this may be a function of the 
question asked. It is conceivable that responses to monetary time preference 
questions do not reflect discounting but the level of uncertainty people feel regarding 
the receipt of rewards in the future.  
Crude means suggested that an incentive of £55 per month was required across 
behaviours for individuals to adopt a healthier lifestyle. The equivalent expected value 
in terms of the lottery reward was close to £17 and these represented around 8.56% 
and 1.37% of monthly income, respectively. The analyses suggested those with low 
health control required £49.85 more than those in control of health to change 
behaviour and those perceiving change as ‘difficult’ required £41.33 more than those 
who felt it was ‘easy’. The motivation item was less powerful in predicting incentive 
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although univariate analyses suggested £36.44 would be needed for an individual 
who did not feel motivated to change behaviour (compared to an individual who was 
motivated). Comparisons with other pricing studies are difficult because responses 
are likely sensitive to the population surveyed, mode of survey and question format. 
You et al’s discrete choice experiment (DCE) revealed that an overweight male would 
need to be paid $59.46 (£42.64) per weigh-in (month) in cash (received at 3 months) 
to motivate them to join the a wellness programme (171) which is close to figures 
observed in this study. The per month weigh-in amount falls to $10.23 (£7.34) if the 
payment was made at each weigh-in. This may reflect high discount rates of 
individuals or their aversion to uncertainty about reward receipt. In contrast, a DCE 
by Wanders and colleagues found that willingness to participate in a lifestyle 
programme actually decreased as incentive level increased. The authors postulate 
that the higher amounts of incentive deter respondents who may believe that more 
effort is required.(641)  
While these studies have explored preference heterogeneity in terms of socio-
demographics, few have included attitudinal items as were here which support the 
hypothesis laid out the in the framework: that the incentive level required is a function 
of the difficulty the individual perceives in changing. Once this idea is considered and 
you acknowledge that this may fluctuate over time it is a natural conclusion that 
incentives should also be allowed to fluctuate in line with this. There was some 
suggestion from the data corroborating this as the incentives required rose over time 
and a further £16.59 per month needed at three months versus baseline. It is unclear 
why this might have been – whether due to a change in WTA, change in setting or 
mode of delivery. The sample comparison suggests it was not due to a systematic 
difference in the sample make-up at different time points. Regardless of the reason 
for it, the fact that WTA appears to change is a finding in itself and is worth knowing 
even if it is useful for this context (incentivising those who are initially hospitalised) or 
highlighting potential future research direction.  
Although there was evidence of the internal validity of the survey there are reasons 
to treat the elicited values with caution. The sample was small and a large proportion 
stated a £0 willingness to accept. It was also a specific population – namely a 
relatively older group of people who had experienced a health shock and were in 
hospital. Whether the values presented here are generalisable outside of this context 
is unknown. The conditions of completion also changed over time (from hospital to 
community) which limit the extent to which claims can be made about WTA 
longitudinally. Many of these limitations were unavoidable as survey was completed 
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alongside an on-going study. With hindsight an additional general population survey 
which may have offered a larger sample and an opportunity to test framing effects 
may have been a worthwhile pursuit.  
An additional cautionary caveat is required here as in any stated preference 
experiment. While these studies are useful for planning future incentive schemes they 
represent stated preferences only and the derived WTA values may be quite different 
to what people would actually be willing to accept in reality. Thus analysis of revealed 
preferences is required when data permits the endeavour. Others have advocated a 
pricing strategy where individuals are paid according to the costs that would be saved 
by the healthcare system if they were to change behaviour.(636) However, the 
practicability and desirability of such a scheme is unclear. 
 
10.3. Cost-effectiveness of incentives for weight 
loss 
The review and meta-analysis of incentives for weight loss concluded that incentives 
led to significantly greater weight loss than control or no active intervention. However 
the results continue to be mixed (83, 642) and the jury is out until larger scale studies 
have reported. The wide range of effects observed may partly be explained by the 
heterogeneity in the incentive designs, pricing and targeting of weight loss. Due to 
this heterogeneity it is questionable whether meta-analyses were appropriate. 
However, the uncertainty captured in this process could be incorporated in the 
decision-analytic model. It is worth noting that weight loss is one of the most common 
goals of incentives. Possibly only smoking cessation has been the focus of as many 
studies and these also exhibit heterogeneity of design and effect. Hence, choosing a 
different behaviour as the focus for the review and analyses would not necessarily 
have improved the synthesis. Although the aggregate weight loss from the meta-
analysis was modest (around 4 kgs) and in line with other interventions such as 
commercial weight loss programmes,(576) there were some exceptional results. For 
example the Volpp study found that weight loss was 6.35 kgs at 16 weeks in a lottery 
incentive arm. The review and analysis of the P4P (WeightWins) trial data suggested 
that higher incentives are better but not proportionately so, which is in line with others 
study findings.(566)   
The results of the economic evaluation suggested that financial incentives for weight 
loss – or at least the particular configuration examined here - do represent value for 
money over a lifetime, both for the NHS and employers. However, for the latter 
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perspective, how productivity losses were calculated made a difference to this finding. 
Even small levels of weight loss could be cost-effective although these results were 
obviously sensitive to assumptions made about long term weight trajectory after the 
incentive period for the incentive group and for the usual care group. Usual care for 
the decision model was only the provision of information about diet and other 
comparators were not included which could be considered a limitation of the 
evaluation. Future analyses might consider head to head comparisons with other 
weight loss programmes and alternative incentive schemes (such as incentives for 
behaviour change or scheme participation alone). As outlined in the framework, 
motivation is necessary but not sufficient for behaviour change as change may be 
reliant on skills and education which would also need to be present in future incentive 
programmes.(124)   
A reduction in weight of 4kg over 6 months of an individual who is motivated to 
change, who has a supportive social network, who see the benefits of a healthier 
lifestyle and who may have (eventually) found an alternative route to weight loss in 
the absence of incentivisation, does not necessarily have the same ‘value’ as same 
level of weight reduction in an individual who had no intention of changing. The 
analyses did not specifically explore the impact of incentives on who is encouraged 
to participate, nor the impact of incentives on inequalities which is a limitation of the 
evaluation. This was due to the lack of evidence for this in the review which stems 
from a lack of testing rather than lack of effect. It is possible the modelling could have 
explored differential effects on participation and weight loss across different socio-
economic groups but this would largely have been speculative in the absence of such 
evidence.  
Standard cost-effectiveness analyses do not accommodate considerations of equity, 
concerned as they are with efficiency and the maximisation of health benefit.(643) 
However, it has been argued that equity could and should be considered in resource 
allocation decisions (644) although this is not straight forward.(645) A number of 
alternative methods have been proposed to incorporate health distributional effects 
in cost-effectiveness analyses and technology appraisals (646) including the 
application of equity weights (645) and multi-criteria decision analysis.(647) A number 
of frameworks have recently been proposed (648) but have yet to come into common 
use. Formal incorporation of these methods was beyond the current piece of research 
but should be considered in future when data on effectiveness by income (or socio-
economic) group is available as it may identify any added value of incentive use.  
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The cost-effectiveness analysis was useful in highlighting some of the complexities in 
conducting an economic evaluation in this area. A key issue to note is the challenge 
in modelling the complexity of the intervention. Incentive schemes are themselves 
complex interventions but may also be bundled together with other interventions such 
as education or skills-based programmes which adds further complexity. This is 
confounded by the fact that, at least in behaviours which are not ‘all or nothing’, both 
the behaviour change target that is set and the incentive amount are likely to be 
crucial. If we consider that there is a ‘dose-response’ relationship between the 
incentive and its effectiveness, the net ‘dose’ is dependent on incentive pricing and 
‘amount’ of behaviour change required as well as individual characteristics. Added to 
this is fact that the dose of incentives is directly linked to cost since raising incentive 
levels increases both costs but also increases effectiveness and likelihood of payouts 
(which again increases costs). Given these complex inter-relationships, establishing 
a trade-off point between incentive level and effects which optimises value for money 
will be very challenging. 
There is likely to be significant heterogeneity in responses to incentives and modelling 
this in the absence of detailed data (for example on income and motivation levels) will 
be difficult. Since the power of incentives is linked to the marginal utility of income 
and behavioural factors such as motivation, the differential in effect across individuals 
may be marked. Factoring in the possibility that this will change over time adds 
another layer of complexity. Furthermore, the impact of behavioural phenomena such 
as crowding out and habit formation is still to be determined and these will likely 
substantively affect estimates of cost-effectiveness and may determine whether 
incentives are sustainable in the long term. Longer term and more detailed follow-up 
data on the effectiveness of incentives and on the personal characteristics of scheme 
participants is required to improve modelled estimates of cost-effectiveness. 
Thus identifying optimal pricing for incentives based on modelled cost-effectiveness 
estimates will be difficult and fraught with uncertainly. However this is an important 
endeavour since paying too much in certain scheme designs (e.g. where the effect is 
per 5% weight loss) may mean that a ceiling in effect is reached and excess 
‘consumer surplus’ generated. This was observed in the current evaluation where, 
beyond a critical incentive level, only costs rose and increases in incentive beyond 
this ceiling decreased cost-effectiveness.  
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10.4. Prospects for user financial incentives 
Interest in the use of incentives appears to be steadily increasing and new studies 
emerge all the time.(642, 649, 650) There have been some very positive results for 
incentives for one-off (e.g. vaccination) and time limited (e.g. smoking during 
pregnancy) behaviours and it is likely, in the UK at least, these will have an opportunity 
to be explored. Indeed a majority of the research thus far has been conducted in these 
categories. While these are obvious avenues to pursue, tackling obesity remains one 
of the key public health challenges and where incentives may play a part. 
Ethical questions will continue to be raised in protest to incentives. The research 
described here did not directly address the ethics of incentives although some of the 
findings may have implications for the moral debate. If incentives help people to make 
choices that are more in line with their future preferences (e.g. not having 
cardiovascular disease) it is difficult to argue that they are coercive. Since the 
downstream social costs of healthcare resource use expended in dealing with 
cardiovascular diseases (for example) are higher than the private costs of (unhealthy 
levels of) consumption, they represent a negative externality. As these costs are 
imposed on others - indirectly in the form of tax payers bearing healthcare costs; or 
directly, for example, in the form of secondary smoke (361) - there is a moral 
argument to intervene and offering incentives in this context may be justifiable. 
Further, if health behaviour can even in part be explained by factors beyond an 
individual’s control such as social environment (651, 652) accusations of unfairness 
may be rebutted. 
The results here suggest that not only do incentives have the potential to be cost-
effective (at least in the weight loss example), they have the potential to be cost 
saving. The efficiency argument these results generate translate into moral 
arguments for incentive use: doing nothing or using interventions that are cost-
ineffective will not optimise societal health. The contingent valuation survey indicated 
that the most important factor in determining the acceptability and pricing of incentives 
was the level of control that individuals felt in their ability to change behaviour. We 
can conclude that those who do not feel able to control their behaviour need help to 
do so. Adopting a consequentialist approach one could argue that incentives are 
permissible if they achieve the ends of reducing inequalities regardless of whether or 
not they are perceived as unfair or coercive. Due to short-comings in the data this 
was not empirically testable here but the idea that incentives may encourage low 
income individuals to change behaviour is enduring. NICE acknowledge that reducing 
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health inequalities is a priority and their Citizens Council stated that NICE should 
support strategies that offer benefit to the most disadvantaged so as to reduce health 
inequalities, especially in the context of public health.(653) In fact, the reduction of 
health inequalities is one of the criteria which the Department of Health uses to decide 
referrals of technologies for NICE appraisal.(653)  
The debate surrounding the morality and fairness of incentives are inextricably tied in 
with both their (cost-)effectiveness and who funds the schemes. Surveys of the 
acceptability of incentives are highly sensitive to framing.(153) Here it’s possible the 
high levels of disagreement with incentives may have been due to the framing of the 
question which specified the NHS would pay. This may have been mediated by 
statements about the effectiveness of incentives. However, this question may be moot 
depending on who funds incentive schemes. A consideration of the agents involved 
provides insight into who could pay: the target individuals (e.g. via deposit contracts); 
employers seeking to reduce productivity losses; the NHS (thus society indirectly as 
tax payers) seeking to avoid cost of future illnesses; society directly through 
donations; charities and the voluntary sector; the Department of Work and Pensions 
seeking to maximise income tax revenues and avoid disability benefit costs; local 
authorities; commercial incentive and wellness scheme companies; and commercial 
companies who would benefit from individuals switching expenditure from unhealthy 
to healthy goods and services (e.g. gyms, health and sports goods producers and 
service providers).  
Although widespread provision directly by the NHS may be contested, more NHS 
work is being tendered out to the private sector who may be more willing to entertain 
such ideas and have more freedom to ‘get results’ by whatever means. Currently the 
trend appears to be for employers to take the lead on incentive scheme provision. 
Several authors have highlighted the reforms of the US Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 as having the potential to herald greater prospects 
for incentives.(654, 655) The ACA continues and expands the 2006 Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 which supported the use of 
outcome-based health targets within private insurance incentives in both public and 
private insurance. The HIPAA regulation allowed the use of incentives to encourage 
weight loss and smoking cessation as long as the incentive was part of a wellness 
programme and did not exceed 20% of insurance coverage costs. The ACA has now 
increased the amount of incentive that can be offered and this has seen a growth in 
incentive scheme use. In companies with 200 or more workers in 2013, 99% offered 
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at least one wellness programme and 36% a financial incentive of some description 
for participation.((656) cited in (655))    
In 2014 NHS England published their five year plan for the NHS which is facing a 
challenging financial situation.(657) In their Five Year Forward View NHS England 
state that: “the future health of millions of children, the sustainability of the NHS, and 
the economic prosperity of Britain all now depend on a radical upgrade in 
prevention and public health” and point four in the executive summary (as a marker 
of its importance): “The NHS will.... help develop and support new workplace 
incentives to promote employee health and cut sickness-related unemployment”. 
Thus it seems the workplace might be fertile ground for incentive schemes in England. 
The use of incentives in the workplace introduces another set of ethical questions 
however since in this case people may have no chance to opt out and may be 
discriminated against if they are unfit.(658) Those who are unemployed would also 
miss out and may be a more valuable target for intervention. Regardless, if the role 
of incentives in companies and health services does not gather momentum, people 
will continue to use their own commitment devices and incentives to try to stick to 
behaviours.(659) In all cases additional research is needed to further finesse the 
design of incentive schemes and to understand their impact. 
 
10.5. Recommendations 
10.5.1. Incentive scheme design and analysis 
The reviews, theoretical work and analysis presented here afford the opportunity to 
describe what effective incentive schemes should look like. Some of the 
recommendations are derived from previous studies and others are derived directly 
from primary research conducted in this PhD research. 
 
 Although there is limited evidence to confirm or refute this point, the theoretical 
framework developed in the PhD suggests that incentive-generated 
motivation alone would not be sufficient and that incentives should be part of 
a wider scheme offering education and skills (e.g. in nutrition and exercise) to 
convert motivation into efficient and effective action. 
 There was evidence from the literature review of incentives in weight loss that 
group incentives are better than individual ones and, in the review of 
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frameworks (e.g. MINDSPACE), it is suggested that this is especially so when 
commitments are made publicly. 
 Previous stated preference studies identified in the reviews suggest that we 
should offer cash where possible although people are also willing to accept 
vouchers (which, according to studies exploring the public view of incentives 
are more acceptable). 
 The literature review conducted here in weight loss incentives did not identify 
any robust attempts to estimate optimal weight loss targets for individuals. 
Certainly in behaviours where the outcome is on a continuum (e.g. weight loss 
and physical activity) rather than binary (continue vs. stop smoking), the 
setting of behaviour change targets is possibly at least as important as the 
incentive amount offered. Further research is required to establish this but it 
is reasonable to say that the target outcome should be measurable in the first 
instance. The target should also be achievable; however, as the economic 
evaluation showed, setting the target too low in relation to the incentive may 
not optimise cost-effectiveness.  
 The reviews of incentives and stated preference studies suggest that people 
prefer certain payments. However, the review in weight loss indicated that 
lotteries are also effective and the decision modelling conducted here 
suggested they may be a more cost-effective option. 
 Studies identified in the reviews of the literature appear to suggest that more 
frequent payments are better than less frequent ones and people may be 
willing to accept smaller incentives as a trade-off. 
 The results of the contingent valuation survey conducted here indicate that 
incentive levels should take account of how difficult the person feels change 
is – that is, one size does not fit all. 
 As some behaviours may be more difficult than others to change, incentive 
levels may need to be specific to behaviour and even strength of health 
behaviour (e.g. amount of alcohol consumed) 
 The survey results also suggest that incentive pricing may need to adapt to 
how difficult people find change during the process. 
 The level of control of the individual may also be critical in behaviour change 
and level of incentive required thus incentives offered should reflect this but 
control or willpower could also be a target for interventions. 
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 Some attempts to measure health behaviour, self-control, perceived difficulty 
and motivation should be undertaken in incentive schemes to facilitate pricing 
and future research. 
 Acceptability of incentives may be low if described as being funded by the 
NHS so alternative funders may need to be sought along with ways of carefully 
framing schemes to maximise participation. 
 The economic evaluation conducted here suggests that incentives can be 
cost-effective from an employer and health service perspective 
 While higher incentives appear (in weight loss at least and over a lifetime 
horizon) to lead to better value for money in cost-utility terms, when cost-
effectiveness is considered there may be a level of incentive where a ceiling 
in effect occurs, beyond which increases in incentive serve only to increase 
costs and reduce cost-effectiveness.  
 
10.5.2. Further research 
Much of the incentive research continues to be conducted in the US which may limit 
generalisability to the UK. In addition, many of the methodological studies are 
unfortunately underpowered. An investment from the present research infrastructure 
is required to allow the conduct of UK studies of sufficient power to answer some of 
the key questions with confidence. Further studies of 30-40 participants per arm will 
not convince anybody of the potential of incentives nor dissuade them that they are a 
worthwhile pursuit.  
Longer term studies are required too. There is already significant uncertainty 
regarding the long term impact of traditional health behaviour change interventions 
and the use of incentives adds another layer of complexity. The conclusions of the 
economic evaluation conducted here were sensitive to the assumptions made about 
what happens after the incentivised period. If is it shown that crowding-out (or some 
other negative effect) occurs then, at best, incentives would be the same as the 
panoply of traditional behaviour change interventions and at worst could deliver 
poorer outcomes than no intervention at all. Conversely, if it becomes apparent that 
the desired and incentivised behaviours become for the participants something that 
is either: a) enjoyable (the behaviour itself or the process such as the social aspects); 
or b) something that is automatic (and thus shifted to System 1 and evading our 
conscious cost-benefit evaluation), then the power of incentives may be 
underestimated.  
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There is mixed evidence as to whether crowding-out occurs in the health 
context.(409, 410, 660) Beyond this there is scope for other negative consequences 
which are less measurable such as strategic behaviour and the change in the 
principal-agent relationship and these should be monitored in future studies. 
Regardless, it is recommended that some measure of motivation, self-control and 
perceived difficulty of change is included in future studies. This is to understand who 
is attracted to studies, to understand the level of incentive that is required and to 
understand what happens to motivation during and after incentivisation. 
An increased understanding of sub-group effects, especially relating to social class is 
required. The key question is: do incentives help reduce inequalities and do they 
encourage those who would not have otherwise considered change to attempt 
change? The hypothesis is that incentives should attract lower income individuals 
who are traditionally the hardest to reach in behaviour change interventions but this 
remains untested. Research is required to establish the role of incentives in this 
respect. Is there a case for incentivising participation in programmes or should the 
reward be contingent on process or outcome? For each of these points it would be 
useful to understand the impact of incentives on different income or social groups – if 
incentives do attract the hardest to reach, are they also the first to fail after incentive 
removal? If we are interested in answering this question then randomised controlled 
trials are possibly not a suitable mode of research. It may be that we need people 
who are motivated by finance to self-select for incentive study arms.  
Despite growing research on the matter, the key question of incentive pricing also 
demands further attention. Future research could explore the value and practicability 
of creating a personalised and dynamic pricing system, where rewards are based on 
how difficult change is and allowing this to change over time should it need to. A 
related and equally important point relevant for some behaviours is target setting. The 
incentive level is only one aspect of the mechanism and only makes sense when it 
relates to a target; £50 for losing 1kg of weight is a good deal but perhaps not for 
losing 5kgs. In smoking you could argue that incentivising cessation is the only goal 
(rather than reduction in cigarettes smoked). However, in diet, weight loss, physical 
activity and alcohol consumption, the desired level of consumption is on a sliding 
scale and the optimal may differ for different individuals based on their current 
consumption levels, and what they feel is achievable. Little or no research has been 
conducted in how these targets are set but it is important as targets that are too easy 
may not optimise cost-effectiveness and targets that are difficult to achieve may de-
motivate and lead to failure.  
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The sustainability of incentives remains in doubt and depends on how they are 
financed. Research is needed to explore alternative financing models that might 
involve charities and the commercial sector. The cost structure may also play a part 
in ensuring that they do not increase inequalities. For example, introducing means-
tested enrolment fees would ensure that higher income individuals could still 
participate in schemes but would help fund the incentive payments to those on lower 
income (whose fees are waived). Introducing an enrolment fee (of $50) has been 
shown not to significantly reduce participation in schemes although the potential 
incentive would have to make the investment worth it.(661) 
Additional research is also required on the cost-effectiveness of incentives. Future 
economic evaluations would be aided by micro-costing of incentive schemes, 
including incentive costs but also less tangible costs such as cost of marketing and 
running the schemes. This element was estimated in the current analysis which is a 
shortcoming. Finally, future decision-modelling work should explore the extent to 
which success in attracting low income individuals into programmes and achieving 
behaviour change may reduce inequalities and therefore have distributional effects. 
This requires some trial estimates relating to any such distributional effects to 
parameterise the decision model.  
 
10.6. Conclusion 
In the face of increasing evidence from experimental psychology and other areas it is 
increasingly untenable to see economics as anything other than behavioural. 
Decisions, including those relating to health, are refracted through a lens of 
perceptions and attitudes, and subject to a number biases and errors. The NHS is 
under increasing financial pressure and a substantive proportion of its available 
resources are expended in dealing with the consequences of preventable diseases 
which result from health behaviour decisions.  
Financial incentives are increasingly being explored as a way to bring about health 
behaviour change. However, we are still some way away from a sufficient 
understanding of incentives and there are few examples of well designed schemes. 
As Loewenstein and colleagues point out, poor design may lead to the widening of 
health inequalities because they reward healthy behaviours which are 
disproportionately higher in higher income individuals.(361) The research conducted 
here sought to apply behavioural economic concepts to standard economic 
approaches and to apply technology assessment methods to improve the 
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understanding of financial incentives for preventive health. The research provides 
some evidence that may be useful for future scheme design, may remove some of 
the barriers to further use and exploration and highlights key areas for future 
investigation. Further research is encouraged to build on what is presented here.  
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12. Appendix 
 
12.1. Pilot VHCQ 
I.D _________ 
Valuing Health Questionnaire 
 
 
 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect information about how you think about 
your health, your lifestyle and what you think about certain health problems 
The information you provide will help us understand people’s attitudes to health and 
what helps people to take up healthier lifestyles. 
Please answer all of the questions you feel able to. There are no right or wrong answers. 
All of your responses are anonymous and confidential and will not affect any treatment 
you might receive in the future. 
 
 
Thank you for your help 
 
 
If you have any questions about the research please contact  
David Meads, telephone: 0113 343 0860  
Please enter today’s date: 
          
d d  m m  y y y y 
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First, a few questions about you 
 
 
1. What is your date of birth?            
 
 
2. Are you?  (please tick one):            Male         Female 
 
 
3. How many children do you have (under 18)?      
 
 
4. Which ethnic group do you belong to? (please tick only one) 
     
 White    Mixed ethnicity   
 Asian or Asian British    Gypsy / traveller 
 Black or Black British    Other ethnic group 
 Chinese    
 
 
Your education 
 
5. What is the highest level of education you have completed? (please tick only 
one) 
 
 University or college or equivalent  
 Intermediate between secondary level and university  
(e.g. technical training) 
 
 Secondary school  
 Primary school (or less)  
 
          
d d  m m  y y y y 
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Your employment and income 
 
6. What is your current employment status? (please tick only one) 
 
 Employed (full or part time)   On long term sick leave 
 Housewife   Retired 
 Full time student   Unemployed 
 
7. Please estimate the monthly income of your household (before deducting tax and 
national insurance)? If you receive any benefits or pensions please include them as 
income. (please tick only one) 
 
 Less than £500  £2501 - £3500 
 £501 - £1500  £3501 -  £4500 
 £1501 - £2500  More than £4500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Compared to most people, how willing are you to take risks? For example, do 
you like to gamble or do you often drive faster than the speed limit? 
 (Please tick only one) 
 
Not at all   
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Very 
6 
       
Your attitudes 
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Your health 
 
1. Do you have any medical conditions, illnesses or disabilities?          
  Yes      No 
 
If you ticked ‘Yes’, please list your main illnesses or disabilities:  
...................................................................................................................................
.... 
...................................................................................................................................
.... 
 
 
 
3. Thinking only about your health, how would you rate your overall health 
at the moment? (Please tick one) 
 
Extremely 
good 
Very 
good 
Good Fair Poor Very 
poor 
Extremely 
poor 
       
 
 
 
 
2. Thinking about your life in general and your current circumstances, how 
happy are you at the moment? (Please tick one) 
 
Extremely 
happy 
Very  
happy 
 
Happy 
Neither 
happy or 
unhappy 
 
Unhappy 
Very 
unhappy 
Extremely 
unhappy 
       
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Your Health-Related Quality of Life  
By placing a tick in one box in each group below, please indicate which 
statement best describes your own health state today. 
 
Mobility                                           
I have no problems in walking about  
I have some problems walking about  
I am confined to bed  
  
Self Care                                          
I have no problems with self care  
I have some problems washing or dressing myself  
I am unable to wash or dress myself  
  
Usual Activities                              
(e.g. work, study, housework, family or leisure activities)  
I have no problems with performing my usual activities  
I have some problems with performing my usual activities  
I am unable to perform my usual activities  
  
Pain/Discomfort                            
I have no pain or discomfort  
I have moderate pain or discomfort  
I have extreme pain or discomfort  
  
Anxiety/Depression                      
I am not anxious or depressed  
I am moderately anxious or depressed  
I am extremely anxious or depressed  
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To help people say how good or bad their health state is, we have drawn a scale (rather like 
a thermometer) on which the best health you can imagine is marked 100 and the worst 
health you can imagine is marked 0.  
 
Box 1.  
We would like you to indicate on this scale 
how good or bad you own health is today, 
in your opinion. Please do this by drawing a 
line from the Box 1 to whichever point on 
the scale indicates how good or bad you 
health is today. 
 
Box 2. 
Next, we would like you to imagine what 
your health state will be in 10 year’s time, 
assuming you continue will your current 
lifestyle (e.g. you have the same diet, same 
levels of alcohol and cigarette use and 
same physical activity levels). 
Please indicate on this scale how good or 
bad you expect your own health to be in 10 
years time by drawing a line to the scale 
from Box 2.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Best 
imaginable 
health 
Box 1: 
Your own health 
today 
 
Box 2: 
Your health in 10 
year’s time 
Worst 
imaginable 
health 
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1. Taking into account your current lifestyle (your weight, diet, whether you 
smoke, drink alcohol and how much you exercise), what do you think is the 
chance (0-100%) that you will suffer from an illness such as heart disease or 
stroke in the next 10 years?  
 
Please mark on the line with a cross what you think your chances are 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Many factors can affect the length of a person’s life (for example, smoking 
and diet). Assuming you continue with your current lifestyle, how old do you 
think you will live to be? 
                        I think I will live to be............years old 
 
 
2. How likely do you think it is that you will suffer from an illness such as 
heart disease or stroke in the next 10 years? (please tick one) 
 
Very 
unlikely 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Very 
likely 
6 
       
0% 
(It definitely 
won’t 
happen) 
100% 
(It definitely 
will happen) 
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Imaginary health exercise 
 
For this question please IMAGINE you have recently had a stroke. Please read the 
description of what it is like to have had a stroke (Box 1) and then answer the 
question below. 
Box 1: Description of a major stroke 
The right side of your body is totally limp (paralysed) 
You can think clearly 
Your speech is slow and unclear but understandable 
You have full control of bladder and bowel  
You must use a wheelchair, because you cannot walk at all 
You need some help for feeding, dressing and transferring 
You are totally dependent on help for bathing 
 
Imagine that you have had a stroke and your health is as described above in Box 1. 
Also imagine that you will live in this situation for 10 years, after which you die. Now 
imagine that there is a cure for the stroke symptoms that would return you to full 
health. The only problem with the cure is that it shortens life expectancy. This means 
that you would live for less than 10 years but in full health.  
So please imagine that you were in the situation described in Box 1 and would be for 
10 years. 
1. Would you accept the cure, if it meant living a shorter life 
but in full health? 
 
 
  Yes     No 
2. If you ticked ‘Yes’, what is the minimum number of months/years in full 
health you would want after the cure? (Please mark your answer on the scale 
below).  
  
Months 
 0  3  6  9  0 
 
0             1               2              3              4               5              6               7               8           9          10 
Years 
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3. For each question below imagine that you have the choice between living for the 
next 10 years with the stroke symptoms described in Box. 1 (after which you 
would die) or living fewer years but in full health (after which you would die).  
 
For each pair of options please tick one box. Please tick one answer in each pair 
Live 10 years with stroke 
symptoms  
 Live 10 years with stroke symptoms   
Live 6 months in full health  Live 6 years in full health  
    
Live 10 years with stroke 
symptoms  
 Live 10 years with stroke symptoms   
Live 1 year in full health  Live 7 years in full health  
    
Live 10 years with stroke 
symptoms  
 Live 10 years with stroke symptoms   
Live 2 years in full health  Live 8 years in full health  
    
Live 10 years with stroke 
symptoms  
 Live 10 years with stroke symptoms   
Live 3 years in full health  Live 9 years in full health  
    
Live 10 years with stroke 
symptoms  
 Live 10 years with stroke symptoms   
Live 4 years in full health  Live 9 years and 6 months in full 
health 
 
    
Live 10 years with stroke 
symptoms  
 Live 10 years with stroke symptoms   
Live 5 years in full health  Live 9 years and 9 months in full 
health 
 
 
Imagine again that you have a stroke and will live in the situation described in Box 1 
for the rest of your life. Now Imagine a new (make believe) pill is available to cure 
stroke symptoms. Your doctor advises you that if you take the pill today and it works 
you will not have any stroke symptoms and will live the rest of your life in full health. 
However, if you take the pill today and it does not work it causes sudden and painless 
death in your sleep tonight. Your doctor has no way of predicting which patients will 
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be cured by this new (make believe) pill, and will support whatever decision you 
make. We want to know what you think about this pill. 
 
4. Would you take this (make believe) pill right now if you knew . . .  
(please circle yes or no for every question). 
 
Please 
circle yes 
or no 
. . . it had a 100% chance of cure and 0% risk of causing death in your sleep 
tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 99.9999% chance of cure and a 1 in 1 million risk of causing death 
in your sleep tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 99.999% chance of cure and a 1 in 100,000 (risk of causing death 
in your sleep tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 99.99% chance of cure and a 1 in 10,000  risk of causing death in 
your sleep tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 99.9% chance of cure and a 1 in 1000 risk of causing death in your 
sleep tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 99% chance of cure and 1% risk of causing death in your sleep 
tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 97% chance of cure and 3% risk of causing death in your sleep 
tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 95% chance of cure and 5% risk of causing death in your sleep 
tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 90% chance of cure and 10% risk of causing death in your sleep 
tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 80% chance of cure and 20% risk of causing death in your sleep 
tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 75% chance of cure and 25% risk of causing death in your sleep 
tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 65% chance of cure and 35% risk of causing death in your sleep 
tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 60% chance of cure and 40% risk of causing death in your sleep 
tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 50% chance of cure and 50% risk of causing death in your sleep 
tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 40% chance of cure and 60% risk of causing death in your sleep 
tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 30% chance of cure and 70% risk of causing death in your sleep 
tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 20% chance of cure and 80% risk of causing death in your sleep 
tonight?  
Yes   No 
. . . it had a 10% chance of cure and 90% risk of causing death in your sleep 
tonight?  
Yes   No 
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We now like you to do the same exercises but this time IMAGINING you have heart 
disease and are in the situation described in Box 2. 
 
Box 2: Description of heart disease symptoms 
You have noticeable limits to how much physical activity you can do 
You are comfortable only when resting 
Physical activity makes you tired, have palpitations or short of breath 
It is difficult to sleep well at night 
Walking is difficult 
It’s difficult to participate in sports, hobbies or recreational pastimes 
 
Imagine now that you have heart disease and your health is as described above in 
Box 2. Also imagine that you will live in this situation for 10 years, after which you 
die. Now imagine that there is a cure for heart disease that would return you to full 
health. The only problem with the cure is that it shortens life expectancy. This means 
that you would live for less than 10 years but in full health.  
 
So please imagine that you were in the situation described in Box 2 and would be for 
10 years. 
 
5. Would you accept the cure, if it meant living a shorter life 
but in full health? 
 
  Yes     No 
6. If you ticked ‘Yes’, what is the minimum number of months/years in full health 
you would want after the cure? (Please mark your answer on the scale below).  
  
Months 
 0  3  6  9  0 
 
0             1               2              3              4               5              6               7               8              9               
10 
Years 
 
 
364 
 
 
 
Imagine that you will be ill starting 2 years from now for 20 days (after which you 
return to normal health). Now imagine that there is a treatment that will postpone 
the illness so it will not start in 2 years but in 6 years time. Although the treatment 
delays the illness, it means you will be ill for longer than 20 days. How many extra 
days would be prepared to be ill for, if it meant you could put off being ill until 6 years 
from now? 
 
7. Please mark on the scale below the maximum number of days of illness you 
would be willing to accept to delay the illness. 
 
 
 
8. Imagine you won a prize draw competition and the prize was either £50 now 
OR instead you could receive £100 in 12 months’ time. Which would you 
choose? (Please tick only one)  
£50 now  
£100 in 12 months’ time  
 
9. If you would choose £50 now, how much would you have to receive in 12 
months’ time instead to choose the second option?  £............... 
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Changing your health behaviour 
 
 
For this section of the questionnaire we would like you to think about your current 
lifestyle and health (your weight, your diet, your level of physical activity, whether 
you smoke or not or drink alcohol). We would then like you to think about what it 
would take to get you to change your behaviour.  
 
1. How difficult do you think it would be for you to do the following: 
 
Health change 
Very 
easy 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Very 
difficult 
6 
Stop smoking 
(Tick here if you do not 
smoke  ) 
       
Lose weight        
Eat less fat, salt and 
sugary foods 
       
Exercise for 30 minutes, 3 
times a week 
       
Drink alcohol in 
moderation 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. How likely do you think it is that you could significantly affect how long you 
will live by the lifestyle choices (for example, smoking, not exercising) you 
make?  (please tick one) 
 
Very 
unlikely 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Very 
likely 
6 
       
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Please IMAGINE that the NHS would be willing to pay people to change their 
lifestyles. The NHS would pay you an amount every month for one year and you 
would be tested or weighed every month to make sure you maintained a healthier 
lifestyle.  
(Please keep in mind this is an imaginary exercise – the NHS are not proposing to pay 
people to change their health behaviours.) 
 
3. What is the minimum amount of money per month that you would want to 
persuade you to change your behaviour? Please consider each separately. For 
each health change please write an amount. 
Behaviour change 
 
I would have to 
be paid 
To stop smoking  
(Tick here if you do not smoke  ) 
 
£………... per 
month 
To go on a calorie controlled diet and weight loss programme  
£………..  per 
month 
To exercise for 30 minutes at least 3 times a week   
£………..  per 
month 
To reduce the amount of alcohol you drink to a moderate 
amount 
 
 
£………..  per 
month 
 
4. People who live unhealthy lifestyles have a high risk of dying from diseases 
such as stroke or heart disease or of being left disabled by them. Given that 
eating too much fat, salt and sugar; smoking; drinking alcohol; and not getting 
enough exercise can increase the risks of stroke or heart disease, how likely 
are you to try and change your behaviour to become healthier? (please tick 
one) 
 
Very 
unlikely 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Very 
likely 
6 
       
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Thank you for completing the questionnaire. Please take a moment to 
check that you have responded to all of the questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Imagine your doctor told you that you have a 1 in 5 risk of a heart attack or 
stroke in the next 10 years, how likely would you be to try and change your 
behaviour to become healthier? (please tick one) 
 
Very 
unlikely 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Very 
likely 
6 
       
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12.1.1. Pilot survey questions 
 
Health Valuation Survey – pilot test schedule 
  
Time started questionnaire:...............    Time finished:..................... 
 
Does the respondent read the instructions to the questions?   Yes       No  
Were any questions difficult to answer or understand?         Yes       No   
If Yes: 
Questio
n No. 
Why difficult? 
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Which question did you find easiest to answer? 
Your Health Question 6 
Your Health Question 7 
 
 
Imaginary health  Question 2 
Imaginary health  Question 3 
 
 
Imaginary health  Question 2 
Imaginary health  Question 4 
 
 
Imaginary health  Question 5 
Imaginary health  Question 6 
 
 
 
Did the respondent take a long time over any questions or appear to struggle?    Yes 
      No  
Did the respondent check their to make sure they answered all questions             Yes 
      No  
Which questions? 
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Did the respondent check their to make sure they answered all questions             Yes 
      No  
Did the respondent miss any questions? Yes       No  
If yes, which?.................................................................................................. 
 
Do you have any comments on the questionnaire? 
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12.2. Contingent valuation analysis 
12.2.1. Comparison of samples 
Table 52: Comparing recruited vs. VHCQ completers 
 n 
Odds 
Ratio SE z P>z LCI UCI 
Male 130 0.85 0.35 -0.39 0.696 0.38 1.92 
Education to college 
or higher 130 1.42 0.61 0.81 0.419 0.61 3.31 
EQ-5D 128 0.53 0.36 -0.94 0.347 0.14 2.00 
EQ-5D VAS 130 1.01 0.01 1.02 0.306 0.99 1.03 
Not in control arm 132 0.93 0.36 -0.2 0.844 0.43 2.00 
Age 132 0.97 0.02 -1.23 0.217 0.93 1.02 
Smoker 130 0.90 0.38 -0.26 0.797 0.39 2.08 
Drinks alcohol 129 1.23 0.53 0.47 0.635 0.53 2.87 
Exercises 128 1.72 0.79 1.18 0.238 0.70 4.24 
BMI group (vs. <25) 122            
25-30  1.85 1.01 1.13 0.259 0.64 5.41 
>30  1.93 1.03 1.23 0.221 0.68 5.49 
 
Table 53: Comparing baseline vs. 3 month VHCQ completers 
 n 
Odds 
Ratio SE z P>z LCI UCI 
Male 112 1.08 0.42 0.19 0.847 0.51 2.29 
Education to 
college or higher 112 2.33 0.93 2.12 0.034 1.07 5.09 
Income ≥£2000 pm 91 0.84 0.36 -0.42 0.678 0.36 1.93 
EQ-5D 111 2.73 1.66 1.65 0.099 0.83 8.98 
EQ-5D VAS 112 1.01 0.01 0.98 0.325 0.99 1.03 
Not in control arm 112 1.91 0.73 1.69 0.09 0.90 4.05 
Age 112 1.02 0.02 1.05 0.292 0.98 1.07 
Mean Difficulty* 97 1.02 0.14 0.14 0.891 0.78 1.34 
Mean WTA* 94 0.99 0.00 -1.97 0.049 0.99 1.00 
Smoker 112 0.71 0.29 -0.82 0.412 0.32 1.60 
Drinks alcohol 112 0.78 0.32 -0.61 0.541 0.35 1.74 
Exercises 111 0.69 0.28 -0.92 0.356 0.32 1.51 
BMI group (vs. 
<25)              
25-30 107 1.05 0.56 0.1 0.923 0.37 2.99 
>30   1.00 0.52 0 1 0.36 2.76 
*Averages were taken of the responses to the difficulty questions and WTA the 
guaranteed incentive at baseline 
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12.2.2. Logistic regression results 
 
Table 54: Logistic regression for £0 vs >£0 WTACertain responses 
Wald chi2  =  10.640     n =  43 
Log likelihood =  -16.184   Prob > chi2 =  0.031 
Smoking Beta SE z P>z 
Lower 
CI Upper CI 
Not in Control 3.316 1.243 2.670 0.008 0.879 5.754 
EQ-5D VAS -0.045 0.026 -1.730 0.083 -0.095 0.006 
age >=59 -0.120 0.063 -1.900 0.058 -0.244 0.004 
VisitCycle = 3 months 3.257 1.355 2.400 0.016 0.602 5.912 
Constant 4.840 3.576 1.350 0.176 -2.169 11.849 
 
Wald chi2 =  7.25     n =  117 
Log likelihood =  -66.476   Prob > chi2 =  0.0645 
Weight Beta SE z P>z Lower CI Upper CI 
Perceive weight 
loss as difficult 0.844 0.730 1.160 0.248 -0.587 2.275 
Not in Control 2.248 0.954 2.360 0.018 0.378 4.119 
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Disagree with 
incentives -1.568 0.811 -1.930 0.053 -3.159 0.022 
Constant 0.486 0.728 0.670 0.505 -0.941 1.914 
       
Wald chi2 =  20.9     n =  136 
Log likelihood =  -77.920   Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
Exercise Beta SE z P>z Lower CI Upper CI 
Not in Control 
1.159 0.466 2.490 0.013 0.245 2.072 
Disagree with 
incentives 
-1.615 0.465 -3.480 0.001 -2.526 -0.705 
EQ-5D  
1.229 0.678 1.810 0.070 -0.101 2.559 
Discount rate 
groups 
       
20-100% 
0.534 0.475 1.120 0.261 -0.397 1.466 
>100% 
0.844 0.522 1.620 0.106 -0.180 1.868 
age >=59 
-0.492 0.393 -1.250 0.210 -1.262 0.278 
Constant 
0.165 0.704 0.230 0.815 -1.216 1.546 
       
Wald chi2 =  20.91   n =  96 
Log likelihood =  -48.648 Prob > chi2 =  0.004 
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Alcohol Beta SE z P>z Lower CI Upper CI 
Perceive alcohol 
reduction as 
difficult 2.158 0.671 3.220 0.001 0.843 3.472 
Believe at high risk 
of health event -1.038 0.573 -1.810 0.070 -2.162 0.085 
Disagree with 
incentives -1.293 0.583 -2.220 0.027 -2.436 -0.150 
EQ-5D  0.722 0.831 0.870 0.385 -0.907 2.350 
age >=59 -1.234 0.541 -2.280 0.022 -2.294 -0.175 
VisitCycle = 3 
months 1.349 0.588 2.300 0.022 0.197 2.501 
Education to 
college or higher 1.467 0.576 2.550 0.011 0.338 2.596 
Constant -1.595 0.995 -1.600 0.109 -3.545 0.355 
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12.2.3. Multinomial regression results 
WTACertain reward responses were collapsed due to low samples in some categories. 
Table 55: Multinomial regression for WTACertain  (all vs. £0) 
     N =  44 
     
Wald 
chi2(12) = 760.91 
     Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
     Pseudo R2 = 0.27 
     
Log pseudo 
likelihood -42.56 
       
Smoking Beta SE Z P>Z Lower CI Upper CI 
£1-£30 
Perceived smoking 
cessation as difficult 14.77 0.86 17.20 0.000 13.08 16.45 
Not in Control 2.97 1.41 2.11 0.035 0.21 5.74 
Not motivated 1.15 1.09 1.06 0.290 -0.98 3.29 
VisitCycle = 3 months 1.05 1.52 0.69 0.489 -1.92 4.02 
Constant -17.91 1.80 -9.97 0.000 -21.43 -14.39 
£31-£100 
Perceived smoking 
cessation as difficult 1.20 1.01 1.19 0.234 -0.78 3.18 
Control 2.55 1.28 1.99 0.046 0.04 5.06 
Not motivated 0.10 1.06 0.10 0.924 -1.99 2.19 
VisitCycle = 3 months 1.58 0.90 1.75 0.080 -0.19 3.35 
Constant -3.72 1.41 -2.63 0.008 -6.49 -0.95 
Over £100 
Perceived smoking 
cessation as difficult -0.01 1.48 -0.01 0.996 -2.90 2.89 
Control 4.25 1.39 3.06 0.002 1.53 6.97 
Not motivated 2.39 1.01 2.36 0.018 0.41 4.36 
VisitCycle = 3 months 3.00 1.26 2.38 0.017 0.53 5.47 
Constant -6.56 1.78 -3.69 0.000 -10.05 -3.08 
       
     N =  110 
     
Wald 
chi2(12) = 34.24 
     Prob > chi2 = 0.0032 
     Pseudo R2 = 0.14 
     
Log pseudo 
likelihood -123.90 
Weight loss Beta SE Z P>Z Lower CI Upper CI 
£1-£30             
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age >=59 -0.09 0.58 -0.15 0.880 -1.22 1.05 
BMI Group 0.16 0.48 0.33 0.741 -0.78 1.09 
Not in Control 1.13 0.58 1.93 0.053 -0.02 2.27 
Disagree with 
incentives -0.51 0.63 -0.81 0.417 -1.74 0.72 
VisitCycle = 3 months -0.26 0.53 -0.49 0.623 -1.30 0.78 
Constant -0.34 0.97 -0.35 0.724 -2.23 1.55 
£31-£100 
age >=59 -1.35 0.59 -2.30 0.021 -2.50 -0.20 
BMI Group 0.85 0.46 1.84 0.065 -0.05 1.75 
Not in Control 1.82 0.65 2.79 0.005 0.54 3.11 
Disagree with 
incentives -0.91 0.62 -1.48 0.139 -2.12 0.30 
VisitCycle = 3 months 0.35 0.56 0.63 0.531 -0.75 1.45 
Constant -1.64 1.11 -1.48 0.138 -3.81 0.53 
Over £100 
age >=59 -0.07 0.76 -0.09 0.926 -1.56 1.42 
BMI Group -0.04 0.46 -0.09 0.929 -0.95 0.87 
Not in Control 2.26 0.74 3.06 0.002 0.81 3.71 
Disagree with 
incentives -1.78 0.72 -2.47 0.013 -3.20 -0.37 
VisitCycle = 3 months 1.43 0.70 2.04 0.041 0.06 2.80 
Constant -2.82 1.35 -2.09 0.036 -5.46 -0.18 
       
     N =  137 
     
Wald 
chi2(12) = 35.17 
     Prob > chi2 = 0.0023 
     Pseudo R2 = 0.13 
     
Log pseudo 
likelihood -156.08 
Exercise Beta SE Z P>Z Lower CI Upper CI 
£1-£30             
age >=59 -0.24 0.54 -0.44 0.662 -1.29 0.82 
EQ-5D VAS 0.03 0.01 2.49 0.013 0.01 0.05 
Perceived exercise as 
difficult -0.40 0.55 -0.73 0.466 -1.49 0.68 
Not in Control 0.95 0.58 1.62 0.106 -0.20 2.09 
Disagree with 
incentives -1.53 0.60 -2.55 0.011 -2.71 -0.35 
Constant -1.32 0.92 -1.44 0.150 -3.12 0.48 
£31-£100             
age >=59 -1.26 0.51 -2.46 0.014 -2.26 -0.26 
EQ-5D VAS 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.879 -0.02 0.03 
Perceived exercise as 
difficult 0.26 0.56 0.46 0.643 -0.84 1.35 
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Not in Control 0.96 0.54 1.79 0.073 -0.09 2.01 
Disagree with 
incentives -1.36 0.56 -2.43 0.015 -2.46 -0.26 
Constant 0.36 1.02 0.35 0.723 -1.64 2.37 
Over £100             
age >=59 0.34 0.64 0.53 0.598 -0.92 1.60 
EQ-5D VAS 0.00 0.01 -0.08 0.940 -0.03 0.03 
Perceived exercise as 
difficult 0.65 0.69 0.95 0.342 -0.69 2.00 
Not in Control 1.59 0.64 2.48 0.013 0.34 2.84 
Disagree with 
incentives -1.70 0.64 -2.66 0.008 -2.94 -0.45 
Constant -1.05 1.24 -0.85 0.396 -3.47 1.37 
       
     N =  98 
     
Wald 
chi2(12) = 28.69 
     Prob > chi2 = 0.0044 
     Pseudo R2 = 0.18 
     
Log pseudo 
likelihood -98.49 
Alcohol Beta SE Z P>Z Lower CI Upper CI 
£1-£30             
age >=59 -0.91 0.64 -1.43 0.154 -2.16 0.34 
Perceive alcohol 
reduction as difficult 0.55 0.84 0.65 0.515 -1.10 2.20 
Not in Control 0.77 0.63 1.23 0.219 -0.46 2.00 
VisitCycle = 3 months 0.59 0.65 0.91 0.364 -0.69 1.88 
Constant -1.72 0.93 -1.84 0.066 -3.55 0.11 
£31-£100             
age >=59 -0.85 0.62 -1.38 0.169 -2.07 0.36 
Perceive alcohol 
reduction as difficult 2.14 0.65 3.30 0.001 0.87 3.42 
Not in Control -0.03 0.71 -0.04 0.964 -1.42 1.36 
VisitCycle = 3 months 1.12 0.54 2.07 0.038 0.06 2.17 
Constant -2.56 0.86 -2.96 0.003 -4.25 -0.87 
Over £100             
age >=59 -2.48 0.89 -2.79 0.005 -4.23 -0.74 
Perceive alcohol 
reduction as difficult 2.96 1.04 2.84 0.005 0.92 5.00 
Not in Control 1.94 0.94 2.06 0.039 0.09 3.78 
VisitCycle = 3 months 2.32 0.94 2.47 0.014 0.48 4.17 
Constant -5.93 1.89 -3.14 0.002 -9.63 -2.23 
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12.2.4. Baseline – 3 month change in WTA 
 
Table 56: Baseline - 3 month change in WTA* 
 WTACertain WTAUncertain  WTACommitment 
 n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD 
Smoking 9 £59.17 £113.66 8 £0.55 £29.64 8 £55.44 £109.75 
Diet 30 £14.08 £83.72 29 -£0.73 £17.62 28 £17.71 £70.35 
Exercise 36 £8.82 £82.16 34 -£1.59 £16.10 34 £6.53 £66.38 
Alcohol 25 £57.10 £148.83 21 £11.87 £30.22 23 £29.83 £120.65 
*Positive values represent an increase in WTA from baseline to 3 months 
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12.2.5. Pooled time-point descriptives – WTAUncertain and 
WTACommitment 
12.2.5.1. WTAUncertain 
 
Table 57: Pooled time-point descriptives – WTAUncertain by demographics and attitudes 
 Smoking Diet Exercise Alcohol 
Socio-
demographics         
Age group        
<=59 £14.49 £7.90 £6.16 £10.72 
>59 £14.95 £7.45 £8.40 £8.18 
P value 0.769 0.324 0.099 0.121 
Sex        
Female £13.36 £7.20 £8.24 £6.24 
Male £15.23 £8.01 £6.49 £11.19 
P value 0.340 0.988 0.524 0.924 
Income group        
<£2000 pm £12.25 £7.12 £9.13 £12.01 
>=£2000 pm £12.14 £7.40 £4.61 £6.54 
P value 0.443 0.481 0.021 0.257 
Attitude questions        
I am in control        
Agree £10.85 £6.79 £5.93 £6.90 
Disagree £19.48 £9.39 £9.73 £15.08 
P value 0.033 0.007 0.027 0.050 
My lifestyle 
determines health        
Agree £17.07 £7.06 £6.61 £9.73 
Disagree £5.06 £9.84 £9.61 £8.92 
P value 0.846 0.034 0.183 0.833 
I am motivated        
Agree £7.18 £6.86 £5.96 £6.11 
Disagree £29.47** £9.79 £10.51 £18.46** 
P value 0.004 0.227 0.526 0.032 
Major achievement        
Agree £13.04 £6.13 £6.71 £7.07 
Disagree £23.25 £13.00* £9.41 £16.09 
P value 0.441 0.218 0.401 0.049 
I am at high risk        
Agree £19.17 £6.57 £7.51 £10.95 
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Disagree £3.01* £9.95 £6.80 £7.24 
P value 0.053 0.739 0.274 0.183 
I live for today        
Agree £20.42 £8.62 £9.61 £12.52 
Disagree £6.26 £6.91 £5.03 £7.39 
P value 0.147 0.722 0.460 0.962 
I can wait for 
things        
Agree £8.60 £6.34 £6.91 £7.03 
Disagree £22.39 £9.95 £7.70 £13.51 
P value 0.159 0.339 0.523 0.428 
NHS should offer 
incentives        
Agree £12.95 £7.12 £9.28 £10.14 
Disagree £15.77 £8.12 £6.04 £9.49 
P value 0.400 0.018 0.001 0.117 
P values are non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon for two groups, Kruskal Wallis for three 
groups); *Significant at 95% level (t-test for two groups, ANOVA for three groups); 
**Significant at 99% level (t-test for two groups, ANOVA for three groups) 
 
Table 58: Pooled time-point descriptives – WTAUncertain by health behaviour 
 Smoking Diet Exercise Alcohol 
Health behaviours         
BMI        
<25 - £16.07 £7.18 - 
25-30 - £5.61 £6.58 - 
>30 - £8.39 £8.18 - 
P value   0.696 0.943   
AUDIT Score        
<4 - - - £4.62 
>=4 - - - £11.21 
P value      0.587 
Difficulty of 
change        
Easy £18.60 £7.92 £4.22 £7.12 
Difficult £14.02 £7.44 £9.20 £15.22 
P value 0.733 0.405 0.030 0.003 
Discount rate        
<20% £25.32 £9.55 £4.43 £6.66 
20%-100% £14.86 £6.94 £6.92 £7.59 
>100% £11.76 £6.85 £10.08 £14.26 
P value 0.597 0.981 0.241 0.391 
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P values are non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon for two groups, Kruskal Wallis for three 
groups); *Significant at 95% level (t-test for two groups, ANOVA for three groups); 
**Significant at 99% level (t-test for two groups, ANOVA for three groups) 
 
12.2.5.2. WTACommitment 
Table 59: Pooled time-point descriptives – WTACommitment by demographics and 
attitudes 
 Smoking Diet Exercise Alcohol 
Socio-
demographics         
Age group         
<=59 £39.62 £40.24 £42.46 £51.41 
>59 £43.30 £32.71 £36.70 £34.56 
P value 0.987 0.276 0.012 0.185 
Sex         
Female £14.00 £33.12 £35.26 £26.63 
Male £54.83 £39.05 £42.85 £52.98 
P value 0.087 0.214 0.150 0.036 
Income group         
<£2000 pm £44.81 £25.86 £37.11 £45.74 
>=£2000 pm £35.65 £47.44 £43.63 £44.31 
P value 0.419 0.087 0.600 0.251 
Attitude questions         
I am in control         
Agree £23.98 £30.31 £30.27 £28.48 
Disagree £60.78 £48.20 £58.30* £76.43** 
P value 0.075 0.022 0.004 0.008 
My lifestyle 
determines health         
Agree £43.94 £34.53 £36.06 £46.43 
Disagree £26.94 £43.86 £54.56 £33.44 
P value 0.531 0.276 0.093 0.701 
I am motivated         
Agree £33.68 £33.85 £36.11 £38.63 
Disagree £56.54 £44.02 £49.68 £58.20 
P value 1.000 0.504 0.657 0.981 
Major achievement         
Agree £45.03 £41.32 £44.22 £49.39 
Disagree £19.36 £24.02 £27.65 £35.23 
P value 0.720 0.493 0.245 0.804 
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I am at high risk         
Agree £49.41 £41.40 £47.78 £52.52 
Disagree £17.14 £28.32 £26.09 £29.15 
P value 0.442 0.747 0.293 0.511 
I live for today         
Agree £33.04 £42.55 £49.07 £43.15 
Disagree £51.78 £31.49 £30.58 £44.68 
P value 0.148 0.888 0.641 0.330 
I can wait for 
things         
Agree £38.79 £38.06 £40.29 £40.08 
Disagree £43.16 £34.19 £38.84 £50.29 
P value 0.381 0.945 0.673 0.893 
NHS should offer 
incentives         
Agree £52.18 £38.49 £46.23 £55.35 
Disagree £34.27 £35.92 £36.67 £38.72 
P value 0.213 0.207 0.122 0.751 
P values are non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon for two groups, Kruskal Wallis for three 
groups); *Significant at 95% level (t-test for two groups, ANOVA for three groups); 
**Significant at 99% level (t-test for two groups, ANOVA for three groups) 
 
Table 60: Pooled time-point descriptives – WTACommitment by health behaviour 
 Smoking Diet Exercise Alcohol 
Health behaviours         
BMI         
<25 - £17.60 £26.50 - 
25-30 - £35.93 £39.95 - 
>30 - £32.64 £37.61 - 
P value   0.464 0.742   
AUDIT Score         
<4 - - - £26.54 
>=4 - - - £49.91 
P value       0.771 
Difficulty of 
change         
Easy £18.75 £32.33 £31.00 £31.75 
Difficult £44.38 £39.40 £45.98 £74.66* 
P value 0.378 0.653 0.823 0.047 
Discount rate         
<20% £67.17 £38.91 £37.86 £46.02 
20%-100% £38.33 £47.92 £46.87 £43.54 
>100% £33.87 £15.62 £31.47 £42.80 
P value 0.721 0.053 0.657 0.068 
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P values are non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon for two groups, Kruskal Wallis for three 
groups); *Significant at 95% level (t-test for two groups, ANOVA for three groups); 
**Significant at 99% level (t-test for two groups, ANOVA for three groups) 
 
12.2.6. Additional figures for WTAUncertain and 
WTACommitment  
Figure 28: WTAUncertain by difficulty of change 
 
Figure 29: WTACommitment by difficulty of change 
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Figure 30: WTACommitment by motivation 
 
Figure 31: WTACommitment by health behaviour strength 
 
12.2.7. Analysis diagnostics – choosing GLM family 
Table A includes the results from the Modified Park Test. The coefficients result from 
the respective GLM model to predict squared residuals using a log of the target 
independent variable as a predictor. The beta on the log value indicates which family 
is appropriate for the data where: 0 = Gaussian; 1 = Poisson; 2 = Gamma; 3 = Inverse 
Gaussian. Table B tests for significant difference between the beta and specified beta 
value (0-3). Insignificant Chi2 indicates the respective family would be appropriate. 
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Table 61: Results of the Modified Park Test for GLM 
A  Beta on Log Variable 
Family  Link Smoking Weight loss Exercise Alcohol  
Gamma Log 1.64 1.31 1.66 1.39 
Gamma  Identity Not converge Not converge 5327.26 Not converge 
Poisson Identity Not converge 3922.23 4446.16 Not converge 
Poisson Log 1.26 0.85 1.09 0.7 
Gaussian Log 0.91 0.66 0.65 0.01 
Gaussian Identity* N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Inv Gaussian Log Not possible Not possible Not possible Not possible 
Inv Gaussian Identity Not possible Not possible Not possible Not possible 
B  Smoking Weight loss Exercise Alcohol  
  Chi2 P Chi2 P Chi2 P Chi2 P 
 Gamma family and Log link 
Gaussian=0 44.13 0.000 7.34 0.0067 37.87 0.000 41.1 0.000 
Poisson=1 6.72 0.0095 0.41 0.5244 6.02 0.0142 3.22 0.0725 
Gamma=2 2.12 0.1451 2.06 0.151 1.56 0.2121 7.95 0.0048 
Inv Gaussian=3 30.33 0.000 12.31 0.0005 24.49 0.000 55.28 0.000 
 Poisson family and Log link 
Gaussian=0 8.51 0.0035 7.7 0.0055 4.81 0.0283 10.98 0.0009 
Poisson=1 0.37 0.5418 0.23 0.628 0.03 0.8581 1.91 0.1672 
Gamma=2 2.88 0.0898 14.02 0.0002 3.37 0.0663 36.91 0.000 
Inv Gaussian=3 16.03 0.0001 49.06 0.000 14.83 0.0001 115.99 0.000 
*Equivalent to normal distribution 
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12.2.8. Predicting WTAUncertain and WTACommitment  
12.2.8.1. Individual behaviours 
Table 62: Predicting WTAUncertain for individual behaviours 
Smoking AIC = 6.669 n = 38 
Log Pseudo likelihood = -122.70 BIC =  -52.61  
 Coef. SE z P > z L 95% CI U 95% CI 
I am motivated 1.91 0.52 3.64 0.000 0.88 2.94 
EQ-5D VAS -0.03 0.01 -2.71 0.007 -0.05 -0.01 
Age group (60+) -1.66 0.54 -3.07 0.002 -2.72 -0.60 
Constant 3.55 0.82 4.36 0.000 1.95 5.15 
       
Weight loss AIC = 6.19  n = 102 
Log Pseudo likelihood = -311.88 BIC =  -202.58  
BMI group (vs. <25)             
25-30 -1.10 0.61 -1.80 0.072 -2.30 0.10 
>30 -0.73 0.60 -1.21 0.225 -1.90 0.45 
I am in control 0.37 0.38 0.98 0.325 -0.37 1.11 
Constant 2.71 0.52 5.18 0.000 1.69 3.74 
       
Exercise AIC = 5.27   n = 119 
Log Pseudo likelihood = -304.53 BIC = -332.18  
Income ≥£2,000 -0.83 0.31 -2.71 0.007 -1.43 -0.23 
I am in control 0.55 0.28 1.98 0.048 0.01 1.10 
NHS should offer 
 incentives -0.59 0.31 -1.89 0.058 -1.21 0.02 
EQ-5D VAS 0.01 0.01 2.46 0.014 0.00 0.02 
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Education (primary)        
Secondary 0.54 0.36 1.49 0.136 -0.17 1.25 
Intermediate 0.61 0.42 1.46 0.144 -0.21 1.42 
University 2.19 0.43 5.09 0.000 1.35 3.03 
Difficulty exercise 1.18 0.31 3.76 0.000 0.56 1.79 
Constant -0.01 0.56 -0.02 0.986 -1.11 1.09 
       
Alcohol AIC = 5.57  n = 85 
Log Pseudo likelihood = -223.59 BIC =  -155.69  
Visit (3 month) 1.78 0.36 4.91 0.000 1.07 2.49 
Audit group (≥4) 1.40 0.55 2.53 0.011 0.32 2.48 
Discount rate (<0.2)        
0.2<1 -0.95 0.40 -2.36 0.018 -1.74 -0.16 
≥1 -0.02 0.49 -0.04 0.968 -0.99 0.95 
Income ≥£2,000 1.10 0.48 2.29 0.022 0.16 2.04 
I am in control 1.12 0.41 2.72 0.006 0.31 1.92 
Sex (Male) -0.85 0.37 -2.32 0.020 -1.57 -0.13 
EQ-5D VAS -0.03 0.01 -2.91 0.004 -0.04 -0.01 
Education (primary)        
Secondary -0.39 0.45 -0.86 0.388 -1.27 0.49 
Intermediate -1.34 0.55 -2.44 0.015 -2.42 -0.27 
University 0.36 0.74 0.49 0.627 -1.09 1.82 
Difficulty Alcohol 0.21 0.46 0.45 0.653 -0.69 1.10 
Constant 0.18 0.78 0.23 0.815 -1.35 1.72 
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Table 63: Predicting WTACommitment for individual behaviours 
Smoking AIC = 8.69  n = 36 
Log Pseudo likelihood = -144.41 BIC =  -41.21  
 Coef. SE z P > z L 95% CI U 95% CI 
Visit (3 month) 1.91 0.53 3.63 0.000 0.88 2.95 
Discount rate 
(<0.2)        
0.2<1 -1.66 0.84 -1.97 0.049 -3.31 -0.01 
≥1 -1.31 0.79 -1.66 0.097 -2.87 0.24 
Income ≥£2,000 -0.59 0.40 -1.49 0.136 -1.37 0.19 
I am in control 0.36 0.32 1.15 0.250 -0.26 0.99 
I am motivated -0.81 0.34 -2.40 0.016 -1.47 -0.15 
I can wait for 
things 0.66 0.50 1.32 0.186 -0.32 1.64 
Sex (Male) 1.67 0.25 6.57 0.000 1.17 2.17 
EQ-5D VAS -0.03 0.01 -1.85 0.064 -0.05 0.00 
Education 
(primary)        
Intermediate 0.09 0.52 0.18 0.859 -0.92 1.11 
University 1.32 0.66 2.00 0.046 0.03 2.62 
Difficulty smoking 0.60 0.42 1.45 0.147 -0.21 1.42 
Constant 1.44 0.99 1.45 0.146 -0.50 3.37 
       
Weight loss AIC = 8.70  n = 98 
Log Pseudo likelihood = -414.21 BIC =  -222.98  
Visit (3 month) 0.49 0.28 1.77 0.077 -0.05 1.03 
BMI group (vs. <25)        
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25-30 0.71 0.41 1.73 0.084 -0.09 1.51 
>30 0.98 0.33 2.93 0.003 0.32 1.63 
Discount rate (<0.2)        
0.2<1 -0.42 0.36 -1.15 0.250 -1.13 0.29 
≥1 -1.30 0.36 -3.60 0.000 -2.00 -0.59 
Income ≥£2,000 0.56 0.30 1.91 0.056 -0.01 1.14 
I am in control 0.53 0.33 1.60 0.109 -0.12 1.17 
I am at high risk  -0.73 0.32 -2.25 0.024 -1.37 -0.09 
Education 
(primary)        
Secondary 1.46 0.37 3.96 0.000 0.74 2.18 
Intermediate 1.34 0.40 3.35 0.001 0.56 2.13 
University 0.63 0.57 1.10 0.269 -0.49 1.74 
Constant 0.83 0.54 1.54 0.123 -0.22 1.88 
       
Exercise AIC = 9.07   n = 122 
Log Pseudo likelihood = -541.24 BIC= -274.68  
Discount rate (<0.2)             
0.2<1 -0.10 0.33 -0.30 0.764 -0.76 0.56 
≥1 -0.64 0.37 -1.72 0.085 -1.36 0.09 
Income ≥£2,000 0.48 0.28 1.72 0.086 -0.07 1.02 
I am in control 0.81 0.37 2.20 0.027 0.09 1.53 
I am at high risk  -0.92 0.26 -3.58 0.000 -1.43 -0.42 
EQ-5D VAS 0.01 0.01 1.46 0.144 -0.01 0.03 
Education 
(primary) 
       
Secondary 1.63 0.46 3.56 0.000 0.73 2.53 
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Intermediate 1.42 0.47 3.02 0.003 0.50 2.35 
University 
(primary) 
0.36 0.54 0.66 0.508 -0.70 1.41 
Age group (60+) -0.39 0.29 -1.38 0.167 -0.95 0.17 
Difficulty 
exercising 0.74 0.34 2.16 0.031 0.07 1.41 
Constant 1.09 0.69 1.57 0.117 -0.27 2.44 
       
Alcohol AIC = 9.06  n = 88 
Log Pseudo likelihood = -387.64 BIC =  -178.89  
Visit (3 month) 1.09 0.34 3.25 0.001 0.43 1.75 
Audit group (≥4) 1.05 0.32 3.27 0.001 0.42 1.68 
Income ≥£2,000 0.64 0.38 1.71 0.088 -0.09 1.38 
I am in control 1.11 0.36 3.08 0.002 0.40 1.81 
I am motivated -0.93 0.35 -2.63 0.009 -1.62 -0.24 
I am at high risk -0.87 0.37 -2.36 0.018 -1.59 -0.15 
Education 
(primary) 
       
Secondary 0.83 0.53 1.56 0.120 -0.22 1.88 
Intermediate 1.47 0.60 2.46 0.014 0.30 2.65 
University 
(primary) 
2.18 0.63 3.48 0.000 0.96 3.41 
Difficulty Alcohol  0.55 0.41 1.33 0.185 -0.26 1.36 
Constant -0.37 0.71 -0.53 0.599 -1.76 1.01 
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12.2.8.2. Pooled health and time-point regression for 
WTACommitment 
Table 64: Pooled health and time-point regression for WTACommitment 
  Number obs =  350    
     AIC =   9.059    
 BIC =  -1251.9    
Log pseudolikelihood =   -1574     
 dy/dx SE. z P>z 
L 95% 
CI 
U 95% 
CI 
Baseline vs 3 months 
(VisitCycle) £23.24 12.14 1.91 0.038 -0.56 47.04 
Income >£2000 pm £23.12 12.77 1.81 0.042 -1.91 48.15 
Sense of Control £18.21 11.57 1.57 0.092 -4.46 40.88 
At high risk -£28.70 10.50 -2.73 0.006 -49.28 -8.11 
Age -£1.11 0.61 -1.82 0.052 -2.31 0.09 
Perceived difficulty 
(Easy)       
Vs Moderate £8.06 7.34 1.10 0.276 -6.33 22.45 
Vs Difficult £17.90 12.32 1.45 0.114 -6.24 42.04 
Education (Primary)       
Vs Secondary  £27.47 9.56 2.87 0.010 8.74 46.20 
Vs Intermediate £35.04 10.73 3.26 0.003 14.00 56.08 
Vs University £21.41 12.41 1.72 0.061 -2.92 45.74 
Constant £41.62 5.94 7.00 0.000 29.97 53.26 
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12.3. Weight loss study search strategy 
 
The literature searches were conducted in August 2014. Searches were restricted to 
studies published after January 2012. Only human and English language studies 
were included. 
 
The following literature databases were searched: 
 Embase 
 MEDLINE 
 PsycINFO 
 EconLit 
 
Search Terms: 
 
1. (Incentive$ or financial reward$ or monetary reward$ or contingency management 
or contingency payment$ or financial payment$ or deposit contract$ or cash transfer$ 
or voucher$ or coupon$ or token$).mp. [mp=hw, ab, ti, ct, sh, tn, ot, dm, mf, nm, an, 
ui, tc, id] 
2. limit 1 to english language 
3. limit 2 to humans 
4. (weight loss or lose weight or diet$ or obes$ or overweight).m_titl. 
5. limit 4 to english language 
6. limit 5 to humans 
7. 3 AND 6 
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12.4. Decision model parameter search terms 
 
The literature searches were conducted in October 2013. There were no year 
restrictions. 
 
The following literature databases were searched: 
 Embase 
 MEDLINE 
 PsycINFO 
 
Search Terms: 
1. diabetes.mp. [mp=ti, ab, sh, hw, tn, ot, dm, mf, dv, kw, nm, kf, ps, rs, ui] 
2. type 2.mp. [mp=ti, ab, sh, hw, tn, ot, dm, mf, dv, kw, nm, kf, ps, rs, ui] 
3. bmi.mp. [mp=ti, ab, sh, hw, tn, ot, dm, mf, dv, kw, nm, kf, ps, rs, ui] 
4. body mass index.mp. [mp=ti, ab, sh, hw, tn, ot, dm, mf, dv, kw, nm, kf, ps, rs, ui] 
5. type ii.mp. [mp=ti, ab, sh, hw, tn, ot, dm, mf, dv, kw, nm, kf, ps, rs, ui] 
6. stroke.m_titl. 
7. 4 and 6 
8. uk.mp. [mp=ti, ab, sh, hw, tn, ot, dm, mf, dv, kw, nm, kf, ps, rs, an, ui] 
9. england.mp. [mp=ti, ab, sh, hw, tn, ot, dm, mf, dv, kw, nm, kf, ps, rs, an, ui] 
10. united kingdom.mp. [mp=ti, ab, sh, hw, tn, ot, dm, mf, dv, kw, nm, kf, ps, rs, an, 
ui] 
11. 8 or 9 or 10 
12. 7 and 11 
13. HEART ATTACK.m_titl. 
14. MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION.m_titl. 
15. 13 or 14 
16. 4 and 11 and 15 
17. remove duplicates from 16 
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18. cost.m_titl. 
19. cancer.m_titl. 
20. 6 and 18 
21. 15 and 18 
22. diabetes.m_titl. 
23. 18 and 22 
24. Mortality.m_titl. 
25. 24 and 1 or 6 or 15  
26. 25 and 11 
 
